Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

4734

Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1

nan Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power. OF all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances. What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else. As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have placed in our power, the right use of appearances; but all other things they have not placed in our power. Was it because they did not choose? I indeed think that, if they had been able, they would have put these other things also in our power, but they certainly could not. For as we exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these things by externals? But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your little property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this: this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things; and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person. Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not. Be content with them then and pray to the gods. But now when it is in our power to look after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many things, and to be bound to many things, to the body and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to child and to slave. Since then we are bound to many things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit down and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us? When will the west wind blow? When it shall choose, my good man, or when it shall please Aeolus; for God has not made you the manager of the winds, but Aeolus. What then? We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the rest according to their nature. What is their nature then? As God may please. Must I then alone have my head cut off? What, would you have all men lose their heads that you may be consoled? Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranus did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded? For when he had stretched out his neck, and received a feeble blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched it out again. And a little before, when he was visited by Epaphroditus, Nero’s freedman, who asked him about the cause of offence which he had given, he said, If I choose to tell anything, I will tell your master. What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I then die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess. I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the things which philosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which they should exercise themselves. Thrasea used to say, I would rather be killed to-day than banished to-morrow. What then did Rufus say to him? If you choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great is the folly of your choice? But if, as the lighter, who has given you the choice? Will you not study to be content with that which has been given to you? What then did Agrippinus say? He said, I am not a hindrance to myself. When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of the day —this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and then take the cold bath— let us go and take our exercise. After he had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, You have been condemned. To banishment, he replies, or to death? To banishment. What about my property? It is not taken from you. Let us go to Aricia then, he said, and dine. This it is to have studied what a man ought to study; to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If now, I am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because it is the dinner-hour; after this I will then die. How? Like a man who gives up what belongs to another.

Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

14 results
1. Herodotus, Histories, 1.131-1.132, 1.140 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) 1.131. As to the customs of the Persians, I know them to be these. It is not their custom to make and set up statues and temples and altars, but those who do such things they think foolish, because, I suppose, they have never believed the gods to be like men, as the Greeks do; ,but they call the whole circuit of heaven Zeus, and to him they sacrifice on the highest peaks of the mountains; they sacrifice also to the sun and moon and earth and fire and water and winds. ,From the beginning, these are the only gods to whom they have ever sacrificed; they learned later to sacrifice to the “heavenly” Aphrodite from the Assyrians and Arabians. She is called by the Assyrians Mylitta, by the Arabians Alilat, by the Persians Mitra. 1.132. And this is their method of sacrifice to the aforesaid gods: when about to sacrifice, they do not build altars or kindle fire, employ libations, or music, or fillets, or barley meal: when a man wishes to sacrifice to one of the gods, he leads a beast to an open space and then, wearing a wreath on his tiara, of myrtle usually, calls on the god. ,To pray for blessings for himself alone is not lawful for the sacrificer; rather, he prays that the king and all the Persians be well; for he reckons himself among them. He then cuts the victim limb from limb into portions, and, after boiling the flesh, spreads the softest grass, trefoil usually, and places all of it on this. ,When he has so arranged it, a Magus comes near and chants over it the song of the birth of the gods, as the Persian tradition relates it; for no sacrifice can be offered without a Magus. Then after a little while the sacrificer carries away the flesh and uses it as he pleases. 1.140. So much I can say of them from my own certain knowledge. But there are other matters concerning the dead which are secretly and obscurely told: how the dead bodies of Persians are not buried before they have been mangled by birds or dogs. ,That this is the way of the Magi, I know for certain; for they do not conceal the practice. But this is certain, that before the Persians bury the body in earth they embalm it in wax. These Magi are as unlike the priests of Egypt as they are unlike all other men: ,for the priests consider it sacrilege to kill anything that lives, except what they sacrifice; but the Magi kill with their own hands every creature, except dogs and men; they kill all alike, ants and snakes, creeping and flying things, and take great pride in it. Leaving this custom to be such as it has been from the first, I return now to my former story.
2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3.1 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
3. Cicero, On Fate, 7-10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
4. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.24-4.25, 4.32, 4.80-4.81 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 4.24. intellegatur igitur perturbationem iactantibus se opinionibus inconstanter et turbide in motu in motu immotus GRV (s del. rec ) H immot os K ( ss. c ) esse semper; cum autem hic fervor concitatioque animi inveteraverit et tamquam in venis medullisque insederit, tum existet existit X (exs. G) existet Küh. ( de fut. cf. p. 378, 14 comm. ad 1, 29 Sen. epist. 85, 9 al. ) inveteravit ... insedit ... existit Sey. et morbus et aegrotatio et offensiones eae, quae sunt eis morbis aegrotationibusque contrariae. Haec, quae dico, cogitatione inter se differunt, re quidem copulata sunt, eaque eaque GRV (eaq K 1 sed; add. 2 ) oriuntur ex libidine et ex laetitia. nam cum est concupita pecunia nec adhibita continuo ratio quasi quaedam Socratica medicina, quae sanaret sanet Bentl. permanet K 1 eam cupiditatem, permanat in venas et inhaeret in visceribus illud malum, existitque existit (exs. KR) qui m. X (que V rec s ) morbus et aegrotatio, quae evelli evelli Wopkens avelli inveterata non possunt, eique morbo nomen est avaritia; 4.25. similiterque similiter quae GKV ceteri morbi, ut gloriae cupiditas, ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam eam s ea X Non. L quae Graece filoguni/a f l L O Gg NlA fere X ( fgL KH -m a GV) dicitur, similiterque ... 7 dicitur Non. 142, 20 ceterique similiter morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur. quae autem sunt his contraria, ea nasci putantur a metu, ut odium mulierum, quale in misogu/nw| Atili est, inmisso gyno X (imm. K guno V 2 immissum K 2 ) Atil. fr. 1 ut in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone de Timone de ti in r. V 2 qui misa/nqrwpos appellatur, quale... 12 appellatur om. H misane p wit oc a appellantur X (misanep wp oc app. V, p fort. ex it ) ut inhospitalitas est: quae omnes aegrotationes animi ex quodam metu nascuntur earum rerum quas fugiunt et oderunt. 4.32. inter acutos autem et inter hebetes hebetes non item est K 1 ( corr. 1 etc ) interest, quod ingeniosi, ut aes Corinthium in aeruginem, aerugine GRV sic illi in morbum et incidunt tardius et recreantur ocius, hebetes non item. nec vero in omnem morbum ac perturbationem animus ingeniosi cadit; †non enim non enim in ulla Bentl. sunt enim multa Mdv. non enim ad omnia vitia aeque propensa est natura humana: sunt enim multa fere desiderat Po. ( cf. p. 402, 8 ) multa ecferata eff. KV c? et immania; quaedam autem humanitatis quoque habent primam speciem, ut misericordia aegritudo metus. Aegrotationes autem morbique animorum St. fr. 3, 430 difficilius evelli posse putantur quam summa illa vitia, quae virtutibus sunt contraria. morbis enim manentibus vitia sublata esse non possunt, quia del. Lb. quia] qui Dav. non tam celeriter satur quam illa tolluntur. sed ut. .. 377, 12 tolluntur ( sine 377, 1 inter 377, 6 immania) H 4.80. Et si fidentia, id est firma animi confisio, scientia quaedam est et opinio gravis non temere adsentientis, metus quoque est diffidentia loco desperato sententia tole- rabilis efficiatur, si scribas : metus quoque qui est diffidentia inbecilla est adsensio ( cf. p. 368, 26 ) expectati et impendentis mali. propter haec ultima autem verba proximum enuntiatum et si spes — metum ante et si fidentia — imp. mali ponen- dum videtur. ut igitur metus — in malo = w(/ste e)n tw=| fau/lw| ( gen. masc. cf. St. fr. 3, 548 p. 147, 9 to sofo ou)k a)pistei=n th ga\r a)pisti/an ei/(nai Yeu/dous u(po/lhYin, th de/ pi/stin a)stei=on u(pa/rxein, ei/)nai ga\r kata/lhWin i)sxura/n ktl. ) ei/)nai to fo/bon, a(sau/tws de\ kai\ ta\ loipa\ pa/qh pa/nta ? sed quid Cicero peccauerit quid librarii, incertum. difidentia KV 3 (itiae V 1 ) defidentia GR expectati et impendentis inp. V mali, et si spes est expectatio boni, mali expectationem esse necesse est metum. ut igitur metus, metum mecum G 1 V 1 sic reliquae reliqui K 1 perturbationes sunt in malo. ergo ut constantia scientiae, sic perturbatio erroris est. Qui autem natura dicuntur iracundi aut misericordes aut invidi aut tale quid, ei sunt constituti quasi mala valetudine valitudini V animi, sanabiles sanabiles s sanabile est tamen, ut Socrates dicitur: cum multa in conventu vitia conlegisset in eum Zopyrus, zopirus GK qui se naturam cuiusque ex forma perspicere profitebatur, derisus est a ceteris, qui illa in Socrate vitia non agnoscerent, ab ipso autem Socrate sublevatus, cum illa sibi sic nata, sic nata Po signa (insita vel innata Bentl. Dav. quod potius de eis rebus dicitur quas etiamnunc habe- mus ) cf. fin. 2, 33 ut bacillum aliud est inflexum de industria, aliud ita natum fat. 9 al. sed ratione a se adse R 1 deiecta deiec ta di ceret K valitudine R diceret. 4.81. ergo ut optuma quisque valetudine adfectus aff. KR potest videri ut natura ad aliquem morbum del. Tr. proclivior, sic animus alius ad alia vitia propensior. qui autem non natura, sed culpa vitiosi esse dicuntur, eorum vitia constant e falsis opinionibus rerum bonarum et malarum, ut sit alius ad alios motus perturbationesque proclivior. inveteratio autem, ut in corporibus, aegrius depellitur quam perturbatio, perturbatione K 1 citiusque repentinus oculorum tumor tumor add. V c mg. tuorum K 1 sanatur quam diuturna lippitudo depellitur. depellitur del. Dav. sed cf. Mue.
5. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.9.4, 1.15, 2.2.21, 2.2.25-2.2.26, 2.5.4-2.5.8, 2.14.7, 2.16.33, 2.18.7-2.18.10, 2.23.42, 3.3.10, 3.24.22-3.24.24, 4.1.62, 4.1.68, 4.1.100, 4.7.7-4.7.11, 4.10.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
6. Musonius Rufus, Fragments, 40 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
7. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 30 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
8. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
9. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 5.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
10. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 75.8-75.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
11. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 6.32 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
12. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.158-7.159, 7.173 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) 7.158. We hear when the air between the sot body and the organ of hearing suffers concussion, a vibration which spreads spherically and then forms waves and strikes upon the ears, just as the water in a reservoir forms wavy circles when a stone is thrown into it. Sleep is caused, they say, by the slackening of the tension in our senses, which affects the ruling part of the soul. They consider that the passions are caused by the variations of the vital breath.Semen is by them defined as that which is capable of generating offspring like the parent. And the human semen which is emitted by a human parent in a moist vehicle is mingled with parts of the soul, blended in the same ratio in which they are present in the parent. 7.159. Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics declares it to be in substance identical with vital breath or spirit. This, he thinks, can be seen from the seeds cast into the earth, which, if kept till they are old, do not germinate, plainly because their fertility has evaporated. Sphaerus and his followers also maintain that semen derives its origin from the whole of the body; at all events every part of the body can be reproduced from it. That of the female is according to them sterile, being, as Sphaerus says, without tension, scanty, and watery. By ruling part of the soul is meant that which is most truly soul proper, in which arise presentations and impulses and from which issues rational speech. And it has its seat in the heart.Such is the summary of their Physics which I have deemed adequate, my aim being to preserve a due proportion in my work. But the points on which certain of the Stoics differed from the rest are the following. 7.173. He was present in the theatre when the poet Sositheus uttered the verse –Driven by Cleanthes' folly like dumb herds,and he remained unmoved in the same attitude. At which the audience were so astonished that they applauded him and drove Sositheus off the stage. Afterwards when the poet apologized for the insult, he accepted the apology, saying that, when Dionysus and Heracles were ridiculed by the poets without getting angry, it would be absurd for him to be annoyed at casual abuse. He used to say that the Peripatetics were in the same case as lyres which, although they give forth sweet sounds, never hear themselves. It is said that when he laid it down as Zeno's opinion that a man's character could be known from his looks, certain witty young men brought before him a rake with hands horny from toil in the country and requested him to state what the man's character was. Cleanthes was perplexed and ordered the man to go away; but when, as he was making off, he sneezed, I have it, cried Cleanthes, he is effeminate.
13. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 16 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
14. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 2.975, 3.126, 3.128

