1. Cicero, On Fate, 9-10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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2. Cicero, On Duties, 1.6-1.7, 1.9, 3.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 1.6. Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat, tamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi consentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum, Academicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset. Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. 1.7. Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio futura est, ante definire, quid sit officium; quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror. Omnis enim, quae a ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio, debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur, quid sit id, de quo disputetur Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum, alterum, quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnis partis usus vitae conformari possit. Superioris generis huius modi sunt exempla: omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem. Quorum autem officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur; de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum. Atque etiam alia divisio est officii. 1.9. Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi deliberatio. Nam aut honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant id, quod in deliberationem cadit; in quo considerando saepe animi in contraries sententias distrahuntur. Tum autem aut anquirunt aut consultant, ad vitae commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum atque copias, ad opes, ad potentiam, quibus et se possint iuvare et suos, conducat id necne, de quo deliberant; quae deliberatio omnis in rationem utilitatis cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cum pugnare videtur cum honesto id, quod videtur esse utile; cum enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra revocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deliberando animus afferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi. 3.95. Quid, quod Agamemnon cum devovisset Dianae, quod in suo regno pulcherrimum natum esset illo anno, immolavit Iphigeniam, qua nihil erat eo quidem anno natum pulchrius? Promissum potius non faciendum quam tam taetrum facinus admittendum fuit. Ergo et promissa non facienda non numquam, neque semper deposita reddenda. Si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum sit, officium non reddere. Quid? si is, qui apud te pecuniam deposuerit, bellum inferat patriae, reddasne depositum? Non credo; facias enim contra rem publicam, quae debet esse carissima. Sic multa, quae honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta; facere promissa, stare conventis, reddere deposita commutata utilitate fiunt non honesta. Ac de iis quidem, quae videntur esse utilitates contra iustitiam simulatione prudentiae, satis arbitror dictum. | 3.95. And once more; when Agamemnon had vowed to Diana the most beautiful creature born that year within his realm, he was brought to sacrifice Iphigenia; for in that year nothing was born more beautiful than she. He ought to have broken his vow rather than commit so horrible a crime. Promises are, therefore, sometimes not to be kept; and trusts are not always to be restored. Suppose that a person leaves his sword with you when he is in his right mind, and demands it back in a fit of insanity; it would be criminal to restore it to him; it would be your duty not to do so. Again, suppose that a man who has entrusted money to you proposes to make war upon your common country, should you restore the trust? I believe you should not; for you would be acting against the state, which ought to be the dearest thing in the world to you. Thus there are many things which in and of themselves seem morally right, but which under certain circumstances prove to be not morally right: to keep a promise, to abide by an agreement, to restore a trust may, with a change of expediency, cease to be morally right. With this I think I have said enough about those actions which masquerade as expedient under the guise of prudence, while they are really contrary to justice. |
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3. Cicero, Letters, 1.1.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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4. Cicero, Letters, 1.1.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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5. Cicero, Letters, 1.1.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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6. Cicero, Letters, 1.1.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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7. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. | |
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8. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 1.40 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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9. Philo of Alexandria, On The Cherubim, 15, 14 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
