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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4479
Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 9.67


nanThey say that, when septic salves and surgical and caustic remedies were applied to a wound he had sustained, he did not so much as frown. Timon also portrays his disposition in the full account which he gives of him to Pytho. Philo of Athens, a friend of his, used to say that he was most fond of Democritus, and then of Homer, admiring him and continually repeating the lineAs leaves on trees, such is the life of man.He also admired Homer because he likened men to wasps, flies, and birds, and would quote these verses as well:Ay, friend, die thou; why thus thy fate deplore?Patroclus too, thy better, is no more,and all the passages which dwell on the unstable purpose, vain pursuits, and childish folly of man.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

15 results
1. Hesiod, Theogony, 115, 114 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)

114. Such is the precious gift of each goddess.
2. Homer, Iliad, 2.284, 6.146, 20.248-20.250, 21.107 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)

2.284. /in the likeness of a herald, bade the host keep silence, that the sons of the Achaeans, both the nearest and the farthest, might hear his words, and lay to heart his counsel. He with good intent addressed their gathering and spake among them:Son of Atreus, now verily are the Achaeans minded to make thee, O king 6.146. / Great-souled son of Tydeus, wherefore inquirest thou of my lineage? Even as are the generations of leaves, such are those also of men. As for the leaves, the wind scattereth some upon the earth, but the forest, as it bourgeons, putteth forth others when the season of spring is come; even so of men one generation springeth up and another passeth away. 21.107. /aye, not one among all the Trojans, and least of all among the sons of Priam. Nay, friend, do thou too die; why lamentest thou thus? Patroclus also died, who was better far than thou. And seest thou not what manner of man am I, how comely and how tall? A good man was my father, and a goddess the mother that bare me; yet over me too hang death and mighty fate.
3. Homer, Odyssey, 5.392, 11.575, 12.169 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)

4. Democritus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

5. Cicero, Academica, 1.44, 2.32 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.44. Tum ego Cum Zenone inquam “ut accepimus Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi ut quidem mihi quidem mihi *gp videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et vel ut iam ante et iam ante Dav. ad Lact. epit. 32 et ueluti amantes *g*d Socratem Democritum Anaxagoram Empedoclem omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus imbecillos inbecilles p 1 sgf animos brevia curricula vitae et et om. sgf ut Democritus cf. p. 43, 13 in profundo veritatem esse demersam, demersam gfx dim- smnp m diuersam *d opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil veritati ueritate *g relinqui, deinceps deinceps denique Bentl. densis IACvHeusde ' Cic. filopla/twn ' ( 1836 ) 236 n. 1 omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. cf. Lact. inst. 3, 4, 11. 28, 12 s. 30, 6 Democr. fr. 117 Deiels Emped. fr. 2 D. ( Kranz Herm. 47, 29 n. 2 )
6. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 5.23, 5.86-5.88 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5.23. de illis, cum volemus. Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tamquam tamquam (tanquā R) tranquillitas RN tranquillitas tamquam BE tranquillitas ( om. tamquam) V tranquillitas, quam appellant eu)qumi/an, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea ipsa secl. Se. est est ipsa BE beata vita; quaerimus autem, non quae sit, sit ( utroque loco ) dett. sint sed unde sit. Iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in hunc orbem, quem circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus diximus p. 163, 16 sqq. naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil quod non aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse del. Lamb. ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nec inter eas res quicquam quicquam quitquid BE omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum cum praeterea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necesse est. ergo ergo igitur BE instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium. 5.86. Id quaeris, Id quaeris P. Man. id queres BE Idque res R Id que res V inquam, in quo, utrum respondero, utrum respondero Lamb. utrum respondebo R tibi utrum respondebo V respondebo utrum BE verses te huc atque illuc necesse est. Quo tandem modo? inquit. Quia, si mala sunt, is, qui erit in iis, beatus non erit; si mala non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum. Et ille ridens: Video, inquit, quid agas; ne discipulum abducam, times. Tu vero, inquam, ducas licet, si sequetur; sequatur RV erit enim mecum, si tecum erit. Audi igitur, inquit, Luci; tecum enim mihi enim mihi Lamb. enim (est V) ut ait theophrastus mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, ut ait Theophrastus Lamb. om. BERV Non. consistit constitit ( LBA Lindsay ) Non. in beata vita comparanda; omnis auct.... comparanda Non. p. 256 beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus. hoc mihi cum tuo fratre convenit. vivendi ... convenit Non. p. 271 5.87. quare hoc hoc atque hoc Non. videndum est, possitne nobis hoc ratio philosophorum dare. pollicetur certe. nisi enim id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit, ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet? cur post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pythagoreos, Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem, Locros, ut, cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagoreorum disciplinam eaque, quae Socrates repudiabat, addisceret? cur ipse Pythagoras et Aegyptum lustravit et Persarum magos adiit? cur tantas regiones barbarorum pedibus obiit, tot maria transmisit? cur haec eadem Democritus? qui —vere falsone, quaerere mittimus quaerere mittimus Se. quereremus BER queremus V quae- rere nolumus C.F.W. Mue. —dicitur oculis se se oculis BE privasse; privavisse R certe, ut quam minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patrimonium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos, quid quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam? beatam vitam R quam si etiam in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen ex illa investigatione naturae consequi volebat, bono ut esset animo. id enim ille id enim ille R ideo enim ille BE id ille V id est enim illi summum bonum; eu)qumi/an cet. coni. Mdv. summum bonum eu)qumi/an et saepe a)qambi/an appellat, id est animum terrore liberum. 5.88. sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita. pauca enim, neque ea ipsa enucleate, ab hoc ab hoc enucleate BE de virtute quidem dicta. post enim haec in hac urbe primum a Socrate quaeri coepta, deinde in hunc locum delata sunt, nec dubitatum, dubium R quin in virtute omnis ut bene, sic etiam beate vivendi spes poneretur. quae cum Zeno didicisset a nostris, ut in actionibus praescribi solet, ' de eadem re fecit alio modo '. hoc tu del. P. Man. nunc in illo probas. scilicet vocabulis rerum mutatis inconstantiae crimen ille effugit, nos effugere non possumus! ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli, praeponendam tamen, nec magis expetendam, sed magis sumendam et, si optio esset, eligendam Metelli, Reguli reiciendam; ego, quam ille praeponendam et magis eligendam, beatiorem hanc appello nec ullo minimo minimo RV omnino BE momento plus ei vitae tribuo quam Stoici. 5.23.  "The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. 5.86.  "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.87.  On this your cousin and I are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is this, can the systems of the philosophers give us happiness? They certainly profess to do so. Whether it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian priests? Why did he later visit Archytas at Tarentum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those branches which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras himself scour Egypt and visit the Persian magi? why did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian lands and sail across those many seas? Why did Democritus do the same? It is related of Democritus (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness? Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should bring him cheerfulness of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles euthumia, or often athambia, that is freedom from alarm. 5.88.  But what he said on this subject, however excellent, nevertheless lacks the finishing touches; for indeed about virtue he said very little, and that not clearly expressed. For it was later that these inquiries began to be pursued at Athens by Socrates, first in the city, and afterwards the study was transferred to the place where we now are; and no one doubted that all hope alike of right conduct and of happiness lay in virtue. Zeno having learnt this doctrine from our school proceeded to deal with 'the same matter in another manner,' as the common preamble to an indictment has it. You now approve of this procedure on his part. He, no doubt, can change the names of things and be acquitted of inconsistency, but we cannot! He denies that the life of Metellus was happier than that of Regulus, yet calls it 'preferable'; not more desirable, but 'more worthy of adoption'; and given the choice, that of Metellus is 'to be selected' and that of Regulus 'rejected.' Whereas the life he called 'preferable' and 'more worthy to be selected' I term happier, though I do not assign any the minutest fraction more value to that life than do the Stoics.
7. Cicero, On Duties, 1.80-1.81 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.80. Quare expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo, sed cavendum, ne id bellandi magis fuga quam utilitatis ratione faciamus. Bellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur. Fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nec tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti et consilio nec a ratione discedere. 1.81. Quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni est, praecipere cogitatione futura et aliquanto ante constituere, quid accidere possit in utramque partem, et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec committere, ut aliquando dicendum sit: Non putaram. Haec sunt opera magni animi et excelsi et prudentia consilioque fidentis; temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est; sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda. 1.80.  And so diplomacy in the friendly settlement of controversies is more desirable than courage in settling them on the battlefield; but we must be careful not to take that course merely for the sake of avoiding war rather than for the sake of public expediency. War, however, should be undertaken in such a way as to make it evident that it has no other object than to secure peace. But it takes a brave and resolute spirit not to be disconcerted in times of difficulty or ruffled and thrown off one's feet, as the saying is, but to keep one's presence of mind and one's self-possession and not to swerve from the path of reason. 1.81.  Now all this requires great personal courage; but it calls also for great intellectual ability by reflection to anticipate the future, to discover some time in advance what may happen whether for good or for ill, and what must be done in any possible event, and never to be reduced to having to say, "I had not thought of that." These are the activities that mark a spirit strong, high, and self-reliant in its prudence and wisdom. But to mix rashly in the fray and to fight hand to hand with the enemy is but a barbarous and brutish kind of business. Yet when the stress of circumstances demands it, we must gird on the sword and prefer death to slavery and disgrace.
8. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.43-5.44, 5.48, 5.50, 5.54-5.66, 5.68-5.80 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5.43. Atque cum atque cum edd. vett. at quicumque X atqui cum V 3 s perturbationes per turbationis ex -es R 1 animi miseriam, sedationes autem vitam efficiant beatam, duplexque ratio perturbationis sit, quod quod quae K aegritudo et metus in malis opinatis, in bonorum autem errore laetitia gestiens libidoque versetur, quae omnia cum quae Bentl. cum s cum omnia ea Sey. consilio et ratione oratione K pugnent, his tu tam gravibus concitationibus tamque ipsis tamque in ipsis G 1 inter se dissentientibus dissentientibus dissidentibus H atque distractis quem vacuum solutum liberum videris, hunc dubitabis beatum dicere? atqui sapiens semper ita adfectus est; semper igitur sapiens beatus est. Atque atque sqq. St.fr.3,37 ( cf. fin. 3, 27 ) etiam omne bonum laetabile est; quod autem laetabile, id praedicandum et prae se ferendum; et praeferendum H s quod tale autem, id etiam gloriosum; si vero gloriosum, certe laudabile; quod laudabile autem, profecto etiam honestum; 5.44. quod bonum igitur, id honestum. qui...424,9 honestum ( sine 11 an...15 universa et 21 haec...22 explicata) H at quae isti atque isti X bona numerant, ne ipsi quidem honesta dicunt; solum igitur bonum, quod honestum; ex quo efficitur honestate una unam GH ( alt. loco ) vitam contineri continere X corr. V rec s beatam. Non sunt igitur ea bona dicenda nec habenda, quibus abundantem habundantem GKH licet esse miserrimum. solum...14 miserrimum (...12 beatam bis ) 5.48. Etenim, pro deorum atque hominum fidem! fidem s fide X parumne cognitum est superioribus nostris disputationibus, an delectationis delectacionis K dilectationis GR dilectationibus V et otii consumendi causa locuti sumus, sapientem ab omni concitatione animi, quam perturbationem voco, semper vacare, semper in animo eius esse placidissimam pacem? vir igitur temperatus, constans, sine metu, sine aegritudine, sine alacritate futtili, futili Bentl. ( cf. 379, 18 ) ulla W et Non. 457, 4 : Alacritatem in malis habendam Cicero Tusculanarum lib.V ostendit: vir igitur... sine alacritate ulla, lubidine non vexatus sine libidine nonne beatus? at a t V aut GKR semper sapiens talis; semper igitur beatus. Iam St. fr. 3,59 vero qui potest vir bonus non ad id, quod laudabile sit, omnia referre, quae agit quaeque sentit? refert autem omnia ad beate vivendum; beata igitur vita laudabilis; nec quicquam nequicquam GV sine virtute laudabile: beata igitur vita virtute conficitur. 5.50. quod si est, add. Lb. beata vita glorianda et praedicanda et prae se ferenda est; nihil est enim aliud quod praedicandum et prae se ferendum praeferendum V ( cf. ad 426, 20 ) sit. quibus positis intellegis quid sequatur. Et quidem, nisi ea vita beata est, quae est eadem honesta, sit aliud necesse est melius vita beata; quod erit enim enim add. G 2 honestum, certe fatebuntur esse melius. ita erit beata vita melius aliquid; quo quid potest dici perversius? dicimus itaque sapientem...9 pacem et 14 beata... 427,7 perversius H Quid? cum fatentur satis magnam vim esse in vitiis ad invitusad V miseram vitam, nonne fatendum est eandem vim in virtute virtute B 1 virtutem X virtutum s esse ad beatam vitam? contrariorum enim contraria sunt consequentia. 5.54. Etenim ut stultitia, etsi adepta est quod concupivit, numquam se tamen satis consecutam putat, consecuta GRV 1 putet V 1 sic sapientia semper eo contenta contenda K 1 conta G contempta H est quod adest, neque eam umquam sui paenitet. at nos autem...14 penitet H Similemne similene X similemen s putas C. Laelii unum consulatum consolat.GR ( in 24 corr. c ) V fuisse, fuisse s V rec fuisset X et eum quidem cum repulsa (si, si sic V rec cum sapiens et bonus vir, qualis ille fuit, suffragiis praeteritur, non populus a bono consule potius quam ille a bono populo del.Mue. a vano populo s a populo ( sine bono) Mdv del.Mue. a vano populo s a populo ( sine bono) Mdv repulsam fert post fert iterat suffragiis praeteritur X )—sed tamen utrum malles te, ma este G ( ss. 2 ) si potestas esset, semel ut Laelium consulem an ut Cinnam quater? 5.55. non dubito, tu quid responsurus sis; itaque video, cui committam. non quemvis hoc idem interrogarem; responderet enim alius fortasse se non modo quattuor consulatus consolat.GR ( in 24 corr. c ) V uni anteponere, sed unum diem Cinnae multorum et clarorum virorum totis aetatibus. Laelius si digito quem attigisset, poenas dedisset; at Cinna collegae sui consulis Cn. Octavii GN.X praecidi caput praeciditapud K iussit, iussit, iussit Sey. lussit G hic et saepius P. Crassi L. Caesaris, nobilissimorum hominum, quorum virtus fuerat domi militiaeque cognita, M. Antonii, omnium eloquentissimi quos ego audierim, C. Caesaris, G. X in quo mihi videtur specimen fuisse humanitatis salis suavitatis leporis. beatusne igitur, qui hos qui hos s V 3 quos X interfecit? interficit V 1 mihi contra non solum eo videtur miser, miser eqs. cf. Aug. civ. 5, 26 quod ea fecit, sed etiam quod ita se gessit, ut ea facere ea se f. G ( exp. 2 ) ei liceret (etsi peccare peccaret X corr. V 1 nemini licet; sed sermonis errore labimur; errore labimur add. V c labimus K id enim licere lic&re V 1 dicimus 5.56. quod cuique conceditur). utrum tandem beatior C. Marius tum, cum Cimbricae victoriae gloriam cum collega Catulo communicavit, paene altero Laelio—nam hunc illi huic X ( unde ilium pro illi V 3 ) hunc s duco simillimum—, an cum an cum annum G 1 civili bello victor iratus necessariis Catuli deprecantibus non semel respondit, sed saepe: moriatur ? in quo beatior ille, qui huic nefariae voci paruit, par uit V quam is, qui tam scelerate imperavit. nam cum accipere quam facere praestat iniuriam, tum morti iam ipsi ipsa K adventanti paulum procedere ob viam, quod fecit Catulus, quam quod Marius, quod quam M. V 1 talis viri interitu sex interitus ex X suos obruere consulatus et contaminare extremum tempus aetatis. 5.57. Duodequadraginta Totum cap. 20 libere excerpsit Val. Max. 9, 13 ext. 4 annos tyrannus Syracusanorum fuit Dionysius, dionisius KV dyonisius GR cum quinque et viginti natus annos dominatum occupavisset. qua pulchritudine urbem, quibus autem opibus praeditam servitute oppressam tenuit civitatem! atqui de hoc homine a bonis auctoribus sic scriptum accepimus, summam fuisse eius in victu temperantiam in rebusque gerundis virum acrem et industrium, et industrium om. R 1 eundem tamen maleficum natura in rebus gerundis... 29 maleficum natura Non. 241,8 et iniustum; ex quo omnibus bene veritatem intuentibus inuentibus X corr. V 1 videri necesse est miserrimum. ea ea ecce K enim ipsa, quae concupierat, ne tum quidem, cum omnia omni G 1 se posse censebat, consequebatur. 5.58. qui cum esset bonis parentibus atque honesto loco natus—etsi id quidem alius alio modo tradidit—abundaretque et B s ei X aequalium familiaritatibus et consuetudine propinquorum, haberet etiam more Graeciae graciae gratiae V 1 quosdam adulescentis amore more amore G 1 coniunctos, credebat eorum nemini, sed is quos quos s V 3 quod X ex familiis locupletium servos delegerat, quibus nomen servitutis ipse detraxerat, traxerat G 1 et quibusdam convenis convenis et B s convenisset X et feris barbaris corporis custodiam committebat. ita propter iniustam dominatus cupiditatem dominatus domi cup. G 1 in carcerem quodam modo ipse se incluserat. quin etiam ne tonsori collum committeret, tondere filias suas docuit. ita ista K 1 sordido ancillarique sordidoque ancillari X corr. V 3 B 1 ( cf. simile mendum in G 415,5 ) sordido atque ancillari alii s artificio regiae virgines ut tonstriculae tondebant barbam et capillum patris. regiae ...17 patris Prisc.GL.2, 371, 11 et tamen ab is ipsis, cum iam essent adultae, ferrum removit instituitque, ut candentibus cadentibus Non. iuglandium putaminibus barbam sibi et capillum adurerent. instituitque...20 adurerent Non. 122, 30 5.59. cumque duas uxores haberet, haberet uxores V 1 Aristomachen aristomachem X (aristhom.G) civem suam, Doridem autem Locrensem, sic noctu ad eas n otu V 1 notua deas K 1 ( corr. c ) ventitabat, ut omnia specularetur et perscrutaretur ante. et cum fossam latam cubiculari fossa lata cubicularis X corr. s lecto circumdedisset eiusque fossae transitum ponticulo ligneo coniunxisset, eum ipsum, ipsum ipse Scheibe (cum forem cubiculi extrinsecus a custodibus opertum interiore claustro ipse diligenter obserasset Val. Max. ) cum forem cubiculi clauserat, detorquebat. idemque cum in communibus suggestis consistere non auderet, contionari ex turri alta solebat. 5.60. atque is cum pila ludere vellet —studiose enim id factitabat—tunicamque poneret, adulescentulo, quem amabat, tradidisse gladium dicitur. hic cum quidam familiaris iocans dixisset: huic quidem quidam V 1 certe vitam tuam committis adrisissetque adrisisetque KR adrisissetque V 1 adulescens, utrumque iussit interfici, alterum, quia viam demonstravisset interimendi sui, alterum, quia dictum id risu adprobavisset. atque eo facto factu V 1 sic doluit, nihil ut tulerit gravius in vita; quem enim vehementer amarat, occiderat. sic distrahuntur in contrarias partis impotentium cupiditates. cum huic obsecutus sis, illi est repugdum. 5.61. Quamquam hic quidem tyrannus ipse iudicavit, quam esset beatus. nam cum cum add. G 2 quidam ex eius adsentatoribus, Damocles, commemoraret in sermone sermonem K copias eius, opes, maiestatem dominatus, rerum abundantiam, magnificentiam aedium regiarum negaretque umquam beatiorem quemquam fuisse, visne igitur inquit, inquid G 1 V inquit add. R 1 o Damocle, quoniam te haec vita delectat, ipse eam eam Ern. eadem ( de tota vita agitur cf. p.433, 4 ) degustare et fortunam experiri meam? cum se ille cupere dixisset, conlocari coll. KR iussit hominem in aureo lecto strato stato K 1 pulcherrimo textili stragulo, magnificis operibus picto, abacosque compluris ornavit argento auroque caelato. tum ad mensam eximia forma pueros delectos iussit consistere eosque que om. G 1 nutum illius intuentis diligenter ministrare. 5.62. aderant unguenta ungenta V coronae, incendebantur odores, mensae conquisitissimis conquisitissimis -nquisiti— V c in r. epulis aepulis GRV extruebantur. fortunatus sibi Damocles videbatur. in hoc medio apparatu fulgentem gladium e lacunari saeta equina lacunariaetaequina G 1 equi Non. aptum demitti dimitti KR Non. iussit, fulgentem... 