Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

4735

Epictetus, Enchiridion, 3
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

15 results
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 8.1-8.3, 8.5 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
2. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.65-3.66 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 3.65.  "This is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one's children when one is dying. And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are born for society and intercourse, and for a natural partnership with our fellow men. Moreover nature inspires us with the desire to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom. 3.66.  Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. Also when we confer upon Jove the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, Lord of Guests, Rallier of Battles, what we mean to imply is that the safety of mankind lies in his keeping. But how inconsistent it would be for us to expect the immortal gods to love and cherish us, when we ourselves despise and neglect one another! Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what particular useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence.
3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.62-3.63, 3.65-3.66, 3.68 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.65. ex hac animorum affectione testamenta commendationesque morientium natae sunt. quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia, facile intellegitur nos ad coniunctionem congregationemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. Inpellimur autem natura, ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis. 3.66. itaque non facile est invenire qui quod sciat ipse non tradat alteri; ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus, verum etiam ad docendum. Atque ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vitulis contra leones summa vi impetuque contendant, sic ii, ii edd. hi qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut de Hercule et de Libero accepimus, ad servandum genus hominum natura incitantur. Atque etiam Iovem cum Optimum et Maximum dicimus cumque eundem Salutarem, Hospitalem, Statorem, hoc intellegi volumus, salutem hominum in eius esse tutela. minime autem convenit, cum ipsi inter nos viles viles NV cules A eules R civiles BE neglectique simus, postulare ut diis inmortalibus cari simus et ab iis diligamur. Quem ad modum igitur membris utimur prius, quam didicimus, cuius ea causa utilitatis habeamus, sic inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus. quod ni ita se haberet, nec iustitiae ullus esset nec bonitati locus. 3.68. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. 3.62.  "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63.  From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the sea‑pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the sea‑pen, which swims out of the sea‑pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard — these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.65.  "This is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one's children when one is dying. And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are born for society and intercourse, and for a natural partnership with our fellow men. Moreover nature inspires us with the desire to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom. 3.66.  Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. Also when we confer upon Jove the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, Lord of Guests, Rallier of Battles, what we mean to imply is that the safety of mankind lies in his keeping. But how inconsistent it would be for us to expect the immortal gods to love and cherish us, when we ourselves despise and neglect one another! Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what particular useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence. 3.68.  Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally.
4. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.83, 3.28, 3.52, 3.59, 3.76 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 1.83. fit enim ad punctum temporis. Illud angit vel potius excruciat, discessus ab omnibus is quae sunt bona in vita . vide ne a malis nea malis K ( fuit m vel ni) dici verius possit. quid ego nunc lugeam vitam hominum? vere et iure possum; sed quid necesse est, cum id agam ne post mortem miseros nos putemus fore, etiam vitam efficere deplorando miseriorem? fecimus hoc in eo libro, in quo nosmet ipsos, quantum potuimus, consolati sumus. a malis igitur mors abducit, non a bonis, verum si sqq. Val. Max 8, 9 ext. 3 quaerimus. et quidem hoc ecquidem GRV h q dĕ (= haec quidem) K 1 (hoc quidem ss. 2 ) a Cyrenaico Hegesia he gesia R 1 sic copiose disputatur, ut is a rege Ptolomaeo ptolomeo K ptholomeo GV prohibitus esse dicatur illa in scholis dicere, quod quod V 2 s quo X multi is auditis mortem sibi ipsi consciscerent. -scerent in r. V c 3.28. Atque hoc quidem perspicuum est, tum tum add. G 2 aegritudinem existere, cum quid ita visum sit, ut magnum quoddam malum adesse et urgere videatur. Epicuro autem placet opinionem mali aegritudinem esse ea ante esse add. V 2 natura, esse, ea natura Usen. Ep. fr. 444 ( sed cf. 334,14 necesse esse eqs.) ex opinione pro opinionem Sey. efficere pro esse Bai. cf. quae dixi Herm. XLI 323 ut, quicumque intueatur in aliquod maius malum, si id sibi accidisse opinetur, sit continuo in aegritudine. aegritudinem X Cyrenaici non omni malo malo modo R 1 aegritudinem aegritudine GK 1 effici censent, sed insperato et necopinato malo. est id quidem non mediocre ad aegritudinem augendam: videntur enim omnia repentina graviora. ex hoc et illa iure laudantur: E/go cum genui, tu/m morituros moriturum et huic rei Sen. ad Pol. 11, 2 sci/vi et ei rei Enn. Telam. sc. 312. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 su/stuli. Prae/terea praeterea ae in r. V c ad Troia/m cum misi ob de/fendendam Grae/ciam, Sci/bam scibam Fronto p. 217 sciebam me in morti/ferum bellum, no/n in epulas mi/ttere. 