Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

4742

Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 127
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1. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 1195 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) 1195. ἢ ψευδόμαντίς εἰμι θυροκόπος φλέδων; 1195. False prophet am I, — knock at doors, a babbler?
2. Plato, Phaedo, 114e (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) 114e. has rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good, and has sought eagerly for those of learning, and after adorning his soul with no alien ornaments, but with its own proper adornment of self-restraint and justice and
3. Plato, Republic, 558d, 571b, 485d (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) 485d. By no means. Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form. By all means. But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel. Surely. So, when a man’s desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument, if the man is a true and not a sham philosopher.
4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1151b32, 1118b8 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
5. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 124-126, 128-132, 122 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
6. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 64-66, 63 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
7. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 29, 79, 20 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
8. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 18, 20, 24, 29, 3, 15 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
9. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.29-1.32, 1.37-1.41, 1.45, 1.66-1.70, 2.9-2.10, 2.96 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 1.29. Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic: 1.30. omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec haec ħ BE hoc NV putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel. dulce esse mel R mel dulce A quorum nihil oportere oportere V oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum tantum om. BE satis esse esse satis A admonere. interesse enim inter inter om. BE argumentum argumentumque BE argumentatum R augmentatum A conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta promta AR et aperta iudicari. indicari NV etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut ad naturam AR ad naturam ( om. aut) BE aut naturam ( om. ad) N 1 aut secundum naturam N 2 aut verum (compend scr) V aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. post iudicari add. in V voluptatem etiam per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum; idem in N ab alt. m. in marg. adscr. posito post iudicari signo eo- demque in marg. ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et et aut NV dolorem? 1.31. Sunt autem quidam e nostris, qui haec subtilius velint tradere et negent satis esse quid bonum sit aut quid malum sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse et voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. esse. Et fugiendum itaque aiunt (om. expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse cf. ad p. 12, 5) R itaque aiunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem, ut alterum esse appetendum, alterum asperdum sentiamus. Alii autem, quibus ego assentior, cum a philosophis compluribus permulta dicantur, cur nec voluptas in bonis sit numeranda nec in malis dolor, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant. 1.32. Sed ut perspiciatis, unde omnis iste natus error sit natus sit error BE error natus sit V voluptatem accusantium doloremque laudantium, totam rem aperiam eaque ipsa, quae ab illo inventore veritatis et quasi architecto beatae vitae dicta sunt, explicabo. nemo enim ipsam voluptatem, quia voluptas sit, sit si BE aspernatur aut odit aut fugit, sed quia consequuntur consecuntur A magni dolores eos, qui ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt, neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quia non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore dolore et labore BE magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem. Ut enim ad minima veniam, quis nostrum exercitationem ullam corporis suscipit suscepit BER laboriosam, nisi ut aliquid ex ea commodi consequatur? quis autem vel eum iure reprehenderit, qui in ea voluptate velit esse, quam nihil molestiae consequatur, vel illum, qui dolorem eum fugiat, quo voluptas nulla pariatur? 1.37. Sed de clarorum hominum factis illustribus et gloriosis satis hoc loco dictum sit. erit enim iam de omnium virtutum cursu ad voluptatem proprius disserendi locus. nunc autem explicabo, voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit, ut tollatur error omnis imperitorum inp. R intellegaturque ea, quae voluptaria, delicata, mollis habeatur disciplina, disciplinata ABER quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit. Non enim hanc solam sequimur, quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus, quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. nam quoniam, cum privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est, ut omne, quo offendimur, dolor, doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. ut enim, cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis, sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem efficit voluptatis. 