Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

4734

Epictetus, Discourses, 4.7

nan WHAT makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, you say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber and those who exclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to the tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or is it because the child does not understand these things? If then any man does understand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to the tyrant for this very purpose because he wishes to die on account of some circumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he afraid of the guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the guards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If then a man has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I have instanced has about his body; and also about his children and his wife: and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are playing with shells care (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him or what guards or what swords? Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through habit, and is it possible that no man can learn from reason and from demonstration that God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it; but the rational animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, magnanimous and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are free from hindrance and in his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the power of others; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them. But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and mean. What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) these things, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting every thing which can happen, and enduring that which has already happened? Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and you will know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the part of a poor man. Would you have me to possess power? Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment? Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with me; for here also where I am, it was not because of the place that it was well with me, but because of my opinions which I shall carry off with me: for neither can any man deprive me of them; but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot be taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to die? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is: it is now time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here? what is going to perish of the things which are in the universe? what new thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for this reason that a tyrant is formidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to have swords which are large and sharp? Say this to others; but I have considered about all these things; no man has power over me. I have been made free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom; I have proper judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my property? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my exile or of my chains? Well, from all these things and all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches. Whom then can I still fear? Those who are over the bedchamber? Lest they should do, what? Shut me out? If they find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think it befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut out? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not choose to go in, but am always content with that which happens; for I think that what God chooses is better than what I choose. I will attach myself as a minister and follower to him; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires; in a word, I have the same will ( συνφέλω ). There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in? Because I know that nothing good is distributed within to those who enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honoured by Caesar, I say, what does he happen to get? A province (the government of a province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought? The office of a Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office well? Why do I still strive to enter (Caesar’s chamber)? A man scatters dried figs and nuts: the children seize them, and fight with one another; men do not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a man should throw about shells, even the children do not seize them. Provinces are distributed: let children look to that. Money is distributed: let children look to that. Praetorships, consulships are distributed: let children scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves: but to me these are only dried figs and nuts. What then? If you fail to get them, while Caesar is scattering them about, do not be troubled: if a dried fig come into your lap, take it and eat it; for so far you may value even a fig. But if I shall stoop down and turn another over, or be turned over by another, and shall flatter those who have got into (Caesar’s) chamber, neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor any thing else of the things which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to think good. Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they are, and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp swords do? They kill. And what does a fever do? Nothing else. And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing else. Would you then have me to wonder at these things and worship them, and go about as the slave of all of them? I hope that this will not happen: but when I have once learned that every thing which has come into existence must also go out of it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it or a tile, or a soldier. But if a man must make a comparison between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with less trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear any thing which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire any thing which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (admiration)? Why am I still confounded? Why do I fear the guards? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke to me? Is he a Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise should be a proof of what I am? Have I been eager to imitate his morals? But I keep up the play and go to him, and serve him so long as he does not bid me to do any thing foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, Go and bring Leon of Salamis, I say to him, Seek another, for I am no longer playing. (The tyrant says): Lead him away (to prison). I follow; that is part of the play. But your head will be taken off—Does the tyrant’s head always remain where it is, and the heads of you who obey him?—But you will be cast out unburied?—If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly according as the fact is, and do not think of frightening me. These things are formidable to children and fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher’s school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of fear and to flatter those whom afterwards he used to flatter; (and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh nor bones nor sinews ( νεῦρα ), but he is that which makes use of these parts of the body and governs there and follows (understands) the appearances of things. Yes, but this talk makes us despise the laws—And what kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws who employ such talk? And the things which are in the power of a fool are not law. And yet see how this talk makes us disposed as we ought to be even to these men (fools); since it teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as to the body to give it up, as to property to give that up also, as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give up all; it only makes an exception of the opinions, which even Zeus has willed to be the select property of every man. What transgression of the laws is there here, what folly? Where you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to you: on the other hand, where I am superior, do you yield to me; for I have studied (cared for) this, and you have not. It is your study to live in houses with floors formed of various stones, how your slaves and dependents shall serve you, how you shall wear fine clothing, have many hunting men, lute players, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these? have you made any study of opinions, and of your own rational faculty? Do you know of what parts it is composed, how they are brought together, how they are connected, what powers it has, and of what kind? Why then are you vexed, if another who has made it his study, has the advantage over you in these things? But these things are the greatest. And who hinders you from being employed about these things and looking after them? And who has a better stock of books, of leisure, of persons to aid you? Only turn your mind at last to these things, attend, if it be only a short time, to your own ruling faculty ( ἡγεμονικόν ): consider what this is that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and rejects. But so long as you employ yourself about externals you will possess them (externals) as no man else does; but you will have this (the ruling faculty) such as you choose to have it, sordid and neglected.

Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

14 results
1. Homer, Iliad, 10.279-10.280 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
2. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 2.3. Even if I had any clear view, I should still prefer to hear you speak in your turn, now that I have said so much myself." "Well," replied Balbus, "I will yield to your wish; and I shall be as brief as I can, for indeed when the errors of Epicurus have been refuted, my argument is robbed of all occasion for prolixity. To take a general view, the topic of the immortal gods which you raise is divided by our school into four parts: first they prove that the gods exist; next they explain their nature; then they show that the world is governed by them; and lastly that they care for the fortunes of mankind. In our present discourse however let us take the first two of these heads; the third and fourth, being questions of greater magnitude, had better I think be put off to another time." "No, no," cried Cotta, "we are at leisure now, and moreover the subjects which we are discussing might fitly claim precedence even of matters of business.
3. Cicero, On Duties, 1.128 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 1.128. Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui filerunt Stoici paene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea, quae turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa ducamus, illa autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis. Latrocinari, fraudare, adulterare re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene; liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine obscenum; pluraque in ear sententiam ab eisdem contra verecundiam disputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur et ab omni, quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione, fugiamus; status incessus, sessio accubitio, vultus oculi manuum motus teneat illud decorum. 1.128.  But we should give no heed to the Cynics (or to some Stoics who are practically Cynics) who censure and ridicule us for holding that the mere mention of some actions that are not immoral is shameful, while other things that are immoral we call by their real names. Robbery, fraud, and adultery, for example, are immoral in deed, but it is not indecent to name them. To beget children in wedlock is in deed morally right; to speak of it is indecent. And they assail modesty with a great many other arguments to the same purport. But as for us, let us follow Nature and shun everything that is offensive to our eyes or our ears. So, in standing or walking, in sitting or reclining, in our expression, our eyes, or the movements of our hands, let us preserve what we have called "propriety.
4. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.6.11-4.6.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
5. Livy, History, 1.19.4 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
6. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.12, 1.12.1-1.12.3, 1.12.5, 1.12.8, 1.16, 1.16.2, 1.16.9-1.16.18, 2.9.19-2.9.20, 4.7.2-4.7.7 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
7. New Testament, 2 Corinthians, 5.11, 7.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
8. New Testament, Philippians, 2.12, 4.10-4.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) 2.12. So then, my beloved, even as you have always obeyed, not only in my presence, but now much more in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. 4.10. But I rejoice in the Lord greatly, that now at length you have revived your thought for me; in which you did indeed take thought, but you lacked opportunity. 4.11. Not that I speak in respect to lack, for I have learned in whatever state I am, to be content in it. 4.12. I know how to be humbled, and I know also how to abound. In everything and in all things I have learned the secret both to be filled and to be hungry, both to abound and to be in need. 4.13. I can do all things through Christ, who strengthens me. 4.14. However you did well that you had fellowship with my affliction. 4.15. You yourselves also know, you Philippians, that in the beginning of the gospel, when I departed from Macedonia, no assembly had fellowship with me in the matter of giving and receiving but you only. 4.16. For even in Thessalonica you sent once and again to my need. 4.17. Not that I seek for the gift, but I seek for the fruit that increases to your account. 4.18. But I have all things, and abound. I am filled, having received from Epaphroditus the things that came from you, a sweet-smelling fragrance, an acceptable and well-pleasing sacrifice to God. 4.19. My God will supply every need of yours according to his riches in glory in Christ Jesus. 4.20. Now to our God and Father be the glory forever and ever! Amen.
9. New Testament, Romans, 11.13, 11.15-11.21, 11.25-11.26 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) 11.13. For I speak to you who are Gentiles. Since then as I am an apostle to Gentiles, I glorify my ministry; 11.15. For if the rejection of them is the reconciling of the world, what would their acceptance be, but life from the dead? 11.16. If the first fruit is holy, so is the lump. If the root is holy, so are the branches. 11.17. But if some of the branches were broken off, and you, being a wild olive, were grafted in among them, and became partaker with them of the root and of the richness of the olive tree; 11.18. don't boast over the branches. But if you boast, it is not you who support the root, but the root supports you. 11.19. You will say then, "Branches were broken off, that I might be grafted in. 11.20. True; by their unbelief they were broken off, and you stand by your faith. Don't be conceited, but fear; 11.21. for if God didn't spare the natural branches, neither will he spare you. 11.25. For I don't desire, brothers, to have you ignorant of this mystery, so that you won't be wise in your own conceits, that a partial hardening has happened to Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles has come in 11.26. and so all Israel will be saved. Even as it is written, "There will come out of Zion the Deliverer, And he will turn away ungodliness from Jacob.
10. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, 1071b, 1069e (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
11. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1034c (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
12. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 9.189-9.190 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
13. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.245-3.246 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
14. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.4, 7.12, 7.33-7.34, 7.111-7.113, 7.116, 7.122, 7.187-7.189 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) 7.4. For a certain space, then, he was instructed by Crates, and when at this time he had written his Republic, some said in jest that he had written it on Cynosura, i.e. on the dog's tail. Besides the Republic he wrote the following works:of Life according to Nature.of Impulse, or Human Nature.of Emotions.of Duty.of Law.of Greek Education.of Vision.of the Whole World.of Signs.Pythagorean Questions.Universals.of Varieties of Style.Homeric Problems, in five books.of the Reading of Poetry.There are also by him:A Handbook of Rhetoric.Solutions.Two books of Refutations.Recollections of Crates.Ethics.This is a list of his writings. But at last he left Crates, and the men above mentioned were his masters for twenty years. Hence he is reported to have said, I made a prosperous voyage when I suffered shipwreck. But others attribute this saying of his to the time when he was under Crates. 7.12. Thraso of the deme Anacaea, Philocles of Peiraeus, Phaedrus of Anaphlystus, Medon of Acharnae, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Paeania have been elected commissioners for the making of the crown and the building.These are the terms of the decree.Antigonus of Carystus tells us that he never denied that he was a citizen of Citium. For when he was one of those who contributed to the restoration of the baths and his name was inscribed upon the pillar as Zeno the philosopher, he requested that the words of Citium should be added. He made a hollow lid for a flask and used to carry about money in it, in order that there might be provision at hand for the necessities of his master Crates. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. 7.34. That the Republic is the work of Zeno is attested by Chrysippus in his De Republica. And he discussed amatory subjects in the beginning of that book of his which is entitled The Art of Love. Moreover, he writes much the same in his Interludes. So much for the criticisms to be found not only in Cassius but in Isidorus of Pergamum, the rhetorician. Isidorus likewise affirms that the passages disapproved by the school were expunged from his works by Athenodorus the Stoic, who was in charge of the Pergamene library; and that afterwards, when Athenodorus was detected and compromised, they were replaced. So much concerning the passages in his writings which are regarded as spurious. 7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 7.112. Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole.Fear is an expectation of evil. Under fear are ranged the following emotions: terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony. Terror is a fear which produces fright; shame is fear of disgrace; nervous shrinking is a fear that one will have to act; consternation is fear due to a presentation of some unusual occurrence; 7.113. panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty. 7.116. Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness. 7.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. 7.187. Again: If anyone is in Megara, he is not in Athens: now there is a man in Megara, therefore there is not a man in Athens. Again: If you say something, it passes through your lips: now you say wagon, consequently a wagon passes through your lips. And further: If you never lost something, you have it still; but you never lost horns, ergo you have horns. Others attribute this to Eubulides.There are people who run Chrysippus down as having written much in a tone that is gross and indecent. For in his work On the ancient Natural Philosophers at line 600 or thereabouts he interprets the story of Hera and Zeus coarsely, with details which no one would soil his lips by repeating. 7.188. Indeed, his interpretation of the story is condemned as most indecent. He may be commending physical doctrine; but the language used is more appropriate to street-walkers than to deities; and it is moreover not even mentioned by bibliographers, who wrote on the titles of books. What Chrysippus makes of it is not to be found in Polemo nor Hypsicrates, no, nor even in Antigonus. It is his own invention. Again, in his Republic he permits marriage with mothers and daughters and sons. He says the same in his work On Things for their own Sake not Desirable, right at the outset. In the third book of his treatise On Justice, at about line 1000, he permits eating of the corpses of the dead. And in the second book of his On the Means of Livelihood, where he professes to be considering a priori how the wise man is to get his living, occur the words: 7.189. And yet what reason is there that he should provide a living? For if it be to support life, life itself is after all a thing indifferent. If it be for pleasure, pleasure too is a thing indifferent. While if it be for virtue, virtue in itself is sufficient to constitute happiness. The modes of getting a livelihood are also ludicrous, as e.g. maintece by a king; for he will have to be humoured: or by friends; for friendship will then be purchasable for money: or living by wisdom; for so wisdom will become mercenary. These are the objections urged against him.