3.52. qui tum aegritudinem censent existere, si necopinato quid evenerit. est id quidem magnum, ut supra supra p. 332, 6 dixi; etiam Chrysippo Chrys. fr. eth. 417 crysippo X ita videri scio, quod provisum ante non sit, id ferire ferire fieri X corr. V c aut 1 vehementius; sed non sunt in hoc hic in hoc G ( exp. 2 ) omnia. quamquam hostium et ante hostium add. V 2 non male repens adventus advetus G 1 R 1 V 1 magis aliquanto aliquando X corr. V c aut 1 conturbat quam expectatus, et maris subita tempestas quam ante provisa terret provisitaret K 1 navigantes vehementius, et eius modi sunt pleraque. sed cum diligenter necopinatorum naturam consideres, nihil aliud reperias repperias G R 1 V nisi omnia videri subita maiora, et quidem ob duas causas, primum quod, quanta sint quae accidunt, post accidunt V c in mg. add. : et qualia, cum repente accidunt ( non inepte cf. p. 345, 21 ) considerandi spatium non datur, deinde, cum cum tum G videtur praecaveri potuisse, si provisum esset, quasi culpa contractum malum aegritudinem acriorem facit. 3.59. hoc igitur efficitur, ut ex illo necopinato plaga maior sit, non, ut illi putant, ut, cum duobus pares casus evenerint, is modo aegritudine adficiatur, aff. KR cui ille necopinato casus evenerit. Itaque dicuntur non nulli in maerore, cum de hac communi hominum condicione audivissent, ea lege esse nos natos, ut nemo in perpetuum esse posset expers mali, gravius etiam tulisse. quocirca Carneades, ut video nostrum scribere Antiochum, anthiochum KR reprendere reprehendere KV c Chrysippum crysippum X Chr. fr. eth. 487 solebat laudantem Euripideum carmen illud: Eurip. Hypsip. fr. 757 ( S. Eur. ed. Arn. p. 62 ) Morta/lis nemo est que/m non non om. X add. K 2 V c attinga/t attingit W (attigit K) vix recte, cf. Mue. in Seyfferti Laelio p. 143 dolor Morbu/sque; multis multis Lb. multi su/nt humandi li/beri, Rursu/m creandi, mo/rsque mors quae GK (morsquę) R 1 V (s in r. c ) est finita o/mnibus. Quae ge/neri genere X corr. V 3 humano ango/rem nequicquam a/dferunt: adferant V 2 Redde/nda terrae est te/rra, tum tum tam Sey. nam Küh. vita o/mnibus Mete/nda ut fruges. si/c iubet Nece/ssitas. 3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V
5. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.44-1.49, 2.646-2.651, 3.59-3.67, 3.830-3.1094, 5.1218-5.1240, 6.379-6.422 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
6. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.11, 2.18.12, 2.22.27-2.22.28, 3.3.14-3.3.16, 3.3.19, 3.24-3.26, 3.24.84-3.24.88, 3.28, 3.30, 3.37, 4.1.111 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
7. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
8. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 9.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
9. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 24.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
10. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 9.18, 42.1, 95.52, 101.10, 118.15-118.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
11. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 28.199 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
12. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.7.7 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
13. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.32-7.33, 7.85, 7.90-7.91, 7.120, 7.123 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) 7.32. Hence he had been well trained even before he left his native place. And thus it came about that on his arrival at Athens he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that, when the rest were at a loss how to express their views, Zeno framed a definition of the end. They say that he was in the habit of swearing by capers just as Socrates used to swear by the dog. Some there are, and among them Cassius the Sceptic and his disciples, who accuse Zeno at length. Their first count is that in the beginning of his Republic he pronounced the ordinary education useless: the next is that he applies to all men who are not virtuous the opprobrious epithets of foemen, enemies, slaves, and aliens to one another, parents to children, brothers to brothers, friends to friends. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. 7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it. 7.90. Virtue, in the first place, is in one sense the perfection of anything in general, say of a statue; again, it may be non-intellectual, like health, or intellectual, like prudence. For Hecato says in his first book On the Virtues that some are scientific and based upon theory, namely, those which have a structure of theoretical principles, such as prudence and justice; others are non-intellectual, those that are regarded as co-extensive and parallel with the former, like health and strength. For health is found to attend upon and be co-extensive with the intellectual virtue of temperance, just as strength is a result of the building of an arch. 7.91. These are called non-intellectual, because they do not require the mind's assent; they supervene and they occur even in bad men: for instance, health, courage. The proof, says Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on Ethics, that virtue really exists is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress. And for the existence of vice as a fundamental fact the proof is that it is the opposite of virtue. That it, virtue, can be taught is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his work On the End, by Cleanthes, by Posidonius in his Protreptica, and by Hecato; that it can be taught is clear from the case of bad men becoming good. 7.120. The Stoics approve also of honouring parents and brothers in the second place next after the gods. They further maintain that parental affection for children is natural to the good, but not to the bad. It is one of their tenets that sins are all equal: so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and he who is only one furlong away are equally not in Canopus, and so too he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the less are equally not in the path of right conduct. 7.123. Furthermore, the wise are infallible, not being liable to error. They are also without offence; for they do no hurt to others or to themselves. At the same time they are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since indulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too severe. Again, they say that the wise man never wonders at any of the things which appear extraordinary, such as Charon's mephitic caverns, ebbings of the tide, hot springs or fiery eruptions. Nor yet, they go on to say, will the wise man live in solitude; for he is naturally made for society and action.
14. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 2, 1
15. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None

