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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



11719
Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 29
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11 results
1. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

114e. has rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good, and has sought eagerly for those of learning, and after adorning his soul with no alien ornaments, but with its own proper adornment of self-restraint and justice and
2. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

485d. By no means. Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form. By all means. But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel. Surely. So, when a man’s desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument, if the man is a true and not a sham philosopher.
3. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.29-1.32, 1.37-1.41, 1.45, 1.65-1.70, 2.9-2.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.29. Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic: 1.30. omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec haec ħ BE hoc NV putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel. dulce esse mel R mel dulce A quorum nihil oportere oportere V oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum tantum om. BE satis esse esse satis A admonere. interesse enim inter inter om. BE argumentum argumentumque BE argumentatum R augmentatum A conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta promta AR et aperta iudicari. indicari NV etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut ad naturam AR ad naturam ( om. aut) BE aut naturam ( om. ad) N 1 aut secundum naturam N 2 aut verum (compend scr) V aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. post iudicari add. in V voluptatem etiam per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum; idem in N ab alt. m. in marg. adscr. posito post iudicari signo eo- demque in marg. ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et et aut NV dolorem? 1.31. Sunt autem quidam e nostris, qui haec subtilius velint tradere et negent satis esse quid bonum sit aut quid malum sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse et voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. esse. Et fugiendum itaque aiunt (om. expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse cf. ad p. 12, 5) R itaque aiunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem, ut alterum esse appetendum, alterum asperdum sentiamus. Alii autem, quibus ego assentior, cum a philosophis compluribus permulta dicantur, cur nec voluptas in bonis sit numeranda nec in malis dolor, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant. 1.32. Sed ut perspiciatis, unde omnis iste natus error sit natus sit error BE error natus sit V voluptatem accusantium doloremque laudantium, totam rem aperiam eaque ipsa, quae ab illo inventore veritatis et quasi architecto beatae vitae dicta sunt, explicabo. nemo enim ipsam voluptatem, quia voluptas sit, sit si BE aspernatur aut odit aut fugit, sed quia consequuntur consecuntur A magni dolores eos, qui ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt, neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quia non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore dolore et labore BE magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem. Ut enim ad minima veniam, quis nostrum exercitationem ullam corporis suscipit suscepit BER laboriosam, nisi ut aliquid ex ea commodi consequatur? quis autem vel eum iure reprehenderit, qui in ea voluptate velit esse, quam nihil molestiae consequatur, vel illum, qui dolorem eum fugiat, quo voluptas nulla pariatur? 1.37. Sed de clarorum hominum factis illustribus et gloriosis satis hoc loco dictum sit. erit enim iam de omnium virtutum cursu ad voluptatem proprius disserendi locus. nunc autem explicabo, voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit, ut tollatur error omnis imperitorum inp. R intellegaturque ea, quae voluptaria, delicata, mollis habeatur disciplina, disciplinata ABER quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit. Non enim hanc solam sequimur, quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus, quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. nam quoniam, cum privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est, ut omne, quo offendimur, dolor, doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. ut enim, cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis, sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem efficit voluptatis. 1.38. itaque non placuit Epicuro medium esse quiddam quiddam A quoddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum, quod quibusdam medium videretur, videretur N (?), Rath.; videtur cum om. R cum omni dolore careret, non modo voluptatem esse, verum etiam summam voluptatem. quisquis enim sentit, quem ad modum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore. omnis omnis Morel. omni autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit. 1.39. At etiam Athenis, ut e patre epatre AN audiebam facete et urbane Stoicos irridente, irridente R arridente statua est in Ceramico Chrysippi sedentis porrecta manu, quae manus significet illum in hac esse rogatiuncula delectatum: 'Numquidnam manus tua sic affecta, quem ad modum affecta nunc est, desiderat?'