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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4734
Epictetus, Discourses, 1.30.4
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

12 results
1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.50, 3.72-3.73, 4.20 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE 3.72. Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant, alteram, quod habeat rationem, ne cui falso adsentiamur neve umquam captiosa probabilitate fallamur, eaque, quae de bonis et malis didicerimus, didicerimus BE didiceremus A diceremus RNV ut tenere teneri AR ne BE tuerique possimus. nam sine hac arte quemvis quamvis RBE arbitrantur a vero abduci fallique posse. recte igitur, si omnibus in rebus temeritas ignoratioque vitiosa est, ars ea, quae tollit haec, virtus nominata est. 3.73. physicae quoque quoque quidem BE non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei ei V et ABER ei et N proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere parere pariete R et sequi sequi et deum et se BE deum et se noscere et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant—et habent maximam— videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere. nec vero pietas adversus adversus advorsum Non. deos nec quanta iis iis Mdv. his expiatione ( explatione L 1 ut vid. Lindsay ) Non. gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest. nec vero ... potest Non. p. 232 s. v. advorsum 4.20. Alia quaedam dicent, credo, magna antiquorum esse peccata, quae ille veri veri ( corr., ut videtur, ex vere) N vere BEV vero R investigandi cupidus nullo modo ferre potuerit. quid enim perversius, quid intolerabilius, quid stultius quam bonam valitudinem, quam dolorum omnium vacuitatem, quam integritatem oculorum reliquorumque sensuum ponere in bonis potius, quam dicerent nihil omnino inter eas res iisque contrarias interesse? ea enim omnia, quae illi bona dicerent, praeposita esse, non bona, itemque illa, quae in corpore excellerent, stulte antiquos dixisse per se esse expetenda; sumenda potius quam expetenda. ea denique omni vita, quae in una virtute virtute una BE consisteret, illam vitam, quae etiam ceteris rebus, quae essent secundum naturam, abundaret, magis expetendam non esse. sed magis sumendam. cumque ipsa virtus efficiat ita beatam vitam, ut beatior esse non possit, tamen quaedam deesse sapientibus tum, cum sint beatissimi; itaque eos id agere, ut a se dolores, morbos, debilitates repellant. 3.50.  But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. 3.72.  "To the virtues we have discussed they also add Dialectic and Natural Philosophy. Both of these they entitle by the name of virtue; the former because it conveys a method that guards us for giving assent to any falsehood or ever being deceived by specious probability, and enables us to retain and to defend the truths that we have learned about good and evil; for without the art of Dialectic they hold that any man may be seduced from truth into error. If therefore rashness and ignorance are in all matters fraught with mischief, the art which removes them is correctly entitled a virtue. 3.73.  "The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to 'obey occasion,' 'follow God,' 'know thyself,' and 'moderation in all things.' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature's secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. 4.20.  As I understand, they will accuse the ancients of certain grave errors in other matters, which that ardent seeker after truth found himself quite unable to tolerate. What, he asked, could have been more insufferably foolish and perverse than to take good health, freedom from all pain, or soundness of eyesight and of the other senses, and class them as goods, instead of saying that there was nothing whatever to choose between these things and their opposites? According to him, all these things which the ancients called good, were not good, but 'preferred'; and so also with bodily excellences, it was foolish of the ancients to call them 'desirable for their own sakes'; they were not 'desirable' but 'worth taking'; and in short, speaking generally, a life bountifully supplied with all the other things in accordance with nature, in addition to virtue, was not 'more desirable,' but only 'more worth taking' than a life of virtue and virtue alone; and although virtue of itself can render life as happy as it is possible for it to be, yet there are some things that Wise Men lack at the very moment of supreme happiness; and accordingly they do their best to protect themselves from pain, disease and infirmity.
2. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 48, 47 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

