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Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 27
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1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.67-1.68, 2.7, 3.69-3.70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 1.67. atque ut odia, odiā BE invidiae, invidiae A 2 invidie (e ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ) N invidiā B invidia A 1 EV, R ( sequente una litt. erasa, quae vi-detur fuisse e) despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus possumus etiam B neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi nisi ipsi ARV aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia et amicitia om. R, A 1 (ab alt. m. in mg. exteriore sinistro ita add. amicitia, ut a ligatore et desectum esse possit) cōnect. BE cum voluptate conectitur. nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque ut RNV atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. 1.68. quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, susciperet susceperit R (suam susceperit voluptatem), NV eosdem suscipiet suscipiet susciperet BE propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae eae A hc B hec E hee RV ea N semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: 'Eadem', his paene verbis eadem eadem hys pene verbis BE hiis pene eadem verbis V inquit, scientia scientia sententia BE confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum. 2.7. istam voluptatem, inquit, Epicurus ignorat? Non semper, inquam; nam interdum nimis nimis minus R etiam novit, quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur. an haec ab eo non dicuntur? Quasi vero me pudeat, inquit, istorum, aut non possim quem ad modum ea dicantur ostendere! Ego vero non dubito, inquam, quin facile possis, nec est quod te pudeat sapienti adsentiri, qui se unus, quod sciam, sapientem profiteri sit ausus. nam Metrodorum non puto ipsum professum, sed, cum appellaretur ab Epicuro, repudiare tantum beneficium noluisse; septem autem illi non suo, sed populorum suffragio omnium nominati sunt. 3.69. Ut vero conservetur omnis homini erga hominem societas, coniunctio, caritas, et emolumenta et detrimenta, quae w)felh/mata et bla/mmata appellant, communia esse voluerunt; quorum altera prosunt, nocent altera. neque solum ea communia, verum etiam paria esse dixerunt. incommoda autem et commoda—ita enim eu)xrhsth/mata et dusxrhsth/mata appello—communia esse voluerunt, paria noluerunt. illa enim, quae prosunt aut quae nocent, aut bona sunt aut mala, quae sint paria necesse est. commoda autem et incommoda in eo genere sunt, quae praeposita et reiecta diximus; dicimus BE ea possunt paria non esse. sed emolumenta communia emolumenta et detrimenta communia Lamb. esse dicuntur, recte autem facta et peccata non habentur communia. 3.70. Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V 2.7.  "What then?" he replied; "does not Epicurus recognize pleasure in your sense?" "Not always," said I; "now and then, I admit, he recognizes it only too fully; for he solemnly avows that he cannot even understand what Good there can be or where it can be found, apart from that which is derived from food and drink, the delight of the ears, and the grosser forms of gratification. Do I misrepresent his words?" "Just as if I were ashamed of all that," he cried, "or unable to explain the sense in which it is spoken!" "Oh," said I, "I haven't the least doubt you can explain it with ease. And you have no reason to be ashamed of sharing the opinions of a Wise Man — who stands alone, so far as I am aware, in venturing to arrogate to himself that title. For I do not suppose that Metrodorus himself claimed to be a Wise Man, though he did not care to refuse the compliment when the name was bestowed upon him by Epicurus; while the famous Seven of old received their appellation not by their own votes, but by the universal suffrage of mankind. 3.69.  "To safeguard the universal alliance, solidarity and affection that subsist between man and man, the Stoics held that both 'benefits' and 'injuries' (in their terminology, ōphelēmata and blammata) are common, the former doing good and the latter harm; and they pronounce them to be not only 'common' but also 'equal.' 'Disadvantages' and 'advantages' (for so I render euchrēstēmata and duschrēstēmata) they held to be 'common' but not 'equal.' For things 'beneficial' and 'injurious' are goods and evils respectively, and these must needs be equal; but 'advantages' and 'disadvantages' belong to the class we speak of as 'preferred' and 'rejected,' and these may differ in degree. But whereas 'benefits' and 'injuries' are pronounced to be 'common,' righteous and sinful acts are not considered 'common.' 3.70.  "They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among 'things beneficial.' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man's own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another's loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake.
