Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

4479

Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 7.156-7.157
nan And there are five terrestrial zones: first, the northern zone which is beyond the arctic circle, uninhabitable because of the cold; second, a temperate zone; a third, uninhabitable because of great heats, called the torrid zone; fourth, a counter-temperate zone; fifth, the southern zone, uninhabitable because of its cold.Nature in their view is an artistically working fire, going on its way to create; which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, or fashioning breath. And the soul is a nature capable of perception. And they regard it as the breath of life, congenital with us; from which they infer first that it is a body and secondly that it survives death. Yet it is perishable, though the soul of the universe, of which the individual souls of animals are parts, is indestructible.
nan Zeno of Citium and Antipater, in their treatises De anima, and Posidonius define the soul as a warm breath; for by this we become animate and this enables us to move. Cleanthes indeed holds that all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration; but Chrysippus says that only the souls of the wise do so.They count eight parts of the soul: the five senses, the generative power in us, our power of speech, and that of reasoning. They hold that we see when the light between the visual organ and the object stretches in the form of a cone: so Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics and Apollodorus. The apex of the cone in the air is at the eye, the base at the object seen. Thus the thing seen is reported to us by the medium of the air stretching out towards it, as if by a stick.

Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

18 results
1. Homer, Odyssey, 11 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
2. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 2.3 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
3. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.36, 1.39, 2.57 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 1.36. Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno's view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a 'reason' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. 1.39. Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. 2.57. I therefore believe that I shall not be wrong if in discussing this subject I take my first principle from the prince of seekers after truth, Zeno himself. Now Zeno gives this definition of nature: 'nature (he says) is a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to the work of generation.' For he holds that the special function of an art or craft is to create and generate, and that what in the processes of our arts is done by the hand is done with far more skilful craftsmanship by nature, that is, as I said, by that 'craftsmanlike' fire which is the teacher of the other arts. And on this theory, while each department of nature is 'craftsmanlike,' in the sense of having a method or path marked out for it to follow
4. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 2.4 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
5. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 36, 35 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) 35. for some bodies he has endowed with habit, others with nature, others with soul, and some with rational soul; for instance, he has bound stones and beams, which are torn from their kindred materials, with the most powerful bond of habit; and this habit is the inclination of the spirit to return to itself; for it begins at the middle and proceeds onwards towards the extremities, and then when it has touched the extreme boundary, it turns back again, until it has again arrived at the same place from which it originally started.
6. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
7. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 1.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
8. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 8 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
9. Galen, On The Movement of Muscles, 4.402-4.403 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
10. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 3.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
11. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 8.400 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
12. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.234 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
13. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 3.63, 3.65-3.67, 3.69-3.70, 3.72, 7.87, 7.134-7.140, 7.142-7.144, 7.147-7.155, 7.157 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) 3.63. Plato has employed a variety of terms in order to make his system less intelligible to the ignorant. But in a special sense he considers wisdom to be the science of those things which are objects of thought and really existent, the science which, he says, is concerned with God and the soul as separate from the body. And especially by wisdom he means philosophy, which is a yearning for divine wisdom. And in a general sense all experience is also termed by him wisdom, e.g. when he calls a craftsman wise. And he applies the same terms with very different meanings. For instance, the word φαῦλος (slight, plain) is employed by him in the sense of ἁπλοῦς (simple, honest), just as it is applied to Heracles in the Licymnius of Euripides in the following passage:Plain (φαῦλος), unaccomplished, staunch to do great deeds, unversed in talk, with all his store of wisdom curtailed to action. 