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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4479
Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 7.116


nanAlso they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

33 results
1. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 20.5 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

20.5. וְדִבְּרוּ הַשֹּׁטְרִים אֶל־הָעָם לֵאמֹר מִי־הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר בָּנָה בַיִת־חָדָשׁ וְלֹא חֲנָכוֹ יֵלֵךְ וְיָשֹׁב לְבֵיתוֹ פֶּן־יָמוּת בַּמִּלְחָמָה וְאִישׁ אַחֵר יַחְנְכֶנּוּ׃ 20.5. And the officers shall speak unto the people, saying: ‘What man is there that hath built a new house, and hath not dedicated it? let him go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man dedicate it."
2. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

875a. the most savage of beasts. The reason thereof is this,—that no man’s nature is naturally able both to perceive what is of benefit to the civic life of men and, perceiving it, to be alike able and willing to practice what is best. For, in the first place, it is difficult to perceive that a true civic art necessarily cares for the public, not the private, interest,—for the public interest bind States together, whereas the private interest rends them asunder,—and to perceive also that it benefits both public and private interests alike when the public interest, rather than the private, is well enacted.
3. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

69d. which has within it passions both fearful and unavoidable—firstly, pleasure, a most mighty lure to evil; next, pains, which put good to rout; and besides these, rashness and fear, foolish counsellors both and anger, hard to dissuade; and hope, ready to seduce. And blending these with irrational sensation and with all-daring lust, they thus compounded in necessary fashion the mortal kind of soul. Wherefore, since they scrupled to pollute the divine, unless through absolute necessity
4. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2.5, 2.8-2.9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