432, 1 iussit Non.235,19 ut impenderet illius beati cervicibus. itaque nec pulchros illos ministratores aspiciebat nec plenum artis argentum nec manum porrigebat in mensam; iam ipsae ipse GKV defluebant coronae; denique exoravit tyrannum, ut abire liceret, quod iam beatus nollet esse. satisne videtur declarasse Dionysius dyonis.X ( in 6 ex dion. K 1 ) nihil esse ei beatum, cui semper cui miser semper K aliqui terror aliqui terror B s aliquid error X (aliquis error V rec ) impendeat? impend at V 1 atque ei ei add. V 1 ne integrum quidem erat, ut ad iustitiam remigraret, remigaret V 1 civibus libertatem et iura redderet; is enim se adulescens inprovida aetate inretierat erratis eaque commiserat, comiserat G 1 R ut salvus esse non posset, si sanus esse coepisset. coepisset ex coepit R 1 5.63. Quantopere vero amicitias desideraret, quarum infidelitatem extimescebat, declaravit in Pythagoriis pythagoris V duobus illis, quorum cum alterum vadem mortis vademortis X corr. G 2 V 3 accepisset, alter, alter ut s alterum X ut vadem suum liberaret, praesto fuisset ad horam oram V mortis destinatam, utinam ego inquit tertius vobis amicus adscriberer! quam huic erat miserum carere consuetudine amicorum, societate victus, sermone omnino familiari, homini praesertim docto docto dato V a puero et artibus ingenuis ingeniis K erudito, musicorum misicorum X (musicum B) vero perstudioso; perstudiosum ( propter poetam) W corr.Dav. ( qui etiam poetae...tragico...bono) poëtam etiam tragicum post tragicum add. accepimus ( ex 429,27) s non male —quam bonum, nihil ad rem; in hoc cf. Att.14, 20, 3 Atil. fr.1 enim genere nescio quo pacto magis quam in aliis suum cuique pulchrum pulcrum G est; adhuc neminem cognovi poëtam (et et om. K 1 mihi fuit cum Aquinio amicitia), qui sibi non optumus videretur; sic se res habet: te tua, me delectant mea mea ea K —sed ut ad Dionysium dyonis.X ( in 6 ex dion. K 1 ) redeamus: omni cultu et victu humano carebat; vivebat cum fugitivis, cum facinerosis, cum barbaris; neminem, qui aut libertate libertatem K dignus esset aut vellet omnino liber esse, sibi amicum arbitrabatur. arbitrabantur G 1 Non ego iam cum huius vita, qua taetrius miserius detestabilius excogitare nihil possum, Platonis aut Archytae architae vitam vitae vitam X (vitae del. s V 3 ) comparabo, doctorum hominum et plane sapientium: 5.64. ex eadem urbe humilem homunculum a pulvere et radio excitabo, qui multis annis post fuit, Archimedem. cuius ego quaestor ignoratum ab Syracusanis, cum esse omnino negarent, saeptum septum X undique et vestitum vestitutum V 1 vepribus et dumetis indagavi sepulcrum. tenebam enim quosdam senariolos, quos in eius monumento esse inscriptos acceperam, qui declarabant in summo sepulcro sphaeram spheram X (18 spherae RV sphaere GK) esse positam cum cylindro. 5.65. ego autem cum omnia conlustrarem oculis—est enim ad ad a GRV 1 ( corr. V 3 ) portas Agragantinas ego ducem cum...16 portas gaianas Non.335,24 agragantinas Came rarius agragianas X gaianas (gafanas L 1 ) Non. agragentinas Sey. ( cf. Th.l.l.l.1428 ) magna frequentia sepulcrorum—, animum adverti columellam non multum e dumis eminentem, in qua inerat sphaerae figura et cylindri. atque ego statim Syracusanis— erant autem principes mecum—dixi me illud ipsum arbitrari esse, quod quaererem. inmissi cum inmissi cum s V 3 inmusicum X (inmuscum K) falcibus multi multi famuli Lattmann milites olim Sey. purgarunt et aperuerunt locum. 5.66. quo cum patefactus patefactum X esset aditus, ad adversam a ddit' adadv. G basim bassim X ( corr. G 1 ) accessimus. accessimus R sed -ss- e corr. ( fuit fort. accedimus) acces imus V apparebat epigramma epygramma KRV exesis posterioribus partibus versiculorum dimidiatum dimidiatis X (di prius in r. R 1 ) corr. Bentl. (dimidiatus de versiculis vel de epigrammate dici poterat, de partibus non poterat cf. Gell. 3, 14 ) fere. ita nobilissima Graeciae civitas, quondam vero etiam doctissima, sui civis unius acutissimi monumentum ignorasset, nisi ab homine Arpinate Arpinati We.cl.leg.1, 4 al. didicisset. sed redeat, reddeat X ( corr. G 1 ) unde aberravit oratio: quis est omnium, qui qui quo V 1 modo cum Musis, id est cum humanitate humilitate K 1 ut v. et cum doctrina, habeat aliquod commercium, qui se non hunc mathematicum malit quam illum tyrannum? si vitae modum actionemque quaerimus, alterius mens rationibus agitandis exquirendisque alebatur cum oblectatione sollertiae, qui est unus suavissimus pastus patus K 1 ( r ss. c ) animorum, alterius in caede et iniuriis cum et diurno et nocturno metu. age confer Democritum Pythagoram, Anaxagoram: quae regna, quas opes studiis eorum et delectationibus antepones? 5.68. Sed ne verbis solum attingamus ea quae eaque v. KRV 1 volumus ostendere, proponenda quaedam quasi moventia sunt, quae nos magis ad cognitionem intellegentiamque convertant. sumatur enim nobis quidam praestans vir optumis optumus V artibus, isque animo parumper et cogitatione cognitione K fingatur. primum ingenio eximio sit necesse est; tardis enim mentibus virtus non facile comitatur; deinde deinde denique K ad investigandam vestigandam K veritatem studio incitato. ex quo triplex ille animi fetus fetus KR (ę) factus GV existet, unus I II III ad-scribunt G 1 V 1 in cognitione rerum positus et in explicatione naturae, alter aliter K in discriptione expetendarum fugiendarumque rerum fugiendarumque vererumne vivendi GKV (ve exp. et be supra ne scr. V 3 ) R 1 ut v. (fugiendarumque rerum . post vivendi quod in ras. certo dispicitur alia manus adscripscrat ue) H 1 (fugiendar verer nevivendi. Verba cū ratio ss.non H 1 sed alia manus eiusdem aetatis sec. Stroux ) et in ratio ne We.bene quod fin. 5,15 certa de causa deest add. Po. cl. ac.1, 19 fin. 5, 11. 16 et in ratione be ne vivendi, tertius in iudicando, in ante iud. om. K iudicando nequid KRH quid cuique rei sit consequens quid repugs, in quo inest omnis inest omnis est H cum subtilitas disserendi, tum veritas iudicandi. 5.69. quo tandem igitur gaudio adfici necesse est est V esset GK C RH est et K 1 sapientis animum cum his habitantem pernoctantemque curis! ut, cum totius mundi motus conversionesque perspexerit ut, quod del.Bentl.,pendet a verbis cum — curis (= so da b ). Ciceronem pergere voluisse ut, cum... perspexerit,... ipse se adgnoscat coniunctumque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio compleatur cum similitudo verborum v. 9—10 et 436,5—9 tum locus gemellus leg. 1,61 declarant. sideraque viderit innumerabilia caelo inhaerentia cum eius ipsius motu congruere certis infixa sedibus, septem alia suos quaeque tenere cursus multum inter se aut altitudine aut humilitate distantia, quorum vagi motus rata tamen et certa sui cursus spatia definiant—horum nimirum aspectus impulit illos veteres et admonuit, ut plura quaererent; inde est est enim G 1 indagatio nata initiorum et tamquam seminum, unde essent omnia orta generata concreta, quaeque cuiusque generis vel iimi iimi animi H vel animantis animantis iimantis K vel muti vel loquentis loquentes GR 1 V 1 origo, quae vita, qui interitus quae int. GR 1 V 1 quaeque ex alio in aliud vicissitudo atque mutatio, unde terra et quibus librata ponderibus, quibus cavernis maria sustineantur, qua sustineantur, qua Dav sustineant. In qua X (sustineantur vel sustineat s ) omnia delata gravitate medium mundi locum semper expetant, expectant qui est idem infimus in rutundo. rotundo KV c? H 5.70. haec tractanti tractanti s V 3 tractandi X (-i ex -o K 1 ) animo et noctes et dies cogitanti cogitandi KV 1 cogitanti G existit illa a a s om. X deo deo H Delphis praecepta cognitio, ut ipsa se mens agnoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio compleatur. completur Bentl. ipsa enim cogitatio de vi et natura deorum studium incendit incedit GRV 1 illius aeternitatem aeternitatem Sey. aeternitatis (aeterni status Mdv. ad fin.1, 60 ) imitandi, neque se in brevitate vitae conlocatam conlocata GRV 1 collocatam H ( bis ) conlocatum s We. putat, cum rerum causas alias ex aliis aptas et necessitate nexas videt, quibus ab aeterno tempore fluentibus in aeternum ratio tamen mensque moderatur. 5.71. Haec ille intuens atque suspiciens suspiciens V sed pic in r. 1 suscipiens K 1 vel potius omnis partis orasque circumspiciens quanta rursus animi tranquillitate tranquillitati K humana et citeriora considerat! hinc illa cognitio virtutis existit, efflorescunt genera partesque virtutum, invenitur, quid sit quod natura spectet expectet G 1 expectetur Gr extremum in bonis, quid in malis ultumum, sumatur...436, 20 ultimum H ( extrema bis ) quo referenda sint officia, quae degendae degente G 1 aetatis ratio deligenda. diligenda X corr. s quibus et et add. K c talibus rebus exquisitis hoc vel maxime efficitur, quod hac hac ac G 1 hic V 1 disputatione agimus, ut virtus ad beate vivendum sit se ipsa contenta. 5.72. Sequitur tertia, quae per omnis partis sapientiae manat et funditur, quae rem definit, definivit X (dif. K) corr. s V 3 genera dispertit, sequentia adiungit, perfecta concludit, vera et falsa diiudicat, disserendi ratio et scientia. ex qua cum summa utilitas existit extitit K ( in 18 corr K c ) ad res ponderandas, tum maxume maxime GKH ingenua delectatio et digna sapientia. Sed haec otii. sed haec otii om. H transeat idem iste sapiens ad rem publicam tuendam. quid eo possit esse praestantius, cum †contineri contineri del.Lb. cum temperantia suas adpetitiones contineat ( vel queat continere), prudentia fere desiderat Po.cl.p.371, 22 off.3,96.116; 2,77.rep.6,1 (rei publicae rector...sapiens sit et iustus et temperans eqs.) prudentia utilitatem civium cernat, iustitia sequitur...437, 8 iustitia H nihil in suam domum inde derivet, derivet -iv- scr. G 2 reliquis utatur tot tam variisque virtutibus? adiunge fructum amicitiarum, in quo doctis positum est cum consilium omnis vitae consentiens et paene conspirans, tum summa iucunditas e e et V 1 (ex V rec ) cotidiano cultu atque victu. victu s V 3 victurus GRV 1 victus K cf.Th.l.l.IV,1333 Quid haec tandem vita desiderat, quo quo quod GK sit beatior? cui refertae tot cui rei refertae etot G cui rei referta etot R cui rei referta et tot V cui rei refertae et tot K corr. Man. tantisque gaudiis Fortuna ipsa cedat necesse est. quodsi gaudere talibus bonis animi, id est virtutibus, beatum est omnesque sapientes is gaudiis perfruuntur, omnis eos beatos esse confiteri necesse est. Etiamne etiamne -ne eras.in R in cruciatu atque tormentis? 