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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4479
Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 7.87


nanThis is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

49 results
1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 9.20, 29.35, 30.18 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

29.35. וַתַּהַר עוֹד וַתֵּלֶד בֵּן וַתֹּאמֶר הַפַּעַם אוֹדֶה אֶת־יְהוָה עַל־כֵּן קָרְאָה שְׁמוֹ יְהוּדָה וַתַּעֲמֹד מִלֶּדֶת׃ 30.18. וַתֹּאמֶר לֵאָה נָתַן אֱלֹהִים שְׂכָרִי אֲשֶׁר־נָתַתִּי שִׁפְחָתִי לְאִישִׁי וַתִּקְרָא שְׁמוֹ יִשָּׂשכָר׃ 9.20. And Noah, the man of the land, began and planted a vineyard." 29.35. And she conceived again, and bore a son; and she said: ‘This time will I praise the LORD.’ Therefore she called his name Judah; and she left off bearing." 30.18. And Leah said: ‘God hath given me my hire, because I gave my handmaid to my husband. And she called his name Issachar."
2. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 19.25 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

19.25. וּבַשָּׁנָה הַחֲמִישִׁת תֹּאכְלוּ אֶת־פִּרְיוֹ לְהוֹסִיף לָכֶם תְּבוּאָתוֹ אֲנִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם׃ 19.25. But in the fifth year may ye eat of the fruit thereof, that it may yield unto you more richly the increase thereof: I am the LORD your God."
3. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 15.22-15.31 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

15.22. וְכִי תִשְׁגּוּ וְלֹא תַעֲשׂוּ אֵת כָּל־הַמִּצְוֺת הָאֵלֶּה אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה׃ 15.23. אֵת כָּל־אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה אֲלֵיכֶם בְּיַד־מֹשֶׁה מִן־הַיּוֹם אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה וָהָלְאָה לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם׃ 15.24. וְהָיָה אִם מֵעֵינֵי הָעֵדָה נֶעֶשְׂתָה לִשְׁגָגָה וְעָשׂוּ כָל־הָעֵדָה פַּר בֶּן־בָּקָר אֶחָד לְעֹלָה לְרֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ לַיהוָה וּמִנְחָתוֹ וְנִסְכּוֹ כַּמִּשְׁפָּט וּשְׂעִיר־עִזִּים אֶחָד לְחַטָּת׃ 15.25. וְכִפֶּר הַכֹּהֵן עַל־כָּל־עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנִסְלַח לָהֶם כִּי־שְׁגָגָה הִוא וְהֵם הֵבִיאוּ אֶת־קָרְבָּנָם אִשֶּׁה לַיהוָה וְחַטָּאתָם לִפְנֵי יְהוָה עַל־שִׁגְגָתָם׃ 15.26. וְנִסְלַח לְכָל־עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלַגֵּר הַגָּר בְּתוֹכָם כִּי לְכָל־הָעָם בִּשְׁגָגָה׃ 15.27. וְאִם־נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת תֶּחֱטָא בִשְׁגָגָה וְהִקְרִיבָה עֵז בַּת־שְׁנָתָהּ לְחַטָּאת׃ 15.28. וְכִפֶּר הַכֹּהֵן עַל־הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַשֹּׁגֶגֶת בְּחֶטְאָה בִשְׁגָגָה לִפְנֵי יְהוָה לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו וְנִסְלַח לוֹ׃ 15.29. הָאֶזְרָח בִּבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלַגֵּר הַגָּר בְּתוֹכָם תּוֹרָה אַחַת יִהְיֶה לָכֶם לָעֹשֶׂה בִּשְׁגָגָה׃ 15.31. כִּי דְבַר־יְהוָה בָּזָה וְאֶת־מִצְוָתוֹ הֵפַר הִכָּרֵת תִּכָּרֵת הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא עֲוֺנָה בָהּ׃ 15.22. And when ye shall err, and not observe all these commandments, which the LORD hath spoken unto Moses," 15.23. even all that the LORD hath commanded you by the hand of Moses, from the day that the LORD gave commandment, and onward throughout your generations;" 15.24. then it shall be, if it be done in error by the congregation, it being hid from their eyes, that all the congregation shall offer one young bullock for a burnt-offering, for a sweet savour unto the LORD—with the meal-offering thereof, and the drink-offering thereof, according to the ordice—and one he-goat for a sin-offering." 15.25. And the priest shall make atonement for all the congregation of the children of Israel, and they shall be forgiven; for it was an error, and they have brought their offering, an offering made by fire unto the LORD, and their sin-offering before the LORD, for their error." 15.26. And all the congregation of the children of Israel shall be forgiven, and the stranger that sojourneth among them; for in respect of all the people it was done in error." 15.27. And if one person sin through error, then he shall offer a she-goat of the first year for a sin-offering." 15.28. And the priest shall make atonement for the soul that erreth, when he sinneth through error, before the LORD, to make atonement for him; and he shall be forgiven," 15.29. both he that is home-born among the children of Israel, and the stranger that sojourneth among them: ye shall have one law for him that doeth aught in error." 15.30. But the soul that doeth aught with a high hand, whether he be home-born or a stranger, the same blasphemeth the LORD; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people." 15.31. Because he hath despised the word of the LORD, and hath broken His commandment; that soul shall utterly be cut off, his iniquity shall be upon him."
4. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

28e. if, when the commanders whom you chose to command me stationed me, both at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium, I remained where they stationed me, like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when the god gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others
5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2.6, 9.4 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

