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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4734
Epictetus, Discourses, 3.16.16
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

19 results
1. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

38e. many things which are, as I maintain, unworthy of me—such things as you are accustomed to hear from others. But I did not think at the time that I ought, on account of the danger I was in, to do anything unworthy of a free man, nor do I now repent of having made my defence as I did, but I much prefer to die after such a defence than to live after a defence of the other sort. For neither in the court nor in war ought I
2. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.12, 3.42-3.44, 3.50, 4.20 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.12. Quae adhuc, Cato, a te a te B ate E ante dicta sunt, eadem, inquam, dicere posses, si sequerere Pyrrhonem aut Aristonem. nec enim ignoras his his edd. siis A, si BE; is ( post eras. breviss. vocabul., cuius initium cognoscitur, fort. ) R; his (h ab alt. m. in ras. ) N; si is V istud honestum non summum modo, sed etiam, ut tu vis, solum bonum videri. quod si ita est, sequitur id ipsum, quod te velle video, omnes semper beatos esse sapientes. hosne igitur laudas et hanc eorum, inquam, sententiam sequi nos censes oportere? Minime vero istorum quidem, inquit. cum enim virtutis hoc proprium sit, earum rerum, quae quae qui AR secundum naturam sint, habere delectum, qui qui edd. quae (que) omnia sic exaequaverunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti uti edd. ut in nulla selectione uterentur, hi hi Mdv. hy BE huius ANV h (= huius) R virtutem ipsam sustulerunt. 3.42. An vero certius quicquam potest esse quam illorum ratione, illorum ratione Lamb. illo ratione (rōe R) AR illa ratione BEV illa ratio est N qui dolorem in malis ponunt, non posse sapientem beatum esse, cum eculeo equuleo R torqueatur? eorum autem, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit ut in omnibus ut in omnibus NV uti n oi ibus R uti nominibus ABE tormentis conservetur beata vita beata vitaz ARN vita beata BEV sapienti. etenim si dolores eosdem tolerabilius patiuntur qui excipiunt eos pro patria quam qui leviore leviori BE de causa, opinio facit, non natura, vim doloris aut maiorem aut minorem. 3.43. Ne illud quidem est consentaneum, ut, si, cum tria genera bonorum sint, quae sententia est Peripateticorum, eo beatior quisque sit, quo sit corporis aut externis bonis plenior, ut hoc idem adprobandum sit nobis, ut, qui plura habeat ea, quae in corpore magni aestimantur, sit beatior. illi enim corporis commodis compleri vitam beatam putant, nostri nihil minus. nam cum ita placeat, ne eorum quidem bonorum, quae nos bona vere appellemus, frequentia beatiorem vitam fieri aut magis expetendam aut pluris aestimandam, certe minus ad beatam vitam pertinet multitudo corporis commodorum. 3.44. etenim, si et sapere expetendum sit et valere, coniunctum utrumque magis expetendum sit quam sapere solum, neque tamen, si utrumque sit aestimatione dignum, pluris sit coniunctum quam sapere ipsum separatim. nam qui valitudinem aestimatione aliqua dignam iudicamus neque eam tamen in bonis ponimus, idem censemus nullam esse tantam aestimationem, ut ea virtuti anteponatur. quod idem Peripatetici non tenent, quibus dicendum est, quae et honesta actio sit et sine dolore, eam magis esse expetendam, quam si esset eadem actio cum dolore. nobis aliter videtur, recte secusne, postea; sed potestne sed potest ne V sed postne AB sed post ne E sed ne ( inter sed et ne ras. duarum fere litt. ) R sed p o t ne (p o t ex corr. alt. m., t in ras. ) N rerum maior esse dissensio? 3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE 4.20. Alia quaedam dicent, credo, magna antiquorum esse peccata, quae ille veri veri ( corr., ut videtur, ex vere) N vere BEV vero R investigandi cupidus nullo modo ferre potuerit. quid enim perversius, quid intolerabilius, quid stultius quam bonam valitudinem, quam dolorum omnium vacuitatem, quam integritatem oculorum reliquorumque sensuum ponere in bonis potius, quam dicerent nihil omnino inter eas res iisque contrarias interesse? ea enim omnia, quae illi bona dicerent, praeposita esse, non bona, itemque illa, quae in corpore excellerent, stulte antiquos dixisse per se esse expetenda; sumenda potius quam expetenda. ea denique omni vita, quae in una virtute virtute una BE consisteret, illam vitam, quae etiam ceteris rebus, quae essent secundum naturam, abundaret, magis expetendam non esse. sed magis sumendam. cumque ipsa virtus efficiat ita beatam vitam, ut beatior esse non possit, tamen quaedam deesse sapientibus tum, cum sint beatissimi; itaque eos id agere, ut a se dolores, morbos, debilitates repellant. 