5.73. An Epic.fr.604 tu me in viola putabas aut in rosa dicere? an Epicuro, qui qui G 1 quia G 2 KRV cf.438,19 tantum modo induit personam philosophi et sibi ipse hoc nomen inscripsit, dicere licebit, licebit alt. i in r. V quod quidem, ut habet se res, me tamen plaudente dicit, nullum sapienti esse tempus, etiamsi uratur torqueatur secetur, quin possit exclamare: quam pro nihilo puto! cum praesertim omne malum dolore definiat defirmat ( vel defirniat) V 1 bonum voluptate, haec nostra honesta turpia inrideat dicatque nos in vocibus Epic.fr.511 occupatos iis sonos fundere, neque quicquam ad nos pertinere nisi quod aut leve aut asperum in corpore sentiatur: huic ergo, ut dixi, non multum differenti a iudicio ferarum oblivisci licebit sui et tum fortunam contemnere, cum sit omne et bonum eius et malum in potestate fortunae, tum dicere se se add. G 2 beatum in summo cruciatu atque tormentis, cum constituerit non modo summum malum esse dolorem, sed etiam solum? 5.74. nec vero illa sibi remedia comparavit ad tolerandum tollerandum X (toll endum G 1 ) dolorem, firmitatem animi, turpitudinis verecundiam, exercitationem consuetudinemque patiendi, praecepta fortitudinis, praecepta fortitudinis del.Sey.sed Cic.l.2,34—41 exercitationem consuetudinemque,postea (cf. maxime 51. 53) praecepta fortitudinis animo proposita (p.313,15sqq.) valere ad tolerandum dolorem exponit (cf.p.285.6 295, 24sqq.fin.2,94.95; 4, 31). cf.etiam Plasberg, Festschrift f. Vahlen p.234 (obloq. Se.,Jb.d.ph.V.29 p.97) duritiam virilem, sed una se dicit recordatione adquiescere praeteritarum voluptatium, voluptatum Bai.cf.Neue 1, 410 ut si quis aestuans, cum vim caloris non non postea add. R 1 facile patiatur, patiatur putatur V 1 recordari velit sese sese s esse X (se V 3 ) aliquando in Arpinati nostro gelidis fluminibus circumfusum fuisse. non enim video, quo modo sedare possint 5.75. mala praesentia praeteritae voluptates—sed cum is is his G 1 KV 1 dicat semper beatum esse sapientem, cui dicere hoc, si si add. G 2 sibi constare vellet, non liceret, quidnam faciendum est is qui nihil expetendum, nihil in bonis ducendum, quod honestate careat, existumant? existumant -a- e corr. R 1 Me quidem auctore auctore ex auctoritate R c etiam Peripatetici veteresque Academici balbuttire balbuttire GR Non. balbut ire V 1 balbutire K aliquando desit me...24 desit Non. 80, 13 aperteque et clara voce audeant dicere beatam vitam in Phalaridis taurum descensuram. decen suram X ( corr. V 3 ) 5.76. sint enim tria genera bonorum, ut ut aut V iam a laqueis Stoicorum, quibus usum me pluribus quam soleo intellego, recedamus, sint sane illa genera bonorum, dum corporis et et s om. X externa iaceant humi et tantum modo, quia sumenda sint, appellentur bona, animi animi Jeep (cf.427,14 443,3 458,6;divini ani- mi bona divina sunt caelumque contingunt) autem illa alii K alia GRV illa add. G 2 divina longe lateque se pandant caelumque contingant; ut, ut del.Lb.sed cf.p.242,25 ea qui adeptus sit, cur eum beatum modo et non beatissimum etiam dixerim? Dolorem vero sapiens extimescet? is enim huic maxime maxime huic G 1 sententiae repugnat. nam nam non V contra mortem nostram atque nostrorum contraque aegritudinem et reliquas animi perturbationes satis esse videmur videmus K superiorum dierum disputationibus armati et parati; dolor esse videtur acerrumus virtutis virtutis We. virtuti istis ard. G adversarius; is ardentis faces intentat, is fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam se debilitaturum minatur. 5.77. huic igitur succumbet virtus, huic beata sapientis et constantis viri vita cedet? caedet RV quam turpe, o dii boni! pueri Spartiatae non ingemescunt ingemiscunt K 1 R c B verberum verberum ex verborum V 1 G 2 dolore laniati. adulescentium greges reges V 1 Lacedaemone vidimus ipsi incredibili contentione contione X (conditione G 1 ) corr. B 1 s certantis pugnis calcibus unguibus morsu denique, cum exanimarentur prius quam victos se faterentur. quae barbaria India vastior aut agrestior? quae...agrestior? Non.415,11 in ea tamen aut... tamen add. V c gente primum sqq. cf.Val.Max.3,3,6 ext.2,6,14 ei, qui sapientes habentur, nudi aetatem agunt et Caucasi nives hiemalemque vim perferunt sine sqq. cf.Val.Max.3,3,6 ext.2,6,14 dolore, cumque ad flammam se adplicaverunt, applicaverunt KRV sine gemitu aduruntur. 5.78. mulieres vero in India, cum est cuius cuiuis V 3 communis Geel ( sed tum plures...nuptae post mortuus legeretur; cf.etiam Se., Jb.d.ph.V.26 p.301 ) earum vir mortuus, in certamen iudiciumque veniunt, quam plurumum ille dilexerit— plures enim singulis solent esse nuptae—; quae est victrix, ea laeta prosequentibus suis una unam V 1 cum viro in rogum imponitur, ponitur G 1 illa ilia cf.Quint.inst.1,3,2 victa quae Se. non male,cf.Claud.de nupt.Hon.64 (superatae cum...maerore in vita remanent Val.M. ) maesta discedit. numquam naturam mos vinceret; vinceret vincit H est enim ea semper invicta; sed nos umbris deliciis delitiis X (deliciis V, sed ci in r scr.,alt. i ss. V 2 ) otio languore langore G desidia animum infecimus, opinionibus maloque more delenitum delinitum V 1 H mollivimus. mollium KR 1 ( corr. 1 aut c )H Aegyptiorum morem quis ignorat? ignoret K quorum inbutae mentes pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificinam carnifici. nam X prius subierint quam ibim aut aspidem aut faelem felem GV cf.nat.deor.1, 82 aut canem aut corcodillum corcodillum GRV corcodrillum KH cf.Th.l.l. violent, volent V 1 quorum etiamsi inprudentes quippiam fecerint, poenam nullam recusent. 5.79. de hominibus loquor; quid? bestiae non frigus, non famem, non montivagos atque silvestris cursus lustrationesque patiuntur? non pro suo sua G 1 partu ita propugt, ut ut K vulnera excipiant, nullos impetus nullos ictus reformident? omitto, quae omittoque p.G 1 V 1 perferant quaeque patiantur ambitiosi honoris causa, laudis studiosi gloriae gratia, amore incensi cupiditatis. plena plana GRV 1 ( corr. 3 ) vita exemplorum exemplum G 1 est. 5.80. Sed adhibeat oratio modum et redeat illuc, unde deflexit. dabit, inquam, dabit, dabit, inquam edd. vett. se in tormenta vita beata nec iustitiam temperantiam in primisque fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam patientia GRVH prosecuta, cum tortoris os viderit, consistet virtutibusque omnibus sine ullo animi terrore ad cruciatum profectis resistet extra extra ( fuit et) R fores, ut ante ante cf.p. 410,8 dixi, limenque lumenque G 1 carceris. quid enim ea foedius, quid deformius sola relicta, a add. Lb. comitatu pulcherrimo pulcherrumo KR segregata? quod tamen fieri nullo pacto potest; nec enim virtutes sine beata vita cohaerere possunt nec illa sine virtutibus.
9. Plutarch, Alexander The Great, 52.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

52.5. It is said that once at supper the conversation turned upon seasons and weather, and that Callisthenes, who held with those who maintain that it is more cold and wintry there than in Greece, was stoutly opposed by Anaxarchus, whereupon he said: You surely must admit that it is colder here than there; for there you used to go about in winter in a cloak merely, but here you recline at table with three rugs thrown over you. of course this also added to the irritation of Anaxarchus.
10. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 9.3, 71.29 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

12. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.135, 11.14 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

13. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.3, 1.213, 1.226 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

14. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 1.15, 6.26-6.27, 9.45, 9.61-9.66, 9.68-9.69, 9.71-9.76, 9.78-9.90, 9.94, 9.96-9.97, 9.99-9.113, 9.115-9.116 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

6.26. And one day when Plato had invited to his house friends coming from Dionysius, Diogenes trampled upon his carpets and said, I trample upon Plato's vainglory. Plato's reply was, How much pride you expose to view, Diogenes, by seeming not to be proud. Others tell us that what Diogenes said was, I trample upon the pride of Plato, who retorted, Yes, Diogenes, with pride of another sort. Sotion, however, in his fourth book makes the Cynic address this remark to Plato himself. Diogenes once asked him for wine, and after that also for some dried figs; and Plato sent him a whole jar full. Then the other said, If some one asks you how many two and two are, will you answer, Twenty? So, it seems, you neither give as you are asked nor answer as you are questioned. Thus he scoffed at him as one who talked without end. 6.27. Being asked where in Greece he saw good men, he replied, Good men nowhere, but good boys at Lacedaemon. When one day he was gravely discoursing and nobody attended to him, he began whistling, and as people clustered about him, he reproached them with coming in all seriousness to hear nonsense, but slowly and contemptuously when the theme was serious. He would say that men strive in digging and kicking to outdo one another, but no one strives to become a good man and true. 9.45. All things happen by virtue of necessity, the vortex being the cause of the creation of all things, and this he calls necessity. The end of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some by a false interpretation have understood, but a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion. This he calls well-being and many other names. The qualities of things exist merely by convention; in nature there is nothing but atoms and void space. These, then, are his opinions.of his works Thrasylus has made an ordered catalogue, arranging them in fours, as he also arranged Plato's works. 9.61. 11. PYRRHOPyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles relates. According to Apollodorus in his Chronology, he was first a painter; then he studied under Stilpo's son Bryson: thus Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers. Afterwards he joined Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even forgathered with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgement. He denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust. And so, universally, he held that there is nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human action; for no single thing is in itself any more this than that. 9.62. He led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; but he was kept out of harm's way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus tells us, used to follow close after him. But Aenesidemus says that it was only his philosophy that was based upon suspension of judgement, and that he did not lack foresight in his everyday acts. He lived to be nearly ninety.This is what Antigonus of Carystus says of Pyrrho in his book upon him. At first he was a poor and unknown painter, and there are still some indifferent torch-racers of his in the gymnasium at Elis. 9.63. He would withdraw from the world and live in solitude, rarely showing himself to his relatives; this he did because he had heard an Indian reproach Anaxarchus, telling him that he would never be able to teach others what is good while he himself danced attendance on kings in their courts. He would maintain the same composure at all times, so that, even if you left him when he was in the middle of a speech, he would finish what he had to say with no audience but himself, although in his youth he had been hasty. often, our informant adds, he would leave his home and, telling no one, would go roaming about with whomsoever he chanced to meet. And once, when Anaxarchus fell into a slough, he passed by without giving him any help, and, while others blamed him, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and sang-froid. 9.64. On being discovered once talking to himself, he answered, when asked the reason, that he was training to be good. In debate he was looked down upon by no one, for he could both discourse at length and also sustain a cross-examination, so that even Nausiphanes when a young man was captivated by him: at all events he used to say that we should follow Pyrrho in disposition but himself in doctrine; and he would often remark that Epicurus, greatly admiring Pyrrho's way of life, regularly asked him for information about Pyrrho; and that he was so respected by his native city that they made him high priest, and on his account they voted that all philosophers should be exempt from taxation.Moreover, there were many who emulated his abstention from affairs, so that Timon in his Pytho and in his Silli says: 9.65. O Pyrrho, O aged Pyrrho, whence and howFound'st thou escape from servitude to sophists,Their dreams and vanities; how didst thou looseThe bonds of trickery and specious craft?Nor reck'st thou to inquire such things as these,What breezes circle Hellas, to what end,And from what quarter each may chance to blow.And again in the Conceits:This, Pyrrho, this my heart is fain to know,Whence peace of mind to thee doth freely flow,Why among men thou like a god dost show?Athens honoured him with her citizenship, says Diocles, for having slain the Thracian Cotys. 9.66. He lived in fraternal piety with his sister, a midwife, so says Eratosthenes in his essay On Wealth and Poverty, now and then even taking things for sale to market, poultry perchance or pigs, and he would dust the things in the house, quite indifferent as to what he did. They say he showed his indifference by washing a porker. Once he got enraged in his sister's cause (her name was Philista), and he told the man who blamed him that it was not over a weak woman that one should display indifference. When a cur rushed at him and terrified him, he answered his critic that it was not easy entirely to strip oneself of human weakness; but one should strive with all one's might against facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in word. 9.68. Posidonius, too, relates of him a story of this sort. When his fellow-passengers on board a ship were all unnerved by a storm, he kept calm and confident, pointing to a little pig in the ship that went on eating, and telling them that such was the unperturbed state in which the wise man should keep himself. Numenius alone attributes to him positive tenets. He had pupils of repute, in particular one Eurylochus, who fell short of his professions; for they say that he was once so angry that he seized the spit with the meat on it and chased his cook right into the market-place. 9.69. Once in Elis he was so hard pressed by his pupils' questions that he stripped and swam across the Alpheus. Now he was, as Timon too says, most hostile to Sophists.Philo, again, who had a habit of very often talking to himself, is also referred to in the lines:Yea, him that is far away from men, at leisure to himself,Philo, who recks not of opinion or of wrangling.Besides these, Pyrrho's pupils included Hecataeus of Abdera, Timon of Phlius, author of the Silli, of whom more anon, and also Nausiphanes of Teos, said by some to have been a teacher of Epicurus. All these were called Pyrrhoneans after the name of their master, but Aporetics, Sceptics, Ephectics, and even Zetetics, from their principles, if we may call them such — 9.71. Some call Homer the founder of this school, for to the same questions he more than anyone else is always giving different answers at different times, and is never definite or dogmatic about the answer. The maxims of the Seven Wise Men, too, they call sceptical; for instance, Observe the Golden Mean, and A pledge is a curse at one's elbow, meaning that whoever plights his troth steadfastly and trustfully brings a curse on his own head. Sceptically minded, again, were Archilochus and Euripides, for Archilochus says:Man's soul, O Glaucus, son of Leptines,Is but as one short day that Zeus sends down.And Euripides:Great God! how can they say poor mortal menHave minds and think? Hang we not on thy will?Do we not what it pleaseth thee to wish? 9.72. Furthermore, they find Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, and Democritus to be sceptics: Xenophanes because he says,Clear truth hath no man seen nor e'er shall knowand Zeno because he would destroy motion, saying, A moving body moves neither where it is nor where it is not; Democritus because he rejects qualities, saying, Opinion says hot or cold, but the reality is atoms and empty space, and again, of a truth we know nothing, for truth is in a well. Plato, too, leaves the truth to gods and sons of gods, and seeks after the probable explanation. Euripides says: 9.73. Who knoweth if to die be but to live,And that called life by mortals be but death?So too Empedocles:So to these mortal may not list nor lookNor yet conceive them in his mind;and before that:Each believes naught but his experience.And even Heraclitus: Let us not conjecture on deepest questions what is likely. Then again Hippocrates showed himself two-sided and but human. And before them all Homer:Pliant is the tongue of mortals; numberless the tales within it;andAmple is of words the pasture, hither thither widely ranging;andAnd the saying which thou sayest, back it cometh later on thee,where he is speaking of the equal value of contradictory sayings. 9.74. The Sceptics, then, were constantly engaged in overthrowing the dogmas of all schools, but enuntiated none themselves; and though they would go so far as to bring forward and expound the dogmas of the others, they themselves laid down nothing definitely, not even the laying down of nothing. So much so that they even refuted their laying down of nothing, saying, for instance, We determine nothing, since otherwise they would have been betrayed into determining; but we put forward, say they, all the theories for the purpose of indicating our unprecipitate attitude, precisely as we might have done if we had actually assented to them. Thus by the expression We determine nothing is indicated their state of even balance; which is similarly indicated by the other expressions, Not more (one thing than another) 9.76. But the Sceptics even refute the statement Not more (one thing than another). For, as forethought is no more existent than non-existent, so Not more (one thing than another) is no more existent than not. Thus, as Timon says in the Pytho, the statement means just absence of all determination and withholding of assent. The other statement, Every saying, etc., equally compels suspension of judgement; when facts disagree, but the contradictory statements have exactly the same weight, ignorance of the truth is the necessary consequence. But even this statement has its corresponding antithesis, so that after destroying others it turns round and destroys itself, like a purge which drives the substance out and then in its turn is itself eliminated and destroyed. 9.79. They showed, then, on the basis of that which is contrary to what induces belief, that the probabilities on both sides are equal. Perplexities arise from the agreements between appearances or judgements, and these perplexities they distinguished under ten different modes in which the subjects in question appeared to vary. The following are the ten modes laid down.The first mode relates to the differences between living creatures in respect of those things which give them pleasure or pain, or are useful or harmful to them. By this it is inferred that they do not receive the same impressions from the same things, with the result that such a conflict necessarily leads to suspension of judgement. For some creatures multiply without intercourse, for example, creatures that live in fire, the Arabian phoenix and worms; others by union, such as man and the rest. 9.80. Some are distinguished in one way, some in another, and for this reason they differ in their senses also, hawks for instance being most keen-sighted, and dogs having a most acute sense of smell. It is natural that if the senses, e.g. eyes, of animals differ, so also will the impressions produced upon them; so to the goat vine-shoots are good to eat, to man they are bitter; the quail thrives on hemlock, which is fatal to man; the pig will eat ordure, the horse will not.The second mode has reference to the natures and idiosyncrasies of men; for instance, Demophon, Alexander's butler, used to get warm in the shade and shiver in the sun. 9.81. Andron of Argos is reported by Aristotle to have travelled across the waterless deserts of Libya without drinking. Moreover, one man fancies the profession of medicine, another farming, and another commerce; and the same ways of life are injurious to one man but beneficial to another; from which it follows that judgement must be suspended.The third mode depends on the differences between the sense-channels in different cases, for an apple gives the impression of being pale yellow in colour to the sight, sweet in taste and fragrant in smell. An object of the same shape is made to appear different by differences in the mirrors reflecting it. Thus it follows that what appears is no more such and such a thing than something different. 