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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4479
Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 7.39-7.40


nanPhilosophic doctrine, say the Stoics, falls into three parts: one physical, another ethical, and the third logical. Zeno of Citium was the first to make this division in his Exposition of Doctrine, and Chrysippus too did so in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine and the first book of his Physics; and so too Apollodorus and Syllus in the first part of their Introductions to Stoic Doctrine, as also Eudromus in his Elementary Treatise on Ethics, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Posidonius.These parts are called by Apollodorus Heads of Commonplace; by Chrysippus and Eudromus specific divisions; by others generic divisions.


nanPhilosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

8 results
1. Cicero, Academica, 1.19 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.19. VA. Pergamus igitur inquit, inquit om. *gx 'quoniam placet. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio rat. phil. p 1 triplex, una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum uerum et *d quid falsum quid rectum in oratione pravumve prauumue accedit s quid consentiens consentiens sit Goer. quid repugnet repugnat s -ans s -ans esset Mue. iudicando. Ac primum primam *d illam partem bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum summum illud psmn bonum quo omnia referrentur, referrentur *d*g -ere- *g constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura omn. e nat. Om. *g et animo anima *g et corpore et vita. corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto alia in partibus, valetudinem vires pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem;
2. Cicero, De Finibus, 4.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4.5.  One of these departments is the science that is held to give rules for the formation of moral character; this part, which is the foundation of our present discussion, I defer. For I shall consider later the question, what is the End of Goods. For the present I only say that the topic of what I think may fitly be entitled Civic Science (the adjective in Greek is politikos) was handled with authority and fullness by the early Peripatetics and Academics, who agreed in substance though they differed in terminology."What a vast amount they have written on politics and on jurisprudence! how many precepts of oratory they have left us in their treatises, and how many examples in their discourses! In the first place, even the topics that required close reasoning they handled in a neat and polished manner, employing now definition, now division; as indeed your school does also, but your style is rather out-at‑elbows, while theirs is noticeably elegant.
3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 4.4-4.5, 5.1-5.3, 5.7-5.8, 5.13-5.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4.4. qui cum viderent ita nos esse natos, ut et communiter ad eas virtutes apti essemus, quae notae illustresque sunt, iustitiam dico, temperantiam, ceteras generis eiusdem—quae omnes similes artium reliquarum materia tantum ad meliorem partem et tractatione differunt—, easque ipsas virtutes viderent nos magnificentius appetere et ardentius, habere etiam insitam quandam vel potius insitam quandam vel potius dett. insitamque quandam velut ( etiam A, velud BEN) potius (pocius) (insitam quasi quandam cod. Glogav. ) innatam cupiditatem scientiae natosque esse ad congregationem hominum et ad societatem communitatemque generis humani, eaque in maximis ingeniis maxime elucere, totam philosophiam tris in partis diviserunt, quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus. 4.5. quarum cum una sit, qua mores conformari confirmari (' emendqvisse videtur A, Man.' Mdv. ) putantur, differo eam partem, quae quasi stirps est huius quaestionis. qui sit enim finis bonorum, mox, hoc loco tantum dico, a veteribus Peripateticis Academicisque, qui re consentientes vocabulis differebant, eum locum, quem civilem recte appellaturi videmur, Graeci politiko/n, graviter et copiose esse tractatum. Quam multa illi de re publica scripserunt, quam multa de legibus! quam multa non solum praecepta in artibus, sed etiam exempla in orationibus bene dicendi reliquerunt! primum enim ipsa illa, quae subtiliter disserenda erant, polite apteque dixerunt tum definientes, tum partientes, ut vestri etiam; sed vos squalidius, illorum vides quam niteat oratio. 5.1. Cum audissem audivissem ER Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam, solebam Vict. solebat cum M. Pisone in eo gymnasio, quod Ptolomaeum vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius Luciusque Cicero, frater noster cognatione patruelis, amore germanus, constituimus inter nos ut ambulationem postmeridianam conficeremus in Academia, maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. inde sermone vario sex illa a Dipylo stadia confecimus. cum autem venissemus in Academiae non sine causa nobilitata spatia, solitudo erat ea, quam volueramus. 5.2. tum Piso: Naturane nobis hoc, inquit, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod aliquid R legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui propinqui hortuli BE non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo, cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram—Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor mihi esse esse mihi B videtur, posteaquam est maior—solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina. 5.3. Tum Quintus: Est plane, Piso, ut dicis, inquit. nam me ipsum huc modo venientem convertebat ad sese Coloneus ille locus, locus lucus Valckenarius ad Callimach. p. 216 cf. Va. II p. 545 sqq. cuius incola Sophocles ob oculos versabatur, quem scis quam admirer quamque eo delecter. me quidem ad altiorem memoriam Oedipodis huc venientis et illo mollissimo carmine quaenam essent ipsa haec hec ipsa BE loca requirentis species quaedam commovit, iiter scilicet, sed commovit tamen. Tum Pomponius: At ego, quem vos ut deditum Epicuro insectari soletis, sum multum equidem cum Phaedro, quem unice diligo, ut scitis, in Epicuri hortis, quos modo praeteribamus, praeteribamus edd. praeteriebamus sed veteris proverbii admonitu vivorum memini, nec tamen Epicuri epicureum Non. licet oblivisci, si cupiam, cuius imaginem non modo in tabulis nostri familiares, sed etiam in poculis et in anulis nec tamen ... anulis habent Non. p. 70 anulis anellis Non. anelis R ambus anulis V habent. habebant Non. 5.7. Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit poterit 'emendavisse videtur Aldus' Mdv. poteris sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam illam veterem BE vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii ii edd. hi R hij BENV soli solum R numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps principes R Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, converte te NV convertere R convertere te BE quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum artificiū R officina profecti sunt. Atque ego: At ego R Et ego V 5.8. Scis me, inquam, istud idem sentire, Piso, sed a te oportune facta mentio est. studet enim meus audire Cicero quaenam sit istius veteris, quam commemoras, Academiae de finibus bonorum Peripateticorumque sententia. sed a te ... Peripat. sententia Non. p. 91 est sed et enim Non. censemus autem facillime te id explanare posse, quod et Staseam Staseam dett. stans eam Neapolitanum multos annos habueris apud te et complures iam menses Athenis haec ipsa te ex Antiocho videamus exquirere. Et ille ridens: Age, age, inquit,—satis enim scite me videtur legenduim : in me nostri sermonis principium esse voluisti—exponamus adolescenti, si quae forte possumus. dat enim id nobis solitudo, quod si qui deus diceret, numquam putarem me in Academia tamquam philosophum disputaturum. sed ne, dum huic obsequor, vobis molestus sim. Mihi, inquam, qui te id ipsum rogavi? Tum, Quintus et Pomponius cum idem se velle dixissent, Piso exorsus est. cuius oratio attende, quaeso, Brute, satisne videatur Antiochi complexa esse sententiam, quam tibi, qui fratrem eius Aristum frequenter audieris, maxime probatam existimo. 