1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.35 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 3.35. Nec vero perturbationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt, quas Graeci pa/- qh appellant—poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conveniret conveniret A. Man. conveniet ABERN conveniat V ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt pa/qos . sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur nec eae perturbationes vi aliqua naturali moventur . secl. Mdv. omnesque eae eae ee RV he (h in ras. ) N hec BE; om. ( spatio parvo relicto ) A sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures, aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi h(donh/n appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam. perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac iudicia levitatis. itaque his sapiens semper vacabit. | 3.35. "Moreover the emotions of the mind, which harass and embitter the life of the foolish (the Greek term for these is pathos, and I might have rendered this literally and styled them 'diseases,' but the word 'disease' would not suit all instances; for example, no one speaks of pity, nor yet anger, as a disease, though the Greeks term these pathos. Let us then accept the term 'emotion,' the very sound of which seems to denote something vicious, and these emotions are not excited by any natural influence. The list of the emotions is divided into four classes, with numerous subdivisions, namely sorrow, fear, lust, and that mental emotion which the Stoics call by a name that also denotes a bodily feeling, hÄdonÄ 'pleasure,' but which I prefer to style 'delight,' meaning the sensuous elation of the mind when in a state of exaltation), these emotions, I say, are not excited by any influence of nature; they are all of them mere fancies and frivolous opinions. Therefore the Wise Man will always be free from them. |
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2. Cicero, On Duties, 3.15, 3.35, 3.42 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 3.15. Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant, id cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus quid absit a perfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat praetermissum; quod idem in poematis, in picturis usu venit in aliisque compluribus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae laudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in iis aliquid probi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quidem, quid in una quaque re vitii sit, nequeant iudicare; itaque, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt facile sententia. Haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia. 3.35. Cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commoveri necesse est; sed si, cum animum attenderis, turpitudinem videas adiunctam ei rei, quae speciem utilitatis attulerit, tum non utilitas relinquenda est, sed intellegendum, ubi turpitude sit, ibi utilitatem esse non posse. Quodsi nihil est tam contra naturam quam turpitudo (recta enim et convenientia et constantia natura desiderat aspernaturque contraria) nihilque tam secundum naturam quam utilitas, certe in eadem re utilitas et turpitudo esse non potest. Itemque, si ad honestatem nati sumus eaque aut sola expetenda est, ut Zenoni visum est, aut certe omni pondere gravior habenda quam reliqua omnia, quod Aristoteli placet, necesse est, quod honestum sit, id esse aut solum aut summum bonum; quod autem bonum, id certe utile; ita, quicquid honestum, id utile. 3.42. Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae sunt aliisque tradendae, cum iis ipsi egeamus, sed suae cuique utilitati, quod sine alterius iniuria fiat, serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa: Qui stadium, inquit, currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime possit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, quicum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est. | 3.15. On the other hand, when some act is performed in which we see "mean" duties manifested, that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of real perfection; but, as far as their comprehension does go, they think there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the estimation of poems, paintings, and a great many other works of art: ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The reason for this, I suppose, is that those productions have some point of excellence which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have not the ability to discover the points of weakness in any particular piece of work before them. And so, when they are instructed by experts, they readily abandon their former opinion. The performance of the duties, then, which I am discussing in these books, is called by the Stoics a sort of second-grade moral goodness, not the peculiar property of their wise men, but shared by them with all mankind. 