| 14. Now of the kind of opposition of place which is connected with standing in front of a judge for judgment, we have an example in the case of the woman who has been suspected of having committed adultery. For, says Moses, "the priest shall cause the woman to stand in front of her lord, and she shall uncover her Head." Let us now examine what he intends to show by this direction. It often happens that what ought to be done is not done, in the manner in which it ought to be done, and sometimes too that which is not proper is nevertheless done in a proper manner. For instance, when the return of a deposit is not made in an honest spirit, but is intended either to work the injury of him who receives it back again, or by way of a snare to bear out a denial in the case of another deposit of greater value, in that case a proper action is done in an improper manner. 14. The third cause is this; as men who set out on a long voyage do not when they have embarked on board ship, and started from the harbour, then begin for the first time to prepare their masts, and cables, and rudders, but, while still remaining on the land, they make ready everything which can conduce to the success of their voyage; so in the same manner Moses did not think it fit that his people, after they had received their inheritances, and settled as inhabitants of their cities, should then seek laws in accordance with which they were to regulate their cities, but that, having previously prepared laws and constitutions, and being trained in those regulations, by which nations can be governed with safety, they should then be settled in their cities, being prepared at once to use the just regulations which were already prepared for them, in uimity and a complete participation in and proper distribution of those things which were fitting for each person. IV. |
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10. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1.1-1.1.13, 1.4.3, 1.4.14, 1.4.28-1.4.29, 1.6.13-1.6.16, 1.6.18-1.6.22, 1.12.8-1.12.12, 1.18.2-1.18.6, 1.20.5, 1.20.7, 1.21.2, 1.24.8, 1.28.4-1.28.5, 1.28.7-1.28.9, 1.28.12-1.28.13, 1.28.31-1.28.33, 1.30.4, 2.2.1-2.2.7, 2.2.19-2.2.26, 2.5.20, 2.8.1-2.8.8, 2.8.23, 2.9.1-2.9.6, 2.17.19-2.17.20, 2.17.23-2.17.26, 2.17.31, 2.18.11-2.18.12, 2.18.23-2.18.26, 2.18.29, 2.22.25-2.22.26, 3.2.4, 3.12.11-3.12.12, 3.13.11, 3.13.13, 3.22.105-3.22.106, 3.24.24, 4.1.1, 4.1.6-4.1.23, 4.1.33-4.1.37, 4.1.40, 4.1.42, 4.1.47, 4.1.51-4.1.62, 4.1.68-4.1.90, 4.1.98-4.1.105, 4.1.107-4.1.123, 4.1.127-4.1.131, 4.1.138-4.1.140, 4.1.145-4.1.147, 4.1.151-4.1.154, 4.1.156-4.1.158, 4.1.162-4.1.163, 4.1.165, 4.1.173, 4.1.176, 4.3.7, 4.8.27, 4.10.13, 4.10.22, 4.10.26 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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11. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1.2-1.3, 1.5, 12.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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12. Ignatius, To The Romans, 2.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
| 2.1. For I would not have you to be men-pleasers but to please God, as indeed ye do please Him. For neither shall I myself ever find an opportunity such as this to attain unto God, nor can ye, if ye be silent, win the credit of any nobler work. For, if ye be silent and leave me alone, I am a word of God; but if ye desire my flesh, then shall I be again a mere cry. |
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13. New Testament, 1 Thessalonians, 1.5, 2.1, 2.5, 2.14, 3.3-3.4, 4.6, 5.2, 5.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
| 1.5. and that our gospel came to you not in word only, but also in power, and in the Holy Spirit, and with much assurance. You know what kind of men we showed ourselves to be among you for your sake. 2.1. For you yourselves know, brothers, our visit to you wasn't in vain 2.5. For neither were we at any time found using words of flattery, as you know, nor a cloak of covetousness (God is witness) 2.14. For you, brothers, became imitators of the assemblies of God which are in Judea in Christ Jesus; for you also suffered the same things from your own countrymen, even as they did from the Jews; 3.3. that no one be moved by these afflictions. For you know that we are appointed to this task. 3.4. For most assuredly, when we were with you, we told you beforehand that we are to suffer affliction, even as it happened, and you know. 4.6. that no one should take advantage of and wrong a brother or sister in this matter; because the Lord is an avenger in all these things, as also we forewarned you and testified. 5.2. For you yourselves know well that the day of the Lord comes like a thief in the night. 5.7. For those who sleep, sleep in the night, and those who are drunken are drunken in the night. |
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14. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 6.5-6.6, 11.9-11.10, 85.10-85.13, 94.26, 95.72 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
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15. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1.14-19.1.21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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16. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 6.32, 6.41, 8.7, 9.40, 11.37 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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17. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.121-7.122 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
| 7.121. But Heraclides of Tarsus, who was the disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus both assert that sins are not equal.Again, the Stoics say that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him – so, for instance, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Various Types of Life – since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue. Also (they maintain) he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, they say that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never give assent to anything that is false; that he will also play the Cynic, Cynicism being a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances. They declare that he alone is free and bad men are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same; 7.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. |
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