5. Cicero, On Fate, 41 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.23. Or were these beauties designed for the sake of men, as your school usually maintains? For the sake of wise men? If so, all this vast effort of construction took place on account of a handful of people. For the sake of fools then? But in the first place there was no reason for god to do a service to the wicked and secondly, what good did he do? inasmuch as all fools are beyond question extremely miserable, precisely because they are fools (for what can be mentioned more miserable than folly?), and in the second place because there are so many troubles in life that, though wise men can assuage them by balancing against them life's advantages, fools can neither avoid their approach nor endure their presence. Those on the other hand who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wisdom, failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living being could conceivably possess. I will touch on this a little later;
7. Cicero, On Duties, 3.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.16. Itaque iis omnes, in quibus est virtutis indoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius aut Aristides iustus nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc iustitiae tamquam a sapiente petitur exemplum; nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem volumus intellegi, nec ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientium. 3.16.  Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a natural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios are mentioned as "brave men" or Fabricius is called "the just," it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of courage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one of them the ideal "wise man." For no one of them was wise in the sense in which we wish to have "wise" understood; neither were Marcus Cato and Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed "the wise." Not even the famous Seven were "wise." But because of their constant observance of "mean" duties they bore a certain semblance and likeness to wise men.
8. Cicero, Republic, 3.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.7. fuisse sapientiam, tamen hoc in ratione utriusque generis interfuit, quod illi verbis et artibus aluerunt naturae principia, hi autem institutis et legibus. Pluris vero haec tulit una civitas, si minus sapientis, quoniam id nomen illi tam restricte tenent, at certe summa laude dignos, quoniam sapientium praecepta et inventa coluerunt. Atque etiam, quot et sunt laudandae civitates et fuerunt, quoniam id est in rerum natura longe maximi consilii, constituere eam rem publicam, quae possit esse diuturna, si singulos numeremus in singulas, quanta iam reperiatur virorum excellentium multitudo! Quodsi aut Italiae Latium aut eiusdem Sabinam aut Volscam gentem, si Samnium, si Etruriam, si magnam illam Graeciam conlustrare animo voluerimus, si deinde Assyrios, si Persas, si Poenos, si haec
9. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.6.11, 4.6.13, 4.12-4.13, 4.16-4.21, 4.72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4.12. laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta inlecta s iniecta X et sqq. cf. Barlaami eth. sec. Stoicos 2, 11 qui hinc haud pauca adsumpsit. inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura natura s V rec naturae X (-re K) enim omnes ea, Stoic. fr. 3, 438 quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est speciei est H speci est KR ( add. c ) speciest GV cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin BO gL AHClN KR bo gL HC in G bo ga HCin V appellant, nos appellemus appellemus We. appellamus X (apell G) cf. v. 26, fin. 3, 20 voluntatem, eam eam iam V illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante adversante Po. ( cf. p.368, 6; 326, 3; St. fr. 3, 462 a)peiqw=s tw=| lo/gw| w)qou/menon e)pi\ plei=on adversa X (d del. H 1 ) a ratione aversa Or. incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. 4.13. itemque cum ita ita om. H movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. nam cum ratione curatione K 1 (ũ 2 ) animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem iiter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. quoniamque, quoniam quae X praeter K 1 (quae del. V rec ) ut bona natura adpetimus, app. KR 2? (H 367, 24) sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio si cum del. Bentl. ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, appellatur K 1 V rec s eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente; quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur metus; est igitur metus a a Gr.(?) s om. X ratione aversa cautio. cautio Cic. dicere debebat: declinatio 4.16. Sed singulis in singulis G ( exp. 2 ) perturbationibus partes eiusdem generis plures subiciuntur, ut aegritudini invidentia— utendum est enim docendi dicendi V 1 causa verbo minus usitato, quoniam invidia non in eo qui invidet solum dicitur, sed etiam in eo cui invidetur ut... 369, 3 invidetur Non. 443, 19 —, aemulatio, obtrectatio, misericordia, angor, luctus, maeror, aerumna, dolor, lamentatio, sollicitudo, molestia, adflictatio, adflectatio K 1 R 1 desperatio, et si quae sunt de genere eodem. sub metum autem subiecta sunt pigritia, pudor, terror, timor, pavor, exanimatio, examinatio GK 1 conturbatio, formido, voluptati voluptatis X -ti s vol uptatis V ( ss. rec ) malivolentia... 