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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4479
Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 9.61


nan11. PYRRHOPyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles relates. According to Apollodorus in his Chronology, he was first a painter; then he studied under Stilpo's son Bryson: thus Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers. Afterwards he joined Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even forgathered with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgement. He denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust. And so, universally, he held that there is nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human action; for no single thing is in itself any more this than that.


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12 results
1. Homer, Iliad, 21.106-21.107 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)

21.106. /aye, not one among all the Trojans, and least of all among the sons of Priam. Nay, friend, do thou too die; why lamentest thou thus? Patroclus also died, who was better far than thou. And seest thou not what manner of man am I, how comely and how tall? A good man was my father, and a goddess the mother that bare me; yet over me too hang death and mighty fate. 21.107. /aye, not one among all the Trojans, and least of all among the sons of Priam. Nay, friend, do thou too die; why lamentest thou thus? Patroclus also died, who was better far than thou. And seest thou not what manner of man am I, how comely and how tall? A good man was my father, and a goddess the mother that bare me; yet over me too hang death and mighty fate.
2. Herodotus, Histories, 1.29 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

1.29. and after these were subdued and subject to Croesus in addition to the Lydians, all the sages from Hellas who were living at that time, coming in different ways, came to Sardis, which was at the height of its property; and among them came Solon the Athenian, who, after making laws for the Athenians at their request, went abroad for ten years, sailing forth to see the world, he said. This he did so as not to be compelled to repeal any of the laws he had made,,since the Athenians themselves could not do that, for they were bound by solemn oaths to abide for ten years by whatever laws Solon should make.
3. Cicero, Academica, 2.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.47-1.48 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.47. Eademque ratione ne temperantiam quidem propter se expetendam esse dicemus, sed quia pacem animis afferat et eos quasi concordia quadam placet ac leniat. temperantia est enim, quae in rebus aut expetendis aut fugiendis ut rationem sequamur monet. nec enim satis est iudicare quid faciendum non faciendumve sit, sed stare etiam oportet in eo, quod sit iudicatum. plerique autem, quod tenere atque servare id, quod ipsi statuerunt, non possunt, victi et debilitati obiecta specie voluptatis tradunt se libidinibus constringendos nec quid eventurum proventurum R sit provident ob eamque causam propter voluptatem et parvam et non non om. A 1 RN 1 necessariam et quae vel aliter pararetur et qua etiam carere possent sine dolore tum in morbos gravis, tum in damna, tum in dedecora incurrunt, saepe etiam legum iudiciorumque poenis obligantur. 1.48. Qui autem ita frui volunt voluptatibus, ut nulli propter eas consequantur dolores, et qui suum iudicium retinent, ne voluptate victi faciant id, quod sentiant non esse faciendum, ii ii A 1 V in BE hi A 2 hii RN voluptatem maximam adipiscuntur praetermittenda voluptate. idem etiam dolorem saepe perpetiuntur, ne, si id non faciant, incidant in maiorem. ex quo intellegitur nec intemperantiam propter se esse fugiendam temperantiamque expetendam, non quia voluptates fugiat, sed quia maiores consequatur.
5. Strabo, Geography, 15.1.63-15.1.65 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

15.1.63. Onesicritus says, that he himself was sent to converse with these wise men. For Alexander heard that they went about naked, practised constancy and fortitude, and were held in the highest honour; that, when invited, they did not go to other persons, but commanded others to come to them, if they wished to participate in their exercises or their conversation. Such being their character, Alexander did not consider it to be consistent with propriety to go to them, nor to compel them to do anything contrary to their inclination or against the custom of their country; he therefore despatched Onesicritus to them.Onesicritus found, at the distance of 20 stadia from the city, fifteen men standing in different postures, sitting or lying down naked, who continued in these positions until the evening, and then returned to the city. The most difficult thing to endure was the heat of the sun, which was so powerful, that no one else could endure without pain to walk on the ground at mid-day with bare feet. 15.1.64. He conversed with Calanus, one of these sophists, who accompanied the king to Persia, and died after the custom of his country, being placed on a pile of [burning] wood. When Onesicritus came, he was lying upon stones. Onesicritus approached, accosted him, and told him that he had been sent by the king, who had heard the fame of his wisdom, and that he was to give an account of his interview, if there were no objection, he was ready to listen to his discourse. When Calanus saw his mantle, head-covering, and shoes, he laughed, and said, 'Formerly, there was abundance everywhere of corn and barley, as there is now of dust; fountains then flowed with water, milk, honey, wine, and oil, but mankind by repletion and luxury became proud and insolent. Jupiter, indigt at this state of things, destroyed all, and appointed for man a life of toil. On the reappearance of temperance and other virtues, there was again an abundance of good things. But at present the condition of mankind approaches satiety and insolence, and there is danger lest the things which now exist should disappear.'When he had finished, he proposed to Onesicritus, if he wished to hear his discourse, to strip off his clothes, to lie down naked by him on the same stones, and in that manner to listen to him; while he was hesitating what to do, Mandanis, who was the oldest and wisest of the sophists, reproached Calanus for his insolence, although he censured such insolence himself. Mandanis called Onesicritus to him, and said, I commend the king, because, although he governs so large an empire, he is yet desirous of acquiring wisdom, for he is the only philosopher in arms that I ever saw; it would be of the greatest advantage, if those were philosophers who have the power of persuading the willing and of compelling the unwilling to learn temperance; but I am entitled to indulgence, if, when conversing by means of three interpreters, who, except the language, know no more than the vulgar, I am not able to demonstrate the utility of philosophy. To attempt it is to expect water to flow pure through mud. 15.1.65. 'The tendency of his discourse,' he said, 'was this, that the best philosophy was that which liberated the mind from pleasure and grief; that grief differed from labour, in that the former was inimical, the latter friendly to men; for that men exercised their bodies with labour in order to strengthen the mental powers, by which means they would be able to put an end to dissensions, and give good counsel to all, to the public and to individuals; that he certainly should at present advise Taxiles to receive Alexander as a friend; for if he entertained a person better than himself, he might be improved; but if a worse person, he might dispose him to good.'After this Mandanis inquired, whether such doctrines were taught among the Greeks. Onesicritus answered, that Pythagoras taught a similar doctrine, and enjoined his disciples to abstain from whatever has life; that Socrates and Diogenes, whose discourses he had heard, held the same opinions. Mandanis replied, 'that in other respects he thought them wise, but that in one thing they were mistaken, namely, in preferring custom to nature, for otherwise they would not be ashamed of going naked, like himself, and of subsisting on frugal fare; for the best house was that which required least repairs.' He says also that they employ themselves much on natural subjects, as prognostics, rain, drought, and diseases. When they repair to the city, they disperse themselves in the market-places; if they meet any one carrying figs or bunches of grapes, they take what is offered gratuitously; if it is oil, it is poured over them, and they are anointed with it. Every wealthy house, even to the women's apartment, is open to them; when they enter it, they engage in conversation, and partake of the repast. Disease of the body they regard as most disgraceful, and he who apprehends it, after preparing a pyre, destroys himself by fire; he (previously) anoints himself, and sitting down upon it orders it to be lighted, remaining motionless while he is burning.
6. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 9.3, 71.29 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

7. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.87-7.88, 7.135, 8.5, 11.14, 11.114, 11.118 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

8. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.3, 1.7-1.15, 1.27-1.28, 1.145-1.163, 1.209-1.241, 3.198-3.207, 3.215, 3.229, 3.235-3.238 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 1.13-1.16, 3.6-3.7, 6.87, 7.179, 8.3, 8.87, 9.5-9.6, 9.20, 9.34-9.35, 9.45, 9.51, 9.62-9.69, 9.71-9.76, 9.78-9.90, 9.94, 9.96-9.97, 9.99-9.113, 9.115-9.116 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.6. From that time onward, having reached his twentieth year (so it is said), he was the pupil of Socrates. When Socrates was gone, he attached himself to Cratylus the Heraclitean, and to Hermogenes who professed the philosophy of Parmenides. Then at the age of twenty-eight, according to Hermodorus, he withdrew to Megara to Euclides, with certain other disciples of Socrates. Next he proceeded to Cyrene on a visit to Theodorus the mathematician, thence to Italy to see the Pythagorean philosophers Philolaus and Eurytus, and thence to Egypt to see those who interpreted the will of the gods; and Euripides is said to have accompanied him thither. There he fell sick and was cured by the priests, who treated him with sea-water, and for this reason he cited the line:The sea doth wash away all human ills. 3.7. Furthermore he said that, according to Homer, beyond all men the Egyptians were skilled in healing. Plato also intended to make the acquaintance of the Magians, but was prevented by the wars in Asia. Having returned to Athens, he lived in the Academy, which is a gymnasium outside the walls, in a grove named after a certain hero, Hecademus, as is stated by Eupolis in his play entitled Shirkers:In the shady walks of the divine Hecademus.Moreover, there are verses of Timon which refer to Plato:Amongst all of them Plato was the leader, a big fish, but a sweet-voiced speaker, musical in prose as the cicala who, perched on the trees of Hecademus, pours forth a strain as delicate as a lily. 6.87. He flourished in the 113th Olympiad.According to Antisthenes in his Successions, the first impulse to the Cynic philosophy was given to him when he saw Telephus in a certain tragedy carrying a little basket and altogether in a wretched plight. So he turned his property into money, – for he belonged to a distinguished family, – and having thus collected about 200 talents, distributed that sum among his fellow-citizens. And (it is added) so sturdy a philosopher did he become that he is mentioned by the comic poet Philemon. At all events the latter says:In summer-time a thick cloak he would wearTo be like Crates, and in winter rags.Diocles relates how Diogenes persuaded Crates to give up his fields to sheep pasture, and throw into the sea any money he had. 7.179. 7. CHRYSIPPUSChrysippus, the son of Apollonius, came either from Soli or from Tarsus, as Alexander relates in his Successions. He was a pupil of Cleanthes. Before this he used to practise as a long-distance runner; but afterwards he came to hear Zeno, or, as Diocles and most people say, Cleanthes; and then, while Cleanthes was still living, withdrew from his school and attained exceptional eminence as a philosopher. He had good natural parts and showed the greatest acuteness in every branch of the subject; so much so that he differed on most points from Zeno, and from Cleanthes as well, to whom he often used to say that all he wanted was to be told what the doctrines were; he would find out the proofs for himself. Nevertheless, whenever he had contended against Cleanthes, he would afterwards feel remorse, so that he constantly came out with the lines:Blest in all else am I, save only whereI touch Cleanthes: there I am ill-fortuned. 8.3. Now he was in Egypt when Polycrates sent him a letter of introduction to Amasis; he learnt the Egyptian language, so we learn from Antiphon in his book On Men of Outstanding Merit, and he also journeyed among the Chaldaeans and Magi. Then while in Crete he went down into the cave of Ida with Epimenides; he also entered the Egyptian sanctuaries, and was told their secret lore concerning the gods. After that he returned to Samos to find his country under the tyranny of Polycrates; so he sailed away to Croton in Italy, and there he laid down a constitution for the Italian Greeks, and he and his followers were held in great estimation; for, being nearly three hundred in number, so well did they govern the state that its constitution was in effect a true aristocracy (government by the best). 8.87. After spending two months there, he went home and, aided by the liberality of his friends, he proceeded to Egypt with Chrysippus the physician, bearing with him letters of introduction from Agesilaus to Nectanabis, who recommended him to the priests. There he remained one year and four months with his beard and eyebrows shaved, and there, some say, he wrote his Octateris. From there he went to Cyzicus and the Propontis, giving lectures; afterwards he came to the court of Mausolus. Then at length he returned to Athens, bringing with him a great number of pupils: according to some, this was for the purpose of annoying Plato, who had originally passed him over. 9.5. He was exceptional from his boyhood; for when a youth he used to say that he knew nothing, although when he was grown up he claimed that he knew everything. He was nobody's pupil, but he declared that he inquired of himself, and learned everything from himself. Some, however, had said that he had been a pupil of Xenophanes, as we learn from Sotion, who also tells us that Ariston in his book On Heraclitus declares that he was cured of the dropsy and died of another disease. And Hippobotus has the same story.As to the work which passes as his, it is a continuous treatise On Nature, but is divided into three discourses, one on the universe, another on politics, and a third on theology. 9.6. This book he dedicated in the sanctuary of Artemis and, according to some, he deliberately made it the more obscure in order that none but adepts should approach it, and lest familiarity should breed contempt. of our philosopher Timon gives a sketch in these words:In their midst uprose shrill, cuckoo-like, a mob-reviler, riddling Heraclitus.Theophrastus puts it down to melancholy that some parts of his work are half-finished, while other parts make a strange medley. As a proof of his magimity, Antisthenes in his Successions of Philosophers cites the fact that he renounced his claim to the kingship in favour of his brother. So great fame did his book win that a sect was founded and called the Heracliteans, after him. 9.20. He also said that the mass of things falls short of thought; and again that our encounters with tyrants should be as few, or else as pleasant, as possible. When Empedocles remarked to him that it is impossible to find a wise man, Naturally, he replied, for it takes a wise man to recognize a wise man. Sotion says that he was the first to maintain that all things are incognizable, but Sotion is in error.One of his poems is The Founding of Colophon, and another The Settlement of a Colony at Elea in Italy, making 2000 lines in all. He flourished about the 60th Olympiad. That he buried his sons with his own hands like Anaxagoras is stated by Demetrius of Phalerum in his work On Old Age and by Panaetius the Stoic in his book of Cheerfulness. He is believed to have been sold into slavery by [... and to have been set free by] the Pythagoreans Parmeniscus and Orestades: so Favorinus in the first book of his Memorabilia. There was also another Xenophanes, of Lesbos, an iambic poet.Such were the sporadic philosophers. 