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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4479
Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 7.54


nanThe standard of truth they declare to be the apprehending presentation, i.e. that which comes from a real object – according to Chrysippus in the twelfth book of his Physics and to Antipater and Apollodorus. Boethus, on the other hand, admits a plurality of standards, namely intelligence, sense-perception, appetency, and knowledge; while Chrysippus in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine contradicts himself and declares that sensation and preconception are the only standards, preconception being a general notion which comes by the gift of nature (an innate conception of universals or general concepts). Again, certain others of the older Stoics make Right Reason the standard; so also does Posidonius in his treatise On the Standard.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

17 results
1. Cicero, On Divination, 1.65 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.65. Ex quo et illud est Callani, de quo ante dixi, et Homerici Hectoris, qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat. Neque enim illud verbum temere consuetudo adprobavisset, si ea res nulla esset omnino: Praésagibat ánimus frustra me íre, cum exirém domo. Sagire enim sentire acute est; ex quo sagae anus, quia multa scire volunt, et sagaces dicti canes. Is igitur, qui ante sagit, quam oblata res est, dicitur praesagire, id est futura ante sentire. 1.65. This is illustrated by the story which I related about Callanus and by Homers account of Hector, who, as he was dying, prophesied the early death of Achilles.[31] It is clear that, in our ordinary speech, we should not have made such frequent use of the word praesagire, meaning to sense in advance, or to presage, if the power of presaging had been wholly non-existent. An illustration of its use is seen in the following well-known line from Plautus:My soul presaged as I left home that my leaving was in vain.Now sagire means to have a keen perception. Accordingly certain old women are called sagae, because they are assumed to know a great deal, and dogs are said to be sagacious. And so one who has knowledge of a thing before it happens is said to presage, that is, to perceive the future in advance.
2. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10, 1.43-1.45 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.43. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some 'preconception' of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgement. 1.44. You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the uimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) 1.45. We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that 'that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favour, since all such things belong only to the weak.' "If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshipping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man's pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favour alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence.
3. Cicero, Lucullus, 21-22, 30-31, 57, 77-78, 83-85, 18 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 40 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. Horace, Sermones, 1.5.101, 1.8.46 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.175, 1.197, 1.208, 1.210, 1.224, 1.255, 1.262, 1.319, 1.358, 1.407, 1.450, 1.465, 4.1057, 4.1106, 5.82 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 1.3.21, 4.11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.1.1-2.1.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

10. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 117.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

11. Albinus, Introduction To Plato, 6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

12. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 4.7-4.8, 6.10 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

13. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.150-7.157, 7.253-7.260, 7.402-7.410, 7.424, 8.70 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

14. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.5, 7.41-7.53, 7.55-7.60, 7.62-7.75, 7.78-7.83, 10.31-10.32 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.5. A different version of the story is that he was staying at Athens when he heard his ship was wrecked and said, It is well done of thee, Fortune, thus to drive me to philosophy. But some say that he disposed of his cargo in Athens, before he turned his attention to philosophy.He used then to discourse, pacing up and down in the Stoa Poikile, which is also called the stoa or Portico of Pisianax, but which received its name from the painting of Polygnotus; his object being to keep the spot clear of a concourse of idlers. It was the spot where in the time of the Thirty 1400 Athenian citizens had been put to death. Hither, then, people came henceforth to hear Zeno, and this is why they were known as men of the Stoa, or Stoics; and the same name was given to his followers, who had formerly been known as Zenonians. So it is stated by Epicurus in his letters. According to Eratosthenes in his eighth book On the Old Comedy, the name of Stoic had formerly been applied to the poets who passed their time there, and they had made the name of Stoic still more famous. 7.41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions. 7.42. Now the part which deals with canons or criteria they admit as a means for the discovery of truth, since in the course of it they explain the different kinds of perceptions that we have. And similarly the part about definitions is accepted as a means of recognizing truth, inasmuch as things are apprehended by means of general notions. Further, by rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by dialectic that of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false.Rhetoric itself, they say, has three divisions: deliberative, forensic, and panegyric. 