9.82. The fourth mode is that due to differences of condition and to changes in general; for instance, health, illness, sleep, waking, joy, sorrow, youth, old age, courage, fear, want, fullness, hate, love, heat, cold, to say nothing of breathing freely and having the passages obstructed. The impressions received thus appear to vary according to the nature of the conditions. Nay, even the state of madmen is not contrary to nature; for why should their state be so more than ours? Even to our view the sun has the appearance of standing still. And Theon of Tithorea used to go to bed and walk in his sleep, while Pericles' slave did the same on the housetop. 9.83. The fifth mode is derived from customs, laws, belief in myths, compacts between nations and dogmatic assumptions. This class includes considerations with regard to things beautiful and ugly, true and false, good and bad, with regard to the gods, and with regard to the coming into being and the passing away of the world of phenomena. Obviously the same thing is regarded by some as just and by others as unjust, or as good by some and bad by others. Persians think it not unnatural for a man to marry his daughter; to Greeks it is unlawful. The Massagetae, according to Eudoxus in the first book of his Voyage round the World, have their wives in common; the Greeks have not. The Cilicians used to delight in piracy; not so the Greeks. 9.84. Different people believe in different gods; some in providence, others not. In burying their dead, the Egyptians embalm them; the Romans burn them; the Paeonians throw them into lakes. As to what is true, then, let suspension of judgement be our practice.The sixth mode relates to mixtures and participations, by virtue of which nothing appears pure in and by itself, but only in combination with air, light, moisture, solidity, heat, cold, movement, exhalations and other forces. For purple shows different tints in sunlight, moonlight, and lamplight; and our own complexion does not appear the same at noon and when the sun is low. 9.85. Again, a rock which in air takes two men to lift is easily moved about in water, either because, being in reality heavy, it is lifted by the water or because, being light, it is made heavy by the air. of its own inherent property we know nothing, any more than of the constituent oils in an ointment.The seventh mode has reference to distances, positions, places and the occupants of the places. In this mode things which are thought to be large appear small, square things round; flat things appear to have projections, straight things to be bent, and colourless coloured. So the sun, on account of its distance, appears small, mountains when far away appear misty and smooth, but when near at hand rugged. 9.86. Furthermore, the sun at its rising has a certain appearance, but has a dissimilar appearance when in mid-heaven, and the same body one appearance in a wood and another in open country. The image again varies according to the position of the object, and a dove's neck according to the way it is turned. Since, then, it is not possible to observe these things apart from places and positions, their real nature is unknowable.The eighth mode is concerned with quantities and qualities of things, say heat or cold, swiftness or slowness, colourlessness or variety of colours. Thus wine taken in moderation strengthens the body, but too much of it is weakening; and so with food and other things. 9.87. The ninth mode has to do with perpetuity, strangeness, or rarity. Thus earthquakes are no surprise to those among whom they constantly take place; nor is the sun, for it is seen every day. This ninth mode is put eighth by Favorinus and tenth by Sextus and Aenesidemus; moreover the tenth is put eighth by Sextus and ninth by Favorinus.The tenth mode rests on inter-relation, e.g. between light and heavy, strong and weak, greater and less, up and down. Thus that which is on the right is not so by nature, but is so understood in virtue of its position with respect to something else; for, if that change its position, the thing is no longer on the right. 9.88. Similarly father and brother are relative terms, day is relative to the sun, and all things relative to our mind. Thus relative terms are in and by themselves unknowable. These, then, are the ten modes of perplexity.But Agrippa and his school add to them five other modes, resulting respectively from disagreement, extension ad infinitum, relativity, hypothesis and reciprocal inference. The mode arising from disagreement proves, with regard to any inquiry whether in philosophy or in everyday life, that it is full of the utmost contentiousness and confusion. The mode which involves extension ad infinitum refuses to admit that what is sought to be proved is firmly established, because one thing furnishes the ground for belief in another, and so on ad infinitum. 9.89. The mode derived from relativity declares that a thing can never be apprehended in and by itself, but only in connexion with something else. Hence all things are unknowable. The mode resulting from hypothesis arises when people suppose that you must take the most elementary of things as of themselves entitled to credence, instead of postulating them: which is useless, because some one else will adopt the contrary hypothesis. The mode arising from reciprocal inference is found whenever that which should be confirmatory of the thing requiring to be proved itself has to borrow credit from the latter, as, for example, if anyone seeking to establish the existence of pores on the ground that emanations take place should take this (the existence of pores) as proof that there are emanations. 9.94. We must not assume that what convinces us is actually true. For the same thing does not convince every one, nor even the same people always. Persuasiveness sometimes depends on external circumstances, on the reputation of the speaker, on his ability as a thinker or his artfulness, on the familiarity or the pleasantness of the topic.Again, they would destroy the criterion by reasoning of this kind. Even the criterion has either been critically determined or not. If it has not, it is definitely untrustworthy, and in its purpose of distinguishing is no more true than false. If it has, it will belong to the class of particular judgements, so that one and the same thing determines and is determined, and the criterion which has determined will have to be determined by another, that other by another, and so on ad infinitum. 9.96. They deny, too, that there is such a thing as a sign. If there is, they say, it must either be sensible or intelligible. Now it is not sensible, because what is sensible is a common attribute, whereas a sign is a particular thing. Again, the sensible is one of the things which exist by way of difference, while the sign belongs to the category of relative. Nor is a sign an object of thought, for objects of thought are of four kinds, apparent judgements on things apparent, non-apparent judgements on things non-apparent, non-apparent on apparent, or apparent on non-apparent; and a sign is none of these, so that there is no such thing as a sign. A sign is not apparent on apparent, for what is apparent needs no sign; nor is it non-apparent on non-apparent, for what is revealed by something must needs appear; 9.97. nor is it non-apparent on apparent, for that which is to afford the means of apprehending something else must itself be apparent; nor, lastly, is it apparent on non-apparent, because the sign, being relative, must be apprehended along with that of which it is the sign, which is not here the case. It follows that nothing uncertain can be apprehended; for it is through signs that uncertain things are said to be apprehended.Causes, too, they destroy in this way. A cause is something relative; for it is relative to what can be caused, namely, the effect. But things which are relative are merely objects of thought and have no substantial existence. 9.99. But if both be alike causes, there will be nothing to be acted upon Nor can an incorporeal thing be the cause of an incorporeal thing, for the same reason. And a thing incorporeal cannot be the cause of a body, since nothing incorporeal creates anything corporeal. And, lastly, a body cannot be the cause of anything incorporeal, because what is produced must be of the material operated upon; but if it is not operated upon because it is incorporeal, it cannot be produced by anything whatever. Therefore there is no such thing as a cause. A corollary to this is their statement that the first principles of the universe have no real existence; for in that case something must have been there to create and act.Furthermore there is no motion; for that which moves moves either in the place where it is or in a place where it is not. But it cannot move in the place where it is, still less in any place where it is not. Therefore there is no such thing as motion. 