9.34. 7. DEMOCRITUSDemocritus was the son of Hegesistratus, though some say of Athenocritus, and others again of Damasippus. He was a native of Abdera or, according to some, of Miletus. He was a pupil of certain Magians and Chaldaeans. For when King Xerxes was entertained by the father of Democritus he left men in charge, as, in fact, is stated by Herodotus; and from these men, while still a boy, he learned theology and astronomy. Afterwards he met Leucippus and, according to some, Anaxagoras, being forty years younger than the latter. But Favorinus in his Miscellaneous History tells us that Democritus, speaking of Anaxagoras, declared that his views on the sun and the moon were not original but of great antiquity, and that he had simply stolen them. 9.35. Democritus also pulled to pieces the views of Anaxagoras on cosmogony and on mind, having a spite against him, because Anaxagoras did not take to him. If this be so, how could he have been his pupil, as some suggest?According to Demetrius in his book on Men of the Same Name and Antisthenes in his Successions of Philosophers, he travelled into Egypt to learn geometry from the priests, and he also went into Persia to visit the Chaldaeans as well as to the Red Sea. Some say that he associated with the Gymnosophists in India and went to Aethiopia. Also that, being the third son, he divided the family property. Most authorities will have it that he chose the smaller portion, which was in money, because he had need of this to pay the cost of travel; besides, his brothers were crafty enough to foresee that this would be his choice. 9.45. All things happen by virtue of necessity, the vortex being the cause of the creation of all things, and this he calls necessity. The end of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some by a false interpretation have understood, but a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion. This he calls well-being and many other names. The qualities of things exist merely by convention; in nature there is nothing but atoms and void space. These, then, are his opinions.of his works Thrasylus has made an ordered catalogue, arranging them in fours, as he also arranged Plato's works. 9.51. Protagoras was the first to maintain that there are two sides to every question, opposed to each other, and he even argued in this fashion, being the first to do so. Furthermore he began a work thus: Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not. He used to say that soul was nothing apart from the senses, as we learn from Plato in the Theaetetus, and that everything is true. In another work he began thus: As to the gods, I have no means of knowing either that they exist or that they do not exist. For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life. 9.62. He led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; but he was kept out of harm's way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus tells us, used to follow close after him. But Aenesidemus says that it was only his philosophy that was based upon suspension of judgement, and that he did not lack foresight in his everyday acts. He lived to be nearly ninety.This is what Antigonus of Carystus says of Pyrrho in his book upon him. At first he was a poor and unknown painter, and there are still some indifferent torch-racers of his in the gymnasium at Elis. 9.63. He would withdraw from the world and live in solitude, rarely showing himself to his relatives; this he did because he had heard an Indian reproach Anaxarchus, telling him that he would never be able to teach others what is good while he himself danced attendance on kings in their courts. He would maintain the same composure at all times, so that, even if you left him when he was in the middle of a speech, he would finish what he had to say with no audience but himself, although in his youth he had been hasty. often, our informant adds, he would leave his home and, telling no one, would go roaming about with whomsoever he chanced to meet. And once, when Anaxarchus fell into a slough, he passed by without giving him any help, and, while others blamed him, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and sang-froid. 9.64. On being discovered once talking to himself, he answered, when asked the reason, that he was training to be good. In debate he was looked down upon by no one, for he could both discourse at length and also sustain a cross-examination, so that even Nausiphanes when a young man was captivated by him: at all events he used to say that we should follow Pyrrho in disposition but himself in doctrine; and he would often remark that Epicurus, greatly admiring Pyrrho's way of life, regularly asked him for information about Pyrrho; and that he was so respected by his native city that they made him high priest, and on his account they voted that all philosophers should be exempt from taxation.Moreover, there were many who emulated his abstention from affairs, so that Timon in his Pytho and in his Silli says: 9.65. O Pyrrho, O aged Pyrrho, whence and howFound'st thou escape from servitude to sophists,Their dreams and vanities; how didst thou looseThe bonds of trickery and specious craft?Nor reck'st thou to inquire such things as these,What breezes circle Hellas, to what end,And from what quarter each may chance to blow.And again in the Conceits:This, Pyrrho, this my heart is fain to know,Whence peace of mind to thee doth freely flow,Why among men thou like a god dost show?Athens honoured him with her citizenship, says Diocles, for having slain the Thracian Cotys. 