7.43. Rhetoric according to them may be divided into invention of arguments, their expression in words, their arrangement, and delivery; and a rhetorical speech into introduction, narrative, replies to opponents, and peroration.Dialectic (they hold) falls under two heads: subjects of discourse and language. And the subjects fall under the following headings: presentations and the various products to which they give rise, propositions enunciated and their constituent subjects and predicates, and similar terms whether direct or reversed, genera and species, arguments too, moods, syllogisms and fallacies whether due to the subject matter or to the language; 7.44. these including both false and true and negative arguments, sorites and the like, whether defective, insoluble, or conclusive, and the fallacies known as the Veiled, or Horned, No man, and The Mowers.The second main head mentioned above as belonging to Dialectic is that of language, wherein are included written language and the parts of speech, with a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and according to some writers chapters on terms, divisions, and style. 7.45. The study of syllogisms they declare to be of the greatest service, as showing us what is capable of yielding demonstration; and this contributes much to the formation of correct judgements, and their arrangement and retention in memory give a scientific character to our conception of things.An argument is in itself a whole containing premisses and conclusion, and an inference (or syllogism) is an inferential argument composed of these. Demonstration is an argument inferring by means of what is better apprehended something less clearly apprehended.A presentation (or mental impression) is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax. 7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 7.47. By wariness they mean a strong presumption against what at the moment seems probable, so as not to be taken in by it. Irrefutability is strength in argument so as not to be brought over by it to the opposite side. Earnestness (or absence of frivolity) is a habit of referring presentations to right reason. Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension or as a habit or state which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. Without the study of dialectic, they say, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so as never to fall; for it enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate what is merely plausible and what is ambiguously expressed, and without it he cannot methodically put questions and give answers. 7.48. Overhastiness in assertion affects the actual course of events, so that, unless we have our perceptions well trained, we are liable to fall into unseemly conduct and heedlessness; and in no other way will the wise man approve himself acute, nimblewitted, and generally skilful in argument; for it belongs to the same person to converse well and to argue well, to put questions to the purpose and to respond to the questions put; and all these qualifications are qualifications belonging to the skilled dialectician.Such is, summarily stated, the substance of their logical teaching. And in order to give it also in detail, let me now cite as much of it as comes within the scope of their introductory handbook. I will quote verbatim what Diocles the Magnesian says in his Synopsis of Philosophers. These are his words: 7.49. The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation. 7.50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take impression in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object. 7.51. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man. 7.52. The Stoics apply the term sense or sensation (αἴσθησις) to three things: (1) the current passing from the principal part of the soul to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses, (3) the apparatus of the sense-organs, in which some persons are deficient. Moreover, the activity of the sense-organs is itself also called sensation. According to them it is by sense that we apprehend black and white, rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that we apprehend the conclusions of demonstration, for instance the existence of gods and their providence. General notions, indeed, are gained in the following ways: some by direct contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, and some by contrariety. 7.53. By incidence or direct contact have come our notions of sensible things; by resemblance notions whose origin is something before us, as the notion of Socrates which we get from his bust; while under notions derived from analogy come those which we get (1) by way of enlargement, like that of Tityos or the Cyclops, or (2) by way of diminution, like that of the Pygmy. And thus, too, the centre of the earth was originally conceived on the analogy of smaller spheres. of notions obtained by transposition creatures with eyes on the chest would be an instance, while the centaur exemplifies those reached by composition, and death those due to contrariety. Furthermore, there are notions which imply a sort of transition to the realm of the imperceptible: such are those of space and of the meaning of terms. The notions of justice and goodness come by nature. Again, privation originates notions; for instance, that of the man without hands. Such are their tenets concerning presentation, sensation, and thought. 7.55. In their theory of dialectic most of them see fit to take as their starting-point the topic of voice. Now voice is a percussion of the air or the proper object of the sense of hearing, as Diogenes the Babylonian says in his handbook On Voice. While the voice or cry of an animal is just a percussion of air brought about by natural impulse, man's voice is articulate and, as Diogenes puts it, an utterance of reason, having the quality of coming to maturity at the age of fourteen. Furthermore, voice according to the Stoics is something corporeal: I may cite for this Archedemus in his treatise On Voice, Diogenes, Antipater and Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics. 7.56. For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. Reduced to writing, what was voice becomes a verbal expression, as day; so says Diogenes. A statement or proposition is speech that issues from the mind and signifies something, e.g. It is day. Dialect (διάλεκτος) means