3.12.  "What you have said so far, Cato," I answered, "might equally well be said by a follower of Pyrrho or of Aristo. They, as you are aware, think as you do, that this Moral Worth you speak of is not merely the chief but the only Good; and from this of necessity follows the proposition that I notice you maintain, namely, that the Wise are always happy. Do you then," I asked, "commend these philosophers, and think that we ought to adopt this view of theirs?" "I certainly would not have you adopt their view," he said; "for it is of the essence of virtue to exercise choice among the things in accordance with nature; so that philosophers who make all things absolutely equal, rendering them indistinguishable either as better or worse, and leaving no room for selection among them, have abolished virtue itself. 3.42.  "Again, can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause, shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature. 3.43.  Further, on the Peripatetic theory that there are three kinds of goods, the more abundantly supplied a man is with bodily or external goods, the happier he is; but it does not follow that we Stoics can accept the same position, and say that the more a man has of those bodily things that are highly valued the happier he is. For the Peripatetics hold that the sum of happiness includes bodily advantages, but we deny this altogether. We hold that the multiplication even of those goods that in our view are truly so called does not render life happier or more desirable or of higher value; even less therefore is happiness affected by the accumulation of bodily advantages. 3.44.  Clearly if wisdom and health be both desirable, a combination of the two would be more desirable than wisdom alone; but it is not the case that if both be deserving of value, wisdom plus ')" onMouseOut="nd();"health is worth more than wisdom by itself separately. We deem health to be deserving of a certain value, but we do not reckon it a good; at the same time we rate no value so highly as to place it above virtue. This is not the view of the Peripatetics, who are bound to say that an action which is both morally good and not attended by pain is more desirable than the same action if accompanied by pain. We think otherwise — whether rightly or wrongly, I will consider later; but how could there be a wider or more real difference of opinion? 3.50.  But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. 4.20.  As I understand, they will accuse the ancients of certain grave errors in other matters, which that ardent seeker after truth found himself quite unable to tolerate. What, he asked, could have been more insufferably foolish and perverse than to take good health, freedom from all pain, or soundness of eyesight and of the other senses, and class them as goods, instead of saying that there was nothing whatever to choose between these things and their opposites? According to him, all these things which the ancients called good, were not good, but 'preferred'; and so also with bodily excellences, it was foolish of the ancients to call them 'desirable for their own sakes'; they were not 'desirable' but 'worth taking'; and in short, speaking generally, a life bountifully supplied with all the other things in accordance with nature, in addition to virtue, was not 'more desirable,' but only 'more worth taking' than a life of virtue and virtue alone; and although virtue of itself can render life as happy as it is possible for it to be, yet there are some things that Wise Men lack at the very moment of supreme happiness; and accordingly they do their best to protect themselves from pain, disease and infirmity.
3. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 3.42, 4.97 (1st cent. CE

4. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.25.2, 1.30.4, 2.1.6-2.1.7, 3.3.15, 3.15.13, 3.16.3, 3.16.7, 3.16.15, 3.19.1-3.19.2, 4.1.83 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

5. Josephus Flavius, Jewish War, 1.44, 1.209 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

1.44. Now he that governed the elephant was but a private man; and had he proved to be Antiochus, Eleazar had performed nothing more by this bold stroke than that it might appear he chose to die, when he had the bare hope of thereby doing a glorious action; 1.44. This charge fell like a thunderbolt upon Herod, and put him into disorder; and that especially, because his love to her occasioned him to be jealous, and because he considered with himself that Cleopatra was a shrewd woman, and that on her account Lysanias the king was taken off, as well as Malichus the Arabian; for his fear did not only extend to the dissolving of his marriage, but to the danger of his life. 1.209. These men said, that by committing the public affairs to the management of Antipater and of his sons, he sat down with nothing but the bare name of a king, without any of its authority; and they asked him how long he would so far mistake himself, as to breed up kings against his own interest; for that they did not now conceal their government of affairs any longer, but were plainly lords of the nation, and had thrust him out of his authority; that this was the case when Herod slew so many men without his giving him any command to do it, either by word of mouth, or by his letter, and this in contradiction to the law of the Jews; who therefore, in case he be not a king, but a private man, still ought to come to his trial, and answer it to him, and to the laws of his country, which do not permit anyone to be killed till he had been condemned in judgment.
6. Musonius Rufus, Dissertationum A Lucio Digestarum Reliquiae, 9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

7. New Testament, Acts, 4.13 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

4.13. Now when they saw the boldness of Peter and John, and had perceived that they were unlearned and ignorant men, they marveled. They recognized that they had been with Jesus.
8. Plutarch, Comparison of Numa With Lycurgus, 1.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

1.1. Now that we have recounted the lives of Numa and Lycurgus, and both lie clearly before us, we must attempt, even though the task be difficult, to assemble and put together their points of difference. For their points of likeness are obvious from their careers: their wise moderation, their piety, their talent for governing and educating, and their both deriving their laws from a divine source. But each also performed noble deeds peculiar to himself. To begin with, Numa accepted, but Lycurgus resigned, a kingdom.
9. Lucian, Disowned, 26 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Lucian, Apology, 12 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Lucian, On Mourning, 2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

2. The vulgar (as philosophers call the generality of mankind), implicitly taking as their text book the fictions of Homer and Hesiod and other poets, assume the existence of a deep subterranean hole called Hades; spacious, murky, and sunless, but by some mysterious means sufficiently lighted to render all its details visible. Its king is a brother of Zeus, one Pluto; whose name — so an able philologer assures me — contains a complimentary allusion to his ghostly wealth. As to the nature of his government, and the condition of his subjects, the authority allotted to him extends over all the dead, who, from the moment that they come under his control, are kept in unbreakable fetters; Shades are on no account permitted to return to Earth; to this rule there have been only two or three exceptions since the beginning of the world, and these were made for very urgent reasons.
12. Lucian, The Passing of Peregrinus, 18, 13 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

13. Lucian, The Runaways, 21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

14. Lucian, The Sky-Man, 16 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

16. Such was the entertainment afforded me by royalty; private life was much more amusing; for I could make that out too. I saw Hermodorus the Epicurean perjuring himself for 40 pounds, Agathocles the Stoic suing a pupil for his fees, lawyer Clinias stealing a bowl from the temple of Asclepius, and Herophilus the cynic sleeping in a brothel. Not to mention the multitude of burglars, litigants, usurers, duns; oh, it was a fine representative show!Fr. I must say, Menippus, I should have liked the details here too; it all seems to have been very much to your taste.Me. I could not go through the whole of it, even to please you; to take it in with the eyes kept one busy. But the main divisions were very much what Homer gives from the shield of Achilles: here junketings and marriages, there courts and councils, in another compartment a sacrifice, and hard by a mourning. If I glanced at Getica, I would see the Getae at war; at Scythia, there were the Scythians wandering about on their waggons; half a turn in another direction gave me Egyptians at the plough, or Phoenicians chaffering, Cilician pirates, Spartan flagellants, Athenians at law.
15. Lucian, The Lover of Lies, 9 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