9 similia Non. 16, 24 s. l. lactare ( sed in textu laetans) malev. hic 370, 21 et 395, 6 X maliv. hic Non. ( 370, 21 R 2 ) malivolentia laetans laetari H malo alieno, laet. m. al. addit C., ut appareat cur mal. voluptati subiciatur delectatio, iactatio et similia, lubidini libidinis V rec inimicitiae Non. ira, excandescentia, odium, inimicitia, discordia, ludisne ira... inimicitiae discordia Non. 103, 12 indigentia, desiderium et cetera eius modi. Haec St. fr. 3, 415. 410. 403. 398 cf. om- nino fr. 391–416, quae graecas harum definitionum formas exhibent. autem definiunt hoc modo: invidentiam esse dicunt aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti. 4.17. (nam si qui qui quid K 1 (d eras. ) RH doleat eius rebus secundis a quo ipse laedatur, non recte dicatur invidere, ut si Hectori haectori X (ut ... Agamemno om. H) Agamemno; qui autem, cui alterius commoda comoda GRV 1 nihil noceant, tamen eum doleat is frui, is frui is R rec s frui se GR 1 V (se exp. rec ) K 2 fuisse K 1 invideat profecto.) aemulatio autem dupliciter illa quidem dicitur, ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit; nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur— sed ea nihil hoc loco utimur; est enim laudis—, et et om. G est aemulatio aegritudo, est aegritudo aemulatio G 1 si eo eo ea H quod concupierit alius potiatur, ipse careat. obtrectatio autem est, ea quam intellegi zhlotupi/an zelotypian GRV (n ut sequens u in r. ) H (i pro y) zelo t ypiam K volo, aegritudo ex eo, quod alter quoque potiatur eo quod ipse concupiverit. 4.18. misericordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria iniuria K laborantis (nemo enim parricidae patricidae G 1 V aut proditoris supplicio subpl. KH misericordia commovetur); angor aegritudo premens, luctus aegritudo ex eius qui carus fuerit interitu acerbo, maeror aegritudo flebilis, aerumna aegritudo laboriosa, dolor aegritudo crucians, lamentatio aegritudo cum eiulatu, sollicitudo aegritudo cum cogitatione, molestia aegritudo permanens, adflictatio adflictio V (G 1 in lemmate mg. ) aegritudo cum vexatione corporis, desperatio aegritudo sine ulla rerum expectatione meliorum. Quae autem subiecta sunt sub metum, ea sic definiunt: pigritiam metum consequentis laboris,. 4.19. . . terrorem metum pudorem metum dedecoris add. Sey. ( ai)sxu/nh fo/bos a)doci/as pudorem metum sanguinem diffundentem Bai. ( cf. Gell. 19, 6 ); quae coniungenda videntur : pudorem metum dedecoris sanguinem diffundentem concutientem, ex quo fit ut pudorem rubor, terrorem pallor et tremor et dentium crepitus consequatur, laboris; Terrorem metum mali adp. K 1 Terrorem in Timorem corr. et verba terrorem ... 15 consequatur in mg. add. K 2 timorem metum metu mientem V ( add. rec ) metu mentem GKRH mali adpropinquantis, pavorem metum mali... 16 metum add. G 2 in mg. mentem loco loquo K 1 moventem, ex quo illud Ennius: ennius X enni V rec M s (et We. coll. nat. deor. 2, 60 fat. 35 off. 2, 89 al. ) Enn. Alcm. 23 tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi omne mmihi ( vel mihi omnem) exanimato expectorat fere de orat. 3, 154. 218 Non. 16, 7. omnem mihi ex anima expectaret X (expectorat K 2 expectoret B ex- pelleret V rec ) exanimato expectorat ex ... 18 expectorat om. H, exanimationem metum subsequentem et quasi comitem pavoris, conturbationem metum excutientem cogitata, formidinem metum permanentem. 4.20. Voluptatis autem partes hoc modo describunt, descr. cf. 366, 18 describit K 1 ut malevolentia sit voluptas ex malo alterius sine emolumento suo, delectatio declaratio K 1 voluptas suavitate auditus animum deleniens; et qualis est haec aurium, tales sunt oculorum et tactionum sunt toculorum et actionum Non. L 1 sunt et ocul. B adorationum K 1 et odorationum et saporum, qualis haec ... 3 saporum Non. 227, 9 quae sunt omnes unius generis ad perfundendum animum tamquam inliquefactae voluptates. iactatio est voluptas gestiens et se efferens insolentius. 4.21. Quae autem libidini subiecta sunt, ea sic definiuntur, ut ira sit libido poeniendi poen. ex pen. V 2 pun. HV rec eius qui videatur laesisse iniuria, excandescentia autem sit ira nascens et modo modo W ( o)rgh\ e)narxome/nh ) sine modo Non. existens, excandescentia... 9 existens Non. 103, 14 desistens V 3 quae qu/mwsis Graece dicitur, odium Qg M w ClC fere X ira inveterata, inimicitia ira ulciscendi tempus observans, discordia ira acerbior intimo animo animo Lb. ( cf. Th. 1. 1. 4, 940 ) odio et corde concepta, indigentia Idigentia K 1 libido inexplebilis, desiderium libido eius, qui nondum adsit, videndi. distinguunt distingunt X illud etiam, ut libido sit earum rerum, quae dicuntur de quodam aut quibusdam, quae kathgorh/mata K a TH G opphm a T L fere X dialectici appellant, ut habere divitias, capere honores, indigentia diligentia X indigentia s V 3 quod verum videtur, etsi Cic. non bene expressit spa/nin duplici sensu adhiberi ( de re cf. St. fr. 3, 91 rerum ipsarum sit, sit Man. est ( def. Küh. ) ut honorum, ut St. fr. 3, 379 pecuniae. ut pec. et pec. H 4.72. Stoici vero et sapientem amaturum esse St. fr. 3, 652 dicunt et amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt. qui si qui si quin V quis est in rerum natura sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio, sine cura, sine suspirio, sit sane; vacat enim omni libidine; haec autem de libidine oratio est. sin autem est aliquis amor, ut est certe, qui nihil absit aut non multum ab insania, qualis in Leucadia est: si quidem sit quisquam Turpil. 115 deus, cui cuii Ribb. ad V ego sim curae —
10. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, 2-6, 1 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