9.66. He lived in fraternal piety with his sister, a midwife, so says Eratosthenes in his essay On Wealth and Poverty, now and then even taking things for sale to market, poultry perchance or pigs, and he would dust the things in the house, quite indifferent as to what he did. They say he showed his indifference by washing a porker. Once he got enraged in his sister's cause (her name was Philista), and he told the man who blamed him that it was not over a weak woman that one should display indifference. When a cur rushed at him and terrified him, he answered his critic that it was not easy entirely to strip oneself of human weakness; but one should strive with all one's might against facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in word. 9.67. They say that, when septic salves and surgical and caustic remedies were applied to a wound he had sustained, he did not so much as frown. Timon also portrays his disposition in the full account which he gives of him to Pytho. Philo of Athens, a friend of his, used to say that he was most fond of Democritus, and then of Homer, admiring him and continually repeating the lineAs leaves on trees, such is the life of man.He also admired Homer because he likened men to wasps, flies, and birds, and would quote these verses as well:Ay, friend, die thou; why thus thy fate deplore?Patroclus too, thy better, is no more,and all the passages which dwell on the unstable purpose, vain pursuits, and childish folly of man. 9.68. Posidonius, too, relates of him a story of this sort. When his fellow-passengers on board a ship were all unnerved by a storm, he kept calm and confident, pointing to a little pig in the ship that went on eating, and telling them that such was the unperturbed state in which the wise man should keep himself. Numenius alone attributes to him positive tenets. He had pupils of repute, in particular one Eurylochus, who fell short of his professions; for they say that he was once so angry that he seized the spit with the meat on it and chased his cook right into the market-place. 9.69. Once in Elis he was so hard pressed by his pupils' questions that he stripped and swam across the Alpheus. Now he was, as Timon too says, most hostile to Sophists.Philo, again, who had a habit of very often talking to himself, is also referred to in the lines:Yea, him that is far away from men, at leisure to himself,Philo, who recks not of opinion or of wrangling.Besides these, Pyrrho's pupils included Hecataeus of Abdera, Timon of Phlius, author of the Silli, of whom more anon, and also Nausiphanes of Teos, said by some to have been a teacher of Epicurus. All these were called Pyrrhoneans after the name of their master, but Aporetics, Sceptics, Ephectics, and even Zetetics, from their principles, if we may call them such — 9.71. Some call Homer the founder of this school, for to the same questions he more than anyone else is always giving different answers at different times, and is never definite or dogmatic about the answer. The maxims of the Seven Wise Men, too, they call sceptical; for instance, Observe the Golden Mean, and A pledge is a curse at one's elbow, meaning that whoever plights his troth steadfastly and trustfully brings a curse on his own head. Sceptically minded, again, were Archilochus and Euripides, for Archilochus says:Man's soul, O Glaucus, son of Leptines,Is but as one short day that Zeus sends down.And Euripides:Great God! how can they say poor mortal menHave minds and think? Hang we not on thy will?Do we not what it pleaseth thee to wish? 9.72. Furthermore, they find Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, and Democritus to be sceptics: Xenophanes because he says,Clear truth hath no man seen nor e'er shall knowand Zeno because he would destroy motion, saying, A moving body moves neither where it is nor where it is not; Democritus because he rejects qualities, saying, Opinion says hot or cold, but the reality is atoms and empty space, and again, of a truth we know nothing, for truth is in a well. Plato, too, leaves the truth to gods and sons of gods, and seeks after the probable explanation. Euripides says: 9.73. Who knoweth if to die be but to live,And that called life by mortals be but death?So too Empedocles:So to these mortal may not list nor lookNor yet conceive them in his mind;and before that:Each believes naught but his experience.And even Heraclitus: Let us not conjecture on deepest questions what is likely. Then again Hippocrates showed himself two-sided and but human. And before them all Homer:Pliant is the tongue of mortals; numberless the tales within it;andAmple is of words the pasture, hither thither widely ranging;andAnd the saying which thou sayest, back it cometh later on thee,where he is speaking of the equal value of contradictory sayings. 9.74. The Sceptics, then, were constantly engaged in overthrowing the dogmas of all schools, but enuntiated none themselves; and though they would go so far as to bring forward and expound the dogmas of the others, they themselves laid down nothing definitely, not even the laying down of nothing. So much so that they even refuted their laying down of nothing, saying, for instance, We determine nothing, since otherwise they would have been betrayed into determining; but we put forward, say they, all the theories for the purpose of indicating our unprecipitate attitude, precisely as we might have done if we had actually assented to them. Thus by the expression We determine nothing is indicated their state of even balance; which is similarly indicated by the other expressions, Not more (one thing than another) 9.76. But the Sceptics even refute the statement Not more (one thing than another). For, as forethought is no more existent than non-existent, so Not more (one thing than another) is no more existent than not. Thus, as Timon says in the Pytho, the statement means just absence of all determination and withholding of assent. The other statement, Every saying, etc., equally compels suspension of judgement; when facts disagree, but the contradictory statements have exactly the same weight, ignorance of the truth is the necessary consequence. But even this statement has its corresponding antithesis, so that after destroying others it turns round and destroys itself, like a purge which drives the substance out and then in its turn is itself eliminated and destroyed. 9.79. They showed, then, on the basis of that which is contrary to what induces belief, that the probabilities on both sides are equal. Perplexities arise from the agreements between appearances or judgements, and these perplexities they distinguished under ten different modes in which the subjects in question appeared to vary. The following are the ten modes laid down.The first mode relates to the differences between living creatures in respect of those things which give them pleasure or pain, or are useful or harmful to them. By this it is inferred that they do not receive the same impressions from the same things, with the result that such a conflict necessarily leads to suspension of judgement. For some creatures multiply without intercourse, for example, creatures that live in fire, the Arabian phoenix and worms; others by union, such as man and the rest. 9.80. Some are distinguished in one way, some in another, and for this reason they differ in their senses also, hawks for instance being most keen-sighted, and dogs having a most acute sense of smell. It is natural