1.38. itaque non placuit Epicuro medium esse quiddam quiddam A quoddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum, quod quibusdam medium videretur, videretur N (?), Rath.; videtur cum om. R cum omni dolore careret, non modo voluptatem esse, verum etiam summam voluptatem. quisquis enim sentit, quem ad modum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore. omnis omnis Morel. omni autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit. 1.39. At etiam Athenis, ut e patre epatre AN audiebam facete et urbane Stoicos irridente, irridente R arridente statua est in Ceramico Chrysippi sedentis porrecta manu, quae manus significet illum in hac esse rogatiuncula delectatum: 'Numquidnam manus tua sic affecta, quem ad modum affecta nunc est, desiderat?'—Nihil sane.—'At, si voluptas esset bonum, desideraret.'—Ita credo.— Non est igitur voluptas bonum. credo ita B (desideraret — voluptas bonum om. E) Hoc ne statuam quidem dicturam pater aiebat, si loqui posset. conclusum est enim contra Cyrenaicos satis acute, nihil ad Epicurum. nam si ea sola voluptas esset, quae quasi titillaret sensus, ut ita dicam, et ad eos cum suavitate afflueret et illaberetur, nec nec ulla par A ut ulla pars BE ulla ( om. nec et pars) RN illa ( om. nec et pars) V manus esse contenta posset nec ulla pars vacuitate doloris sine iucundo motu voluptatis. sin autem summa voluptas est, ut Epicuro placet, nihil dolere, primum tibi recte, Chrysippe, concessum est nihil desiderare manum, cum ita esset affecta, secundum non recte, si voluptas esset bonum, fuisse desideraturam. idcirco enim non desideraret, quia, quod dolore caret, id in voluptate est. 1.40. Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus nullo dolore nec impediente nec inpendente, quem tandem hoc statu praestabiliorem aut magis expetendum possimus possumus BE dicere? inesse enim necesse est in eo, qui ita sit affectus, et firmitatem animi nec mortem nec dolorem timentis, quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis, lenis ARN in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio consoletur. 1.41. ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est, quod huc possit, quod melius sit, accedere? Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus, quanti in hominem maximi maximi dett. maxime cadere possunt, nulla spe proposita fore levius aliquando, aliquando dett. aliquanto nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec expectata voluptate, quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest? quodsi vita doloribus referta maxime fugienda est, summum profecto malum est vivere cum dolore, cui sententiae consentaneum est ultimum esse bonorum cum voluptate vivere. nec enim habet nostra habet praeter voluptatem nostra V fortasse recte mens quicquam, ubi consistat tamquam in extremo, omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla, quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere. aut angere Vict. aut tangere 1.45. quae est enim aut utilior aut ad bene vivendum aptior partitio quam illa, qua est usus Epicurus? qui unum genus posuit earum cupiditatum, quae essent et naturales et ante naturales om. BE et necessariae, alterum, quae naturales essent nec nec non BE tamen necessariae, tertium, quae nec naturales nec necessariae. quarum ea ratio est, ut necessariae nec opera multa nec impensa inp. R expleantur; ne naturales quidem multa desiderant, propterea quod ipsa natura divitias, quibus contenta sit, et parabilis parabilis A 1 R parabiles (in N e ex corr. alt. m.) et terminatas habet; iium autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec finis inveniri potest. 1.66. Tribus igitur igitur ergo BE modis video esse a nostris a nostris esse BE de amicitia disputatum. alii cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur confirmetur ABE animus et a spe et a spe ad spem et ABE pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. 1.67. atque ut odia, odiā BE invidiae, invidiae A 2 invidie (e ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ) N invidiā B invidia A 1 EV, R ( sequente una litt. erasa, quae vi-detur fuisse e) despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus possumus etiam B neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi nisi ipsi ARV aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia et amicitia om. R, A 1 (ab alt. m. in mg. exteriore sinistro ita add. amicitia, ut a ligatore et desectum esse possit) cōnect. BE cum voluptate conectitur. nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque ut RNV atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. 1.68. quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, susciperet susceperit R (suam susceperit voluptatem), NV eosdem suscipiet suscipiet susciperet BE propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae eae A hc B hec E hee RV ea N semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: 'Eadem', his paene verbis eadem eadem hys pene verbis BE hiis pene eadem verbis V inquit, scientia scientia sententia BE confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum. 1.69. Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, nostra convitia V convicia nostra BE sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; voluntates A voluptates R voluptatum NV om. BE voluptatem voluptates R cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra si ludicras A 2 si ludicrica R exercendi aut vedi consuetudine consuetudines A consuetudinēs R adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit poterit edd. potuerit et iustius? 