16. Lucian, A True Story, 2.31 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

17. Lucian, Philosophies For Sale, 10 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

18. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.101-7.102, 7.104-7.105, 7.160-7.164 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.101. And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term good has equal force with the term beautiful, which comes to the same thing. Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good. They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent). 7.102. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine, book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics, and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision things preferred. 7.104. To benefit is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with virtue; whereas to harm is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with vice.The term indifferent has two meanings: in the first it denotes the things which do not contribute either to happiness or to misery, as wealth, fame, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy without having these, although, if they are used in a certain way, such use of them tends to happiness or misery. In quite another sense those things are said to be indifferent which are without the power of stirring inclination or aversion; e.g. the fact that the number of hairs on one's head is odd or even or whether you hold out your finger straight or bent. But it was not in this sense that the things mentioned above were termed indifferent 7.105. they being quite capable of exciting inclination or aversion. Hence of these latter some are taken by preference, others are rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense affords no ground for either choosing or avoiding.of things indifferent, as they express it, some are preferred, others rejected. Such as have value, they say, are preferred, while such as have negative, instead of positive, value are rejected. Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living, such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which indirectly contributes to the life according to nature: which is as much as to say any assistance brought by wealth or health towards living a natural life; thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts – as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in. 7.160. 2. ARISTONAriston the Bald, of Chios, who was also called the Siren, declared the end of action to be a life of perfect indifference to everything which is neither virtue nor vice; recognizing no distinction whatever in things indifferent, but treating them all alike. The wise man he compared to a good actor, who, if called upon to take the part of a Thersites or of an Agamemnon, will impersonate them both becomingly. He wished to discard both Logic and Physics, saying that Physics was beyond our reach and Logic did not concern us: all that did concern us was Ethics. 7.161. Dialectical reasonings, he said, are like spiders' webs, which, though they seem to display some artistic workmanship, are yet of no use. He would not admit a plurality of virtues with Zeno, nor again with the Megarians one single virtue called by many names; but he treated virtue in accordance with the category of relative modes. Teaching this sort of philosophy, and lecturing in the Cynosarges, he acquired such influence as to be called the founder of a sect. At any rate Miltiades and Diphilus were denominated Aristoneans. He was a plausible speaker and suited the taste of the general public. Hence Timon's verse about him:One who from wily Ariston's line boasts his descent. 7.162. After meeting Polemo, says Diocles of Magnesia, while Zeno was suffering from a protracted illness, he recanted his views. The Stoic doctrine to which he attached most importance was the wise man's refusal to hold mere opinions. And against this doctrine Persaeus was contending when he induced one of a pair of twins to deposit a certain sum with Ariston and afterwards got the other to reclaim it. Ariston being thus reduced to perplexity was refuted. He was at variance with Arcesilaus; and one day when he saw an abortion in the shape of a bull with a uterus, he said, Alas, here Arcesilaus has had given into his hand an argument against the evidence of the senses. 7.163. When some Academic alleged that he had no certainty of anything, Ariston said, Do you not even see your neighbour sitting by you? and when the other answered No, he rejoined,Who can have blinded you? who robbed you of luminous eyesight?The books attributed to him are as follows:Exhortations, two books.of Zeno's Doctrines.Dialogues.Lectures, six books.Dissertations on Philosophy, seven books.Dissertations on Love.Commonplaces on Vainglory.Notebooks, twenty-five volumes.Memorabilia, three books.Anecdotes, eleven books.Against the Rhetoricians.An Answer to the Counter-pleas of Alexinus.Against the Dialecticians, three books.Letters to Cleanthes, four books.Panaetius and Sosicrates consider the Letters to be alone genuine; all the other works named they attribute to Ariston the Peripatetic. 7.164. The story goes that being bald he had a sunstroke and so came to his end. I have composed a trifling poem upon him in limping iambics as follows:Wherefore, Ariston, when old and bald did you let the sun roast your forehead? Thus seeking warmth more than was reasonable, you lit unwillingly upon the chill reality of Death.There was also another Ariston, a native of Iulis; a third, a musician of Athens; a fourth, a tragic poet; a fifth, of Halae, author of treatises on rhetoric; a sixth, a Peripatetic philosopher of Alexandria.
19. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
adiaphora/indistinguishable/neutral, translation of Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32
appropriation (oikeiōsis) Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 33
cleanthes Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 33
crete vii Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
divine being, cronus Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
divine being, destiny Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
divine being, hermes Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
economics, wealth Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
education Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
egypt Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
epicurus/epicureans Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 33
good (agathos) Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32, 33
honor Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
impulses Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32, 33
king, emperor, marcus aurelius Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
mind, observation Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
nature, natural phenomena, earth, land Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
nature, natural phenomena, heaven, sky Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
nature/nature Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32
neither/nothing (oudeteros/ouden) Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32, 33
philosophy, cynic Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
philosophy, epicurean Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
philosophy, stoic Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
philosophy Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
punishment Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
rhetoric, dialogue Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
rhetoric, satire Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
socrates Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 33
tyranny' Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 257
value (axia) Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 33
vice Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32, 33
virtue Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 33