that if the senses, e.g. eyes, of animals differ, so also will the impressions produced upon them; so to the goat vine-shoots are good to eat, to man they are bitter; the quail thrives on hemlock, which is fatal to man; the pig will eat ordure, the horse will not.The second mode has reference to the natures and idiosyncrasies of men; for instance, Demophon, Alexander's butler, used to get warm in the shade and shiver in the sun. 9.81. Andron of Argos is reported by Aristotle to have travelled across the waterless deserts of Libya without drinking. Moreover, one man fancies the profession of medicine, another farming, and another commerce; and the same ways of life are injurious to one man but beneficial to another; from which it follows that judgement must be suspended.The third mode depends on the differences between the sense-channels in different cases, for an apple gives the impression of being pale yellow in colour to the sight, sweet in taste and fragrant in smell. An object of the same shape is made to appear different by differences in the mirrors reflecting it. Thus it follows that what appears is no more such and such a thing than something different. 9.82. The fourth mode is that due to differences of condition and to changes in general; for instance, health, illness, sleep, waking, joy, sorrow, youth, old age, courage, fear, want, fullness, hate, love, heat, cold, to say nothing of breathing freely and having the passages obstructed. The impressions received thus appear to vary according to the nature of the conditions. Nay, even the state of madmen is not contrary to nature; for why should their state be so more than ours? Even to our view the sun has the appearance of standing still. And Theon of Tithorea used to go to bed and walk in his sleep, while Pericles' slave did the same on the housetop. 9.83. The fifth mode is derived from customs, laws, belief in myths, compacts between nations and dogmatic assumptions. This class includes considerations with regard to things beautiful and ugly, true and false, good and bad, with regard to the gods, and with regard to the coming into being and the passing away of the world of phenomena. Obviously the same thing is regarded by some as just and by others as unjust, or as good by some and bad by others. Persians think it not unnatural for a man to marry his daughter; to Greeks it is unlawful. The Massagetae, according to Eudoxus in the first book of his Voyage round the World, have their wives in common; the Greeks have not. The Cilicians used to delight in piracy; not so the Greeks. 9.84. Different people believe in different gods; some in providence, others not. In burying their dead, the Egyptians embalm them; the Romans burn them; the Paeonians throw them into lakes. As to what is true, then, let suspension of judgement be our practice.The sixth mode relates to mixtures and participations, by virtue of which nothing appears pure in and by itself, but only in combination with air, light, moisture, solidity, heat, cold, movement, exhalations and other forces. For purple shows different tints in sunlight, moonlight, and lamplight; and our own complexion does not appear the same at noon and when the sun is low. 9.85. Again, a rock which in air takes two men to lift is easily moved about in water, either because, being in reality heavy, it is lifted by the water or because, being light, it is made heavy by the air. of its own inherent property we know nothing, any more than of the constituent oils in an ointment.The seventh mode has reference to distances, positions, places and the occupants of the places. In this mode things which are thought to be large appear small, square things round; flat things appear to have projections, straight things to be bent, and colourless coloured. So the sun, on account of its distance, appears small, mountains when far away appear misty and smooth, but when near at hand rugged. 9.86. Furthermore, the sun at its rising has a certain appearance, but has a dissimilar appearance when in mid-heaven, and the same body one appearance in a wood and another in open country. The image again varies according to the position of the object, and a dove's neck according to the way it is turned. Since, then, it is not possible to observe these things apart from places and positions, their real nature is unknowable.The eighth mode is concerned with quantities and qualities of things, say heat or cold, swiftness or slowness, colourlessness or variety of colours. Thus wine taken in moderation strengthens the body, but too much of it is weakening; and so with food and other things. 9.87. The ninth mode has to do with perpetuity, strangeness, or rarity. Thus earthquakes are no surprise to those among whom they constantly take place; nor is the sun, for it is seen every day. This ninth mode is put eighth by Favorinus and tenth by Sextus and Aenesidemus; moreover the tenth is put eighth by Sextus and ninth by Favorinus.The tenth mode rests on inter-relation, e.g. between light and heavy, strong and weak, greater and less, up and down. Thus that which is on the right is not so by nature, but is so understood in virtue of its position with respect to something else; for, if that change its position, the thing is no longer on the right. 9.88. Similarly father and brother are relative terms, day is relative to the sun, and all things relative to our mind. Thus relative terms are in and by themselves unknowable. These, then, are the ten modes of perplexity.But Agrippa and his school add to them five other modes, resulting respectively from disagreement, extension ad infinitum, relativity, hypothesis and reciprocal inference. The mode arising from disagreement proves, with regard to any inquiry whether in philosophy or in everyday life, that it is full of the utmost contentiousness and confusion. The mode which involves extension ad infinitum refuses to admit that what is sought to be proved is firmly established, because one thing furnishes the ground for belief in another, and so on ad infinitum. 9.89. The mode derived from relativity declares that a thing can never be apprehended in and by itself, but only in connexion with something else. Hence all things are unknowable. The mode resulting from hypothesis arises when people suppose that you must take the most elementary of things as of themselves entitled to credence, instead of postulating them: which is useless, because some one else will adopt the contrary hypothesis. The mode arising from reciprocal inference is found whenever that which should be confirmatory of the thing requiring to be proved itself has to borrow credit from the latter, as, for example, if anyone seeking to establish the existence of pores on the ground that emanations take place should take this (the existence of pores) as proof that there are emanations. 