2. Cicero, On Duties, 2.7, 3.69-3.70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 2.7. Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et eruditis quaerentibus, satisne constanter facere videamur, qui, cum percipi nihil posse dicamus, tamen et aliis de rebus disserere soleamus et hoc ipso tempore praecepta officii persequamur. Quibus vellem satis cognita esset nostra sententia. Non enim sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore nec habeat umquam, quid sequatur. Quae enim esset ista mens vel quae vita potius non modo disputandi, sed etiam vivendi ratione sublata? Nos autem, ut ceteri alia certa, alia incerta esse dicunt, sic ab his dissentientes alia probabilia, contra alia dicimus. 3.69. Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis. 3.70. Nam quanti verba illa: UTI NE PROPTER TE FIDEMVE TUAM CAPTUS FRAUDATUSVE SIM! quam illa aurea: UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER OPORTET ET SINE FRAUDATIONE! Sed, qui sint boni, et quid sit bene agi, magna quaestio est. Q. quidem Scaevola, pontifex maximus, summam vim esse dicebat in omnibus iis arbitriis, in quibus adderetur EX FIDE BONA, fideique bonae nomen existimabat manare latissime, idque versari in tutelis societatibus, fiduciis mandatis, rebus emptis venditis, conductis locatis, quibus vitae societas contineretur; in iis magni esse iudicis statuere, praesertim cum in plerisque essent iudicia contraria, quid quemque cuique praestare oporteret. 2.7.  But people raise other objections against me â€” and that, too, philosophers and scholars — asking whether I think I am quite consistent in my conduct — for although our school maintains that nothing can be known for certain, yet, they urge, I make a habit of presenting my opinions on all sorts of subjects and at this very moment am trying to formulate rules of duty. But I wish that they had a proper understanding of our position. For we Academicians are not men whose minds wander in uncertainty and never know what principles to adopt. For what sort of mental habit, or rather what sort of life would that be which should dispense with all rules for reasoning or even for living? Not so with us; but, as other schools maintain that some things are certain, others uncertain, we, differing with them, say that some things are probable, others improbable. 3.69.  Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship — although I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and again — which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. 3.70.  For how weighty are the words: "That I be not deceived and defrauded through you and my confidence in you"! How precious are these "As between honest people there ought to be honest dealing, and no deception"! But who are "honest people," and what is "honest dealing" — these are serious questions. It was Quintus Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, who used to attach the greatest importance to all questions of arbitration to which the formula was appended "as good faith requires"; and he held that the expression "good faith" had a very extensive application, for it was employed in trusteeships and partnerships, in trusts and commissions, in buying and selling, in hiring and letting — in a word, in all the transactions on which the social relations of daily life depend; in these, he said, it required a judge of great ability to decide the extent of each individual's obligation to the other, especially when the counter-claims were admissible in most cases.
3. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 10.9-10.10, 10.22, 10.120-10.121 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) 10.9. But these people are stark mad. For our philosopher has abundance of witnesses to attest his unsurpassed goodwill to all men – his native land, which honoured him with statues in bronze; his friends, so many in number that they could hardly be counted by whole cities, and indeed all who knew him, held fast as they were by the siren-charms of his doctrine, save Metrodorus of Stratonicea, who went over to Carneades, being perhaps burdened by his master's excessive goodness; the School itself which, while nearly all the others have died out, continues for ever without interruption through numberless reigns of one scholarch after another; 10.10. his gratitude to his parents, his generosity to his brothers, his gentleness to his servants, as evidenced by the terms of his will and by the fact that they were members of the School, the most eminent of them being the aforesaid Mys; and in general, his benevolence to all mankind. His piety towards the gods and his affection for his country no words can describe. He carried deference to others to such excess that he did not even enter public life. He spent all his life in Greece, notwithstanding the calamities which had befallen her in that age; when he did once or twice take a trip to Ionia, it was to visit his friends there. Friends indeed came to him from all parts and lived with him in his garden. 10.22. And when near his end he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.Such were the terms of his will.Among his disciples, of whom there were many, the following were eminent: Metrodorus, the son of Athenaeus (or of Timocrates) and of Sande, a citizen of Lampsacus, who from his first acquaintance with Epicurus never left him except once for six months spent on a visit to his native place, from which he returned to him again.
4. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 78, 52
5. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 28, 18

Subjects of this text:

subject	book bibliographic info
anger / irascibility, natural (ὀργή)	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 179
anti-epicurean polemics	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
armstrong, david	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
arrogance	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
castaldi, francesco	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
catiline	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
cicero	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
death/dying	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29
diogenes laertius	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29
disposition (διάθεσις)	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29, 179
economics, epicurean, economics, philodemus account of	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
economics, epicurean	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
enemies	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
epicureanism, ethics of	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 191
epicurus, economic commentary	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
frankness	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 179
friends/friendship, having many	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 37
friends/friendship, instrumentality of	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 37
friends/friendship	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29, 37, 179, 217
friendship	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 191
good of others	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 191
gratitude	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 37, 179
happiness	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 191
hospitality	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29, 37
idomeneus	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29
io	Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 152
judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 191
kalon, kalos	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 191
kindness, feigned	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 179
kindness	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29, 37
labor, in lucretius	Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 152
lucretius, labor in	Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 152
maecenas, relationship with horace	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
mars	Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 152
memories	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29
militello, cesira	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
mithres	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
natural goods	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
pain	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29
patronage, (greek) development of system	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
philodemus of gadara, on economics	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
piso	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
pleasure	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 191; Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 37, 179
poetry and poetics	Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 152
politics	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
ponczoch, joseph a.	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
rhetoric	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 179
sallust	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
satires (horace), treatment of relationship with maecenas	Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 34
self-proclaimed	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
seven sages	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
slander	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29
slaves/servants	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
species impressa (φαντασία)	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 217
students	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 179
teachers/teaching	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 37, 179
torquatus	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 37
venus	Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 152
vice	Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 29
virtue	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 191; Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 179
wise man'	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 191