11. Philo of Alexandria, On Husbandry, 118 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)

118. For when two opposite opinions are established concerning any one thing, whether it be person or action, it follows of necessity that one or other of them must be wrong, and the other right, for it is impossible for them both to be right: which is the two, then, will you praise deservedly? Will you not say that that sentence is right which orders those who begin acts of violence to be punished? You would justly blame the contrary law, which commands such persons to be honoured; that nothing sacred may be blamed, every such thing must be altogether glorious. XXVII.
12. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 2.17 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)

13. Epictetus, Discourses, 2.1.1-2.1.7, 3.23.34, 3.23.37 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

14. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 8.4-8.6, 10.1-10.22 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

8.4. Therefore concerning the eating of things sacrificed to idols, we knowthat no idol is anything in the world, and that there is no other Godbut one. 8.5. For though there are things that are called "gods,"whether in the heavens or on earth; as there are many "gods" and many"lords; 8.6. yet to us there is one God, the Father, of whom are allthings, and we for him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom areall things, and we live through him. 10.1. Now I would not have you ignorant, brothers, that our fatherswere all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; 10.2. andwere all baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea; 10.3. andall ate the same spiritual food; 10.4. and all drank the samespiritual drink. For they drank of a spiritual rock that followed them,and the rock was Christ. 10.5. However with most of them, God was notwell pleased, for they were overthrown in the wilderness. 10.6. Nowthese things were our examples, to the intent we should not lust afterevil things, as they also lusted. 10.7. Neither be idolaters, as someof them were. As it is written, "The people sat down to eat and drink,and rose up to play. 10.8. Neither let us commit sexual immorality,as some of them committed, and in one day twenty-three thousand fell. 10.9. Neither let us test the Lord, as some of them tested, andperished by the serpents. 10.10. Neither grumble, as some of them alsogrumbled, and perished by the destroyer. 10.11. Now all these thingshappened to them by way of example, and they were written for ouradmonition, on whom the ends of the ages have come. 10.12. Thereforelet him who thinks he stands be careful that he doesn't fall. 10.13. No temptation has taken you but such as man can bear. God isfaithful, who will not allow you to be tempted above what you are able,but will with the temptation also make the way of escape, that you maybe able to endure it. 10.14. Therefore, my beloved, flee fromidolatry. 10.15. I speak as to wise men. Judge what I say. 10.16. Thecup of blessing which we bless, isn't it a communion of the blood ofChrist? The bread which we break, isn't it a communion of the body ofChrist? 10.17. Because we, who are many, are one bread, one body; forwe all partake of the one bread. 10.18. Consider Israel after theflesh. Don't those who eat the sacrifices have communion with the altar? 10.19. What am I saying then? That a thing sacrificed to idols isanything, or that an idol is anything? 10.20. But I say that thethings which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons, and notto God, and I don't desire that you would have communion with demons. 10.21. You can't both drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons.You can't both partake of the table of the Lord, and of the table ofdemons. 10.22. Or do we provoke the Lord to jealousy? Are we strongerthan he?
15. New Testament, John, 12.27 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

12.27. Now my soul is troubled. What shall I say? 'Father, save me from this time?' But for this cause I came to this time.
16. New Testament, Matthew, 26.37 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

26.37. He took with him Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, and began to be sorrowful and severely troubled.
17. Plutarch, Alcibiades, 4.1-4.2, 6.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

4.1. It was not long before many men of high birth clustered about him and paid him their attentions. Most of them were plainly smitten with his brilliant youthful beauty and fondly courted him. But it was the love which Socrates had for him that bore strong testimony to the boy’s native excellence and good parts. These Socrates saw radiantly manifest in his outward person, and, fearful of the influence upon him of wealth and rank and the throng of citizens, foreigners and allies who sought to preempt his affections by flattery and favour, he was fain to protect him, and not suffer such a fair flowering plant to cast its native fruit to perdition. 4.2. For there is no man whom Fortune so envelops and compasses about with the so-called good things of life that he cannot be reached by the bold and caustic reasonings of philosophy, and pierced to the heart. And so it was that Alcibiades, although he was pampered from the very first, and was prevented by the companions who sought only to please him from giving ear to one who would instruct and train him, nevertheless, through the goodness of his parts, at last saw all that was in Socrates, and clave to him, putting away his rich and famous lovers. 6.1. But the love of Socrates, though it had many powerful rivals, somehow mastered Alcibiades. For he was of good natural parts, and the words of his teacher took hold of him and wrung his heart and brought tears to his eyes. But sometimes he would surrender himself to the flatterers who tempted him with many pleasures, and slip away from Socrates, and suffer himself to be actually hunted down by him like a runaway slave. And yet he feared and reverenced Socrates alone, and despised the rest of his lovers.
18. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