3.35. Now when we meet with expediency in some specious form or other, we cannot help being influenced by it. But if upon closer inspection one sees that there is some immorality connected with what presents the appearance of expediency, then one is not necessarily to sacrifice expediency but to recognize that there can be no expediency where there is immorality. But if there is nothing so repugt to Nature as immorality (for Nature demands right and harmony and consistency and abhors their opposites), and if nothing is so thoroughly in accord with Nature as expediency, then surely expediency and immorality cannot coexist in one and the same object. Again: if we are born for moral rectitude and if that is either the only thing worth seeking, as Zeno thought, or at least to be esteemed as infinitely outweighing everything else, as Aristotle holds, then it necessarily follows that the morally right is either the sole good or the supreme good. Now, that which is good is certainly expedient; consequently, that which is morally right is also expedient. 3.42. And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interest and surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his neighbour's. "When a man enters the foot-race," says Chrysippus with his usual aptness, "it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive with all his might to win; but he ought never with his foot to trip, or with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of life, it is not unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own advantage, but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour. |
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3. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.25-3.26, 3.28 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.26. qualis enim tibi ille videtur Ta/ntalo progna/tus, Pelope na/tus, qui quondam a/ Enn. Thy. sc. 357 socru socru Bentl. coll. Non. 223, 30 al. socero Oe/nomao rege Hi/ppodameam hippodamiam R 2 ra/ptis ctus nactus KR c nactust Bentl. sed haec ab ipso Thyeste proferri videri Va. monet nu/ptiis—? Iovis iste quidem pronepos. Iovis ... pronepos poe- tae trib. Bentl. tamne ergo abiectus tamque fractus? Noli/te inquit hospite/s ad me adi/re, ilico illic oG 1 KV 1 (l exp. 2 ) i/stic, Enn. Thy.349 istic istinc vel isti s sed cf. Plaut. Mere. 912 Ne co/ntagio/ mea boni/s umbrave o/bsit. Tanta ante tanta ins. meo Bentl. stetis La. vis sce/leris in co/rpore hae/ret. tu te, tu te tune R 2 Thyesta, damnabis orbabisque luce propter vim sceleris alieni? quid? illum filium Solis nonne patris ipsius luce indignum putas? Refu/gere oculi, co/rpus macie exta/buit, Trag. inc. 189 extabunt R 1 V 1 G 2 extabant G 1 Lacrimae/ peredere u/more umorem RV 1 K c humo-rem GV 2 K 2 utmorem K 1 exangui/s genas, Situm i/nter oris situm inter oris La. ad Lucr. 2,118 situ nitoris GKRV 1 situ nitoris corr. V 2? praeterea nidoris V rec ut v. situ nigroris Va. op. ac. 1, 56 al. alii bárba paedore pedore hic X ( cf.p. 348, 25 ) hórrida atque atque (adque G 1 ) del. Bothe sed cf. La. ad Lucr. 2,118 Intónsa infuscat péctus inluvié inluviae GK (ill.) R 1 scabrum. haec mala, o stultissime Aeeta, aeota G eota KRV 1 (aeota V 2 ) ipse tibi addidisti; non inerant in is quae tibi casus invexerat, et quidem inveterato malo, cum tumor animi resedisset—est autem aegritudo, ut docebo, in opinione mali recentis est etiam aegr.... 6 recentis H recenti Ba. sed cf. 5 inveterate, p. 355, 8, Rabbow, Antike Schr. über Seelenheilung S. 153 —; sed maeres videlicet regni desiderio, non filiae. illam enim oderas, et iure fortasse; regno non aequo animo carebas. est autem inpudens impud. GKR e corr. luctus maerore se sed G conficientis, quod imperare non liceat liberis. 3.28. Atque hoc quidem perspicuum est, tum tum add. G 2 aegritudinem existere, cum quid ita visum sit, ut magnum quoddam malum adesse et urgere videatur. Epicuro autem placet opinionem mali aegritudinem esse ea ante esse add. V 2 natura, esse, ea natura Usen. Ep. fr. 444 ( sed cf. 334,14 necesse esse eqs.) ex opinione pro opinionem Sey. efficere pro esse Bai. cf. quae dixi Herm. XLI 323 ut, quicumque intueatur in aliquod maius malum, si id sibi accidisse opinetur, sit continuo in aegritudine. aegritudinem X Cyrenaici non omni malo malo modo R 1 aegritudinem aegritudine GK 1 effici censent, sed insperato et necopinato malo. est id quidem non mediocre ad aegritudinem augendam: videntur enim omnia repentina graviora. ex hoc et illa iure laudantur: E/go cum genui, tu/m morituros moriturum et huic rei Sen. ad Pol. 11, 2 sci/vi et ei rei Enn. Telam. sc. 312. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 su/stuli. Prae/terea praeterea ae in r. V c ad Troia/m cum misi ob de/fendendam Grae/ciam, Sci/bam scibam Fronto p. 217 sciebam me in morti/ferum bellum, no/n in epulas mi/ttere. | |