—Nihil sane.—'At, si voluptas esset bonum, desideraret.'—Ita credo.— Non est igitur voluptas bonum. credo ita B (desideraret — voluptas bonum om. E) Hoc ne statuam quidem dicturam pater aiebat, si loqui posset. conclusum est enim contra Cyrenaicos satis acute, nihil ad Epicurum. nam si ea sola voluptas esset, quae quasi titillaret sensus, ut ita dicam, et ad eos cum suavitate afflueret et illaberetur, nec nec ulla par A ut ulla pars BE ulla ( om. nec et pars) RN illa ( om. nec et pars) V manus esse contenta posset nec ulla pars vacuitate doloris sine iucundo motu voluptatis. sin autem summa voluptas est, ut Epicuro placet, nihil dolere, primum tibi recte, Chrysippe, concessum est nihil desiderare manum, cum ita esset affecta, secundum non recte, si voluptas esset bonum, fuisse desideraturam. idcirco enim non desideraret, quia, quod dolore caret, id in voluptate est. 1.40. Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus nullo dolore nec impediente nec inpendente, quem tandem hoc statu praestabiliorem aut magis expetendum possimus possumus BE dicere? inesse enim necesse est in eo, qui ita sit affectus, et firmitatem animi nec mortem nec dolorem timentis, quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis, lenis ARN in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio consoletur. 1.41. ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est, quod huc possit, quod melius sit, accedere? Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus, quanti in hominem maximi maximi dett. maxime cadere possunt, nulla spe proposita fore levius aliquando, aliquando dett. aliquanto nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec expectata voluptate, quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest? quodsi vita doloribus referta maxime fugienda est, summum profecto malum est vivere cum dolore, cui sententiae consentaneum est ultimum esse bonorum cum voluptate vivere. nec enim habet nostra habet praeter voluptatem nostra V fortasse recte mens quicquam, ubi consistat tamquam in extremo, omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla, quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere. aut angere Vict. aut tangere 1.45. quae est enim aut utilior aut ad bene vivendum aptior partitio quam illa, qua est usus Epicurus? qui unum genus posuit earum cupiditatum, quae essent et naturales et ante naturales om. BE et necessariae, alterum, quae naturales essent nec nec non BE tamen necessariae, tertium, quae nec naturales nec necessariae. quarum ea ratio est, ut necessariae nec opera multa nec impensa inp. R expleantur; ne naturales quidem multa desiderant, propterea quod ipsa natura divitias, quibus contenta sit, et parabilis parabilis A 1 R parabiles (in N e ex corr. alt. m.) et terminatas habet; iium autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec finis inveniri potest. 1.65. Restat locus huic disputationi vel maxime necessarius de amicitia, quam, si voluptas summum sit bonum, affirmatis nullam omnino fore. de qua Epicurus quidem ita dicit, omnium rerum, quas ad beate vivendum sapientia comparaverit, nihil esse maius amicitia, nihil uberius, nihil iucundius. nec vero hoc hoc hos A 1 BER oratione solum, sed multo magis vita et factis et moribus comprobavit. quod quam magnum sit fictae veterum fabulae declarant, in quibus tam multis tamque variis ab ultima antiquitate repetitis tria vix amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem pervenias profectus a Theseo. at vero Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientis tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis. sed ad rem redeamus; de hominibus dici non necesse est. 1.66. Tribus igitur igitur ergo BE modis video esse a nostris a nostris esse BE de amicitia disputatum. alii cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur confirmetur ABE animus et a spe et a spe ad spem et ABE pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. 1.67. atque ut odia, odiā BE invidiae, invidiae A 2 invidie (e ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ) N invidiā B invidia A 1 EV, R ( sequente una litt. erasa, quae vi-detur fuisse e) despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus possumus etiam B neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi nisi ipsi ARV aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia et amicitia om. R, A 1 (ab alt. m. in mg. exteriore sinistro ita add. amicitia, ut a ligatore et desectum esse possit) cōnect. BE cum voluptate conectitur. nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque ut RNV atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. 