9.100. They used also to deny the possibility of learning. If anything is taught, they say, either the existent is taught through its existence or the non-existent through its non-existence. But the existent is not taught through its existence, for the nature of existing things is apparent to and recognized by all; nor is the non-existent taught through the nonexistent, for with the non-existent nothing is ever done, so that it cannot be taught to anyone.Nor, say they, is there any coming into being. For that which is does not come into being, since it is; nor yet that which is not, for it has no substantial existence, and that which is neither substantial nor existent cannot have had the chance of coming into being either. 9.101. There is nothing good or bad by nature, for if there is anything good or bad by nature, it must be good or bad for all persons alike, just as snow is cold to all. But there is no good or bad which is such to all persons in common; therefore there is no such thing as good or bad by nature. For either all that is thought good by anyone whatever must be called good, or not all. Certainly all cannot be so called; since one and the same thing is thought good by one person and bad by another; for instance, Epicurus thought pleasure good and Antisthenes thought it bad; thus on our supposition it will follow that the same thing is both good and bad. But if we say that not all that anyone thinks good is good, we shall have to judge the different opinions; and this is impossible because of the equal validity of opposing arguments. Therefore the good by nature is unknowable. 9.102. The whole of their mode of inference can be gathered from their extant treatises. Pyrrho himself, indeed, left no writings, but his associates Timon, Aenesidemus, Numenius and Nausiphanes did; and others as well.The dogmatists answer them by declaring that the Sceptics themselves do apprehend and dogmatize; for when they are thought to be refuting their hardest they do apprehend, for at the very same time they are asseverating and dogmatizing. Thus even when they declare that they determine nothing, and that to every argument there is an opposite argument, they are actually determining these very points and dogmatizing. 9.103. The others reply, We confess to human weaknesses; for we recognize that it is day and that we are alive, and many other apparent facts in life; but with regard to the things about which our opponents argue so positively, claiming to have definitely apprehended them, we suspend our judgement because they are not certain, and confine knowledge to our impressions. For we admit that we see, and we recognize that we think this or that, but how we see or how we think we know not. 9.104. And we say in conversation that a certain thing appears white, but we are not positive that it really is white. As to our 'We determine nothing' and the like, we use the expressions in an undogmatic sense, for they are not like the assertion that the world is spherical. Indeed the latter statement is not certain, but the others are mere admissions. Thus in saying 'We determine nothing,' we are not determining even that.Again, the dogmatic philosophers maintain that the Sceptics do away with life itself, in that they reject all that life consists in. The others say this is false, for they do not deny that we see; they only say that they do not know how we see. We admit the apparent fact, say they, without admitting that it really is what it appears to be. We also perceive that fire burns; as to whether it is its nature to burn, we suspend our judgement. 9.105. We see that a man moves, and that he perishes; how it happens we do not know. We merely object to accepting the unknown substance behind phenomena. When we say a picture has projections, we are describing what is apparent; but if we say that it has no projections, we are then speaking, not of what is apparent, but of something else. This is what makes Timon say in his Python that he has not gone outside what is customary. And again in the Conceits he says:But the apparent is omnipotent wherever it goes;and in his work On the Senses, I do not lay it down that honey is sweet, but I admit that it appears to be so. 9.106. Aenesidemus too in the first book of his Pyrrhonean Discourses says that Pyrrho determines nothing dogmatically, because of the possibility of contradiction, but guides himself by apparent facts. Aenesidemus says the same in his works Against Wisdom and On Inquiry. Furthermore Zeuxis, the friend of Aenesidemus, in his work On Two-sided Arguments, Antiochus of Laodicea, and Apellas in his Agrippa all hold to phenomena alone. Therefore the apparent is the Sceptic's criterion, as indeed Aenesidemus says; and so does Epicurus. Democritus, however, denied that any apparent fact could be a criterion, indeed he denied the very existence of the apparent. 9.107. Against this criterion of appearances the dogmatic philosophers urge that, when the same appearances produce in us different impressions, e.g. a round or square tower, the Sceptic, unless he gives the preference to one or other, will be unable to take any course; if on the other hand, say they, he follows either view, he is then no longer allowing equal value to all apparent facts. The Sceptics reply that, when different impressions are produced, they must both be said to appear; for things which are apparent are so called because they appear. The end to be realized they hold to be suspension of judgement, which brings with it tranquillity like its shadow: so Timon and Aenesidemus declare. 9.108. For in matters which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink from that; and things which are not for us to decide but happen of necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape, for they are not to be removed by force of reason. And when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility; according to others, gentleness. 9.109. 12. TIMONTimon, says our Apollonides of Nicaea in the first book of his commentaries On the Silli, which he dedicated to Tiberius Caesar, was the son of Timarchus and a native of Phlius. Losing his parents when young, he became a stage-dancer, but later took a dislike to that pursuit and went abroad to Megara to stay with Stilpo; then after some time he returned home and married. After that he went to Pyrrho at Elis with his wife, and lived there until his children were born; the elder of these he called Xanthus, taught him medicine, and made him his heir. 9.110. This son was a man of high repute, as we learn from Sotion in his eleventh book. Timon, however, found himself without means of support and sailed to the Hellespont and Propontis. Living now at Chalcedon as a sophist, he increased his reputation still further and, having made his fortune, went to Athens, where he lived until his death, except for a short period which he spent at Thebes. He was known to King Antigonus and to Ptolemy Philadelphus, as his own iambics testify.He was, according to Antigonus, fond of wine, and in the time that he could spare from philosophy he used to write poems. These included epics, tragedies, satyric dramas, thirty comedies and sixty tragedies, besides silli (lampoons) and obscene poems. 9.111. There are also reputed works of his extending to twenty thousand verses which are mentioned by Antigonus of Carystus, who also wrote his life. There are three silli in which, from his point of view as a Sceptic, he abuses every one and lampoons the dogmatic philosophers, using the form of parody. In the first he speaks in the first person throughout, the second and third are in the form of dialogues; for he represents himself as questioning Xenophanes of Colophon about each philosopher in turn, while Xenophanes answers him; in the second he speaks of the more ancient philosophers, in the third of the later, which is why some have entitled it the Epilogue. 9.112. The first deals with the same subjects, except that the poem is a monologue. It begins as follows:Ye sophists, ye inquisitives, come! follow!He died at the age of nearly ninety, so we learn from Antigonus and from Sotion in his eleventh book. I have heard that he had only one eye; indeed he used to call himself a Cyclops. There was another Timon, the misanthrope.Now this philosopher, according to Antigonus, was very fond of gardens and preferred to mind his own affairs. At all events there is a story that Hieronymus the Peripatetic said of him, Just as with the Scythians those who are in flight shoot as well as those who pursue, so, among philosophers, some catch their disciples by pursuing them, some by fleeing from them, as for instance Timon. 9.113. He was quick to perceive anything and to turn up his nose in scorn; he was fond of writing and at all times good at sketching plots for poets and collaborating in dramas. He used to give the dramatists Alexander and Homer materials for their tragedies. When disturbed by maidservants and dogs, he would stop writing, his earnest desire being to maintain tranquillity. Aratus is said to have asked him how he could obtain a trustworthy text of Homer, to which he replied, You can, if you get hold of the ancient copies, and not the corrected copies of our day. He used to let his own poems lie about, sometimes half eaten away. 9.115. Asked once by Arcesilaus why he had come there from Thebes, he replied, Why, to laugh when I have you all in full view! Yet, while attacking Arcesilaus in his Silli, he has praised him in his work entitled the Funeral Banquet of Arcesilaus.According to Menodotus he left no successor, but his school lapsed until Ptolemy of Cyrene re-established it. Hippobotus and Sotion, however, say that he had as pupils Dioscurides of Cyprus, Nicolochus of Rhodes, Euphranor of Seleucia, and Pralus of the Troad. The latter, as we learn from the history of Phylarchus, was a man of such unflinching courage that, although unjustly accused, he patiently suffered a traitor's death, without so much as deigning to speak one word to his fellow-citizens. 9.116. Euphranor had as pupil Eubulus of Alexandria; Eubulus taught Ptolemy, and he again Sarpedon and Heraclides; Heraclides again taught Aenesidemus of Cnossus, the compiler of eight books of Pyrrhonean discourses; the latter was the instructor of Zeuxippus his fellow-citizen, he of Zeuxis of the angular foot, he again of Antiochus of Laodicea on the Lycus, who had as pupils Menodotus of Nicomedia, an empiric physician, and Theiodas of Laodicea; Menodotus was the instructor of Herodotus of Tarsus, son of Arieus, and Herodotus taught Sextus Empiricus, who wrote ten books on Scepticism, and other fine works. Sextus taught Saturninus called Cythenas, another empiricist.
15. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 14.18.1-14.18.5, 14.18.14, 14.18.26-14.18.27 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
achilles Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 120
aeneas Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 120
aenesidemus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 74; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81
alexander the great Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74
anaxarchus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 105
anaxarchus xxv, and indifference regarding value Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
anaxarchus xxv Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
antigonus of carystus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 72, 74
apatheia Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 100
apollodorus of athens Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
appearances Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
apraxia challenge Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
arcesilaus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71
archilochus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106
aristocles Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71
aristotle Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 149; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 88
ataraxia Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 193; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 73
atomism, and sense perception Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
atomism Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
bett, richard Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
bett., r. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 73
biography Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 72, 74
burnyeat, m.f. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 73
cannibalism Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
character, excellence of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 73
cicero, as source for democritus Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
cicero Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 100
consistency Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 73
convention, challenges to Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
cynics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 73, 74, 88
deception and falsehood Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
democritus, concept of euthumiē Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
democritus, importance and reputation Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
democritus Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 28; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74, 88; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 81, 105, 106, 109; Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
demonstration Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81
diocles of magnesia Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
diogenes laertius Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 28; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 11, 12, 52, 105, 106, 109, 120
diogenes of babylon Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72, 73, 74
dolor Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 100
elis Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
epicureanism Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 149; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 105, 106, 109
epicurus, on nature and the self Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 73, 74
epicurus Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 193; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 105
epoche Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71
eratosthenes Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
eudaimonia Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 193
euripides Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106
eusebius Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71
euthumia/-ē Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
ferrari, g.a. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
fritz, k. von Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
god Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 88
goodness, good life Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72, 73
heraclitus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 88
homer Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 73, 74; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 12, 81, 105, 106, 109, 120
human thought Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11, 12
india Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74
indifference Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 105; Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
kant, immanuel Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
kathekon, kenos Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72, 73
lacydes Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71
language Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81
maxims (gnōmai) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
mill, john stuart Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 149
nature, of human beings Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
nature, of things Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72, 73
nausiphanes Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 73, 74; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 105
numenius Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106, 109
objectivism, objectivity Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 73
perceptual relativism Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
peripatetics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 88
pherecydes Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 105
philo of athens Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81, 105, 106, 109
philosophy as a way of life Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
philosophy of language Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11
plato Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 149; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 88
plutarch, and democritus Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
poseidon Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 120
posidonius Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106, 109
pre-socratics Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 11, 12
protagoras Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 88
pyrrho, and anaxarchus Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
pyrrho Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 28, 149, 193; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 12, 52, 81, 105, 106, 109; Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
pyrrhonism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 11, 81, 105, 109
pyrrhonists Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81, 109
pyrrhos students Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 81, 106
pythagoras Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 105
robin, l. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74
self Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 149
seven sages Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 106
sextus empiricus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 74, 88; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 11, 105
silloi Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 88
skeptical investigation Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
skeptical language Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
skeptical phrases Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81
skepticism, academic Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 193
skepticism, indifference Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
skepticism, metaphysically inclined skepticism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11
skepticism, pyrrhonian skepticism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 105
skepticism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 11, 12
skeptics Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 10, 11, 12, 52, 106
socrates Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71
sophists Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72, 73, 88; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 109
stoicism Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 149, 193
suffering Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 100
suspension of judgment Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
theodosius Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81
theophrastus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 88
thrasyllus of alexandria Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
timon Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 81, 106, 109
timon of phlius Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 149; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 72, 73, 74, 88
tranquility Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 105
tranquillity' Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71
tranquillity Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
troy Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 12, 52
virtue Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 100
vogt, katja maria Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 28
wilamowitz-moellendorff, u. von Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 72
xenophanes Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 149; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 88; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 105, 106
zeno of elea Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106
οὐ μᾶλλον\u200e arguments Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683