3.65. The right interpretation of his dialogues includes three things: first, the meaning of every statement must be explained; next, its purpose, whether it is made for a primary reason or by way of illustration, and whether to establish his own doctrines or to refute his interlocutor; in the third place it remains to examine its truth.And since certain critical marks are affixed to his works let us now say a word about these. The cross × is taken to indicate peculiar expressions and figures of speech, and generally any idiom of Platonic usage; the diple ( ) calls attention to doctrines and opinions characteristic of Plato; 3.66. the dotted cross (⨰) denotes select passages and beauties of style; the dotted diple (⋗) editors' corrections of the text; the dotted obelus (÷) passages suspected without reason; the dotted antisigma (Ꜿ) repetitions and proposals for transpositions; the ceraunium the philosophical school; the asterisk (∗) an agreement of doctrine; the obelus (−) a spurious passage. So much for the critical marks and his writings in general. As Antigonus of Carystus says in his Life of Zeno, when the writings were first edited with critical marks, their possessors charged a certain fee to anyone who wished to consult them. 3.67. The doctrines he approved are these. He held that the soul is immortal, that by transmigration it puts on many bodies, and that it has a numerical first principle, whereas the first principle of the body is geometrical; and he defined soul as the idea of vital breath diffused in all directions. He held that it is self-moved and tripartite, the rational part of it having its seat in the head, the passionate part about the heart, while the appetitive is placed in the region of the navel and the liver. 3.69. And the division from the centre to the circumference which is adjusted in harmony with the soul being thus determined, the soul knows that which is, and adjusts it proportionately because she has the elements proportionately disposed in herself. And when the circle of the Other revolves aright, the result is opinion; but from the regular motion of the circle of the Same comes knowledge. He set forth two universal principles, God and matter, and he calls God mind and cause; he held that matter is devoid of form and unlimited, and that composite things arise out of it; and that it was once in disorderly motion but, inasmuch as God preferred order to disorder, was by him brought together in one place. 3.70. This substance, he says, is converted into the four elements, fire, water, air, earth, of which the world itself and all that therein is are formed. Earth alone of these elements is not subject to change, the assumed cause being the peculiarity of its constituent triangles. For he thinks that in all the other elements the figures employed are homogeneous, the scalene triangle out of which they are all put together being one and the same, whereas for earth a triangle of peculiar shape is employed; the element of fire is a pyramid, of air an octahedron, of water an icosahedron, of earth a cube. Hence earth is not transmuted into the other three elements, nor these three into earth. 3.72. For that maker contains the other living things, and this universe the shapes of them all. It is smooth and has no organ all round because it has no need of organs. Moreover, the universe remains imperishable because it is not dissolved into the Deity. And the creation as a whole is caused by God, because it is the nature of the good to be beneficent, and the creation of the universe has the highest good for its cause. For the most beautiful of created things is due to the best of intelligible causes; so that, as God is of this nature, and the universe resembles the best in its perfect beauty, it will not be in the likeness of anything created, but only of God. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.134. They hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter. This doctrine is laid down by Zeno of Citium in his treatise On Existence, Cleanthes in his work On Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics towards the end, Archedemus in his treatise On Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Exposition. There is a difference, according to them, between principles and elements; the former being without generation or destruction, whereas the elements are destroyed when all things are resolved into fire. Moreover, the principles are incorporeal and destitute of form, while the elements have been endowed with form. 7.135. Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. But surface is the extremity of a solid body, or that which has length and breadth only without depth. That surface exists not only in our thought but also in reality is maintained by Posidonius in the third book of his Celestial Phenomena. A line is the extremity of a surface or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the extremity of a line, the smallest possible mark or dot.God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names. 7.136. In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. They are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and by Archedemus in a work On Elements. An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved. 7.137. The four elements together constitute unqualified substance or matter. Fire is the hot element, water the moist, air the cold, earth the dry. Not but what the quality of dryness is also found in the air. Fire has the uppermost place; it is also called aether, and in it the sphere of the fixed stars is first created; then comes the sphere of the planets, next to that the air, then the water, and lowest of all the earth, which is at the centre of all things.The term universe or cosmos is used by them in three senses: (1) of God himself, the individual being whose quality is derived from the whole of substance; he is indestructible and ingenerable, being the artificer of this orderly arrangement, who at stated periods of time absorbs into himself the whole of substance and again creates it from himself. (2) 7.138. Again, they give the name of cosmos to the orderly arrangement of the heavenly bodies in itself as such; and (3) in the third place to that whole of which these two are parts. Again, the cosmos is defined as the individual being qualifying the whole of substance, or, in the words of Posidonius