47. for that is the only quality in us which the Father, who created us, thought deserving of freedom; and, unloosing the bonds of necessity, he let it go unrestrained, bestowing on it that most admirable gift and most connected with himself, the power, namely, of spontaneous will, as far as he was able to receive it; for the irrational animals, in whose soul there is not that especial gift tending to freedom, namely, mind, are put under the yoke and have bridles put in their mouths, and so are given unto men to be their slaves, as servants are given to their masters. But man, who has had bestowed on him a voluntary and self-impelling intellect, and who for the most part puts forth his energies in accordance with deliberate purpose, very properly receives blame for the offences which he designedly commits, and praise for the good actions which he intentionally performs.
3. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1.5-1.1.7, 1.1.23, 1.2.33, 1.4.3, 1.4.14, 1.4.28-1.4.29, 1.6.13-1.6.16, 1.6.18-1.6.22, 1.8.16, 1.12.8-1.12.12, 1.12.34, 1.17.21, 1.17.26-1.17.27, 1.18.2-1.18.6, 1.19.8, 1.20.5, 1.20.7, 1.20.15, 1.21.2, 1.24.8, 1.25.2, 1.28.4-1.28.5, 1.28.7-1.28.9, 1.28.12-1.28.13, 1.28.31-1.28.33, 1.29.1, 1.29.3, 1.29.12, 1.30.3, 2.1.6-2.1.7, 2.2.1-2.2.7, 2.2.19-2.2.26, 2.8.1-2.8.8, 2.8.11, 2.8.23, 2.9.1-2.9.6, 2.10.1, 2.15.1, 2.17.19-2.17.20, 2.17.23-2.17.26, 2.17.31, 2.18.11-2.18.12, 2.18.23-2.18.26, 2.18.29, 2.19.26, 2.22.25-2.22.26, 2.22.29, 2.23.42, 3.1.25-3.1.26, 3.1.40, 3.2.4, 3.3.1, 3.3.15, 3.3.19, 3.12.11-3.12.12, 3.13.11, 3.13.13, 3.16.16, 3.19.2, 3.22.95, 3.24.24, 3.24.58, 3.24.69, 4.1.1, 4.1.6-4.1.23, 4.1.33-4.1.37, 4.1.40, 4.1.42, 4.1.47, 4.1.51-4.1.62, 4.1.68-4.1.90, 4.1.98-4.1.105, 4.1.107-4.1.123, 4.1.127-4.1.131, 4.1.138-4.1.140, 4.1.145-4.1.147, 4.1.151-4.1.154, 4.1.156-4.1.159, 4.1.162-4.1.163, 4.1.165, 4.1.173, 4.1.176, 4.3.7, 4.4.34, 4.5.32, 4.8.27, 4.10.13, 4.10.22, 4.10.26 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

4. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1.5, 12.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

5. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

6. Seneca The Younger, De Providentia (Dialogorum Liber I), 5.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

7. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 15.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

8. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 8.7, 37.4, 54.7, 61.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1.14-19.1.21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 10.28 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.101-7.102, 7.104-7.105 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.101. And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term good has equal force with the term beautiful, which comes to the same thing. Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good. They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent). 7.102. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine, book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics, and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision things preferred. 7.104. To benefit is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with virtue; whereas to harm is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with vice.The term indifferent has two meanings: in the first it denotes the things which do not contribute either to happiness or to misery, as wealth, fame, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy without having these, although, if they are used in a certain way, such use of them tends to happiness or misery. In quite another sense those things are said to be indifferent which are without the power of stirring inclination or aversion; e.g. the fact that the number of hairs on one's head is odd or even or whether you hold out your finger straight or bent. But it was not in this sense that the things mentioned above were termed indifferent 7.105. they being quite capable of exciting inclination or aversion. Hence of these latter some are taken by preference, others are rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense affords no ground for either choosing or avoiding.of things indifferent, as they express it, some are preferred, others rejected. Such as have value, they say, are preferred, while such as have negative, instead of positive, value are rejected. Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living, such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which indirectly contributes to the life according to nature: which is as much as to say any assistance brought by wealth or health towards living a natural life; thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts – as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in.
12. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
(lekta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 289
actions / acts (stoic), appropriate (kathēkonta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 289
adiaphora/indistinguishable/neutral, translation of Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32
agency, divine Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 114
agency, human Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 114
animals (general) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279
apatheia (freedom from passion) Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 114
apatheia (passionlessness) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279
appearance (phantasia, impression) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279, 289
appearances (kataleptic) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 289
arius didymus Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 34
assent (sunkatathesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279, 289
choice (hairesis) / choosing (haireisthai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 289
cleanthes Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
craft/craftsman (technē) Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 34
epictetus Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 114; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279, 289
false belief / false judgment / false opinion Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279, 289
foolishness (aphrosunē) / fool (phaulos, mōros) / ignorance (agnoia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279
free will, stoicism Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
freedom, and cognition Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 114
freedom, stoicism Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
freedom (eleutheria) / free (eleutheros) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279
gift of cognition, in epictetus and paul Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 114
good (agathos) Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32, 34
identity Sandnes and Hvalvik, Early Christian Prayer and Identity Formation (2014) 357, 358
impulse (hormē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279, 289
impulses Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32
in-group Sandnes and Hvalvik, Early Christian Prayer and Identity Formation (2014) 358
intermediates Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 34
judgment (krisis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279, 289
kathēkon), right (katorthōmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279
logic Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
moral purpose (proairesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279, 289
nature/nature Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32, 34
nature (phusis) / natural, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279
neither/nothing (oudeteros/ouden) Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32
out-group Sandnes and Hvalvik, Early Christian Prayer and Identity Formation (2014) 358
paul, determinism Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
paul, free will Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
piety Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
pleasure Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
prayer, of cleanthes Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
preferreds (proēgmena) Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 34
prohairesis (choice) in epictetus, as individual use of faculty Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 114
prohairesis (choice) in epictetus Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 114
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279, 289
sage (wise person) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii, intellect (nous) / thoughts (dianoiai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279
stoicism, and freedom through cognition Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 114
stoicism, determinism Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
stoicism, pantheism Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279, 289
strength (ischus) / strengthen Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 289
student / disciple Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 289
training (askēsis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 289
tranquility (ataraxia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 279
value (axia) Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 34
value (axia) / valuation Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 289
vice Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 32
virtue Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 34
virtue / moral virtue (aretē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 289
weapon' Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 302
wisdom (philosophos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 289
zeno Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 34