1.70. Sunt autem, qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, sapientum V sap ia (= sapientia, pro sap iu = sapientiū) R ut ne minus amicos quam minus amicos quam P. Man. minus quidem amicos quam ARNV minus quam amicos BE se ipsos diligant. quod et posse fieri fieri posse BE intellegimus et saepe etiam etiam Dav. enim videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri. et 26 repp. A 2.9. Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam. Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere. Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante paulo ante I 37—39 docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio. Non Non cum non RN' tum non N 2 tum vero (~uo) V; tuum non dolere Lamb. dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est. Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius. Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas? Quis istud possit, inquit, negare? Eademne, quae restincta siti? Immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis enim om. RN (siti immo alio genere restincta enim om. V) stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit, inquit om. BE illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est. Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles dissimiles ( etiam A 2 )] difficiles A 1 eodem nomine appellas? Quid paulo ante, paulo ante p. 17, 17 sqq. inquit, dixerim nonne meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem? 2.10. Memini vero, inquam; sed tu istuc tu quidem istuc V dixti dixisti RNV bene Latine, parum plane. varietas enim Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in disparibus coloribus dicitur, sed transfertur in multa disparia: varium poe+ma, varia oratio, varii mores, varia fortuna, voluptas etiam varia dici solet, cum percipitur e multis dissimilibus rebus dissimilis dissimilis dissimiliter RNV efficientibus voluptates. eam si varietatem diceres, intellegerem, ut etiam non dicente te intellego; ista varietas quae sit non satis perspicio, quod ais, cum dolore careamus, tum in summa voluptate nos esse, cum autem vescamur iis rebus, quae dulcem motum afferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, qui qui Dav. quae (que); in BE compend. incert. faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem, quam cur voluptatem appelles nescio. An potest, inquit ille, ille inquit BE quicquam esse suavius quam nihil dolere? 2.96. Audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat Epicurus, ut intellegas intellegas (intellig.) BEA 2 intellegat A 1 intelligat R intelligantur N intelligatur V facta eius cum dictis discrepare: 'Epicurus Hermarcho salutem. Cum ageremus', inquit, vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribebamus haec. tanti autem autem om. A aderant aderant om. BE vesicae et torminum morbi, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem posset accedere. Miserum hominem! Si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest. sed audiamus ipsum: 'Compensabatur', inquit, tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia, quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. sed tu, ut dignum est tua erga me et philosophiam me et philosophiam Bai. me (ne R) et philosophia A 1 RN me philosophia BE me et philosophia et A 2 V voluntate ab adolescentulo suscepta, fac ut Metrodori tueare liberos. 2.9.  "He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I said, "as for the formula 'freedom from pain,' I will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same as 'pleasure.' " "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any pleasure in the act of drinking?" "That is undeniable," he answered. "Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst?" "No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst is a 'static' pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a 'kinetic' pleasure." "Why then," I asked, "do you call two such different things by the same name? 2.10.  "Do you not remember," he replied, "what I said just now, that when all pain has been removed, pleasure may vary in kind but cannot be increased in degree?" "Oh, yes, I remember," said I; "but though your language was quite correct in form, your meaning was far from clear. 'Variation' is a good Latin term; we use it strictly of different colours, but it is applied metaphorically to a number of things that differ: we speak of a varied poem, a varied speech, a varied character, varied fortunes. Pleasure too can be termed varied when it is derived from a number of unlike things producing unlike feelings of pleasure. If this were the variation you spoke of, I could understand the term, just as I understand it without your speaking of it. But I cannot quite grasp what you mean by 'variation' when you say that when we are free from pain we experience the highest pleasure, and that when we are enjoying things that excite a pleasant activity of the senses, we then experience an active or 'kinetic' pleasure that causes a variation of our pleasant sensations, but no increase in the former pleasure that consists in absence of pain — although why you should call this 'pleasure' I cannot make out. 2.96.  "But I must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: 'Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I write these words,' he says, 'on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.' Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. 'Yet all my sufferings,' he continues, 'are counterbalanced by the joy which I derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Metrodorus.'
10. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.41-3.42 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 3.41. Quid tergiversamur, Epicure, nec fatemur eam nos dicere voluptatem, quam tu idem, cum os perfricuisti, soles dicere? sunt haec tua verba necne? in eo quidem libro, qui continet Epic. p. te/lous fr. 67 p. 119, 16 omnem disciplinam tuam,—fungar enim iam interpretis munere, ne quis me putet fingere—dicis haec: nec equidem habeo, quod intellegam bonum illud, detrahens eas voluptates quae sapore percipiuntur, detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur veneriis, detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur venereis detrahens add. in mg. V c om. rell. cf. praef. et locos ab Usenero ad fr. 67 congestos eas quae auditu e e Sor. et ( cf. 23 ex formis) cantibus, detrahens eas etiam quae ex formis percipiuntur oculis detrahens eas supra oculis add. K 2 suavis motiones, sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet quelibet V 1 quodlibet K 1 sensu. nec vero ita dici potest, mentis laetitiam solam esse in bonis. laetantem enim mentem ita novi: spe eorum omnium, quae supra dixi, fore forte G 1 K 1 ut natura is natura is naturalis X natura iis s potiens dolore careat. 3.42. atque haec quidem his verbis, quivis ut intellegat, quam voluptatem norit Epicurus. deinde paulo infra: saepe quaesivi inquit Epic. ib. fr. 69 ex is qui appellabantur sapientes, quid haberent quod in bonis quid in boni GV (quod V 2 ) R 1 (in exp. 1 ) quidboni K 1 quid in bonis K 2 B quod in bono Gr. relinquerent, si illa detraxissent, nisi si vellent voces iis fundere: nihil ab is potui cognoscere. qui si virtutes ebullire volent et sapientias, sapientiam V 2 nihil aliud dicent nisi eam viam, vi am K viam V ( exp. 2 ) vim quae fiant ureae vol. Non. quae G qua efficiantur eae eae haec K voluptates quas supra dixi. qui si ... 7 dixi Non. 26, 19 quae secuntur, sequuntur GR in eadem sententia sunt, totusque liber, qui est alt. est om. X add. V 2 de summo bono, refertus est et verbis et sententiis talibus.
11. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.28-3.29, 3.262-3.287, 3.417-3.424, 3.830-3.894, 3.931-3.977, 3.1042, 5.1164-5.1167 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
12. Vergil, Aeneis, 4.653, 4.704-4.705 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 4.653. ome lengthening path to travel, or to seek 4.704. and boughs of mournful shade; and crowning all 4.705. he laid on nuptial bed the robes and sword
13. Juvenal, Satires, 1.142-1.143, 6.428-6.432 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
14. Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1125d (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
15. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, 1100d (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
16. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 19 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
17. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 6.27, 7.85-7.86, 9.108, 10.22, 10.117-10.120, 10.127-10.128, 10.136 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) 6.27. Being asked where in Greece he saw good men, he replied, Good men nowhere, but good boys at Lacedaemon. When one day he was gravely discoursing and nobody attended to him, he began whistling, and as people clustered about him, he reproached them with coming in all seriousness to hear nonsense, but slowly and contemptuously when the theme was serious. He would say that men strive in digging and kicking to outdo one another, but no one strives to become a good man and true. 7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it. 7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically. 9.108. For in matters which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink from that; and things which are not for us to decide but happen of necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape, for they are not to be removed by force of reason. And when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility; according to others, gentleness. 10.22. And when near his end he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.Such were the terms of his will.Among his disciples, of whom there were many, the following were eminent: Metrodorus, the son of Athenaeus (or of Timocrates) and of Sande, a citizen of Lampsacus, who from his first acquaintance with Epicurus never left him except once for six months spent on a visit to his native place, from which he returned to him again. 10.117. Such are his views on celestial phenomena.But as to the conduct of life, what we ought to avoid and what to choose, he writes as follows. Before quoting his words, however, let me go into the views of Epicurus himself and his school concerning the wise man.There are three motives to injurious acts among men – hatred, envy, and contempt; and these the wise man overcomes by reason. Moreover, he who has once become wise never more assumes the opposite habit, not even in semblance, if he can help it. He will be more susceptible of emotion than other men: that will be no hindrance to his wisdom. However, not every bodily constitution nor every nationality would permit a man to become wise.Even on the rack the wise man is happy. He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed. 10.118. When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans. As regards women he will submit to the restrictions imposed by the law, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epicurus' ethical doctrines. Nor will he punish his servants; rather he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character. The Epicureans do not suffer the wise man to fall in love; nor will he trouble himself about funeral rites; according to them love does not come by divine inspiration: so Diogenes in his twelfth book. The wise man will not make fine speeches. No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse. 10.119. Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry owing to special circumstances in his life. Some too will turn aside from their purpose. Nor will he drivel, when drunken: so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life; nor will he make himself a tyrant; nor will he turn Cynic (so the second book On Life tells us); nor will he be a mendicant. But even when he has lost his sight, he will not withdraw himself from life: this is stated in the same book. The wise man will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta. 10.127. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his words are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. 10.128. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure. Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. 10.136. He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are: Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest. The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are: Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.

Subjects of this text:

subject	book bibliographic info
(akratēs) / weakness of the will	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
(prokoptōn) vii	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 41
academic / academy, the	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29
action, and cult	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
anger / irascibility, rage (θύμος)	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
animals (general), horse (platos metaphor)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