in his elementary treatise on Celestial Phenomena, a system made up of heaven and earth and the natures in them, or, again, as a system constituted by gods and men and all things created for their sake. By heaven is meant the extreme circumference or ring in which the deity has his seat.The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence: so says Chrysippus in the fifth book of his treatise On Providence and Posidonius in his work On the Gods, book iii. – inasmuch as reason pervades every part of it, just as does the soul in us. Only there is a difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less. 7.139. For through some parts it passes as a hold or containing force, as is the case with our bones and sinews; while through others it passes as intelligence, as in the ruling part of the soul. Thus, then, the whole world is a living being, endowed with soul and reason, and having aether for its ruling principle: so says Antipater of Tyre in the eighth book of his treatise On the Cosmos. Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Providence and Posidonius in his book On the Gods say that the heaven, but Cleanthes that the sun, is the ruling power of the world. Chrysippus, however, in the course of the same work gives a somewhat different account, namely, that it is the purer part of the aether; the same which they declare to be preeminently God and always to have, as it were in sensible fashion, pervaded all that is in the air, all animals and plants, and also the earth itself, as a principle of cohesion. 7.140. The world, they say, is one and finite, having a spherical shape, such a shape being the most suitable for motion, as Posidonius says in the fifth book of his Physical Discourse and the disciples of Antipater in their works on the Cosmos. Outside of the world is diffused the infinite void, which is incorporeal. By incorporeal is meant that which, though capable of being occupied by body, is not so occupied. The world has no empty space within it, but forms one united whole. This is a necessary result of the sympathy and tension which binds together things in heaven and earth. Chrysippus discusses the void in his work On Void and in the first book of his Physical Sciences; so too Apollophanes in his Physics, Apollodorus, and Posidonius in his Physical Discourse, book ii. But these, it is added [i.e. sympathy and tension], are likewise bodies. 7.142. The world, they hold, comes into being when its substance has first been converted from fire through air into moisture and then the coarser part of the moisture has condensed as earth, while that whose particles are fine has been turned into air, and this process of rarefaction goes on increasing till it generates fire. Thereupon out of these elements animals and plants and all other natural kinds are formed by their mixture. The generation and the destruction of the world are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, by Posidonius in the first book of his work On the Cosmos, by Cleanthes, and by Antipater in his tenth book On the Cosmos. Panaetius, however, maintained that the world is indestructible.The doctrine that the world is a living being, rational, animate and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius. 7.143. It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world, ergo the world is a living being. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it. Boethus, however, denies that the world is a living thing. The unity of the world is maintained by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius in the first book of his Physical Discourse. By the totality of things, the All, is meant, according to Apollodorus, (1) the world, and in another sense (2) the system composed of the world and the void outside it. The world then is finite, the void infinite. 7.144. of the stars some are fixed, and are carried round with the whole heaven; others, the wandering stars or planets, have their special motions. The sun travels in an oblique path through the zodiac. Similarly the moon travels in a spiral path. The sun is pure fire: so Posidonius in the seventh book of his Celestial Phenomena. And it is larger than the earth, as the same author says in the sixth book of his Physical Discourse. Moreover it is spherical in shape like the world itself according to this same author and his school. That it is fire is proved by its producing all the effects of fire; that it is larger than the earth by the fact that all the earth is illuminated by it; nay more, the heaven beside. The fact too that the earth casts a conical shadow proves that the sun is greater than it. And it is because of its great size that it is seen from every part of the earth. 7.147. The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil, taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes. 7.148. The substance of God is declared by Zeno to be the whole world and the heaven, as well as by Chrysippus in his first book of the Gods, and by Posidonius in his first book with the same title. Again, Antipater in the seventh book of his work On the Cosmos says that the substance of God is akin to air, while Boethus in his work On Nature speaks of the sphere of the fixed stars as the substance of God. Now the term Nature is used by them to mean sometimes that which holds the world together, sometimes that which causes terrestrial things to spring up. Nature is defined as a force moving of itself, producing and preserving in being its offspring in accordance with seminal principles within definite periods, and effecting results homogeneous with their sources. 