6. Chrysippus, Fragments, 3.4 (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

7. Chrysippus, Fragments, 3.4 (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

8. Chrysippus, Fragments, 3.4 (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

9. Chrysippus, Fragments, 3.4 (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

10. Cicero, On Fate, 30 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

11. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.16-3.21, 4.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.16.  "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. 3.17.  Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalēpseis), — these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.18.  The sciences also, we consider, are things to be chosen for their own sake, partly because there is in them something worthy of choice, partly because they consist of acts of cognition and contain an element of fact established by methodical reasoning. The mental assent to what is false, as the Stoics believe, is more repugt to us than all the other things that are contrary to nature. "(Again, of the members or parts of the body, some appear to have been bestowed on us by nature for the sake of their use, for example the hands, legs, feet, and internal organs, as to the degree of whose utility even physicians are not agreed; while others serve no useful purpose, but appear to be intended for ornament: for instance the peacock's tail, the plumage of the dove with its shifting colours, and the breasts and beard of the male human being.) 3.19.  All this is perhaps somewhat baldly expressed; for it deals with what may be called the primary elements of nature, to which any embellishment of style can scarcely be applied, nor am I for my part concerned to attempt it. On the other hand, when one is treating of more majestic topics the style instinctively rises with the subject, and the brilliance of the language increases with the dignity of the theme." "True," I rejoined; "but to my mind, any clear statement of an important topic possesses excellence of style. It would be childish to desire an ornate style in subjects of the kind with which you are dealing. A man of sense and education will be content to be able to express his meaning plainly and clearly. 3.20.  "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value — axia as the Stoics call it — this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathēkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.21.  Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' — in Stoic phraseology ennoia — and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' — inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 4.14.  "But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics' conception of this 'End of Goods,' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being 'to live in accordance with nature.' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, 'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase 'to live in agreement with nature.'
12. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.16-3.23, 3.48, 3.59, 3.62-3.63, 3.68, 3.75, 4.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo. 3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.18. artis etiam ipsas propter se adsumendas putamus, cum cum ABE tum N (t corr. ut vid., ex c), RV quia sit in iis iis Mdv. his aliquid dignum adsumptione, tum quod constent ex cognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via. a falsa autem adsensione magis nos alienatos esse quam a ceteris rebus, quae sint sunt R contra naturam, arbitrantur. iam membrorum, id est partium corporis, alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata, ut manus, crura, pedes, ut ea, ut ea et ea BE quae sunt intus in corpore, quorum utilitas quanta sit a medicis etiam etiam a medicis R disputatur, alia autem nullam ob utilitatem quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumae versicolores columbis, viris mammae atque barba. 3.19. Haec dicuntur fortasse ieiunius; sunt enim quasi prima elementa naturae, quibus ubertas orationis adhiberi vix potest, nec equidem eam cogito consectari. verum tamen cum de rebus grandioribus dicas, ipsae res verba rapiunt; ita fit cum gravior, tum etiam splendidior oratio. Est, ut dicis, inquam. sed tamen omne, quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, mihi praeclare dici videtur. istius modi autem res dicere ornate velle puerile est, plane autem et perspicue expedire posse docti et intellegentis viri. 3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. 3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.22. cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec ad ea hec R referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est est enim BE et post oritur, ut dixi. est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. etenim, etenim ( cf. p. 106,4 etenim si; contra p. 107, 5 ut si; p. 110, 17 ut enim) Se. ut enim si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo hastam aliquo N astam aliquo A aliquo hastam BE hastam aliquā V hastam ( om. aliquo) R aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet secl. Mdv. huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint sint sunt R facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum adsequatur, sit sit Ern. sed (Sed RNV) hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum. 3.23. Cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab isdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. sed quem ad modum saepe fit, ut is, qui commendatus alicui pluris eum faciat cui commendatus sit om. BEN 1 sit alicui, pluris eum faciat, cui commendatus sit, quam illum, a quo, sic sic sit BR minime mirum est primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam ipsam autem BE sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri, quam illa sint, a quibus ad hanc venerimus. atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae o(rmh/ Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. 3.48. itaque consentaneum est his, quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem, quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse—isdem placere esse alium alio et et ABERV ( sequitur itemque; cf. p.188, 15 sq. et eos ... nosque), et (= etiam, ab alt. m., ut vid. ) N sapientiorem itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam adpropinquat adpropinquat (appr.) edd. ut propinquat ABER apropin- quat N 2 propinquat N 1 V ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum habitum dett. aditum (additum R) nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit. Haec mirabilia videri intellego, sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et consequentia, ne de horum de eorum R quidem est veritate dubitandum. sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen tamen N 2 et tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. Divitias autem Diogenes censet eam eam non eam dett. modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valitudinem bonam; 3.59. Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus. 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.68. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. 3.75. quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator dictator est BE —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis quam corporis NV quam corporibus ABE corporibus ( om. quam) R —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum uti tum Se. ut tum (ut in ras., sequente ras. 2 vel 3 litt. ) N virtutum ABE ututū R ubi tum V denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit; 4.14. Sed haec hactenus. nunc videamus, quaeso, de summo bono, quod continet philosophiam, quid tandem attulerit, quam ob rem ab inventoribus tamquam a parentibus dissentiret. hoc igitur loco, quamquam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum, finis hic bonorum qui continet del. Bentl., Ern. philosophiam et quis quis ARV quid (d ab alt. m. in ras. ) N qui BE a Stoicis et quem ad modum diceretur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspiciamus, si potuerimus, quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum. cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, dixissent edd. dixisset his verbis tria significari significari BE significare Stoici dicunt, unum eius modi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent. hunc ipsum Zenonis aiunt esse finem declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere. 3.16.  "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. 3.17.  Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalēpseis), — these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.18.  The sciences also, we consider, are things to be chosen for their own sake, partly because there is in them something worthy of choice, partly because they consist of acts of cognition and contain an element of fact established by methodical reasoning. The mental assent to what is false, as the Stoics believe, is more repugt to us than all the other things that are contrary to nature. "(Again, of the members or parts of the body, some appear to have been bestowed on us by nature for the sake of their use, for example the hands, legs, feet, and internal organs, as to the degree of whose utility even physicians are not agreed; while others serve no useful purpose, but appear to be intended for ornament: for instance the peacock's tail, the plumage of the dove with its shifting colours, and the breasts and beard of the male human being.) 3.19.  All this is perhaps somewhat baldly expressed; for it deals with what may be called the primary elements of nature, to which any embellishment of style can scarcely be applied, nor am I for my part concerned to attempt it. On the other hand, when one is treating of more majestic topics the style instinctively rises with the subject, and the brilliance of the language increases with the dignity of the theme." "True," I rejoined; "but to my mind, any clear statement of an important topic possesses excellence of style. It would be childish to desire an ornate style in subjects of the kind with which you are dealing. A man of sense and education will be content to be able to express his meaning plainly and clearly. 3.20.  "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value — axia as the Stoics call it — this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathēkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.21.  Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' — in Stoic phraseology ennoia — and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' — inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 3.22.  But since those actions which I have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' 3.23.  "Again, as all 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormē, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. 3.48.  So it would be consistent with the principles already stated that on the theory of those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, they should also hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open for us to say, who do not think that the end of Goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all."I am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question. Yet although the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that each of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. 3.59.  "It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification 'on principle' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. 3.62.  "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63.  From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the sea‑pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the sea‑pen, which swims out of the sea‑pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard — these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.68.  Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. 3.75.  "Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a better right to the name of 'Master of the People' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man's authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. 4.14.  "But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics' conception of this 'End of Goods,' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being 'to live in accordance with nature.' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, 'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase 'to live in agreement with nature.'
13. Cicero, On Laws, 1.18, 2.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

14. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.76, 4.12-4.15, 4.59-4.62, 5.68-5.72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V 4.12. laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta inlecta s iniecta X et sqq. cf. Barlaami eth. sec. Stoicos 2, 11 qui hinc haud pauca adsumpsit. inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura natura s V rec naturae X (-re K) enim omnes ea, Stoic. fr. 3, 438 quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est speciei est H speci est KR ( add. c ) speciest GV cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin BO gL AHClN KR bo gL HC in G bo ga HCin V appellant, nos appellemus appellemus We. appellamus X (apell G) cf. v. 26, fin. 3, 20 voluntatem, eam eam iam V illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante adversante Po. ( cf. p.368, 6; 326, 3; St. fr. 3, 462 a)peiqw=s tw=| lo/gw| w)qou/menon e)pi\ plei=on adversa X (d del. H 1 ) a ratione aversa Or. incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. 4.13. itemque cum ita ita om. H movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. nam cum ratione curatione K 1 (ũ 2 ) animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem iiter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. quoniamque, quoniam quae X praeter K 1 (quae del. V rec ) ut bona natura adpetimus, app. KR 2? (H 367, 24) sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio si cum del. Bentl. ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, appellatur K 1 V rec s eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente; quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur metus; est igitur metus a a Gr.(?) s om. X ratione aversa cautio. cautio Cic. dicere debebat: declinatio 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.15. sed quae iudicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam etiam ilia H quae efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, metus recessum quendam animi et fugam, laetitia profusam hilaritatem, libido lubido K x li bido R effrenatam effrenata X corr. K 2 R c adpetentiam. opinationem autem, quam in omnis definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse inbecillam adsensionem. 4.59. ad te at V 1 igitur mihi iam convertenda omnis oratio est; simulas enim quaerere te de sapiente, quaeris autem fortasse de te. Earum eorum s earum X igitur perturbationum, quas exposui, variae sunt curationes. nam neque omnis aegritudo una ratione sedatur sadatur V (alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti aut invidenti adhibenda adhibenda add. G 2 medicina); est etiam in omnibus quattuor perturbationibus illa distinctio, utrum ad universam perturbationem, quae est aspernatio rationis aut aut V adpetitus vehementior, an ad singulas, ut ad metum lubidinem libid. K 1 V reliquas reliquas V 1 (que add. 3 ) reliquias GKR melius adhibeatur oratio, et utrum illudne non videatur aegre ferundum, ex quo suscepta sit aegritudo, an omnium rerum tollenda tollenda s toleranda X omnino omni V 1 aegritudo, ut, si quis aegre ferat se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse, an hominem aegre ferre nihil oportere. nimirum hoc melius, ne, si si add. K c forte de paupertate non persuaseris, sit aegritudini concedendum; aegritudine autem sublata propriis rationibus, quibus heri usi sumus, quodam modo etiam paupertatis malum tollitur. 4.60. sed omnis eius modi perturbatio animi animi enim V 1 placatione abluatur illa quidem, cum doceas nec nec s V 3 et X bonum illud esse, ex quo laetitia aut aut V et G 1 libido oriatur, nec malum, ex quo aut metus aut aegritudo; verum tamen haec est certa et propria sanatio, si doceas ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quicquam aut naturale aut necessarium, ut ut aut R 1 V ipsam ipsa GRV 1 aegritudinem leniri videmus, cum obicimus obicibus GKR maerentibus imbecillitatem inbecil itatem G animi ecfeminati, cumque eorum gravitatem constantiamque gravitate constantiaque GRV 1 laudamus, qui non turbulente humana patiantur. quod quidem solet eis etiam accidere, qui illa mala esse censent, ferenda ferendum K tamen aequo animo arbitrantur. arbitratur GRV 1 putat puta GRV 1 aliquis aliquid K idem fuit fort. in R (aliqui esse) esse voluptatem bonum, alius autem pecuniam; tamen et ille ab intemperantia et hic ab avaritia hic abaritia V 1 avocari potest. illa autem altera ratio et oratio, et oratio om. V quae simul et opinionem falsam falsa GRV 1 tollit et et om. K 1 aegritudinem aegritudine GRV 1 detrahit, est ea quidem utilior, sed raro proficit neque est ad volgus adhibenda. 4.61. quaedam autem sunt aegritudines, quas levare illa ulla V rec medicina nullo modo possit, ut, si quis aegre ferat nihil in se esse virtutis, nihil animi, nihil officii, nihil honestatis, propter mala is is ex si G 2 agatur G 1 quidem angatur, sed alia quaedam sit ad eum admovenda curatio, et talis quidem, quae possit esse omnium etiam de ceteris rebus discrepantium philosophorum. inter omnis enim convenire oportet commotiones animorum a recta ratione aversas esse vitiosas, vitiosas om. V 3 ut, etiamsi vel mala sint illa, quae quae ex quem V 3 metum aegritudinemve, vel vel ...17 vel Bentl. nec ... nec bona, quae cupiditatem laetitiamve moveant, tamen sit vitiosa ipsa commotio. constantem enim quendam volumus, sedatum, gravem, humana omnia spernentem spernentem Anon. ap. Lb. illum esse, quem prementem (praem. GKH)X ( vix Cice- ronianum, licet Sen. de ira 3, 6, 1 dicat : animus quietus semper, omnia infra se premens cf. Tusc. p. 405, 20 omnia subter se habet) praemeditantem Se. magimum et fortem virum virum add. G 3 dicimus. talis autem nec maerens nec timens nec cupiens nec gestiens esse quisquam potest. eorum enim haec sunt, qui eventus quae ventus G 1 ( corr. 1 ) V 1 ( corr. 3 ) humanos superiores quam suos animos esse ducunt. ducunt s di- cunt X 4.62. Quare omnium philosophorum, ut aut V ( exp. 3 ) ante dixi, una St. fr. 3, 488 cf. 474 ratio est medendi, ut nihil, quale sit illud quod perturbet animum, sed de ipsa sit sit add. G 2 perturbatione dicendum. itaque primum in ipsa cupiditate, cum id solum agitur ut ea tollatur, non est quaerendum, bonum illud necne sit quod lubidinem lib. H ( bis ) K 1 priore loco moveat, sed lubido ipsa tollenda est, ut, sive, sive ex sine V 3 quod honestum est, id sit summum bonum sive voluptas sive horum utrumque coniunctum sive tria illa genera bonorum, tamen, etiamsi etiamsi si H virtus KRH virtutis ipsius vehementior adpetitus sit, eadem sit sit add. G 1 omnibus ad deterrendum adhibenda oratio. continet autem omnem sedationem animi humana in conspectu posita natura; quae quo facilius expressa cernatur, explicanda est oratione communis condicio lexque vitae. constantem ... 