19. Plutarch, On Tranquility of Mind, 476 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

20. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.10.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

21. Seneca The Younger, On Leisure, 2.3, 8.3, 15.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

22. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 59.2, 116.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

23. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2.20, 6.9 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

24. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.5.4, 4.6.5-4.6.6 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

25. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 9.211 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

26. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.15, 7.46, 7.96, 7.110-7.115, 7.117-7.120, 7.129 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.15. After Zeno's death Antigonus is reported to have said, What an audience I have lost. Hence too he employed Thraso as his agent to request the Athenians to bury Zeno in the Ceramicus. And when asked why he admired him, Because, said he, the many ample gifts I offered him never made him conceited nor yet appear poor-spirited.His bent was towards inquiry, and he was an exact reasoner on all subjects. Hence the words of Timon in his Silli:A Phoenician too I saw, a pampered old woman ensconced in gloomy pride, longing for all things; but the meshes of her subtle web have perished, and she had no more intelligence than a banjo. 7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 7.96. Similarly of things evil some are mental evils, namely, vices and vicious actions; others are outward evils, as to have a foolish country or a foolish friend and the unhappiness of such; other evils again are neither mental nor outward, e.g. to be yourself bad and unhappy.Again, goods are either of the nature of ends or they are the means to these ends, or they are at the same time end and means. A friend and the advantages derived from him are means to good, whereas confidence, high-spirit, liberty, delight, gladness, freedom from pain, and every virtuous act are of the nature of ends. 7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure. 7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 7.112. Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole.Fear is an expectation of evil. Under fear are ranged the following emotions: terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony. Terror is a fear which produces fright; shame is fear of disgrace; nervous shrinking is a fear that one will have to act; consternation is fear due to a presentation of some unusual occurrence; 7.113. panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty. 7.114. Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines:Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.Resentment is anger in an early stage.Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another's ills. Delight is the mind's propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue. 7.115. And as there are said to be certain infirmities in the body, as for instance gout and arthritic disorders, so too there is in the soul love of fame, love of pleasure, and the like. By infirmity is meant disease accompanied by weakness; and by disease is meant a fond imagining of something that seems desirable. And as in the body there are tendencies to certain maladies such as colds and diarrhoea, so it is with the soul, there are tendencies like enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and the like. 7.117. Now they say that the wise man is passionless, because he is not prone to fall into such infirmity. But they add that in another sense the term apathy is applied to the bad man, when, that is, it means that he is callous and relentless. Further, the wise man is said to be free from vanity; for he is indifferent to good or evil report. However, he is not alone in this, there being another who is also free from vanity, he who is ranged among the rash, and that is the bad man. Again, they tell us that all good men are austere or harsh, because they neither have dealings with pleasure themselves nor tolerate those who have. The term harsh is applied, however, to others as well, and in much the same sense as a wine is said to be harsh when it is employed medicinally and not for drinking at all. 7.118. Again, the good are genuinely in earnest and vigilant for their own improvement, using a manner of life which banishes evil out of sight and makes what good there is in things appear. At the same time they are free from pretence; for they have stripped off all pretence or make-up whether in voice or in look. Free too are they from all business cares, declining to do anything which conflicts with duty. They will take wine, but not get drunk. Nay more, they will not be liable to madness either; not but what there will at times occur to the good man strange impressions due to melancholy or delirium, ideas not determined by the principle of what is choiceworthy but contrary to nature. Nor indeed will the wise man ever feel grief; seeing that grief is irrational contraction of the soul, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics. 7.119. They are also, it is declared, godlike; for they have a something divine within them; whereas the bad man is godless. And yet of this word – godless or ungodly – there are two senses, one in which it is the opposite of the term godly, the other denoting the man who ignores the divine altogether: in this latter sense, as they note, the term does not apply to every bad man. The good, it is added, are also worshippers of God; for they have acquaintance with the rites of the gods, and piety is the knowledge of how to serve the gods. Further, they will sacrifice to the gods and they keep themselves pure; for they avoid all acts that are offences against the gods, and the gods think highly of them: for they are holy and just in what concerns the gods. The wise too are the only priests; for they have made sacrifices their study, as also establishing holy places, purifications, and all the other matters appertaining to the gods. 7.120. The Stoics approve also of honouring parents and brothers in the second place next after the gods. They further maintain that parental affection for children is natural to the good, but not to the bad. It is one of their tenets that sins are all equal: so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and he who is only one furlong away are equally not in Canopus, and so too he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the less are equally not in the path of right conduct. 7.129. Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations. Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countece show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics.
27. Nag Hammadi, The Tripartite Tractate, 77.11-77.25 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