7.149. Nature, they hold, aims both at utility and at pleasure, as is clear from the analogy of human craftsmanship. That all things happen by fate or destiny is maintained by Chrysippus in his treatise De fato, by Posidonius in his De fato, book ii., by Zeno and by Boethus in his De fato, book i. Fate is defined as an endless chain of causation, whereby things are, or as the reason or formula by which the world goes on. What is more, they say that divination in all its forms is a real and substantial fact, if there is really Providence. And they prove it to be actually a science on the evidence of certain results: so Zeno, Chrysippus in the second book of his De divinatione, Athenodorus, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Discourse and the fifth book of his De divinatione. But Panaetius denies that divination has any real existence. 7.150. The primary matter they make the substratum of all things: so Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and Zeno. By matter is meant that out of which anything whatsoever is produced. Both substance and matter are terms used in a twofold sense according as they signify (1) universal or (2) particular substance or matter. The former neither increases nor diminishes, while the matter of particular things both increases and diminishes. Body according to them is substance which is finite: so Antipater in his second book On Substance, and Apollodorus in his Physics. Matter can also be acted upon, as the same author says, for if it were immutable, the things which are produced would never have been produced out of it. Hence the further doctrine that matter is divisible ad infinitum. Chrysippus says that the division is not ad infinitum, but itself infinite; for there is nothing infinitely small to which the division can extend. But nevertheless the division goes on without ceasing. 7.151. Hence, again, their explanation of the mixture of two substances is, according to Chrysippus in the third book of his Physics, that they permeate each other through and through, and that the particles of the one do not merely surround those of the other or lie beside them. Thus, if a little drop of wine be thrown into the sea, it will be equally diffused over the whole sea for a while and then will be blended with it.Also they hold that there are daemons (δαίμονες) who are in sympathy with mankind and watch over human affairs. They believe too in heroes, that is, the souls of the righteous that have survived their bodies.of the changes which go on in the air, they describe winter as the cooling of the air above the earth due to the sun's departure to a distance from the earth; spring as the right temperature of the air consequent upon his approach to us; 7.152. ummer as the heating of the air above the earth when he travels to the north; while autumn they attribute to the receding of the sun from us. As for the winds, they are streams of air, differently named according to the localities from which they blow. And the cause of their production is the sun through the evaporation of the clouds. The rainbow is explained as the reflection of the sun's rays from watery clouds or, as Posidonius says in his Meteorology, an image of a segment of the sun or moon in a cloud suffused with dew, which is hollow and visible without intermission, the image showing itself as if in a mirror in the form of a circular arch. Comets, bearded stars, and meteors are fires which arise when dense air is carried up to the region of aether. 7.153. A shooting star is the sudden kindling of a mass of fire in rapid motion through the air, which leaves a trail behind it presenting an appearance of length. Rain is the transformation of cloud into water, when moisture drawn up by the sun from land or sea has been only partially evaporated. If this is cooled down, it is called hoar-frost. Hail is frozen cloud, crumbled by a wind; while snow is moist matter from a cloud which has congealed: so Posidonius in the eighth book of his Physical Discourse. Lightning is a kindling of clouds from being rubbed together or being rent by wind, as Zeno says in his treatise On the Whole; thunder the noise these clouds make when they rub against each other or burst. 7.154. Thunderbolt is the term used when the fire is violently kindled and hurled to the ground with great force as the clouds grind against each other or are torn by the wind. Others say that it is a compression of fiery air descending with great force. A typhoon is a great and violent thunderstorm whirlwind-like, or a whirlwind of smoke from a cloud that has burst. A prester is a cloud rent all round by the force of fire and wind. Earthquakes, say they, happen when the wind finds its way into, or is imprisoned in, the hollow parts of the earth: so Posidonius in his eighth book; and some of them are tremblings, others openings of the earth, others again lateral displacements, and yet others vertical displacements. 7.155. They maintain that the parts of the world are arranged thus. The earth is in the middle answering to a centre; next comes the water, which is shaped like a sphere all round it, concentric with the earth, so that the earth is in water. After the water comes a spherical layer of air. There are five celestial circles: first, the arctic circle, which is always visible; second, the summer tropic; third, the circle of the equinox; fourth, the winter tropic; and fifth, the antarctic, which is invisible to us. They are called parallel, because they do not incline towards one another; yet they are described round the same centre. The zodiac is an oblique circle, as it crosses the parallel circles. 7.157. Zeno of Citium and Antipater, in their treatises De anima, and Posidonius define the soul as a warm breath; for by this we become animate and this enables us to move. Cleanthes indeed holds that all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration; but Chrysippus says that only the souls of the wise do so.They count eight parts of the soul: the five senses, the generative power in us, our power of speech, and that of reasoning. They hold that we see when the light between the visual organ and the object stretches in the form of a cone: so Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics and Apollodorus. The apex of the cone in the air is at the eye, the base at the object seen. Thus the thing seen is reported to us by the medium of the air stretching out towards it, as if by a stick.