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4. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.4.3, 1.4.14, 1.4.28-1.4.29, 1.6.13-1.6.16, 1.6.18-1.6.22, 1.12.8-1.12.12, 1.18.2-1.18.6, 1.20.5, 1.20.7, 1.21.2, 1.24.8, 1.28.4-1.28.5, 1.28.7-1.28.9, 1.28.12-1.28.13, 1.28.31-1.28.33, 1.30.4, 2.2.1-2.2.7, 2.2.19-2.2.26, 2.5.23, 2.8.1-2.8.8, 2.8.23, 2.9.1-2.9.6, 2.17.19-2.17.20, 2.17.23-2.17.26, 2.17.29, 2.17.33, 2.18.11-2.18.12, 2.18.23-2.18.26, 2.18.29, 2.22.25-2.22.26, 3.2.4, 3.12.7-3.12.12, 3.13.11, 3.13.13, 3.24.24, 3.24.31, 3.24.84, 4.1.1, 4.1.6-4.1.23, 4.1.33-4.1.37, 4.1.40, 4.1.42, 4.1.47, 4.1.51-4.1.62, 4.1.68-4.1.90, 4.1.98-4.1.105, 4.1.107-4.1.123, 4.1.127-4.1.131, 4.1.138-4.1.140, 4.1.145-4.1.147, 4.1.151-4.1.154, 4.1.156-4.1.159, 4.1.162-4.1.163, 4.1.165, 4.1.173, 4.1.176, 4.3.7, 4.8.27, 4.10.13, 4.10.22, 4.10.26, 4.12.15-4.12.17 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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5. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1.5, 12.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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6. New Testament, Philippians, 3.12-3.13, 3.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
| 3.12. Not that I have already obtained, or am already made perfect; but I press on, if it is so that I may take hold of that for which also I was taken hold of by Christ Jesus. 3.13. Brothers, I don't regard myself as yet having taken hold, but one thing I do. Forgetting the things which are behind, and stretching forward to the things which are before 3.20. For our citizenship is in heaven, from where we also wait for a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ; |
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7. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 47.9-47.10, 51.4-51.6, 51.8-51.12, 56.15, 59.6-59.8, 94.1-94.3, 95.4-95.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
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8. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1.14-19.1.21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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9. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.91, 7.110, 7.117 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
| 7.91. These are called non-intellectual, because they do not require the mind's assent; they supervene and they occur even in bad men: for instance, health, courage. The proof, says Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on Ethics, that virtue really exists is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress. And for the existence of vice as a fundamental fact the proof is that it is the opposite of virtue. That it, virtue, can be taught is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his work On the End, by Cleanthes, by Posidonius in his Protreptica, and by Hecato; that it can be taught is clear from the case of bad men becoming good. 7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure. 7.117. Now they say that the wise man is passionless, because he is not prone to fall into such infirmity. But they add that in another sense the term apathy is applied to the bad man, when, that is, it means that he is callous and relentless. Further, the wise man is said to be free from vanity; for he is indifferent to good or evil report. However, he is not alone in this, there being another who is also free from vanity, he who is ranged among the rash, and that is the bad man. Again, they tell us that all good men are austere or harsh, because they neither have dealings with pleasure themselves nor tolerate those who have. The term harsh is applied, however, to others as well, and in much the same sense as a wine is said to be harsh when it is employed medicinally and not for drinking at all. |
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10. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.7.5b
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