393, 15 vitae H 5.68. Sed ne verbis solum attingamus ea quae eaque v. KRV 1 volumus ostendere, proponenda quaedam quasi moventia sunt, quae nos magis ad cognitionem intellegentiamque convertant. sumatur enim nobis quidam praestans vir optumis optumus V artibus, isque animo parumper et cogitatione cognitione K fingatur. primum ingenio eximio sit necesse est; tardis enim mentibus virtus non facile comitatur; deinde deinde denique K ad investigandam vestigandam K veritatem studio incitato. ex quo triplex ille animi fetus fetus KR (ę) factus GV existet, unus I II III ad-scribunt G 1 V 1 in cognitione rerum positus et in explicatione naturae, alter aliter K in discriptione expetendarum fugiendarumque rerum fugiendarumque vererumne vivendi GKV (ve exp. et be supra ne scr. V 3 ) R 1 ut v. (fugiendarumque rerum . post vivendi quod in ras. certo dispicitur alia manus adscripscrat ue) H 1 (fugiendar verer nevivendi. Verba cū ratio ss.non H 1 sed alia manus eiusdem aetatis sec. Stroux ) et in ratio ne We.bene quod fin. 5,15 certa de causa deest add. Po. cl. ac.1, 19 fin. 5, 11. 16 et in ratione be ne vivendi, tertius in iudicando, in ante iud. om. K iudicando nequid KRH quid cuique rei sit consequens quid repugs, in quo inest omnis inest omnis est H cum subtilitas disserendi, tum veritas iudicandi. 5.69. quo tandem igitur gaudio adfici necesse est est V esset GK C RH est et K 1 sapientis animum cum his habitantem pernoctantemque curis! ut, cum totius mundi motus conversionesque perspexerit ut, quod del.Bentl.,pendet a verbis cum — curis (= so da b ). Ciceronem pergere voluisse ut, cum... perspexerit,... ipse se adgnoscat coniunctumque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio compleatur cum similitudo verborum v. 9—10 et 436,5—9 tum locus gemellus leg. 1,61 declarant. sideraque viderit innumerabilia caelo inhaerentia cum eius ipsius motu congruere certis infixa sedibus, septem alia suos quaeque tenere cursus multum inter se aut altitudine aut humilitate distantia, quorum vagi motus rata tamen et certa sui cursus spatia definiant—horum nimirum aspectus impulit illos veteres et admonuit, ut plura quaererent; inde est est enim G 1 indagatio nata initiorum et tamquam seminum, unde essent omnia orta generata concreta, quaeque cuiusque generis vel iimi iimi animi H vel animantis animantis iimantis K vel muti vel loquentis loquentes GR 1 V 1 origo, quae vita, qui interitus quae int. GR 1 V 1 quaeque ex alio in aliud vicissitudo atque mutatio, unde terra et quibus librata ponderibus, quibus cavernis maria sustineantur, qua sustineantur, qua Dav sustineant. In qua X (sustineantur vel sustineat s ) omnia delata gravitate medium mundi locum semper expetant, expectant qui est idem infimus in rutundo. rotundo KV c? H 5.70. haec tractanti tractanti s V 3 tractandi X (-i ex -o K 1 ) animo et noctes et dies cogitanti cogitandi KV 1 cogitanti G existit illa a a s om. X deo deo H Delphis praecepta cognitio, ut ipsa se mens agnoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio compleatur. completur Bentl. ipsa enim cogitatio de vi et natura deorum studium incendit incedit GRV 1 illius aeternitatem aeternitatem Sey. aeternitatis (aeterni status Mdv. ad fin.1, 60 ) imitandi, neque se in brevitate vitae conlocatam conlocata GRV 1 collocatam H ( bis ) conlocatum s We. putat, cum rerum causas alias ex aliis aptas et necessitate nexas videt, quibus ab aeterno tempore fluentibus in aeternum ratio tamen mensque moderatur. 5.71. Haec ille intuens atque suspiciens suspiciens V sed pic in r. 1 suscipiens K 1 vel potius omnis partis orasque circumspiciens quanta rursus animi tranquillitate tranquillitati K humana et citeriora considerat! hinc illa cognitio virtutis existit, efflorescunt genera partesque virtutum, invenitur, quid sit quod natura spectet expectet G 1 expectetur Gr extremum in bonis, quid in malis ultumum, sumatur...436, 20 ultimum H ( extrema bis ) quo referenda sint officia, quae degendae degente G 1 aetatis ratio deligenda. diligenda X corr. s quibus et et add. K c talibus rebus exquisitis hoc vel maxime efficitur, quod hac hac ac G 1 hic V 1 disputatione agimus, ut virtus ad beate vivendum sit se ipsa contenta. 5.72. Sequitur tertia, quae per omnis partis sapientiae manat et funditur, quae rem definit, definivit X (dif. K) corr. s V 3 genera dispertit, sequentia adiungit, perfecta concludit, vera et falsa diiudicat, disserendi ratio et scientia. ex qua cum summa utilitas existit extitit K ( in 18 corr K c ) ad res ponderandas, tum maxume maxime GKH ingenua delectatio et digna sapientia. Sed haec otii. sed haec otii om. H transeat idem iste sapiens ad rem publicam tuendam. quid eo possit esse praestantius, cum †contineri contineri del.Lb. cum temperantia suas adpetitiones contineat ( vel queat continere), prudentia fere desiderat Po.cl.p.371, 22 off.3,96.116; 2,77.rep.6,1 (rei publicae rector...sapiens sit et iustus et temperans eqs.) prudentia utilitatem civium cernat, iustitia sequitur...437, 8 iustitia H nihil in suam domum inde derivet, derivet -iv- scr. G 2 reliquis utatur tot tam variisque virtutibus? adiunge fructum amicitiarum, in quo doctis positum est cum consilium omnis vitae consentiens et paene conspirans, tum summa iucunditas e e et V 1 (ex V rec ) cotidiano cultu atque victu. victu s V 3 victurus GRV 1 victus K cf.Th.l.l.IV,1333 Quid haec tandem vita desiderat, quo quo quod GK sit beatior? cui refertae tot cui rei refertae etot G cui rei referta etot R cui rei referta et tot V cui rei refertae et tot K corr. Man. tantisque gaudiis Fortuna ipsa cedat necesse est. quodsi gaudere talibus bonis animi, id est virtutibus, beatum est omnesque sapientes is gaudiis perfruuntur, omnis eos beatos esse confiteri necesse est. Etiamne etiamne -ne eras.in R in cruciatu atque tormentis?
15. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, 2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

16. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 1.262-1.314 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

17. Philo of Alexandria, On Husbandry, 176, 101 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

101. For the indulgences of intemperance and gluttony, and whatever other vices the immoderate and insatiable pleasures, when completely filled with an abundance of all external things, produce and bring forth, do not allow the soul to proceed onwards by the plain and straight road, but compel it to fall into ravines and gulfs, until they utterly destroy it; but those practices which adhere to patience, and endurance, and moderation, and all other virtues, keep the soul in the straight road, leaving no stumbling block in the way, against which it can stumble and fall. Very naturally, therefore, has Moses declared that temperance clings to the right way, because it is plain that the contrary habit, intemperance, is always straying from the road. XXIII.
18. Philo of Alexandria, On The Decalogue, 1 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

19. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Joseph, 29 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

29. for this world is a sort of large state, and has one constitution, and one law, and the word of nature enjoins what one ought to do, and forbids what one ought not to do: but the cities themselves in their several situations are unlimited in number, and enjoy different constitutions, and laws which are not all the same; for there are different customs and established regulations found out and established in different nations;
20. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 128 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

128. And this is the end which is celebrated among those who study philosophy in the best manner, namely, to live in accordance with nature. And this takes place when the mind, entering into the path of virtue, treads in the steps of right reason, and follows God, remembering his commandments, and at all times and in all places confirming them both by word and deed;
21. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 3, 143 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

143. But since every city in which laws are properly established, has a regular constitution, it became necessary for this citizen of the world to adopt the same constitution as that which prevailed in the universal world. And this constitution is the right reason of nature, which in more appropriate language is denominated law, being a divine arrangement in accordance with which everything suitable and appropriate is assigned to every individual. But of this city and constitution there must have been some citizens before man, who might be justly called citizens of a mighty city, having received the greatest imaginable circumference to dwell in; and having been enrolled in the largest and most perfect commonwealth.
22. Philo of Alexandria, On The Posterity of Cain, 11, 10 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

10. Accordingly God banished Adam; but Cain went forth from his presence of his own accord; Moses here showing to us the manner of each sort of absence from God, both the voluntary and the involuntary sort; but the involuntary sort as not existing in consequence of any intention on our part, will subsequently have such a remedy applied to it as the case admits of; for God will raise up another offspring in the place of Abel, whom Cain slew, a male offspring for the soul which has not turned by its own intention, by name Seth, which name being interpreted means irrigation;
23. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.227, 1.259 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

1.227. Also there is a distinction made, which is very necessary, as to whether they are voluntary or involuntary, with reference to those who, after they have erred, change for the better, confessing that they have sinned, and reproaching themselves for the offences that they have committed, and turning, for the future, to an irreproachable way of life. 1.259. What, then, is the mode of purifying the soul? "Look," says the law, "take care that the victim which thou bringest to the altar is perfect, wholly without participation in any kind of blemish, selected from many on account of its excellence, by the uncorrupted judgments of the priests, and by their most acute sight, and by their continual practice derived from being exercised in the examination of faultless victims. For if you do not see this with your eyes more than with your reason, you will not wash off all the imperfections and stains which you have imprinted on your whole life, partly in consequence of unexpected events, and partly by deliberate purpose;
24. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 2.48, 2.106 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

2.48. for he was not like any ordinary compiler of history, studying to leave behind him records of ancient transactions as memorials to future ages for the mere sake of affording pleasure without any advantage; but he traced back the most ancient events from the beginning of the world, commencing with the creation of the universe, in order to make known two most necessary principles. First, that the same being was the father and creator of the world, and likewise the lawgiver of truth; secondly, that the man who adhered to these laws, and clung closely to a connection with and obedience to nature, would live in a manner corresponding to the arrangement of the universe with a perfect harmony and union, between his words and his actions and between his actions and his words. 2.106. But it became usual to call the altar which was in the open air the altar of sacrifice, as being that which preserved and took care of the sacrifices; intimating, figuratively, the consuming power of these things, and not the lambs and different parts of the victims which were offered, and which were naturally calculated to be destroyed by fire, but the intention of him who offered them;
25. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 3.129-3.131 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

26. Philo of Alexandria, That The Worse Attacks The Better, 94-95, 114 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

114. but of the lovers of knowledge the prophet speaks in a great song, and says, "That she has made them to ascend upon the strength of the earth, and has fed them upon the produce of the Fields," showing plainly that the godless man fails in attaining his object, in order that he may grieve the more while strength is not added to these operations in which he expends his energies, but while on the other hand it is take from them; but they who follow after virtue, placing it above all these things which are earthly and mortal, disregard their strength in their exceeding abundance, using God as the guide to conduct them in their ascent, who proffers to them the produce of the earth for their enjoyment and most profitable use, likening the virtues to fields, and the fruits of the virtues to the produce of the fields, according to the principles of their generation; for from prudence is derived prudent action, and from temperance temperate action, and from piety pious conduct, and from each of the other virtues is derived the energy in accordance with it. XXXI.
27. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 46 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

46. But the unerring law is right reason; not an ordice made by this or that mortal, a corruptible and perishable law, a lifeless law written on lifeless parchment or engraved on lifeless columns; but one imperishable, and stamped by immortal nature on the immortal mind.
28. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.10.7-1.10.8, 1.20.10-1.20.11, 2.6.9-2.6.10, 2.23.30-2.23.35, 3.3.2-3.3.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

29. New Testament, Romans, 10.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

10.4. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who believes.
30. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

31. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

32. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

441c. and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason.
33. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 4.34 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

34. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 26.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

35. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.1.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

36. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 94.3, 94.48, 101.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

37. Seneca The Younger, Natural Questions, 3.27-3.29 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

38. Tacitus, Annals, 13.11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

13.11.  In the consulate of Claudius Nero and Lucius Antistius, while the magistrates were swearing allegiance to the imperial enactments, the prince withheld his colleague Antistius from swearing to his own: a measure which the senate applauded warmly, in the hope that his youthful mind, elated by the fame attaching even to small things, would proceed forthwith to greater. There followed, in fact, a display of leniency towards Plautius Lateranus, degraded from his rank for adultery with Messalina, but now restored to the senate by the emperor, who pledged himself to clemency in a series of speeches, which Seneca, either to attest the exalted qualities of his teaching or to advertise his ingenuity, kept presenting to the public by the lips of the sovereign.
39. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 3.153.30 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

40. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.5.12, 4.7.7-4.7.8, 4.7.24, 4.7.26-4.7.27, 5.6.20 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

41. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.151-7.157 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

42. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 3.5, 7.5, 7.40-7.41, 7.84-7.86, 7.88-7.89, 7.91-7.94, 7.111, 7.119, 7.122, 7.128, 7.151, 7.156, 8.87, 9.6 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.5. and that he applied himself to painting and wrote poems, first dithyrambs, afterwards lyric poems and tragedies. He had, they say, a weak voice; this is confirmed by Timotheus the Athenian in his book On Lives. It is stated that Socrates in a dream saw a cygnet on his knees, which all at once put forth plumage, and flew away after uttering a loud sweet note. And the next day Plato was introduced as a pupil, and thereupon he recognized in him the swan of his dream.At first he used to study philosophy in the Academy, and afterwards in the garden at Colonus (as Alexander states in his Successions of Philosophers), as a follower of Heraclitus. Afterwards, when he was about to compete for the prize with a tragedy, he listened to Socrates in front of the theatre of Dionysus, and then consigned his poems to the flames, with the words:Come hither, O fire-god, Plato now has need of thee. 7.5. A different version of the story is that he was staying at Athens when he heard his ship was wrecked and said, It is well done of thee, Fortune, thus to drive me to philosophy. But some say that he disposed of his cargo in Athens, before he turned his attention to philosophy.He used then to discourse, pacing up and down in the Stoa Poikile, which is also called the stoa or Portico of Pisianax, but which received its name from the painting of Polygnotus; his object being to keep the spot clear of a concourse of idlers. It was the spot where in the time of the Thirty 1400 Athenian citizens had been put to death. Hither, then, people came henceforth to hear Zeno, and this is why they were known as men of the Stoa, or Stoics; and the same name was given to his followers, who had formerly been known as Zenonians. So it is stated by Epicurus in his letters. According to Eratosthenes in his eighth book On the Old Comedy, the name of Stoic had formerly been applied to the poets who passed their time there, and they had made the name of Stoic still more famous. 7.40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus. 7.41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions. 7.84. The ethical branch of philosophy they divide as follows: (1) the topic of impulse; (2) the topic of things good and evil; (3) that of the passions; (4) that of virtue; (5) that of the end; (6) that of primary value and of actions; (7) that of duties or the befitting; and (8) of inducements to act or refrain from acting. The foregoing is the subdivision adopted by Chrysippus, Archedemus, Zeno of Tarsus, Apollodorus, Diogenes, Antipater, and Posidonius, and their disciples. Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes treated the subject somewhat less elaborately, as might be expected in an older generation. They, however, did subdivide Logic and Physics as well as Ethics. 7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it. 7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. 7.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse. 7.91. These are called non-intellectual, because they do not require the mind's assent; they supervene and they occur even in bad men: for instance, health, courage. The proof, says Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on Ethics, that virtue really exists is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress. And for the existence of vice as a fundamental fact the proof is that it is the opposite of virtue. That it, virtue, can be taught is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his work On the End, by Cleanthes, by Posidonius in his Protreptica, and by Hecato; that it can be taught is clear from the case of bad men becoming good. 7.92. Panaetius, however, divides virtue into two kinds, theoretical and practical; others make a threefold division of it into logical, physical, and ethical; while by the school of Posidonius four types are recognized, and more than four by Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, and their followers. Apollophanes for his part counts but one, namely, practical wisdom.Amongst the virtues some are primary, some are subordinate to these. The following are the primary: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance. Particular virtues are magimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, good counsel. And wisdom they define as the knowledge of things good and evil and of what is neither good nor evil; courage as knowledge of what we ought to choose, what we ought to beware of, and what is indifferent; justice . . .; 7.93. magimity as the knowledge or habit of mind which makes one superior to anything that happens, whether good or evil equally; continence as a disposition never overcome in that which concerns right reason, or a habit which no pleasures can get the better of; endurance as a knowledge or habit which suggests what we are to hold fast to, what not, and what is indifferent; presence of mind as a habit prompt to find out what is meet to be done at any moment; good counsel as knowledge by which we see what to do and how to do it if we would consult our own interests.Similarly, of vices some are primary, others subordinate: e.g. folly, cowardice, injustice, profligacy are accounted primary; but incontinence, stupidity, ill-advisedness subordinate. Further, they hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge. 7.94. Good in general is that from which some advantage comes, and more particularly what is either identical with or not distinct from benefit. Whence it follows that virtue itself and whatever partakes of virtue is called good in these three senses – viz. as being (1) the source from which benefit results; or (2) that in respect of which benefit results, e.g. the virtuous act; or (3) that by the agency of which benefit results, e.g. the good man who partakes in virtue.Another particular definition of good which they give is the natural perfection of a rational being qua rational. To this answers virtue and, as being partakers in virtue, virtuous acts and good men; as also its supervening accessories, joy and gladness and the like. 7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 7.119. They are also, it is declared, godlike; for they have a something divine within them; whereas the bad man is godless. And yet of this word – godless or ungodly – there are two senses, one in which it is the opposite of the term godly, the other denoting the man who ignores the divine altogether: in this latter sense, as they note, the term does not apply to every bad man. The good, it is added, are also worshippers of God; for they have acquaintance with the rites of the gods, and piety is the knowledge of how to serve the gods. Further, they will sacrifice to the gods and they keep themselves pure; for they avoid all acts that are offences against the gods, and the gods think highly of them: for they are holy and just in what concerns the gods. The wise too are the only priests; for they have made sacrifices their study, as also establishing holy places, purifications, and all the other matters appertaining to the gods. 7.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. 7.128. For if magimity by itself alone can raise us far above everything, and if magimity is but a part of virtue, then too virtue as a whole will be sufficient in itself for well-being – despising all things that seem troublesome. Panaetius, however, and Posidonius deny that virtue is self-sufficing: on the contrary, health is necessary, and some means of living and strength.Another tenet of theirs is the perpetual exercise of virtue, as held by Cleanthes and his followers. For virtue can never be lost, and the good man is always exercising his mind, which is perfect. Again, they say that justice, as well as law and right reason, exists by nature and not by convention: so Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. 7.151. Hence, again, their explanation of the mixture of two substances is, according to Chrysippus in the third book of his Physics, that they permeate each other through and through, and that the particles of the one do not merely surround those of the other or lie beside them. Thus, if a little drop of wine be thrown into the sea, it will be equally diffused over the whole sea for a while and then will be blended with it.Also they hold that there are daemons (δαίμονες) who are in sympathy with mankind and watch over human affairs. They believe too in heroes, that is, the souls of the righteous that have survived their bodies.of the changes which go on in the air, they describe winter as the cooling of the air above the earth due to the sun's departure to a distance from the earth; spring as the right temperature of the air consequent upon his approach to us; 7.156. And there are five terrestrial zones: first, the northern zone which is beyond the arctic circle, uninhabitable because of the cold; second, a temperate zone; a third, uninhabitable because of great heats, called the torrid zone; fourth, a counter-temperate zone; fifth, the southern zone, uninhabitable because of its cold.Nature in their view is an artistically working fire, going on its way to create; which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, or fashioning breath. And the soul is a nature capable of perception. And they regard it as the breath of life, congenital with us; from which they infer first that it is a body and secondly that it survives death. Yet it is perishable, though the soul of the universe, of which the individual souls of animals are parts, is indestructible. 8.87. After spending two months there, he went home and, aided by the liberality of his friends, he proceeded to Egypt with Chrysippus the physician, bearing with him letters of introduction from Agesilaus to Nectanabis, who recommended him to the priests. There he remained one year and four months with his beard and eyebrows shaved, and there, some say, he wrote his Octateris. From there he went to Cyzicus and the Propontis, giving lectures; afterwards he came to the court of Mausolus. Then at length he returned to Athens, bringing with him a great number of pupils: according to some, this was for the purpose of annoying Plato, who had originally passed him over. 9.6. This book he dedicated in the sanctuary of Artemis and, according to some, he deliberately made it the more obscure in order that none but adepts should approach it, and lest familiarity should breed contempt. of our philosopher Timon gives a sketch in these words:In their midst uprose shrill, cuckoo-like, a mob-reviler, riddling Heraclitus.Theophrastus puts it down to melancholy that some parts of his work are half-finished, while other parts make a strange medley. As a proof of his magimity, Antisthenes in his Successions of Philosophers cites the fact that he renounced his claim to the kingship in favour of his brother. So great fame did his book win that a sect was founded and called the Heracliteans, after him.
43. Origen, Commentary On John, 2.10 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