9.94. We must not assume that what convinces us is actually true. For the same thing does not convince every one, nor even the same people always. Persuasiveness sometimes depends on external circumstances, on the reputation of the speaker, on his ability as a thinker or his artfulness, on the familiarity or the pleasantness of the topic.Again, they would destroy the criterion by reasoning of this kind. Even the criterion has either been critically determined or not. If it has not, it is definitely untrustworthy, and in its purpose of distinguishing is no more true than false. If it has, it will belong to the class of particular judgements, so that one and the same thing determines and is determined, and the criterion which has determined will have to be determined by another, that other by another, and so on ad infinitum. 9.96. They deny, too, that there is such a thing as a sign. If there is, they say, it must either be sensible or intelligible. Now it is not sensible, because what is sensible is a common attribute, whereas a sign is a particular thing. Again, the sensible is one of the things which exist by way of difference, while the sign belongs to the category of relative. Nor is a sign an object of thought, for objects of thought are of four kinds, apparent judgements on things apparent, non-apparent judgements on things non-apparent, non-apparent on apparent, or apparent on non-apparent; and a sign is none of these, so that there is no such thing as a sign. A sign is not apparent on apparent, for what is apparent needs no sign; nor is it non-apparent on non-apparent, for what is revealed by something must needs appear; 9.97. nor is it non-apparent on apparent, for that which is to afford the means of apprehending something else must itself be apparent; nor, lastly, is it apparent on non-apparent, because the sign, being relative, must be apprehended along with that of which it is the sign, which is not here the case. It follows that nothing uncertain can be apprehended; for it is through signs that uncertain things are said to be apprehended.Causes, too, they destroy in this way. A cause is something relative; for it is relative to what can be caused, namely, the effect. But things which are relative are merely objects of thought and have no substantial existence. 9.99. But if both be alike causes, there will be nothing to be acted upon Nor can an incorporeal thing be the cause of an incorporeal thing, for the same reason. And a thing incorporeal cannot be the cause of a body, since nothing incorporeal creates anything corporeal. And, lastly, a body cannot be the cause of anything incorporeal, because what is produced must be of the material operated upon; but if it is not operated upon because it is incorporeal, it cannot be produced by anything whatever. Therefore there is no such thing as a cause. A corollary to this is their statement that the first principles of the universe have no real existence; for in that case something must have been there to create and act.Furthermore there is no motion; for that which moves moves either in the place where it is or in a place where it is not. But it cannot move in the place where it is, still less in any place where it is not. Therefore there is no such thing as motion. 9.100. They used also to deny the possibility of learning. If anything is taught, they say, either the existent is taught through its existence or the non-existent through its non-existence. But the existent is not taught through its existence, for the nature of existing things is apparent to and recognized by all; nor is the non-existent taught through the nonexistent, for with the non-existent nothing is ever done, so that it cannot be taught to anyone.Nor, say they, is there any coming into being. For that which is does not come into being, since it is; nor yet that which is not, for it has no substantial existence, and that which is neither substantial nor existent cannot have had the chance of coming into being either. 9.101. There is nothing good or bad by nature, for if there is anything good or bad by nature, it must be good or bad for all persons alike, just as snow is cold to all. But there is no good or bad which is such to all persons in common; therefore there is no such thing as good or bad by nature. For either all that is thought good by anyone whatever must be called good, or not all. Certainly all cannot be so called; since one and the same thing is thought good by one person and bad by another; for instance, Epicurus thought pleasure good and Antisthenes thought it bad; thus on our supposition it will follow that the same thing is both good and bad. But if we say that not all that anyone thinks good is good, we shall have to judge the different opinions; and this is impossible because of the equal validity of opposing arguments. Therefore the good by nature is unknowable. 9.102. The whole of their mode of inference can be gathered from their extant treatises. Pyrrho himself, indeed, left no writings, but his associates Timon, Aenesidemus, Numenius and Nausiphanes did; and others as well.The dogmatists answer them by declaring that the Sceptics themselves do apprehend and dogmatize; for when they are thought to be refuting their hardest they do apprehend, for at the very same time they are asseverating and dogmatizing. Thus even when they declare that they determine nothing, and that to every argument there is an opposite argument, they are actually determining these very points and dogmatizing. 9.103. The others reply, We confess to human weaknesses; for we recognize that it is day and that we are alive, and many other apparent facts in life; but with regard to the things about which our opponents argue so positively, claiming to have definitely apprehended them, we suspend our judgement because they are not certain, and confine knowledge to our impressions. For we admit that we see, and we recognize that we think this or that, but how we see or how we think we know not. 9.104. And we say in conversation that a certain thing appears white, but we are not positive that it really is white. As to our 'We determine nothing' and the like, we use the expressions in an undogmatic sense, for they are not like the assertion that the world is spherical. Indeed the latter statement is not certain, but the others are mere admissions. Thus in saying 'We determine nothing,' we are not determining even that.Again, the dogmatic philosophers maintain that the Sceptics do away with life itself, in that they reject all that life consists in. The others say this is false, for they do not deny that we see; they only say that they do not know how we see. We admit the apparent fact, say they, without admitting that it really is what it appears to be. We also perceive that fire burns; as to whether it is its nature to burn, we suspend our judgement. 