a variety of speech which is stamped on one part of the Greek world as distinct from another, or on the Greeks as distinct from other races; or, again, it means a form peculiar to some particular region, that is to say, it has a certain linguistic quality; e.g. in Attic the word for sea is not θάλασσα but θάλαττα, and in Ionic day is not ἡμέρα but ἡμέρη.Elements of language are the four-and-twenty letters. Letter, however, has three meanings: (1) the particular sound or element of speech; (2) its written symbol or character; (3) its name, as Alpha is the name of the sound A. 7.57. Seven of the letters are vowels, a, e, ē i, o, u, ō, and six are mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. There is a difference between voice and speech; because, while voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement, because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example βλίτυρι, may be unintelligible – which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse. 7.58. There are, as stated by Diogenes in his treatise on Language and by Chrysippus, five parts of speech: proper name, common noun, verb, conjunction, article. To these Antipater in his work On Words and their Meaning adds another part, the mean.A common noun or appellative is defined by Diogenes as part of a sentence signifying a common quality, e.g. man, horse; whereas a name is a part of speech expressing a quality peculiar to an individual, e.g. Diogenes, Socrates. A verb is, according to Diogenes, a part of speech signifying an isolated predicate, or, as others define it, an un-declined part of a sentence, signifying something that can be attached to one or more subjects, e.g. I write, I speak. A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech, binding the various parts of a statement together; and an article is a declinable part of speech, distinguishing the genders and numbers of nouns, e.g. ὁ, ἡ, τό, οἱ, αἱ, τά. 7.59. There are five excellences of speech – pure Greek, lucidity, conciseness, appropriateness, distinction. By good Greek is meant language faultless in point of grammar and free from careless vulgarity. Lucidity is a style which presents the thought in a way easily understood; conciseness a style that employs no more words than are necessary for setting forth the subject in hand; appropriateness lies in a style akin to the subject; distinction in the avoidance of colloquialism. Among vices of style barbarism is violation of the usage of Greeks of good standing; while there is solecism when the sentence has an incongruous construction. 7.60. Posidonius in his treatise On Style defines a poetical phrase as one that is metrical or rhythmical, thus mechanically avoiding the character of prose; an example of such rhythmical phrase is:O mightiest earth, O sky, God's canopy.And if such poetical phraseology is significant and includes a portrayal or representation of things human and divine, it is poetry.A term is, as stated by Antipater in his first book On Terms, a word which, when a sentence is analysed, is uttered with complete meaning; or, according to Chrysippus in his book On Definitions, is a rendering back one's own. Delineation is a statement which brings one to a knowledge of the subject in outline, or it may be called a definition which embodies the force of the definition proper in a simpler form. Genus (in logic) is the comprehension in one of a number of inseparable objects of thought: e.g. Animal; for this includes all particular animals. 7.62. Partition in logic is (according to Crinis) classification or distribution of a genus under heads: for instance, of goods some are mental, others bodily.Verbal ambiguity arises when a word properly, rightfully, and in accordance with fixed usage denotes two or more different things, so that at one and the same time we may take it in several distinct senses: e.g. in Greek, where by the same verbal expression may be meant in the one case that A house has three times fallen, in the other that a dancing-girl has fallen.Posidonius defines Dialectic as the science dealing with truth, falsehood, and that which is neither true nor false; whereas Chrysippus takes its subject to be signs and things signified. Such then is the gist of what the Stoics say in their theory of language. 7.63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries. 7.64. A predicate is, according to the followers of Apollodorus, what is said of something; in other words, a thing associated with one or more subjects; or, again, it may be defined as a defective expression which has to be joined on to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement. of predicates some are adjectival, as e.g. to sail through rocks. Again, some predicates are direct, some reversed, some neither. Now direct predicates are those that are constructed with one of the oblique cases, as hears, sees, converses; while reversed are those constructed with the passive voice, as I am heard, I am seen. Neutral are such as correspond to neither of these, as thinks, walks. Reflexive predicates are those among the passive, which, although in form passive, are yet active operations, as he gets his hair cut: 7.65. for here the agent includes himself in the sphere of his action. The oblique cases are genitive, dative, and accusative.A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions: A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. `It is day,' `Dion is walking.' The Greek word for judgement (ἀξίωμα) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection; for when you say It is day, you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false. 7.66. There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. Is it day? and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus It is day is a judgement; Is it day? an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, He lives in this or that place. 