44. Origen, Against Celsus, 8.51 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

8.51. In the next place, he expresses his approval of those who hope that eternal life shall be enjoyed with God by the soul or mind, or, as it is variously called, the spiritual nature, the reasonable soul, intelligent, holy, and blessed; and he allows the soundness of the doctrine, that those who had a good life shall be happy, and the unrighteous shall suffer eternal punishments. And yet I wonder at what follows, more than at anything that Celsus has ever said; for he adds, And from this doctrine let not them or any one ever swerve. For certainly in writing against Christians, the very essence of whose faith is God, and the promises made by Christ to the righteous, and His warnings of punishment awaiting the wicked, he must see that, if a Christian were brought to renounce Christianity by his arguments against it, it is beyond doubt that, along with his Christian faith, he would cast off the very doctrine from which he says that no Christian and no man should ever swerve. But I think Celsus has been far surpassed in consideration for his fellow-men by Chrysippus in his treatise, On the Subjugation of the Passions. For when he sought to apply remedies to the affections and passions which oppress and distract the human spirit, after employing such arguments as seemed to himself to be strong, he did not shrink from using in the second and third place others which he did not himself approve of. For, says he, if it were held by any one that there are three kinds of good, we must seek to regulate the passions in accordance with that supposition; and we must not too curiously inquire into the opinions held by a person at the time that he is under the influence of passion, lest, if we delay too long for the purpose of overthrowing the opinions by which the mind is possessed, the opportunity for curing the passion may pass away. And he adds, Thus, supposing that pleasure were the highest good, or that he was of that opinion whose mind was under the dominion of passion, we should not the less give him help, and show that, even on the principle that pleasure is the highest and final good of man, all passion is disallowed. And Celsus, in like manner, after having embraced the doctrine, that the righteous shall be blessed, and the wicked shall suffer eternal punishments, should have followed out his subject; and, after having advanced what seemed to him the chief argument, he should have proceeded to prove and enforce by further reasons the truth that the unjust shall surely suffer eternal punishment, and those who lead a good life shall be blessed.
45. Plotinus, Enneads, 2.9.9 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

46. Augustine, Confessions, 8.29 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

47. Olympiodorus The Younger of Alexandria, In Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria, 8.4 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)

48. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None

49. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.179, 1.537, 2.42, 2.53, 2.1076, 3.4, 3.178, 3.262, 3.264-3.266