28. Jerome, Letters, 133.3 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

29. Jerome, Letters, 133.3 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

30. Jerome, Letters, 133.3 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

31. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None

32. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None

33. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.378, 3.389, 3.391, 3.413, 3.431-3.432, 3.438



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
action-tendency,of fear Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180
advantage (sumpheron,utilitas) Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 170
aeons Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95, 96
antipater Amendola (2022), The Demades Papyrus (P.Berol. inv. 13045): A New Text with Commentary, 404
apatheia,freedom from,eradication of,emotion (; some emotions for stoics compatible with apatheia,esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
apatheia (impassivity) Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
apathy Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 89
appraisal,of fear Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180, 181
appraisal Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 76
aristotle Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 290
assent Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 76
attention Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
awakening Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
bailey,c. Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 212
becker,lawrence Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
brutishness Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
causes,as bodies Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
causes,causal determinism Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
causes,of assent Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
causes,of impulses Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
caution (eulabeia),stoic eupatheia Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
change (metabolē) to wisdom Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 81, 89
cherishing Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
chrysippus,on moral development Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
chrysippus,stoic (already in antiquity,views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus),eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement,not disobedient to reason and not unstable Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
cicero,and law of nature Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 23
cicero,on erotic love Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
cicero,on species-level classification Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
cicero,on wise man Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 23
clement of alexandria,platonism and stoicism in,,good emotions of stoics Ayres and Ward (2021), The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual, 140
clement of alexandria,platonism and stoicism in,,love commandment and Ayres and Ward (2021), The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual, 140
clement of alexandria,platonism and stoicism in Ayres and Ward (2021), The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual, 140
cognition,and emotion Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 76
cognitive aspect Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
cognitive theory Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95, 96
compared to platos turn to the divine,goes unnoticed Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 81, 89
confidence,and moral shame Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
confidence,in plato Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
confidence,terminology of Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
conversion,experience Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
conversion,moral Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
conversion,philosophical Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
cooper,john Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
de falco,vittorio v Amendola (2022), The Demades Papyrus (P.Berol. inv. 13045): A New Text with Commentary, 404
democracy,democritus and Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 212
democritus,importance and reputation Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 212
democritus,political and social thought Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 212
democritus Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 212
determinism Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
dinarchus of corinth (politician) Amendola (2022), The Demades Papyrus (P.Berol. inv. 13045): A New Text with Commentary, 404
distress,characteristics of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107
distress,definition of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107
distress,in greco-roman sources Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107, 109
distress,object of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107
distress,subcategories of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 109
distress Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107, 109
eagerness (prothumia) Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
emotion,ancient philosophical theory of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 76
emotion,ancient rhetorical theory of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 88
emotion,categorisation of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 76
emotional repertoire Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180, 181
emotions,as contumacious Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
emotions,classified by species Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
emotions,examples of Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
emotions,identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
emotions,modern theories Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
emotions,toward integral objects Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
emotions/passions (πάθη),good emotions (εὐπάθειαι) Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
emotions/passions (πάθη),stoics on Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
emotions/passions (πάθη),will (βούλησις) as a good emotion Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
emotions Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 89
emotions (πάθη) (stoic) Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 215
emotions [ passions Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95, 96
end (telos),as good flow of life Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 89
epictetus,on moral shame Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
eunoia (good intent),as eupathic response Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
eupatheia/eupatheiai Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 76, 88, 180, 181
eupatheiai,classified by species Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
eupatheiai,equanimous states,aspasmos,agapēsis are eupatheiai in stoics Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
eupatheiai,equanimous states,distinguished from emotion (pathos) by being true judgements,not disobedient to reason and not unstable Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
eupatheiai,equanimous states,eulabeia (caution) Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
eupatheiai,equanimous states,euphrosunē (a kind of joy) Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
eupatheiai,equanimous states,euthumia (cheerfulness) Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
eupatheiai,equanimous states,khara (joy) Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
eupatheiai,include erotic love Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
eupatheiai (εὐπάθειαι) good feelings (stoic term) Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 215
euphrosunē,a kind of joy Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
euthumia,cheerfulness,tranquillity Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
external goods Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 290
father,the Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95, 96
fear,and goods Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 181
fear,characteristics of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180
fear,contextualisation of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 181
fear,definition of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180
fear,in greco-roman sources Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180, 181
fear,object of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180, 181
fear,subcategories of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180, 181
fear Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180, 181; Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 215