Subjects of this text:

subject	book bibliographic info
acquisition of virtues	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
ambition,lucretius,ambition is due to fear of death	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
anger	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
anticipation of misfortune,cyrenaics on unexpected	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
anticipation of misfortune,epictetus	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
anticipation of misfortune,posidonius	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
apatheia,freedom from,eradication of,emotion (; reasons for and against apatheia	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 184
appearance (phantasia),distinguished from judgement,belief,as involving assent,questioning of appearances	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
appropriateness,arch analogy	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
aristippus,cyrenaic	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
aristotle,on friendship	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
aristotle,proairesis	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
ascent of appetite,see appetite	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
attention,epicurean therapy distracts attention	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
avarice,lucretius,due to fear of death	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
becker,lawrence	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
belief/opinion (doxa,δόξα\u200e)	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
brutishness	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
chrysippus,on moral development	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
chrysippus,treatises of,on ends	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
chrysippus,treatises of,on justice	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
clement of alexandria,church father	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
community,cosmic	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
consolation writings,is it bad or merely unexpected?	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
curriculum,exegesis and ethics	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
curriculum	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
cyrenaics,anticipate misfortune	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
education (paideia,παιδεία\u200e) and textual community (traditional vs. neoplatonic)	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
emotions,as contumacious	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
emotions,modern theories	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
epictetus,stoic,do not project your desire to approaching food	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
epictetus,stoic,questioning appearances,assessing for indifference and training for this	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
epictetus,stoic,remember wife and children are mortal	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
epictetus,stoic,true love requires detachment	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 184, 216
epictetus	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
epicureans,against fear of death	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
epicurus,distracting attention as therapy,esp. to past	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
exegesis and (transformation of) soul	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
friendship,aristotle on	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
galen,platonizing ecletic doctor,quench thirst in a leisurely manner	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
hegesias,cyrenaic,death an escape	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
hierocles,on social instinct	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
hobbes,thomas	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 184
homer as educator	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
image (eikôn,εἰκών\u200e) in epictetus	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
irwin,terry	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
libanius	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
likeness (homoiotês,ὁμοιότης\u200e; homoiôsis,ὁμοίωσις\u200e) and causality	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
love,epictetus,true love requires detachment	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 184
lucretius,epicurean,against fear of death	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
matter (hulê,ὕλη\u200e) as qualitiless body/second substrate/first body	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
midgley,mary	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
neo-stoicism	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
oikeiōsis,unity of mankind,in zeno and epictetus,unity only of the virtuous	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 184
plutarch of chaeroneia,middle platonist,appreciating something more by imagining it absent	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
posidonius,stoic,and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
proairesis,epictetus	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
psychic/innate logos/logoi (reason principle,λόγος\u200e/λόγοι\u200e)	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
reaching (orexis)	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
relation of god (theoi,θεοί\u200e) to matter	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
rhetoric	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
self-knowledge	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
suicide,encouraged,hegesias	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
therapy,reinforcement	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
therapy,techniques see esp.	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216, 236
therapy	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216, 236
time-lapse,effects of,delay recommended in satisfying appetite	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
time-lapse,effects of,emotions fade with time,because of reassessment	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
time-lapse,effects of,familiarity in advance has same effect as fading	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
unconscious,cyrenaics	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
virtue,starting points toward (aphormai)	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
virtues	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
virtues and (reading) philosophy	d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269
will,proairesis	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216
wise person,arch analogy	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
wise person,scarcity of	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 250
zeno of citium,stoic,hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)'	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 184
zeno of citium,stoic,hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216, 236