antisthenes	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; nicasicrates	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
apatheia	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
apatheia (passionlessness)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91
appearance (phantasia, impression)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 498
aristotle, natural and necessary emotions	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
aristotle, on desire	Huffman, A History of Pythagoreanism (2019) 198
aristotle	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
art of life	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
ataraxia	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30, 79
atomism	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
avarice, condemned	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 103
awareness, and value	Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 127
banquets	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
belief, doxastic	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
belief, false	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
belief, in gods/goddesses	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
belief, religious	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
bignone, e.	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
birth	Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 82
body / bodies (corporeal, material, matter, physical)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 91, 498
character, excellence of	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
character (diathesis, hexis, disposition, stable state)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
choice (hairesis) / choosing (haireisthai)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91
choices/avoidances, and hedonic calculus	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 28, 149
chrysippus	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
cicero	Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 96
city (polis) / citizen	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29
codoñer, carmen	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 103
competitive appropriation	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 498
consciousness	Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 82
crates of thebes	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
creation / creatures / create	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 498
cult, action	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
cult, practices	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
cult, traditional practices of	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
dal pra, m.	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
death, and value	Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 127
death, epicureanism	Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 127
death	Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 82, 96
desire, but plato says the same of pleasure	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
desire, natural and/or necessary desires	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
desire	Huffman, A History of Pythagoreanism (2019) 198, 415
desire (epithumia)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 41, 91
desires	Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94
dido	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 70
diodorus (mentioned in senecas de vita beata)	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 70
diogenes of sinope	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
dionysus	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
distress (lupē, grief, pain), avoiding distress (alupēsia) / distresslessness	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91, 498
distress (lupē, grief, pain)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41, 91, 498
doctrines (dogma, decreta)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 498
economics, epicurean, and pleasure/pain	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 28
economics, epicurean	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 28
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 91
end or goal of life (telos), epicurus	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurean therapeutic program	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
epicureanism	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
epicureans, selective emotion	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurus, dists. between pleasure as static freedom from distress and kinetic pleasure	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurus, economic commentary	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 28
epicurus, natural and/or necessary desires	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurus, pleasure goal of life	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurus, static cannot be increased, only varied	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurus	Huffman, A History of Pythagoreanism (2019) 198; Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 41, 91, 498; Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 127; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 82, 96
ethics, modern compared with ancient	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
ethics / ethical theory	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 41
eucleides	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
eudaimonia (flourishing, happiness)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91
filling and emptying	Huffman, A History of Pythagoreanism (2019) 415
frankness	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 103
freedom (eleutheria) / free (eleutheros)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91, 498
freedom from, of death	Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 82, 96
friendship	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
friendship (philia) / friend (philos)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91, 498
galen of pergamum	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91, 498
goal (telos)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41, 91, 498
goal of life	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
gods/goddesses, belief in	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
gods/goddesses, common notion of	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
gods / goddesses, zeus	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91
good (moral)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91, 498
goodness, good life	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
gowers, emily	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 103
greek terms, ἡδονή	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 3
habit / habituate / habitude (ethos, ethizesthai, hexis)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
hades	Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 96
hairesis	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
happiness	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 96
health (hugieia)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91
hedonic calculus	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 28
hellenistic philosophy, ethics of	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
hermarchus	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 3