7.67. An imperative is something which conveys a command: e.g.Go thou to the waters of Inachus.An adjurative utterance is something ... A vocative utterance is something the use of which implies that you are addressing some one; for instance:Most glorious son of Atreus, Agamemnon, lord of men.A quasi-proposition is that which, having the enunciation of a judgement, yet in consequence of the intensified tone or emotion of one of its parts falls outside the class of judgements proper, e.g.Yea, fair indeed the Parthenon!How like to Priam's sons the cowherd is! 7.68. There is also, differing from a proposition or judgement, what may be called a timid suggestion, the expression of which leaves one at a loss, e.g.Can it be that pain and life are in some sort akin?Interrogations, inquiries and the like are neither true nor false, whereas judgements (or propositions) are always either true or false.The followers of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater and Crinis divide propositions into simple and not simple. Simple are those that consist of one or more propositions which are not ambiguous, as It is day. Not simple are those that consist of one or more ambiguous propositions. 7.69. They may, that is, consist either of a single ambiguous proposition, e.g. If it is day, it is day, or of more than one proposition, e.g. If it is day, it is light.With simple propositions are classed those of negation, denial, privation, affirmation, the definitive and the indefinitive; with those that are not simple the hypothetical, the inferential, the coupled or complex, the disjunctive, the causal, and that which indicates more or less. An example of a negative proposition is It is not day. of the negative proposition one species is the double negative. By double negative is meant the negation of a negation, e.g. It is not not-day. Now this presupposes that it is day. 7.70. A denial contains a negative part or particle and a predication: such as this, No one is walking. A privative proposition is one that contains a privative particle reversing the effect of a judgement, as, for example, This man is unkind. An affirmative or assertory proposition is one that consists of a noun in the nominative case and a predicate, as Dion is walking. A definitive proposition is one that consists of a demonstrative in the nominative case and a predicate, as This man is walking. An indefinitive proposition is one that consists of an indefinite word or words and a predicate, e.g. Some one is walking, or There's some one walking; He is in motion. 7.71. of propositions that are not simple the hypothetical, according to Chrysippus in his Dialectics and Diogenes in his Art of Dialectic, is one that is formed by means of the conditional conjunction If. Now this conjunction promises that the second of two things follows consequentially upon the first, as, for instance, If it is day, it is light. An inferential proposition according to Crinis in his Art of Dialectic is one which is introduced by the conjunction Since and consists of an initial proposition and a conclusion; for example, Since it is day-time, it is light. This conjunction guarantees both that the second thing follows from the first and that the first is really a fact. 7.72. A coupled proposition is one which is put together by certain coupling conjunctions, e.g. It is day-time and it is light. A disjunctive proposition is one which is constituted such by the disjunctive conjunction Either, as e.g. Either it is day or it is night. This conjunction guarantees that one or other of the alternatives is false. A causal proposition is constructed by means of the conjunction Because, e.g. Because it is day, it is light. For the first clause is, as it were, the cause of the second. A proposition which indicates more or less is one that is formed by the word signifying rather and the word than in between the clauses, as, for example, It is rather day-time than night. 7.73. Opposite in character to the foregoing is a proposition which declares what is less the fact, as e.g. It is less or not so much night as day. Further, among propositions there are some which in respect of truth and falsehood stand opposed to one another, of which the one is the negative of the other, as e.g. the propositions It is day and It is not day. A hypothetical proposition is therefore true, if the contradictory of its conclusion is incompatible with its premiss, e.g. If it is day, it is light. This is true. For the statement It is not light, contradicting the conclusion, is incompatible with the premiss It is day. On the other hand, a hypothetical proposition is false, if the contradictory of its conclusion does not conflict with the premiss, e.g. If it is day, Dion is walking. For the statement Dion is not walking does not conflict with the premiss It is day. 7.74. An inferential proposition is true if starting from a true premiss it also has a consequent conclusion, as e.g. Since it is day, the sun is above the horizon. But it is false if it starts from a false premiss or has an inconsequent conclusion, as e.g. Since it is night, Dion is walking, if this be said in day-time. A causal proposition is true if its conclusion really follows from a premiss itself true, though the premiss does not follow conversely from the conclusion, as e.g. Because it is day, it is light, where from the it is day the it is light duly follows, though from the statement it is light it would not follow that it is day. But a causal proposition is false if it either starts from a false premiss or has an inconsequent conclusion or has a premiss that does not correspond with the conclusion, as e.g. Because it is night, Dion is walking. 7.75. A probable judgement is one which induces to assent, e.g. Whoever gave birth to anything, is that thing's mother. This, however, is not necessarily true; for the hen is not mother of an egg.Again, some things are possible, others impossible; and some things are necessary, others are not necessary. A proposition is possible which admits of being true, there being nothing in external circumstances to prevent it being true, e.g. Diocles is alive. Impossible is one which does not admit of being true, as e.g. The earth flies. That is necessary which besides being true does not admit of being false or, while it may admit of being false, is prevented from being false by circumstances external to itself, as Virtue is beneficial. Not necessary is that which, while true, yet is capable of being false if there are no external conditions to prevent, e.g. Dion is walking. 