14. Eusebius of Caesarea, Demonstration of The Gospel, 3.3-3.8 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
15. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 15.14.2, 15.20.2, 15.20.6 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
16. Origen, Against Celsus, 1.40, 1.64, 4.48, 4.63, 8.49, 8.51 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) 1.64. But if we were to reproach those who have been converted with their former lives, then we would have occasion to accuse Ph do also, even after he became a philosopher; since, as the history relates, he was drawn away by Socrates from a house of bad fame to the pursuits of philosophy. Nay, even the licentious life of Polemo, the successor of Xenocrates, will be a subject of reproach to philosophy; whereas even in these instances we ought to regard it as a ground of praise, that reasoning was enabled, by the persuasive power of these men, to convert from the practice of such vices those who had been formerly entangled by them. Now among the Greeks there was only one Ph do, I know not if there were a second, and one Polemo, who betook themselves to philosophy, after a licentious and most wicked life; while with Jesus there were not only at the time we speak of, the twelve disciples, but many more at all times, who, becoming a band of temperate men, speak in the following terms of their former lives: For we ourselves also were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving various lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful, and hating one another. But after that the kindness and love of God our Saviour towards man appeared, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which He shed upon us richly, we became such as we are. For God sent forth His Word and healed them, and delivered them from their destructions, as the prophet taught in the book of Psalms. And in addition to what has been already said, I would add the following: that Chrysippus, in his treatise on the Cure of the Passions, in his endeavours to restrain the passions of the human soul, not pretending to determine what opinions are the true ones, says that according to the principles of the different sects are those to be cured who have been brought under the dominion of the passions, and continues: And if pleasure be an end, then by it must the passions be healed; and if there be three kinds of chief blessings, still, according to this doctrine, it is in the same way that those are to be freed from their passions who are under their dominion; whereas the assailants of Christianity do not see in how many persons the passions have been brought under restraint, and the flood of wickedness checked, and savage manners softened, by means of the Gospel. So that it well became those who are ever boasting of their zeal for the public good, to make a public acknowledgement of their thanks to that doctrine which by a new method led men to abandon many vices, and to bear their testimony at least to it, that even though not the truth, it has at all events been productive of benefit to the human race. 4.48. In the next place, as if he had devoted himself solely to the manifestation of his hatred and dislike of the Jewish and Christian doctrine, he says: The more modest of Jewish and Christian writers give all these things an allegorical meaning; and, Because they are ashamed of these things, they take refuge in allegory. Now one might say to him, that if we must admit fables and fictions, whether written with a concealed meaning or with any other object, to be shameful narratives when taken in their literal acceptation, of what histories can this be said more truly than of the Grecian? In these histories, gods who are sons castrate the gods who are their fathers, and gods who are parents devour their own children, and a goddess-mother gives to the father of gods and men a stone to swallow instead of his own son, and a father has intercourse with his daughter, and a wife binds her own husband, having as her allies in the work the brother of the fettered god and his own daughter! But why should I enumerate these absurd stories of the Greeks regarding their gods, which are most shameful in themselves, even though invested with an allegorical meaning? (Take the instance) where Chrysippus of Soli, who is considered to be an ornament of the Stoic sect, on account of his numerous and learned treatises, explains a picture at Samos, in which Juno was represented as committing unspeakable abominations with Jupiter. This reverend philosopher says in his treatises, that matter receives the spermatic words of the god, and retains them within herself, in order to ornament the universe. For in the picture at Samos Juno represents matter, and Jupiter god. Now it is on account of these, and of countless other similar fables, that we would not even in word call the God of all things Jupiter, or the sun Apollo, or the moon Diana. But we offer to the Creator a worship which is pure, and speak with religious respect of His noble works of creation, not contaminating even in word the things of God; approving of the language of Plato in the Philebus, who would not admit that pleasure was a goddess, so great is my reverence, Protarchus, he says, for the very names of the gods. We verily entertain such reverence for the name of God, and for His noble works of creation, that we would not, even under pretext of an allegorical meaning, admit any fable which might do injury to the young. 