Subjects of this text:

subject	book bibliographic info
alexander of aphrodisias	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
astrology	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
autonomy	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
basil of caesarea	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
becker, lawrence	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
bobzien, susanne	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
body, bodies in stoic physics	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
brutishness	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
cappadocians	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 213
causes, as bodies	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
children, resemble parents	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
choice	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
christians, christianity	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 213
chrysippus	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345; Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
cicero	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
compatibilism	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
compulsion vs. freedom	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
cynics	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
damnation, eternal	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
determinism	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
emotions, as causes	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
emotions, as contumacious	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
emotions, modern theories	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
environment, influence on traits	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
epictetus, on development of character traits	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
epictetus, on self-review	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
epictetus	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345; Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
epiktetos	Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 149
evil will, stoic non-free free will	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
evil will	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
fate/fatalism	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
faults, ineradicable	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
foreknowledge	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
free choice/free will	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
freedom	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
gnosticism/gnostics	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
grace	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
gratia fidei/grace of faith, manichaean radical grace	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
harmony with nature	Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 149
health	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
heredity and character traits	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
hesiod	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
honourableness	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
identity	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
indifferent things	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
khrysippos	Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 149
manichaeism	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
marcus aurelius	Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 149
mind	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
musonius rufus	Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 149
nature, and value	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
nature, of human beings	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
nemesius	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 213
origen	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 213
parents, children resemble	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
permission (self-) (αὐτ-ἐξουσία)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 213
philo judaeus	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
phronesis (good sense or prudence)	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
pliny the elder	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
porphyry	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
predestination (προόρισις), epictetus on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 213
predetermination	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
property-ownership	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
providence, stoic type	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
prudence (phronesis)	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
qumran essenes	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
reaching (orexis)	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
reason	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
salvation	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
self, concepts of	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
self-ownership	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
sovereignty of god	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
sphaerus	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
techne, teleology	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
tertullian, on god	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 213
tertullian	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
total depravity/incapacity	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37
up to us/depending on us/in our power (ἐφ ἡμῖν)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 213
wealth'	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 345
zeno of citium, reproductive theory	Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 249
zeus	Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 149
zoroaster	Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 37