7.78. of conclusive some are denoted by the common name of the whole class, conclusive proper, others are called syllogistic. The syllogistic are such as either do not admit of, or are reducible to such as do not admit of, immediate proof in respect of one or more of the premisses; e.g. If Dion walks, then Dion is in motion; but Dion is walking, therefore Dion is in motion. Conclusive specifically are those which draw conclusions, but not by syllogism; e.g. the statement It is both day and night is false: now it is day; therefore it is not night. Arguments not syllogistic are those which plausibly resemble syllogistic arguments, but are not cogent proof; e.g. If Dion is a horse, he is an animal; but Dion is not a horse, therefore he is not an animal. 7.79. Further, arguments may be divided into true and false. The former draw their conclusions by means of true premisses; e.g. If virtue does good, vice does harm; but virtue does good, therefore vice does harm. Those are false which have error in the premisses or are inconclusive; e.g. If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore Dion is alive. Arguments may also be divided into possible and impossible, necessary and not necessary. Further, there are statements which are indemonstrable because they do not need demonstration; they are employed in the construction of every argument. As to the number of these, authorities differ; Chrysippus makes them five. These are assumed alike in reasoning specifically conclusive and in syllogisms both categorical and hypothetical. 7.80. The first kind of indemonstrable statement is that in which the whole argument is constructed of a hypothetical proposition and the clause with which the hypothetical proposition begins, while the final clause is the conclusion; as e.g. If the first, then the second; but the first is, therefore the second is. The second is that which employs a hypothetical proposition and the contradictory of the consequent, while the conclusion is the contradictory of the antecedent; e.g. If it is day, it is light; but it is night, therefore it is not day. Here the minor premiss is the contradictory of the consequent; the conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent. The third kind of indemonstrable employs a conjunction of negative propositions for major premiss and one of the conjoined propositions for minor premiss, concluding thence the contradictory of the remaining proposition; e.g. It is not the case that Plato is both dead and alive; but he is dead, therefore Plato is not alive. 7.81. The fourth kind employs a disjunctive proposition and one of the two alternatives in the disjunction as premisses, and its conclusion is the contradictory of the other alternative; e.g. Either A or B; but A is, therefore B is not. The fifth kind is that in which the argument as a whole is constructed of a disjunctive proposition and the contradictory of one of the alternatives in the disjunction, its conclusion being the other alternative; e.g. Either it is day or it is night; but it is not night, therefore it is day.From a truth a truth follows, according to the Stoics, as e.g. It is light from It is day; and from a falsehood a falsehood, as It is dark from It is night, if this latter be untrue. Also a truth may follow from a falsehood; e.g. from The earth flies will follow The earth exists; whereas from a truth no falsehood will follow, for from the existence of the earth it does not follow that the earth flies aloft. 7.82. There are also certain insoluble arguments: the Veiled Men, the Concealed, Sorites, Horned Folk, the Nobodies. The Veiled is as follows: . . . It cannot be that if two is few, three is not so likewise, nor that if two or three are few, four is not so; and so on up to ten. But two is few, therefore so also is ten. . . . The Nobody argument is an argument whose major premiss consists of an indefinite and a definite clause, followed by a minor premiss and conclusion; for example, If anyone is here, he is not in Rhodes; but there is some one here, therefore there is not anyone in Rhodes. . . . 7.83. Such, then, is the logic of the Stoics, by which they seek to establish their point that the wise man is the true dialectician. For all things, they say, are discerned by means of logical study, including whatever falls within the province of Physics, and again whatever belongs to that of Ethics. For else, say they, as regards statement and reasoning Physics and Ethics could not tell how to express themselves, or again concerning the proper use of terms, how the laws have defined various actions. Moreover, of the two kinds of common-sense inquiry included under Virtue one considers the nature of each particular thing, the other asks what it is called. Thus much for their logic. 10.31. They reject dialectic as superfluous; holding that in their inquiries the physicists should be content to employ the ordinary terms for things. Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are the standards of truth; the Epicureans generally make perceptions of mental presentations to be also standards. His own statements are also to be found in the Summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Sovran Maxims. Every sensation, he says, is devoid of reason and incapable of memory; for neither is it self-caused nor, regarded as having an external cause, can it add anything thereto or take anything therefrom. 10.32. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error: one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same; nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Hence it is from plain facts that we must start when we draw inferences about the unknown. For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning. And the objects presented to mad-men and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects – i.e. movements in the mind – which that which is unreal never does.
15. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 38

16. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 24, 23

17. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 2.54, 2.83, 2.841, 3.658, 3.663



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
(lekta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