8.49. Let us see in what terms Celsus next addresses us: Besides, is it not most absurd and inconsistent in you, on the one hand, to make so much of the body as you do - to expect that the same body will rise again, as though it were the best and most precious part of us; and yet, on the other, to expose it to such tortures as though it were worthless? But men who hold such notions, and are so attached to the body, are not worthy of being reasoned with; for in this and in other respects they show themselves to be gross, impure, and bent upon revolting without any reason from the common belief. But I shall direct my discourse to those who hope for the enjoyment of eternal life with God by means of the soul or mind, whether they choose to call it a spiritual substance, an intelligent spirit, holy and blessed, or a living soul, or the heavenly and indestructible offspring of a divine and incorporeal nature, or by whatever name they designate the spiritual nature of man. And they are rightly persuaded that those who live well shall be blessed, and the unrighteous shall all suffer everlasting punishments. And from this doctrine neither they nor any other should ever swerve. Now, as he has often already reproached us for our opinions on the resurrection, and as we have on these occasions defended our opinions in what seemed to us a reasonable way, we do not intend, at each repetition of the one objection, to go into a repetition of our defense. Celsus makes an unfounded charge against us when he ascribes to us the opinion that there is nothing in our complex nature better or more precious than the body; for we hold that far beyond all bodies is the soul, and especially the reasonable soul; for it is the soul, and not the body, which bears the likeness of the Creator. For, according to us, God is not corporeal, unless we fall into the absurd errors of the followers of Zeno and Chrysippus. 8.51. In the next place, he expresses his approval of those who hope that eternal life shall be enjoyed with God by the soul or mind, or, as it is variously called, the spiritual nature, the reasonable soul, intelligent, holy, and blessed; and he allows the soundness of the doctrine, that those who had a good life shall be happy, and the unrighteous shall suffer eternal punishments. And yet I wonder at what follows, more than at anything that Celsus has ever said; for he adds, And from this doctrine let not them or any one ever swerve. For certainly in writing against Christians, the very essence of whose faith is God, and the promises made by Christ to the righteous, and His warnings of punishment awaiting the wicked, he must see that, if a Christian were brought to renounce Christianity by his arguments against it, it is beyond doubt that, along with his Christian faith, he would cast off the very doctrine from which he says that no Christian and no man should ever swerve. But I think Celsus has been far surpassed in consideration for his fellow-men by Chrysippus in his treatise, On the Subjugation of the Passions. For when he sought to apply remedies to the affections and passions which oppress and distract the human spirit, after employing such arguments as seemed to himself to be strong, he did not shrink from using in the second and third place others which he did not himself approve of. For, says he, if it were held by any one that there are three kinds of good, we must seek to regulate the passions in accordance with that supposition; and we must not too curiously inquire into the opinions held by a person at the time that he is under the influence of passion, lest, if we delay too long for the purpose of overthrowing the opinions by which the mind is possessed, the opportunity for curing the passion may pass away. And he adds, Thus, supposing that pleasure were the highest good, or that he was of that opinion whose mind was under the dominion of passion, we should not the less give him help, and show that, even on the principle that pleasure is the highest and final good of man, all passion is disallowed. And Celsus, in like manner, after having embraced the doctrine, that the righteous shall be blessed, and the wicked shall suffer eternal punishments, should have followed out his subject; and, after having advanced what seemed to him the chief argument, he should have proceeded to prove and enforce by further reasons the truth that the unjust shall surely suffer eternal punishment, and those who lead a good life shall be blessed.
