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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Galen, On The Doctrines Of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.7.37
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1. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

69c. or any of the other elements; but He, in the first place, set all these in order, and then out of these He constructed this present Universe, one single Living Creature containing within itself all living creatures both mortal and immortal. And He Himself acts as the Constructor of things divine, but the structure of the mortal things He commanded His own engendered sons to execute. And they, imitating Him, on receiving the immortal principle of soul, framed around it a mortal body, and gave it all the body to be its vehicle, and housed therein besides another form of soul, even the mortal form
2. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.22, 3.54-3.55, 3.58, 3.74-3.75, 3.82-3.83 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.22. Haec sic sic R c? V c si X dicuntur a Stoicis concludunturque contortius. sed latius aliquando aliquando cf. 323,22 aliquanto s male, cf. de orat. 1, 133 opt. gen. 23 dicenda sunt et diffusius; sententiis tamen utendum eorum potissimum, qui qui ex quā ut v. G 2 maxime forti et, ut ita dicam, virili utuntur ratione atque sententia. nam Peripatetici, familiares nostri, quibus nihil est uberius, nihil eruditius, nihil gravius, mediocritates vel perturbationum vel morborum animi mihi non sane probant. omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, mediocre iocre in r. G 2 malum malum Bouh. magnum alt. id om. H est; nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. nam ut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter aegrum est, sanum non est, sic in animo ista mediocritas caret sanitate. itaque praeclare nostri, ut alia multa, molestiam sollicitudinem angorem propter similitudinem corporum aegrorum aegritudinem aegritudinem cf. Aug. civ. 14,17 ext. nominaverunt. 3.54. legimus librum Clitomachi, quem ille eversa Karthagine misit consolandi causa ad captivos, cives suos; in eo est disputatio scripta Carneadis, quam se ait in commentarium rettulisse. retulisse G 1 K ( ex retullisse 1 ) V cum ita positum esset, videri vidi G 1 fore in aegritudine sapientem patria capta, quae Carneades contra dixerit, scripta sunt. tanta igitur calamitatis praesentis adhibetur a philosopho medicina, quanta inveteratae inveterata X corr. s (in inveterata al. ) desideraretur V 2 ne desideratur quidem, nec, si aliquot aliquod G annis post idem ille liber captivis missus esset, volneribus mederetur, sed cicatricibus. sensim enim et pedetemptim progrediens extenuatur dolor, non quo ipsa res immutari soleat aut possit, sed id, quod ratio debuerat, usus docet, minora esse ea quae sint visa maiora. Quid ergo opus est, dicet aliquis, omnino ratione aut consolatione illa, ratione aut omnino consolatione ulla X illa s ( idem men- dum p. 353, 29 al. ) omnino ratione aut Po. qua solemus uti, cum levare dolorem maerentium volumus? 3.55. hoc enim fere tum habemus in promptu, promtu GR nihil oportere inopinatum videri. aut aut R, sed u del. R c qui sic VBM s videantur y non quia G 1 R 1, in mg. eodem signo addito quia recentia sunt, maiora videntur G 2 quia recentia sunt R vet (c ?) quia recentia sunt in textu habet K 1 maiora videntur add. K 2 ( item P) tolerabilius feret incommodum, qui cognoverit cognoverint X corr. R 2 V c necesse esse homini tale aliquid accidere? haec enim oratio de ipsa summa mali nihil detrahit, tantum modo adfert, nihil evenisse quod non opidum fuisset. neque tamen genus id orationis in consolando non valet, sed id haud sciam an plurimum. * ergo ista necopinata non habent tantam vim, ut aegritudo ex is omnis oriatur; feriunt enim fortasse gravius, non id efficiunt, ut ea, quae accidant maiora videantur: sic VBM s videantur y non quia G 1 R 1, in mg. eodem signo addito quia recentia sunt, maiora videntur G 2 quia recentia sunt R vet (c ?) quia recentia sunt in textu habet K 1 maiora videntur add. K 2 ( item P) quia recentia sunt, maiora videntur, non quia repentina. Ergo... 18 repentina verba ipsa sana sunt ( cf. Herm. XLI p. 324 ), sed non suo loco posita. a Cicerone ipso, ut argumentationem §§ 52–54 concluderent, in chiro- grapho postea adscripta, ab Attici librariis autem falso loco inserta esse videntur. (nam id efficiunt ... videantur, sed maiora videntur, quia recentia sunt, non quia repentina We. ut ea quae accidant, mala videantur ... non quia repentina, mala Se, Jb. d. ph. V. 24 p. 244 ) 3.58. similiter commemorandis exemplis orbitates quoque liberum liberorum V c praedicantur, eorumque, eorum quoque K 1 qui gravius ferunt, luctus aliorum exemplis leniuntur. sic perpessio ceterorum facit, ut ea quae acciderint multo minora maiora ex minora V c quam quanta sint existimata, videantur. ita fit, sensim cogitantibus ut, quantum sit ementita opinio, appareat. atque hoc idem et Telamo ille declarat: ego cum genui et Theseus: futuras mecum commentabar miserias tum morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli add. R 2, moriturum scivi V 3 et Anaxagoras: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. cf. p. 332, 9 sqq. hi enim omnes diu cogitantes de rebus humanis intellegebant eas nequaquam pro opinione volgi esse extimescendas. extimescendas KR 1 existimescendas R c G existimiscendas G 1 e corr. V et mihi quidem videtur idem fere accidere is qui ante meditantur, quod is quibus medetur dies, nisi quod ratio ratio V ratione GKR ( unde in hoc quae- dam 2? ) quaedam sanat illos, hos ipsa natura intellecto eo quod rem continet, illud illud continet X trp. B malum, quod opinatum sit esse maxumum, nequaquam esse tantum, ut vitam beatam possit evertere. 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. 3.75. additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens. hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paulo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut ut s et X vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu appelletur appellatur K recens. ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli Cariae regis uxor, quae nobile illud Halicarnasi alicarnasi X fecit sepulcrum, quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu eodemque etiam confecta contabuit. huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens; quae tum denique non appellatur appellabatur X corr. V 2 recens, cum vetustate exaruit. Haec igitur officia sunt consolantium, tollere aegritudinem funditus aut sedare aut detrahere aut detr. V ( ss. 2 ) quam plurumum aut supprimere nec pati manare longius aut ad alia traducere. 3.82. et tamen, ut medici uti medici K ( er. n) toto corpore curando minimae etiam parti, si condoluit, medentur, sic philosophia cum universam aegritudinem sustulit, sustulit aegritudinem sustulit tamen si X (sustullit G 1 V 1 condoluit tamen si K 1 medenturaegr. sustulit add. c ) corr. Keil, Quaest. Tull. p. XVIII etiam, si quis error alicunde alicunde Ern. aliunde extitit, si paupertas momordit, si ignominia pupugit, pupigit G 1 R 1 V 1 si quid tenebrarum obfudit exilium, exsilium GV 1 aut eorum quae quaeque (quaeque G) modo X corr. s modo dixi si quid si quid sicut K extitit. etsi singularum rerum sunt propriae consolationes, de quibus audies tu quidem, cum voles. sed ad eundem fontem revertendum est, aegritudinem omnem procul abesse a sapiente, quod iis sit, quod frustra suscipiatur, quod non natura exoriatur, sed iudicio, sed opinione, sed quadam invitatione ad dolendum, cum id decreverimus ita fieri oportere. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare.
3. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , 32 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 159, 164, 154 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.152-3.160, 5.45-5.50 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments, 5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

7. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

442c. but though the passionate part is wanting in reason and has no reason of its own, yet otherwise it is by nature fitted to heed the rational and intelligent part, to turn toward it, to yield to it, to conform itself thereto, if it is not completely corrupted by the foolish pleasure and a life of no restraint. Those who wonder how it is that this part is irrational, yet subservient to reason, do not seem to me to reflect thoroughly upon the power of reason, How great it is, how far it penetrates, through its mastery and guidance, not by harsh and inflexible methods, but by flexible ones, which have a quality of yielding and submitting to the rein which is more effective than any possible constraint or violence. For, to be sure, even our breathing, our sinews and bones
8. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.17.1, 2.3.4-2.3.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 113.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

10. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 2.8.40, 2.8.44, 2.8.47-2.8.49, 3.3.15, 4.2.10-4.2.18, 4.2.27, 4.3.1-4.3.4, 4.3.8, 4.5.18, 4.5.26-4.5.44, 4.7.4-4.7.11, 4.7.16-4.7.17, 4.7.19, 4.7.24-4.7.36, 4.7.38, 4.7.41, 5.1.10, 5.1.17, 5.2.3-5.2.7, 5.5.8-5.5.26, 5.5.34-5.5.38, 5.6.9-5.6.10, 5.6.18, 5.6.20-5.6.26, 5.6.29-5.6.32, 5.6.37-5.6.38, 5.6.42, 5.7.29, 5.7.74-5.7.87 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

11. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

12. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, 159, 164, 154 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

13. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.206-7.210, 11.118, 11.141, 11.158-11.159 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

14. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.17, 1.22-1.28, 1.231, 3.173-3.175, 3.177, 3.235-3.236 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

15. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.151 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

16. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.46, 10.127-10.128 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 10.127. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his words are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. 10.128. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure. Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good.
17. Augustine, The City of God, 9.4, 14.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call παθη, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term goods to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Attic that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus. The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasi, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was immediately to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas by Virgil when he says, He stands immovable by tears, Nor tenderest words with pity hears. 14.9. But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, He that endures to the end shall be saved. Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that the Lord loves a cheerful giver. 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart. They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations. James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in - that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 - very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, I am glad for your sakes, to the intent you may believe, John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul. But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were without natural affection. Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none. For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ἀπαθεια, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, impassibilitas, if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this απάθεια . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition. For that fear of which the Apostle John says, There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love, 1 John 4:18 - that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. Romans 8:15 But as for that clean fear which endures for ever, if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of clean fear David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever, must be taken in the same sense as that other, The patience of the poor shall not perish forever. For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this clean fear is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure. And since this is so - since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh - that is to say, according to God, not according to man - and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible.
18. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 132

19. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 25, 30, 18



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
antipater of tarsus, stoic Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
aristotle, on impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
aristotle, on involuntary feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
aristotle Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
arius didymus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
assent Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 158
augustine Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236, 237
ben-zeev, aaron Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
carneades, platonist Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
children, training of Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
chrysippus, on involuntary feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), natural tendency to virtue overlooks irrational tendencies in soul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), not suited to children Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), rejects plato's tripartition of soul, in favour of unitary rational command centre" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
chrysippus, uses examples from literature Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
chrysippus Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 158; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235, 236, 237
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, time removes emotion because reflection or familiarity can remove the relevant judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
cooper, john Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235, 237
distress Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
emotions, causation of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235, 236, 237
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236, 237
emotions, plato, posidonius, galen, without irrational forces in the soul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98, 112
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
end or goal of life (telos), posidonius Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
epictetus, on unassented feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
epictetus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
epicurus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
eupatheiai, and being carried away Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235, 236, 237
false belief / false judgment / false opinion Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
feelings, involuntary, in aristotle Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
feelings, physical alterations underlying Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
freshness of judgement and fading of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
galen, platonizing ecletic doctor, instead of appealing to freshness, chrysippus could more consistently have said time removes the judgement (associated with fear) that the evil is intolerable Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
galen, platonizing ecletic doctor, praises plato and posidonius Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98, 112
galen of pergamum Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
gellius, aulus Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235, 236, 237
goal (telos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
grief, weeping griffiths, paul Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
holler, ernst Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
horse analogy Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
imagination Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236, 237
impressions, in aristotle Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235, 236, 237; Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 158
judgement Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 158
judgment (krisis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
kinesis (movement) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
lucretius of rome Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
medea Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
medical writers, greek, vivisection at alexandria Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
movements, of emotive capacity Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
movements Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
nature (phusis) / natural, kind / type / purpose Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
opinion (doxa) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
origins of error, value as source Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235, 237
passions Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 158
pathetike kinesis (emotive movements) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
peripateticism / peripatetic Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
philodemus of gadara Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
plato, on mind and spirit Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
plato Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
platonism (middle / imperial) vi–viii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
plutarch, as source Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
poetry, as source of examples Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
posidonius, on causes of emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235, 236, 237
posidonius, reinterpretations of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
posidonius, stoic, different virtues and natures cultivated corresponding to different capacities Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
posidonius, stoic, judgements never sufficient for emotion (i) irrational movements of emotional part also required, as shown by emotions fading faster than judgements, due to satiety with movements Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
posidonius, stoic, satiety distinguished satisfaction Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
posidonius, stoic, the lower capacities have different affiliations (oikeiousthai) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
posidonius, stoic, the lower capacities of soul, wrongly ignored in chrysippus' unitary conception of soul, explain why philosophy and good example do not on their own produce good character" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
posidonius, stoic, zeno's and chrysippus' call for freshness of judgement does not explain fading of emotion" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98, 112
posidonius Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 158
pre-emotions, criticism Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
pre-emotions, origins of stoic concept Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
prerehearsal of future ills Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
price, anthony Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235
progressors, pain of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
rabbow, paul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 235, 236, 237
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
satiety, distinguished satisfaction as a reason for emotion fading Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
school (scholē) / sect (hairesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
seneca, on anger Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
seneca, on involuntary feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
seneca Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
skepticism / scepticism (pyrrhonism) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
sorabji, richard Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
soul, seearistotle, chrysippus, plato, posidonius, ; division of Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
stobaeus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
stoicism / stoic / stoa, neostoicism (greco-roman) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
tension Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 158
time-lapse, effects of, because irrational forces tire Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
time-lapse, effects of, because judgements change Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
time-lapse, effects of, emotions fade with time, because of reassessment Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112
vii–viii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
virtue, posidonius and galen, different virtues for different soul capacities Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98
weeping, involuntary Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
zajonc, r. b. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
zeno (of citium) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 112