Subjects of this text:

subject	book bibliographic info
agency, divine	Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 132
agency, human	Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 132
appropriation'	Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 203
arrian, and epictetus teachings	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 151
arrian of nicomedia	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 280
cannae	Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 162
carthage	Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 162
children	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 280, 310
christian, teachings, philosophical elements in	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
christians, roman view of	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
christians	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
deity, deities	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
demonstration	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
desire (epithumia)	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
diatribai (dissertationes), on λογικός and human vocation	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 151
divine providence, and human vocation in epictetus	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 147, 148, 149, 150, 151
dobbin, robert f.	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 151
epictetus, compared with paul	Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 132
epictetus, on christians	Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 132
epictetus, on divine providence and human vocation	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 147, 148, 149, 150, 151
epictetus	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 280
erskine, andrew	Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 203
fearlessness	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
flaminius	Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 162
freedom, and cognition	Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 132
galileans	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 280
gathercole, simon	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 149
gentiles (ethnē)	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
gift of cognition, in epictetus and paul	Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 132
gill, christopher	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 148, 149
god	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 280, 310
grief (lupē)	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
hengel, martin	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 149
huttunen, niko	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 149
israel	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
lunatics	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
metus hostilis	Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 162
nicopolis	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 280
pagan, second-century	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 280
passions (pathē)	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
paul, and moral progress	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
paul, and passions (pathē)	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
paul, rhetoric of	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
paul	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
philosophers, ancient	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
philosophy (term), of epictetus	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 280
pliny the younger	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
reason	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 280, 310
roman assembly, correspondence	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
salvation	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
sedley, david	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 147; Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 203
self-sufficiency, in paul	Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 132
socrates, in epictetus	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 147, 148
soul	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
stern, menahem	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 149
stoicism, and freedom through cognition	Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 132
stoics, stoicism	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
suetonius	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
tacitus	Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 162; Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
tiberius	Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 162
trasimene, lake	Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 162
tyrant	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 280, 310
universe	Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 310
varro, as flaminius	Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 162
virtus, martial	Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 162
vollenweider, samuel	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 149
word (logos)	Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 99
zeno	Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 203
γαλιλαῖοι	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 149
λογικός, and human vocation in epictetus	Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 151