17. Augustine, Contra Academicos, 3.38 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
18. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.146, 1.171, 2.774, 2.809, 2.817, 2.1009

Subjects of this text:

subject	book bibliographic info
academy	Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
alcinous	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
analogy	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120
antiochus of ascalon	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
antipater	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
antipater of tarsus	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
aristotle,on basics of psychology	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
body,and soul	Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 237
body,heavenly/pneumatic/subtle	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
body,relation to soul	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
body,vs. mind	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
body	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
breath,warm breath	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
breath	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 48; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 237
christ	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
chrysippus,on expertise	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
chrysippus,on the end	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
chrysippus,treatises of,on the psyche	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
chrysippus	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140; Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
cicero	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 48; Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
cleanthes,hymn	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
cleanthes,on expertise	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
cleanthes	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
cognition	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
confidence,conflagration	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
conflagration	Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
crantor	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
culture,greco- roman	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
curriculum	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
david	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 48
death,survival of souls after	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
death	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
demiurge/craftsman	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120
design,rational	Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 113
diogenes laertius	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46, 48; Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 113; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149; Schliesser et al. (2021), Alexandria: Hub of the Hellenistic World. 312
diogenes of babylon	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
directive faculty,in aristotle and plato	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
dreams	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
dunamis	Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 237
elements,four-element physics	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
end (telos),chrysippus on	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
epitēdeios,as fitting	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 48
ethics	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
eusebius of caesarea	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
expertise (technē),as system of cognitions	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
expertise (technē),as tenor	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
expertise (technē),chrysippus on	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
expertise (technē),cleanthes on	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
expertise (technē),stoic definitions of	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
expertise (technē),zeno on	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
extension in three dimensions	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
fire,as hot element	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
fire,conflagration	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
fire,in nature	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
fire,intelligent	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
fire	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
form	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
galen	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 237
geometrical principle	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
god	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
godlikeness,stoic	Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
hahm,david	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
harmonia	Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 237
health and disease	Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 113
hebrews	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
hierocles,on the psyche	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
human/humankind	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
immortality,achieved	Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
immortality,deathlessness	Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
immortality,divinity	Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
immortality	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
imperishability	Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
inspiration	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
jew/jewish,literature/ authors	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
jew/jewish,war	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
johannine circle	Schliesser et al. (2021), Alexandria: Hub of the Hellenistic World. 312
law,god's" '151.0_140.0@lucilius balbus	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
limit	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
literature	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
logic	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
medical writers,greek,on pneuma	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
mind,relation to body	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
nature	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120
numenius	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
numerical principle	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
olympiodorus	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
origen	Schliesser et al. (2021), Alexandria: Hub of the Hellenistic World. 312
part of a whole (soul as,etc.)	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120
paul (saul)	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
pauline theology,pneumatology and stoic physics	Schliesser et al. (2021), Alexandria: Hub of the Hellenistic World. 312
pauline theology,spiritual body	Schliesser et al. (2021), Alexandria: Hub of the Hellenistic World. 312
physics	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
plato,on mind and spirit	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
plato	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
plutarch of athens,ps. plutarch	Schliesser et al. (2021), Alexandria: Hub of the Hellenistic World. 312
pneuma,in greek biology	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
pneuma (spiritus)	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 120, 189
posidonius	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
proclus	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
pythagoras,pythagoreans	Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
pythagoras	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
rationality,of god	Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 113
rationality,of the creation of the world)	Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 113
righteousness	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
scheme	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
seminal principles	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
seneca,on mind and body	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
seneca	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
sextus empiricus	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
simmias	Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 237
soul,individual	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
soul,survives death	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
soul-body relationship,temporary survival after death	Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
soul	Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 237
souls,and immortality	Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
speusippus	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
spirit,characterizations as,aether	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spirit,characterizations as,breath (life itself)	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spirit,characterizations as,holy	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spirit,characterizations as,stoic pneuma	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spirit,effects of,cosmic unity	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spirit,effects of,holiness/ integrity	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spirit,effects of,life itself	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spirit,effects of,mind enlightened	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spirit,effects of,perception and movement	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spirit,effects of,psychic movement	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spirit,effects of,virtue	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
spiritual food,reference by paul	Schliesser et al. (2021), Alexandria: Hub of the Hellenistic World. 312
stoic,stoicism	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
stoicism	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140; Schliesser et al. (2021), Alexandria: Hub of the Hellenistic World. 312
stoicism and stoic doctrine	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189
stoics	Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 237
techne	Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 113
tension (tonos)	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
theologia tripertita	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
theology,stoic	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
theology	Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 149
timaeus (plato)	Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 237
tonos	Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 237
vehicle (ὄχημα)	Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 486
von arnim,joachim	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
wisdom (sophia),as fitting expertise'	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 46
wisdom (sophia),as fitting expertise	Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 48
zedekiah	Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 140
zeno of citium,on pneuma	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
zeno of citium,treatise on the universe	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225
zeno of citium	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 189; Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 82
zeus,as designing fire	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 225