figures of speech,rhetorical question Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 290
free/freedom (ἐλεύθερος/ἐλευθερία,liber/libertas),as following reason Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
galen,accuses stoics of indeterminism Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
genus-level classification Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
gnostics and gnosticism,clement of alexandria on Ayres and Ward (2021), The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual, 140
goals,personal Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180, 181
good (moral,stoic) Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 215
good emotions Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 290
good intent (eunoia),as eupathic response Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
good passions (eupatheiai),accepting passively (eulabeia) Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 89
good passions (eupatheiai),contributing actively (boulēsis) Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 89
good passions (eupatheiai),feeling joy (chara,lat.,gaudium) Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 89
good passions (eupatheiai) Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 89
good spirits,as eupathic response Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
goods,benefit Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107
goodwill,as eupathic response Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
guthrie,w. k. c. Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 212
harm Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107, 180, 181
heraclitus,contrasted with democritus Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 212
impression Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 88
impressions Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
impulse Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 76
inwood,brad Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
irwin,t. Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 212
jealousy Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
jerome,on apatheia Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
jesus [ christ,savior,and son Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95
joy,definition of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107
joy,in greco-roman sources Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107, 109
joy,subcatergories of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 109
joy Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107, 109
joy (khara,latin gaudium),stoic eupatheia Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
kamtekar,rachana Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
law of nature,and wise man Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 23
love,agapēsis and aspasmos are kinds of eupatheia in stoics Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
love,erotic or sexual,eupathic Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232, 254
love,erotic or sexual,ordinary Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
love commandment,clement of alexandria on Ayres and Ward (2021), The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual, 140
material humans/powers Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 96
matter (material substance/existence) Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95
mosaic law,for ordinary people Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 23
movement [ primus motus Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95
musonius rufus Ayres and Ward (2021), The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual, 140; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
nature,contrary to Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 181
object,typical Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 181
object Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 88
opinion Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107
origen,platonism in Ayres and Ward (2021), The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual, 140
origen Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95
origen and Ayres and Ward (2021), The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual, 140
passion,four primary stoic Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 88
passion,irrationality of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107, 180
passions,cardinal (four) Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 290
passions (pathē) Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 170
passions [ emotions Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95, 96
pathos/path?,and rhetorical style Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 88
pathos/path? Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 88
philo of alexandria Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 81
pity Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
plato,on confidence Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
plato Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 23
pleasure Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 290; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 107
pleroma Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95, 96
pneumatic humans/powers Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 96
power Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 181
prodicus Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 290
propatheiai (προπάθειαι) (stoic technical term) Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 215
proper functions Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 181
rational Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
reaching (orexis) Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
reason Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 76
related fabulously about,unaware of his wisdom' Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 81
related fabulously about,unaware of his wisdom Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 89
rensberger,david Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 215
responsibility,moral,for actions and emotions Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
rhetoric Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 290
rhetorical criticism,failure of stoic rhetorical theory Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 88
ruaro,enrica Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 254
sage,in apathy Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 89
schulthess,friedrich Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 215
sicknesses (nosemata),conflated with pathe Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
slavery Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 170
socrates,democritus compared with Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 212
socratic Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
son [ jesus,christ,and savior Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 96
soul,movement of Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180
soul Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
stoic sage Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
stoicism Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95, 96
stoics/stoicism,and law of nature Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 23
stoics/stoicism,and the sage Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 23
stoics/stoicism,on emotions/passions (πάθη) Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
stoics/stoicism,on god/zeus Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
stoics/stoicism,on virtue (ἀρετή) Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
stoics/stoicism,on will (βούλησις) Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
sympathy Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 89
valentinian/valentinians Linjamaa (2019), The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics, 95
value (axia) Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 170
vice Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 170
virtue Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 181
virtue (ἀρετή,virtus),stoics on Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
voelke,andré-jean Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
way of life Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
welcoming Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
will,will (boulēsis) as a eupatheia Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 48
will Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 215
will (βούλησις,voluntas),stoics on Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
wine Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 176
wise man,and law of nature Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 23
wise man,and stoics Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 23
wish,rational (βούλησις) Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36
zeller,eduard Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 212
zeus Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 36