9.105. We see that a man moves, and that he perishes; how it happens we do not know. We merely object to accepting the unknown substance behind phenomena. When we say a picture has projections, we are describing what is apparent; but if we say that it has no projections, we are then speaking, not of what is apparent, but of something else. This is what makes Timon say in his Python that he has not gone outside what is customary. And again in the Conceits he says:But the apparent is omnipotent wherever it goes;and in his work On the Senses, I do not lay it down that honey is sweet, but I admit that it appears to be so. 9.106. Aenesidemus too in the first book of his Pyrrhonean Discourses says that Pyrrho determines nothing dogmatically, because of the possibility of contradiction, but guides himself by apparent facts. Aenesidemus says the same in his works Against Wisdom and On Inquiry. Furthermore Zeuxis, the friend of Aenesidemus, in his work On Two-sided Arguments, Antiochus of Laodicea, and Apellas in his Agrippa all hold to phenomena alone. Therefore the apparent is the Sceptic's criterion, as indeed Aenesidemus says; and so does Epicurus. Democritus, however, denied that any apparent fact could be a criterion, indeed he denied the very existence of the apparent. 9.107. Against this criterion of appearances the dogmatic philosophers urge that, when the same appearances produce in us different impressions, e.g. a round or square tower, the Sceptic, unless he gives the preference to one or other, will be unable to take any course; if on the other hand, say they, he follows either view, he is then no longer allowing equal value to all apparent facts. The Sceptics reply that, when different impressions are produced, they must both be said to appear; for things which are apparent are so called because they appear. The end to be realized they hold to be suspension of judgement, which brings with it tranquillity like its shadow: so Timon and Aenesidemus declare. 9.108. For in matters which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink from that; and things which are not for us to decide but happen of necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape, for they are not to be removed by force of reason. And when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility; according to others, gentleness. 9.109. 12. TIMONTimon, says our Apollonides of Nicaea in the first book of his commentaries On the Silli, which he dedicated to Tiberius Caesar, was the son of Timarchus and a native of Phlius. Losing his parents when young, he became a stage-dancer, but later took a dislike to that pursuit and went abroad to Megara to stay with Stilpo; then after some time he returned home and married. After that he went to Pyrrho at Elis with his wife, and lived there until his children were born; the elder of these he called Xanthus, taught him medicine, and made him his heir. 9.110. This son was a man of high repute, as we learn from Sotion in his eleventh book. Timon, however, found himself without means of support and sailed to the Hellespont and Propontis. Living now at Chalcedon as a sophist, he increased his reputation still further and, having made his fortune, went to Athens, where he lived until his death, except for a short period which he spent at Thebes. He was known to King Antigonus and to Ptolemy Philadelphus, as his own iambics testify.He was, according to Antigonus, fond of wine, and in the time that he could spare from philosophy he used to write poems. These included epics, tragedies, satyric dramas, thirty comedies and sixty tragedies, besides silli (lampoons) and obscene poems. 9.111. There are also reputed works of his extending to twenty thousand verses which are mentioned by Antigonus of Carystus, who also wrote his life. There are three silli in which, from his point of view as a Sceptic, he abuses every one and lampoons the dogmatic philosophers, using the form of parody. In the first he speaks in the first person throughout, the second and third are in the form of dialogues; for he represents himself as questioning Xenophanes of Colophon about each philosopher in turn, while Xenophanes answers him; in the second he speaks of the more ancient philosophers, in the third of the later, which is why some have entitled it the Epilogue. 9.112. The first deals with the same subjects, except that the poem is a monologue. It begins as follows:Ye sophists, ye inquisitives, come! follow!He died at the age of nearly ninety, so we learn from Antigonus and from Sotion in his eleventh book. I have heard that he had only one eye; indeed he used to call himself a Cyclops. There was another Timon, the misanthrope.Now this philosopher, according to Antigonus, was very fond of gardens and preferred to mind his own affairs. At all events there is a story that Hieronymus the Peripatetic said of him, Just as with the Scythians those who are in flight shoot as well as those who pursue, so, among philosophers, some catch their disciples by pursuing them, some by fleeing from them, as for instance Timon. 9.113. He was quick to perceive anything and to turn up his nose in scorn; he was fond of writing and at all times good at sketching plots for poets and collaborating in dramas. He used to give the dramatists Alexander and Homer materials for their tragedies. When disturbed by maidservants and dogs, he would stop writing, his earnest desire being to maintain tranquillity. Aratus is said to have asked him how he could obtain a trustworthy text of Homer, to which he replied, You can, if you get hold of the ancient copies, and not the corrected copies of our day. He used to let his own poems lie about, sometimes half eaten away. 9.115. Asked once by Arcesilaus why he had come there from Thebes, he replied, Why, to laugh when I have you all in full view! Yet, while attacking Arcesilaus in his Silli, he has praised him in his work entitled the Funeral Banquet of Arcesilaus.According to Menodotus he left no successor, but his school lapsed until Ptolemy of Cyrene re-established it. Hippobotus and Sotion, however, say that he had as pupils Dioscurides of Cyprus, Nicolochus of Rhodes, Euphranor of Seleucia, and Pralus of the Troad. The latter, as we learn from the history of Phylarchus, was a man of such unflinching courage that, although unjustly accused, he patiently suffered a traitor's death, without so much as deigning to speak one word to his fellow-citizens. 9.116. Euphranor had as pupil Eubulus of Alexandria; Eubulus taught Ptolemy, and he again Sarpedon and Heraclides; Heraclides again taught Aenesidemus of Cnossus, the compiler of eight books of Pyrrhonean discourses; the latter was the instructor of Zeuxippus his fellow-citizen, he of Zeuxis of the angular foot, he again of Antiochus of Laodicea on the Lycus, who had as pupils Menodotus of Nicomedia, an empiric physician, and Theiodas of Laodicea; Menodotus was the instructor of Herodotus of Tarsus, son of Arieus, and Herodotus taught Sextus Empiricus, who wrote ten books on Scepticism, and other fine works. Sextus taught Saturninus called Cythenas, another empiricist.
10. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 14.18.1-14.18.5, 14.18.14, 14.18.26-14.18.27 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

11. Ammianus Marcellinus, History, 15.9-15.12 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

12. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.265



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academics, the academy Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109
academy Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 112
achilles Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 108
aenesidemus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 74, 109; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81, 96, 112
alexander the great Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74, 85
alexandria Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 112
almsgiving Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228
anaxarchus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74, 85; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 76
anaxarchus xxv, and indifference regarding value Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682, 683
anaxarchus xxv Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682, 683
antigonus of carystus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 72, 74, 85
antisthenes Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 84
apatheia Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 100
apollodorus of athens Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
apollodorus of cyzicus Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9
appearances Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
apraxia challenge Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
arcesilaus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71
archilochus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106
argument pro and contra Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109
aristo of chios Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 85, 95
aristocles Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 95; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 96
aristotle, ethics and politics of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20
ataraxia Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20
atomism, and sense perception Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
atomism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 108
belief (doxa) Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 95
bett, richard Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
biography/biographical Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228, 232
biography Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 72, 74
bion Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 84
brunschwig, j. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 95
cannibalism Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682, 683
carneades Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109
cicero, on academic sceptics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109
cicero Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 100
convention, challenges to Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72, 84
conversion, models/variations Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228, 232
conversion, philosophical Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228, 232
crates of thebes Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 84, 85
cynics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74, 84, 85, 95
deception and falsehood Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
decleva caizzi, f. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109
democritus Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 76, 81, 106, 108
demonstration Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81
determinism, dialectic Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109
diocles of magnesia Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
diogenes laertius Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11, 52, 76, 96, 106, 112, 151
diogenes of apollonia Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 76
diogenes of babylon Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72, 74
diogenes of sinope Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 84
disciple Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228, 232
dogmatism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 151
dogmatists Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 151
dolor Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 100
eleatics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 95
elis Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
enkrateia Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20
epicureanism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106
epicurus, on nature and the self Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20, 74
epicurus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 76
epistemic investigation Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 151
epoche Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 109
eratosthenes Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72, 85
ethics, influence of socrates on Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20
euripides Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106
eusebius Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71
ferrari, g.a. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
fritz, k. von Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
glucker, john Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9
good / bad Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 96
goodness, good life Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20, 72
gymnosophists Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 232
habit Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682
happiness Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 95
hecataeus of abdera, life Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9
hecataeus of abdera, on the egyptians Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9
hecataeus of abdera, on the hyperboreans Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9
hecataeus of abdera, structure of ethnographies Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9
hector Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 108
hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20
heraclitus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 112
hesiod Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9
homer Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81, 106, 108
human thought Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11
huxley, t. h. Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682
hyperboreans Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9
india Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20, 74, 85
indian Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 232
indifference Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52; Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682, 683
initiation Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228
kathekon, kenos Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
lacydes Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 109
language Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81
lifestyle Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228
love Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228
lycaon Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 108
magoi/magi Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 232
megarians Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 84
melissus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 76
menippus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 85
monimus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 85
nature, of human beings Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
nature, of things Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
naucydes Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 76
nausiphanes Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 76
numenius Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106
objectivism, objectivity Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 84
ohair, madalyn murray Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682
onesicritus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 85
patroclus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 108
perceptual relativism Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 683
philo of athens Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81, 106, 108
philosopher, in progress/potential Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 232
philosopher, new Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228
philosophy, philosophical Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228
philosophy Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 151
philosophy as a way of life Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
philosophy of language Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11
plato Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 84
politics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20
posidonius Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106
pre-socratics Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11
priam Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 108
priest, property, sharing/renouncing of Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228
protagoras Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 76
pyrrho' "363.0_9.0@ethnography, hecataeus's contributions to" Bar Kochba, Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (1997) 9
pyrrho, and anaxarchus Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682, 683
pyrrho Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 76, 81, 96, 106, 108
pyrrhonism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11, 76, 81, 96, 108, 112
pyrrhonists Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81, 96, 112
pyrrhos students Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 81, 106
ratio Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109
reality Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 96
renunciation Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228
robin, l. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 74
scepticism, academic Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109
scepticism, pyrrhonean Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109
self-mastery Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20
seven sages Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106
sextus empiricus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 74; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11, 96; Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682
silloi Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 85
skeptical investigation Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
skeptical language Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
skeptical phrases Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81
skepticism, academic skepticism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 112
skepticism, indifference Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682, 683
skepticism, metaphysically inclined skepticism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11
skepticism, pyrrhonian skepticism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
skepticism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11, 112, 151
skeptics Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 11, 52, 106, 151
socrates, influence on ethics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20
socrates, influence on scepticism Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 109
socrates Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 84
sophists Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 72
sophrosyne Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20
sotion Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 112
suffering Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 100
suspension of judgment Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
theodosius Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 81
timon Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 76, 81, 96, 106
timon of phlius Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 72, 74, 84, 85, 95
tranquility Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52, 108
tranquillity Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71
troy Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 52
virtue Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 100
way of life Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228
wilamowitz-moellendorff, u. von Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 71, 72
wise man' Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 84
woodruff, p. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20
works Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 228
xenophanes Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 85; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 76, 106, 112
zeno of elea Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 106
οὐ μᾶλλον\u200e arguments Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 682, 683