agency / agent, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
animals (general) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
antiochus of ascalon Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
appearance (phantasia, impression) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
appearances (kataleptic) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
apuleius Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
argument Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
assent (sunkatathesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
athenagoras Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
atticus, platonist Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
burnyeat, m.f. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 246
chrysippus Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 143
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
cognitive / cognition Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
cosmic conflagration Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237
criterion (of truth) Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 246
determinism, dialectic Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237, 246
dialectic Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
diogenes laertius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
diogenes of babylon Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237, 246
doctrines (dogma, decreta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
duquesnay, i. m. le m. Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 142
education Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
epictetus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
epicurus, on sensory perception Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 143
first principle, platonic Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
fiske, g. c. Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 142
future Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 143
galen Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
human and divine matters, inferior person and the sage distinguished Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 97
impulse (hormē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
katalepsis, kataleptic impression Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 246
kemp, jerome Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 143
knowledge Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 246
language, stoic philosophy of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237, 246
lejay, paul Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 143
lekton Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237
logic Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
logos Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237, 246
lucretius, on the nature of things Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 143
lucretius t. caro Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 143
maximus of tyre Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
meaning, stoic theory of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237
mind Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 246
notion / notitia / ἔννοια Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 143
objectivism, objectivity Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 246
orthodoxy Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
phantasia Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237, 246
philosopher Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
philosophy Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
phone Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237
phonetics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237
plato Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 143
platonism, remembrance Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
platonism Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
praesensio / praenotio / anticipatio / πρόληψις Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 143
principatum / ἡγεμονικόν Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 143
propositions Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237
providence Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 246
ratio, rational impressions Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 246
reason Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 246
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
related fabulously about, of the stoics' Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 97
representation / φαντασία Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 143
rhetoric Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 246
sage, rarity of the Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 97
schiesaro, alessandro Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 143
seneca Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
senses / sense-perception (aisthēsis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
sensory perception Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 142, 143
sextus empiricus Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 97
signs Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237, 246
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii, intellect (nous) / thoughts (dianoiai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
stoicism, prolēpsis Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 815
stoicism, stoics, logic of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237, 246
stoicism, stoics, on language Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237, 246
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
tillius Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 142
toher, mark Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 142
tranquillity, truth Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237, 246
utterance Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 237
value (axia) / valuation Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
vice (kakos) / viciousness (kakia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
virtue / moral virtue (aretē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188