5.13. namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus. huius, Lyco, lyco V lico R lisias et N 2 ( versu ultra marg. continuato; ex priore script. lic cognosci posse videtur ); om. BE spatio vacuo rel. oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ipsi rebus R ieiunior. concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas, in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet. 5.14. praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is is his R quidem in patriis institutis add. Brem. manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic hic his R quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli aristotilis R, N ( fort. corr. ex aristotili), V fuisse et Polemonis docet. 4.4.  Well, these philosophers observed (1) that we are so constituted as to have a natural aptitude for the recognized and standard virtues in general, I mean Justice, Temperance and the others of that class (all of which resemble the end of the arts, and differ only by excelling them in the material with which they work and in their treatment of it); they observed moreover that we pursue these virtues with a more lofty enthusiasm than we do the arts; and (2) that we possess an implanted or rather an innate appetite for knowledge, and (3) that we are naturally disposed towards social life with our fellow men and towards fellowship and community with the human race; and that these instincts are displayed most clearly in the most highly endowed natures. Accordingly they divided philosophy into three departments, a division that was retained, as we notice, by Zeno. 4.5.  One of these departments is the science that is held to give rules for the formation of moral character; this part, which is the foundation of our present discussion, I defer. For I shall consider later the question, what is the End of Goods. For the present I only say that the topic of what I think may fitly be entitled Civic Science (the adjective in Greek is politikos) was handled with authority and fullness by the early Peripatetics and Academics, who agreed in substance though they differed in terminology."What a vast amount they have written on politics and on jurisprudence! how many precepts of oratory they have left us in their treatises, and how many examples in their discourses! In the first place, even the topics that required close reasoning they handled in a neat and polished manner, employing now definition, now division; as indeed your school does also, but your style is rather out-at‑elbows, while theirs is noticeably elegant. 5.1.  My dear Brutus, — Once I had been attending a lecture of Antiochus, as I was in the habit of doing, with Marcus Piso, in the building called the School of Ptolemy; and with us were my brother Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom I loved as a brother but who was really my first cousin. We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the Academy, chiefly because the place would be quiet and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly at the time appointed we met at our rendezvous, Piso's lodgings, and starting out beguiled with conversation on various subjects the three-quarters of a mile from the Dipylon Gate. When we reached the walks of the Academy, which are so deservedly famous, we had them entirely to ourselves, as we had hoped. 5.2.  Thereupon Piso remarked: "Whether it is a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I can't say; but one's emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the present moment are a case in point. I am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed the garden close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates' pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the very seat we see over there. For my own part even the sight of our senate-house at home (I mean the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, which looks to my eyes smaller since its enlargement) used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and chief of all, my grandfather; such powers of suggestion do places possess. No wonder the scientific training of the memory is based upon locality. 5.3.  "Perfectly true, Piso," rejoined Quintus. "I myself on the way here just now noticed yonder village of Colonus, and it brought to my imagination Sophocles who resided there, and who is as you know my great admiration and delight. Indeed my memory took me further back; for I had a vision of Oedipus, advancing towards this very spot and asking in those most tender verses, 'What place is this?' — a mere fancy no doubt, yet still it affected me strongly." "For my part," said Pomponius, "you are fond of attacking me as a devotee of Epicurus, and I do spend much of my time with Phaedrus, who as you know is my dearest friend, in Epicurus's Gardens which we passed just now; but I obey the old saw: I 'think of those that are alive.' Still I could not forget Epicurus, even if I wanted; the members of our body not only have pictures of him, but even have his likeness on their drinking-cups and rings. 5.7.  "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians. 5.8.  "You know that I agree with you about that, Piso," I replied; "but you have raised the point most opportunely; for my cousin Cicero is eager to hear the doctrine of the Old Academy of which you speak, and of the Peripatetics, on the subject of the Ends of Goods. We feel sure you can expound it with the greatest ease, for you have had Staseas from Naples in your household for many years, and also we know you have been studying this very subject under Antiochus for several months at Athens." "Here goes, then," replied Piso, smiling, "(for you have rather craftily arranged for our discussion to start with me), let me see what I can do to give the lad a lecture. If an oracle had foretold that I should find myself discoursing in the Academy like a philosopher, I should not have believed it, but here I am, thanks to our having the place to ourselves. Only don't let me bore the rest of you while I am obliging our young friend." "What, bore me?" said I. "Why, it is I who asked you to speak." Thereupon Quintus and Pomponius having declared that they wished it too, Piso began. And I will ask you, Brutus, kindly to consider whether you think his discourse a satisfactory summary of the doctrine of Antiochus, which I believe to be the system which you most approve, as you have often attended the lectures of his brother Aristus. 5.13.  Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. 5.14.  "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo.
4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.16. Well, I too," I replied, "think I have come at the right moment, as you say. For here are you, three leaders of three schools of philosophy, met in congress. In fact we only want Marcus Piso to have every considerable school represented." "Oh," rejoined Cotta, "if what is said in the book which our master Antiochus lately dedicated to our good Balbus here is true, you have no need to regret the absence of your friend Piso. Antiochus holds the view that the doctrines of the Stoics, though differing in form of expression, agree in substance with those of the Peripatetics. I should like to know your opinion of the book, Balbus." "My opinion?" said Balbus, "Why, I am surprised that a man of first-rate intellect like Antiochus should have failed to see what a gulf divides the Stoics, who distinguish expediency and right not in name only but in essential nature, from the Peripatetics, who class the right and the expedient together, and only recognize differences of quantity or degree, not of kind, between them. This is not a slight verbal discrepancy but a fundamental difference of doctrine.
5. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

6. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.40-7.41 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus. 7.41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions.
8. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 2.42



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academic philosophy,attitude towards auctoritas Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
academics Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
academy,old Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
academy,old (i.e.,antiochus) Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
academy,sceptical Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
alcinous James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
antiochus Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
antiochus of ascalon Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
apollodorus (stoic) Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
aristotle Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95; James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
auctoritas Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
authority/authoritative (auctoritas) Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
chrysippus,on the order of the parts of philosophy Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23
chrysippus Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
cicero Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
cleanthes James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
clement of alexandria James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
crantor Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
curriculum,ancient philosophical James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
dialectic,and the stoics James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
diogenes laertius Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 19, 23; Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
diogenes of babylon Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
ethics,corresponding with human matters Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 19
ethics Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95; Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
eudromus Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
formal properties Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 24
galen and pseudo-galen,works,,the best doctor is also a philosopher Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280
harl,margerite James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
hippocrates,works,,decorum Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280
hippocratic,model Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280
interpretation,and logic James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
logic,corresponding with knowledge Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 19
logic Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
logic (λογικὴ),aristotelian James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
logica utens,origens James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
logos (λόγος),divine James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
music Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 24
old academy Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
order (τάξις),logical Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
order (τάξις),reading Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
parts of philosophy,interrelatedness,images of Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23
parts of philosophy,interrelatedness of ethics and physics Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 19
parts of philosophy Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 19, 23
peripatetic Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
peripatetics Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
peripatos Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
philo James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
philoponia (love of effort) Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280
philosopher-doctor Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280
philosophy,three parts of Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280
philosophy,tripartite curriculum of James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
physics,corresponding with divine matters Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 19
physics Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
piso (ciceros character) Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
plato James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
platonism James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
plutarch Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23; James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
polemo Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
posidonius Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23; Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
posidonius preferred image,according to chrysippus Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23
posidonius preferred image,according to zeno Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23
posidonius preferred image,mixed together Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23
posidonius preferred image,order of Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23
posidonius preferred image Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23
progress (spiritual) Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
proverbs,teaches logic James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
quintilian Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
rhetoric James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
scripture (γραφή),difficulty of James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
sextus empiricus Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
solomon James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
somos,robért James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
speusippus Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
stoicism Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280
stoics Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
strato Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
syllus Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91
system Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
theology,in greek philosophy James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
theophrastus Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95
wisdom (sophia),as knowledge of human and divine matters Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 19, 23
wisdom (sophia),on the order of the parts of philosophy' Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 23
wisdom (σοφία) James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
xenocrates Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95; James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
zeno of citium Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 270
zeno of citius Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91