1.68. quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, susciperet susceperit R (suam susceperit voluptatem), NV eosdem suscipiet suscipiet susciperet BE propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae eae A hc B hec E hee RV ea N semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: 'Eadem', his paene verbis eadem eadem hys pene verbis BE hiis pene eadem verbis V inquit, scientia scientia sententia BE confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum. 1.69. Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, nostra convitia V convicia nostra BE sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; voluntates A voluptates R voluptatum NV om. BE voluptatem voluptates R cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra si ludicras A 2 si ludicrica R exercendi aut vedi consuetudine consuetudines A consuetudinēs R adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit poterit edd. potuerit et iustius? 1.70. Sunt autem, qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, sapientum V sap ia (= sapientia, pro sap iu = sapientiū) R ut ne minus amicos quam minus amicos quam P. Man. minus quidem amicos quam ARNV minus quam amicos BE se ipsos diligant. quod et posse fieri fieri posse BE intellegimus et saepe etiam etiam Dav. enim videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri. et 26 repp. A 2.9. Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam. Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere. Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante paulo ante I 37—39 docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio. Non Non cum non RN' tum non N 2 tum vero (~uo) V; tuum non dolere Lamb. dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est. Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius. Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas? Quis istud possit, inquit, negare? Eademne, quae restincta siti? Immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis enim om. RN (siti immo alio genere restincta enim om. V) stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit, inquit om. BE illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est. Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles dissimiles ( etiam A 2 )] difficiles A 1 eodem nomine appellas? Quid paulo ante, paulo ante p. 17, 17 sqq. inquit, dixerim nonne meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem? 2.10. Memini vero, inquam; sed tu istuc tu quidem istuc V dixti dixisti RNV bene Latine, parum plane. varietas enim Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in disparibus coloribus dicitur, sed transfertur in multa disparia: varium poe+ma, varia oratio, varii mores, varia fortuna, voluptas etiam varia dici solet, cum percipitur e multis dissimilibus rebus dissimilis dissimilis dissimiliter RNV efficientibus voluptates. eam si varietatem diceres, intellegerem, ut etiam non dicente te intellego; ista varietas quae sit non satis perspicio, quod ais, cum dolore careamus, tum in summa voluptate nos esse, cum autem vescamur iis rebus, quae dulcem motum afferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, qui qui Dav. quae (que); in BE compend. incert. faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem, quam cur voluptatem appelles nescio. An potest, inquit ille, ille inquit BE quicquam esse suavius quam nihil dolere? 2.9.  "He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I said, "as for the formula 'freedom from pain,' I will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same as 'pleasure.' " "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any pleasure in the act of drinking?" "That is undeniable," he answered. "Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst?" "No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst is a 'static' pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a 'kinetic' pleasure." "Why then," I asked, "do you call two such different things by the same name? 2.10.  "Do you not remember," he replied, "what I said just now, that when all pain has been removed, pleasure may vary in kind but cannot be increased in degree?" "Oh, yes, I remember," said I; "but though your language was quite correct in form, your meaning was far from clear. 'Variation' is a good Latin term; we use it strictly of different colours, but it is applied metaphorically to a number of things that differ: we speak of a varied poem, a varied speech, a varied character, varied fortunes. Pleasure too can be termed varied when it is derived from a number of unlike things producing unlike feelings of pleasure. If this were the variation you spoke of, I could understand the term, just as I understand it without your speaking of it. But I cannot quite grasp what you mean by 'variation' when you say that when we are free from pain we experience the highest pleasure, and that when we are enjoying things that excite a pleasant activity of the senses, we then experience an active or 'kinetic' pleasure that causes a variation of our pleasant sensations, but no increase in the former pleasure that consists in absence of pain — although why you should call this 'pleasure' I cannot make out.
5. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , 37.32-37.39 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.28-3.29, 5.1164-5.1167 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.85-7.86, 10.19, 10.22, 10.117-10.120, 10.136 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it. 7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically. 10.19. And let Amynomachus and Timocrates take care of Epicurus, the son of Metrodorus, and of the son of Polyaenus, so long as they study and live with Hermarchus. Letthem likewise provide for the maintece of Metrodorus's daughter, so long as she is well-ordered and obedient to Hermarchus; and, when she comes of age, give her in marriage to a husband selected by Hermarchus from among the members of the School; and out of the revenues accruing to me let Amynomachus and Timocrates in consultation with Hermarchus give to them as much as they think proper for their maintece year by year. 10.22. And when near his end he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.Such were the terms of his will.Among his disciples, of whom there were many, the following were eminent: Metrodorus, the son of Athenaeus (or of Timocrates) and of Sande, a citizen of Lampsacus, who from his first acquaintance with Epicurus never left him except once for six months spent on a visit to his native place, from which he returned to him again. 10.117. Such are his views on celestial phenomena.But as to the conduct of life, what we ought to avoid and what to choose, he writes as follows. Before quoting his words, however, let me go into the views of Epicurus himself and his school concerning the wise man.There are three motives to injurious acts among men – hatred, envy, and contempt; and these the wise man overcomes by reason. Moreover, he who has once become wise never more assumes the opposite habit, not even in semblance, if he can help it. He will be more susceptible of emotion than other men: that will be no hindrance to his wisdom. However, not every bodily constitution nor every nationality would permit a man to become wise.Even on the rack the wise man is happy. He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed. 10.118. When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans. As regards women he will submit to the restrictions imposed by the law, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epicurus' ethical doctrines. Nor will he punish his servants; rather he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character. The Epicureans do not suffer the wise man to fall in love; nor will he trouble himself about funeral rites; according to them love does not come by divine inspiration: so Diogenes in his twelfth book. The wise man will not make fine speeches. No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse. 10.119. Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry owing to special circumstances in his life. Some too will turn aside from their purpose. Nor will he drivel, when drunken: so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life; nor will he make himself a tyrant; nor will he turn Cynic (so the second book On Life tells us); nor will he be a mendicant. But even when he has lost his sight, he will not withdraw himself from life: this is stated in the same book. The wise man will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta. 10.136. He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are: Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest. The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are: Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.
10. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 128-132, 127

11. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 25, 3, 30, 18



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
action, and cult Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
anger / irascibility, rage (θύμος) Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
annas, julia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 26
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; nicasicrates Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
aristo of ceos, aristotelian Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 26
aristotle, natural and necessary emotions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
art of life Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
ataraxia Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
atomism Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
avarice, condemned Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 103
banquets Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
belief, doxastic Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
belief, false Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
belief, in gods/goddesses Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
belief, religious Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
bignone, e. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
character, excellence of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
children Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 139
choices/avoidances, and hedonic calculus Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 149
choices/avoidances, motivations Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 254
codoñer, carmen Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 103
cult, action Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
cult, practices Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
cult, traditional practices of Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
desire, but plato says the same of pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
desire, natural and/or necessary desires Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 26, 201
dionysus Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurean therapeutic program Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
epicureans, selective emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicureans Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 26
epicurus, dists. between pleasure as static freedom from distress and kinetic pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurus, natural and/or necessary desires Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurus, pleasure goal of life Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurus, static cannot be increased, only varied Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
epicurus Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 139; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 26
ethics, modern compared with ancient Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
father, fatherhood Albrecht, The Divine Father: Religious and Philosophical Concepts of Divine Parenthood in Antiquity (2014) 127
frankness Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 103
friendship Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
god, tetragram Albrecht, The Divine Father: Religious and Philosophical Concepts of Divine Parenthood in Antiquity (2014) 127
gods/goddesses, belief in Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
gods/goddesses, common notion of Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
goodness, good life Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
gowers, emily Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 103
hairesis Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
happiness Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
homeric elements Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
horror Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
intention Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
intoxication Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
kemp, jerome Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 97
love and friendship Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 139
lucretius Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
maximalists Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; natural and/or necessary desires Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 26, 201
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; natural and/or necessary emotions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; natural and/or necessary pleasures Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
metrodorus Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
muecke, frances Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 97
music Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
natural, necessary, desire Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 26, 201
natural, necessary, emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
natural, necessary, pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
nature, of human beings Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
overindulgence, condemned Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 254
pangs in epicureanism Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 139
perfection Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
persian-hellenistic period Albrecht, The Divine Father: Religious and Philosophical Concepts of Divine Parenthood in Antiquity (2014) 127
philodemus, epicurean Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 26
philodemus Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 139
plato, approves some pleasures Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
plato, some desires and pleasures necessary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
pleasure, epicurus, pleasure goal of life Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
pleasure, epicurus dists. pleasure as static freedom from distress from kinetic pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
pleasure, kinetic Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
pleasure, natural and/or necessary pleasures Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
pleasure, plato approves pleasure of intellect Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
pleasure Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30; Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201
prayer Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
pride, aristo of ceos on pride Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 26
psychological mode, desire Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 241
qumran' Albrecht, The Divine Father: Religious and Philosophical Concepts of Divine Parenthood in Antiquity (2014) 127
reason Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
satires (horace), treatment of economic issues Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 254
satires (horace), treatment of frankness Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 103
sober reasoning Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 195
telos Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30
torquatus Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 149
turpin, william Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 149
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201