homer	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 70
homeric elements	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
horme	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
horror	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
imagination	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 498
imitation	Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94
intemperance (akolasia) / intemperate, (akolastos)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
intention	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
interactions, types of	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 498
intoxication	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
judgment (krisis)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91
knowledge (epistēmē, gnōsis) / epistemology	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 498
lucretius	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 3, 70; Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 82, 96
luxury	Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94
mathematics	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29
maximalists	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
maximus of tyre	Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94
megarians	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
memory	Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94
menedemus	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
metaphor	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; natural and/or necessary desires	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; natural and/or necessary emotions	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; natural and/or necessary pleasures	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
metrodorus	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 3, 70; Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
moderation (metriopatheia)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 498
music	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
musonius rufus	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91
natural, necessary, desire	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
natural, necessary, emotion	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
natural, necessary, pleasure	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
nature, of human beings	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
nature	Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94
nature (phusis) / natural, human	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91
nature and convention'	Huffman, A History of Pythagoreanism (2019) 415
odysseus	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 70
pain	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 3; Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94
painlessness (aochlēsia)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41, 91, 498
paul (apostle) / pauline	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29
perfection	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
phaeacians	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 70
phaedo	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
plato, approves some pleasures	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
plato, on desire	Huffman, A History of Pythagoreanism (2019) 198
plato, some desires and pleasures necessary	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
plato	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
platonism (middle / imperial) vi–viii	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 498
pleasure, and pain	Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 82
pleasure, epicurus, pleasure goal of life	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
pleasure, epicurus dists. pleasure as static freedom from distress from kinetic pleasure	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
pleasure, kinetic	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
pleasure, natural and/or necessary pleasures	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
pleasure, plato approves pleasure of intellect	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
pleasure	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 3; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30; Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 82; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
pleasure (hēdonē)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29
pleasures	Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94
polyaenus	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 3
prayer	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91, 498; Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
precepts (praecepta)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
psuchē, loss of	Seaford, Wilkins, Wright, Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (2017) 82
psychological mode, desire	Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
reason	Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
reason (divine)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41, 498
refutation	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 498
sage (wise person)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91
sardanapallus	Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 94
satires (horace), treatment of frankness	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 103
school (scholē) / sect (hairesis)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 41, 498
self-mastery (enkrateia)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
self / selfhood (identity)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
seneca (the younger)	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 70
sextus empiricus	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
sober reasoning	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41, 91, 498
stilpo	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
stoicism / stoic / stoa, neostoicism (greco-roman)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 91
stoicism / stoic / stoa	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 41, 91
strength (ischus) / strengthen	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
system / model	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29
telos	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 3; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
temperance (sōphrosunē) / temperate	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
tetrapharmakos	Gordon, The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus (2012) 3
theognis	Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 127
timon of phlius	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 79
torquatus	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 149
training (askēsis)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 498
tranquility (ataraxia)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 91, 498
turpin, william	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 149
usener, hermann	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 28
value, in epicureanism	Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 127
vii–viii	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 29, 41, 91, 498
virtue / moral virtue (aretē)	Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 41
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)	Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201