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
abraham Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164
aelian Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 303
affect/affection Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
alcibiades Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
algra,keimpe Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 187
analogy Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120
anticipation of misfortune,posidonius Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
antiochus of ascalon Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 17
apatheia Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
apatheia (impassivity),objections to Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 202
appropriate actions (lat. officia = gr. kathēkonta) Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 86
appropriation Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 195
appropriation (oikeiōsis) Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 26
archedemus Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
archedemus of tarsus Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25
ariston of chios Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
aristotle,on emotions Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
aristotle,ἔργον argument paraphrased by aspasius Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 84
arius didymus Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 25
aspasius,use of λογικός language Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 84
attention Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
awakening Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165, 174
bailey,c. Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
becker,lawrence Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
behaviour Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
bible,responses to Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 64
biography/biographical Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 227
brutishness Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
bénatouïl,thomas Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 187
causation,cause Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
character Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 60, 61
children,training of Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
chrysippus,on ends Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
chrysippus,on moral development Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
chrysippus,on the end Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 27, 28
chrysippus,stoic (already in antiquity,views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus),not suited to children Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
chrysippus Alvarez (2018), The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries, 40; Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 169; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 121; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 19; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
cicero,marcus tullius,on ends Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 86
cicero Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215
city Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165
cleanthes,as author of the hymn Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 25
cleanthes,on pleasure Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 27
cleanthes,on the end Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 27
cleanthes,stoic Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
cleanthes Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 37; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 54
cognitive aspect Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
consolation,philosophical methods of Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
consolation Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
conversion,definition Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165
conversion,models/variations Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 227
conversion,moral Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
conversion,philosophical Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165, 174, 227
cosmic Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
cosmos,gods house/temple Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165
cosmos Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 121
craft/craftsman (technē) Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 26, 36, 54
cynics Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 25
daimons Alvarez (2018), The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries, 40
de abrahamo,inconsistencies in Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153
de abrahamo,prologue of Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153
death Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120
decreta Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 199
deliberation/deliberate Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165
demiurge/craftsman Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120
derveni author Alvarez (2018), The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries, 40
dialectic Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
didactic aim Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
diogenes laertius,general diogenes of babylon Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 97
diogenes laertius Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 27, 40; Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215
diogenes of babylon Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25
diogenes of ptolemais Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
dionysius of halicarnassus Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165
disciple Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174, 227
divine Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
divine perspective Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 199
dog-and-cart simile Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 37
education Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
elements Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 130
emic Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165
emotion,ancient philosophical theory of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
emotions,as contumacious Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
emotions,modern theories Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
emotions,moral emotions Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
emotions,plato,posidonius,galen,without irrational forces in the soul Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
end/ telos Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 121
end Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 60, 61, 187
end (telos),chrysippus on Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 27, 28
end (telos),cleanthes on Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 27
end (telos),with nature Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 27, 28
end (telos),zeno on Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 27
end (telos) Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 27, 28
end or goal of life (telos),posidonius Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
epictetus Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 97; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 37
epicurus,on nature and the self Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
ethics,stoic Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
ethics Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
eudromus Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
excellence,(moral) Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164
excellence (aretē),as cognition Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
excellence (aretē),as tenor Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
excellence (aretē),logic as Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
excellence (aretē),physics as Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
excellence (aretē),related to cosmic nature Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
excellence (aretē) Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
exhortation,paraenesis Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 227
fairmindedness,personal Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 37
feelings,natural capacity for Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 202
felicity Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165
fire Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120
flood (inundation) Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 64
forgiveness Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153
forschner,maximilian Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 45
function (ἔργον),of human beings Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 84
galen,platonizing ecletic doctor,praises plato and posidonius Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
genuine humanness,meaning of Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 84
goal of life Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
god,forgiveness from Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153
god,lawgiver Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 245
god Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
gods Alvarez (2018), The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries, 40
good (agathos) Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 26, 36
goods,benefit Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
gregory of nazianzus Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174
gregory of nyssa Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215
gurtler,g.m. Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174
happiness Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
happiness (εύξωΐα) Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 222
harm Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
hecato of rhodes Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 61
hellenistic Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165
heraclitus of efese Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165
hierarchy Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
hippolytus Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 37
human beings,as „mortal rational animals Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 84
human beings,vocation of Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 84
human nature,and capacity for emotions Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 202
humanity,compound nature of Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153
ignorance Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165
imagery,running Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164
impression Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
impulse (lat. appetitus = gr. hormē) Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 86
impulses,with reservation Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
impulses Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 26, 36
inconsistency,in stoicism Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 54
inflammation (phlegmone) Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
irrational Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165, 174
israel Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215; Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165
issachar Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 245
judah Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 245
justice Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165
kaster,robert Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
law of nature,and common law Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 17, 19
law of nature,and stoicism Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 17
law of nature,connection to reason and god Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 17, 19
law of nature,jarring nature of phrase Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 19
law of nature,stoic concept of Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153
law of nature,transcended written law Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 19
law of nature Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 245
laws,in community Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 225
laws,of philosophy Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 222
laws,unwritten Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153
learning and teaching Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153
lifestyle Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 227
logic,as an excellence Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
logic Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
logos Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174
logos of god Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164
long,anthony a. Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 45
love,erotic or sexual,eupathic Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
lucretius Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
matter Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
medicine Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
metameleia Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
metamorphosis Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165
metanoia/metanoeō Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165
metaphorical language,use of Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 245
meteorology,comets Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 121
meteorology,earthquakes Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 121
meteorology,flood Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 130
meteorology,hail Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 121
meteorology Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 121
midian Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215
mind Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
mosaic law,for ordinary people Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 17, 19
music,affects character of soul Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
music,in education Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
natural law Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 61, 122
nature,according to Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165, 174
nature,and the end Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 27, 28
nature,and virtue Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 17
nature,benevolence of Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 202
nature,central to stoic thought Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 202, 253
nature,contrary to Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
nature,cosmic Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 27, 28
nature,human Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 27, 28
nature,living according to Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 64
nature,living in accordance with Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
nature/nature Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 25, 26, 36, 54
nature Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 61; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 86
niehoff,m. Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165
numbers,five Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 245
oikeiōsis = lat. commendatio or conciliatio Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 86
oikeosis Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174
ontic/ontological Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
origen Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215
paenitentia Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
panaetius Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
part of a whole (soul as,etc.) Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120
parts of philosophy,interrelatedness and knowledge Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
parts of philosophy,interrelatedness of ethics and physics Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 27, 28
parts of philosophy Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 27, 28, 40
passion,irrationality of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
passion Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
passionate attachment (προσπάθεια) Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 225
passions,freedom of/impassibility Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165
passions,struggle against Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164
passions Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174; Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 60
passions (πάθος),attachment to (προσπάθεια) Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 225
pentateuch Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215
perception Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
philosophy,in community Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 225
philosophy,philosophical Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165, 174, 227
philosophy Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 222
physics Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
physis Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174
planets Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 245
plato,on remorse Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
plato/platonic Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164, 165
platonism Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
plotinus Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174
plutarch Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
pneuma (spiritus) Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120
polybius Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165
polycarp Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215
posidonius,stoic,and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
posidonius,stoic,diet affects characters Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
posidonius,stoic,different virtues and natures cultivated corresponding to different capacities Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
posidonius,stoic,music as training irrational character Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
posidonius,stoic,training of irrational capacities starts in the womb,following plato,and involves seed,behaviour of mother,diet,habituation e.g. by rhythms and scales Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97
posidonius Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 169; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
preconceptions Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 195
preferreds (proēgmena) Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 36, 54
previous lives Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 222
priests adolescent,and magic Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174
prologue of de abrahamo Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153
prophets and priests at rome,prophecy as a priestly function Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174
providence Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 222
ps.iamblichus Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 245
psychic Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
punishments Alvarez (2018), The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries, 40
purpose Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
pythagoreanism/pythagoreans/pythagorean Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164
ratio Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
rational Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165, 174
rationality,and the human good Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 202
reason Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
reason (lat. ratio = gr. logos),life according to Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 86
reason (lat. ratio = gr. logos) Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 86
regret Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
religion,religious Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
remorse,in plato and aristotle Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
remorse,vs. repentance Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
remorse Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
repentance Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
reservation Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
right (όρθός λόγος / λογισμός) Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 222, 225
right reason Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215; Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165
road of moral insight/virtue/wisdom Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164, 165
sedley,david Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 45
self,concepts of Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
self-control Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174; Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164
self-perception Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
self-preservation Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 86
self Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165
seneca,on remorse,shame,and regret Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
seneca generally Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 25
senses,five Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 165, 245
senses Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174
sextus empiricus Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
smith,m.f. Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
socrates,and alcibiades Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
socratic Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 165
soul,transmigration Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 121
soul Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174; Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215; Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 245
souls Alvarez (2018), The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries, 40
stoa/stoic/stoicism,aim of life Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164, 165, 245
stoa/stoic/stoicism,apatheia Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 164, 165
stobaeus Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 215
stoic Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81
stoicism Alvarez (2018), The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries, 40; Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
stoics,stoicism Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 64
stoics/stoicism,and law of nature Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 17, 19
stoics Alvarez (2018), The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries, 40
substances (ούσία) Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 222
sympatheia Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 174
tacitus Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 121
teaching (διδασκαλία) Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
techne,teleology Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213
telos Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 86
tension of the soul Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174