Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

4479

Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 5.49

nan

Epitomes of Aristotle's work on Animals, six books.Two books of Refutative Arguments.Theses, three books.Of Kingship, two books.Of Causes, one book.On Democritus, one book.[Of Calumny, one book.]Of Becoming, one book.Of the Intelligence and Character of Animals, one book.On Motion, two books.On Vision, four books.Relating to Definitions, two books.On Data, one book.On Greater and Less, one book.On the Musicians, one book.Of the Happiness of the Gods, one book.A Reply to the Academics, one book.Exhortation to Philosophy, one book.How States can best be governed, one book.Lecture-Notes, one book.On the Eruption in Sicily, one book.On Things generally admitted, one book.[On Problems in Physics, one book.]What are the methods of attaining Knowledge, one book.On the Fallacy known as the Liar, three books.

Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

16 results

1. Democritus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Aristotle, Soul, 1.1 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Aristotle, Parts of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

5. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

6. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

7. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2.8 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

8. Straton Comicus, Fragments, 74 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

9. Straton of Lampsacus, Fragments, 74 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

10. Cicero, De Finibus, 4.18, 5.38, 5.48, 5.57-5.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4.18. Again, from the elements given by nature arose certain lofty excellences, springing partly from the contemplation of the secrets of nature, since the mind possessed an innate love of knowledge, whence also resulted the passion for argument and for discussion; and also, since man is the only animal endowed with a sense of modesty and shame, with a desire for intercourse and society with his fellows, and with a scrupulous care in all his words and actions to avoid any conduct that is not honourable and seemly, from these beginnings or germs, as I called them before, of nature's bestowal, were developed Temperance, Self-control, Justice and moral virtue generally in full flower and perfection. 5.38. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâvolitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. 5.48. "Let us consider the parts of the mind, which are of nobler aspect. The loftier these are, the more unmistakable indications of nature do they afford. So great is our innate love of learning and of knowledge, that no one can doubt that man's nature is strongly attracted to these things even without the lure of any profit. Do we notice how children cannot be deterred even by punishment from studying and inquiry into the world around them? Drive them away, and back they come. They delight in knowing things; they are eager to impart their knowledge to others; pageants, games and shows of that sort hold them spell-bound, and they will even endure hunger and thirst so as to be able to see them. Again, take persons who delight in the liberal arts and studies; do we not see them careless of health or business, patiently enduring any inconvenience when under the spell of learning and of science, and repaid for endless toil and trouble by the pleasure they derive from acquiring knowledge? 5.57. Hence the abler and more accomplished a man is, the less he would care to be alive at all if debarred from taking part in affairs, although allowed to batten on the most exquisite pleasures. Men of ability either choose a life of private activity, or, if of loftier ambition, aspire to a public career of political or military office, or else they devote themselves entirely to study and learning; and the devotees of learning are so far from making pleasure their aim, that they actually endure care, anxiety and loss of sleep, in the exercise of the noblest part of man's nature, the divine element within us (for so we must consider the keen edge of the intellect and the reason), they ask for no pleasure and avoid no toil; they are ceaselessly occupied in marvelling at the discoveries of the ancients or in pursuing new researches of their own; insatiable in their appetite for study, they forget all else besides, and harbour not one base or mean thought. So potent is the spell of these pursuits, that even those who profess to follow other Ends of Goods, defined by utility or pleasure, may yet be seen to spend their whole lives in investigating and unfolding the processes of nature. 5.58. "It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities vary in kind, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Courage and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consot therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature's own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. 'Happy the man,' Plato well says, 'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.' Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later.

11. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 4.18, 5.38, 5.48, 5.57-5.58, 5.74 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4.18. Principiis autem a natura datis amplitudines quaedam bonorum excitabantur partim profectae a contemplatione rerum occultiorum, occultorum R quod erat insitus menti cognitionis amor, e quo etiam rationis explicandae disserendique cupiditas consequebatur; quodque hoc solum animal natum est pudoris ac verecundiae particeps appetensque coniunctionum coniunctionum RNV coniunctium (coniunct iu pro coniunct iu m = coniunctionum) BE hominum ad ad R et B ac ENV societatem societatem R societatum BENV cf. III 66 inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus et p. 128, 15 sq., ubi de cognitione rerum respicit ad p. 127,23 (erat insitus menti cognitionis amor) et de coniunctione generis humani ad p. 127, 26 sq. (coniunctionum hominum ad societatem) animadvertensque in omnibus rebus, quas ageret aut aut RN 2 ut BEN 1 V diceret, ut ne quid ab eo fieret nisi honeste ac ac BER et NV decore, his initiis, ut ante dixi, et et V om. BERN ( ad initiis, ut ante dixi, et seminibus cf. p. 127, 14 et 9 ) seminibus a natura datis temperantia, modestia, iustitia et omnis honestas perfecte absoluta est. 5.38. Quibus expositis facilis est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris, quae plurimum habent habent habeant Ern. dignitatis, ut optimae cuiusque partis, quae per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maxime. ita fiet, ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie virtutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius. etenim omnium rerum, quas et creat natura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt sunt Ern. sint aut sine animo sunt aut om. R non non add. A. Man. multo secus, earum earum edd. eorum summum bonum in corpore est, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. non inscite ... putisceret Non. p. 161 putisceret Non. putresceret sunt autem bestiae quaedam, in quibus inest aliquid aliquod BER simile virtutis, ut in leonibus, ut in canibus, in equis, leonibus ut in canibus in equis BEN 1 leonibus in canibus in equis RV leonibus ut in canibus ut in equis N 2 in quibus non corporum solum, ut in suibus, sed etiam animorum aliqua ex parte motus quosdam videmus. in homine autem summa omnis animi est et in animo rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio definitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam putant. 5.48. Videamus animi partes, quarum est conspectus illustrior; quae quo sunt excelsiores, eo dant clariora indicia naturae. inditia nature N iudicia natura BE iudicia nature RV tantus est igitur innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiae, ut nemo dubitare possit quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur. videmusne ut pueri ne verberibus quidem a contemplandis rebus perquirendisque deterreantur? ut pulsi ut pulsi P. Man. aut pulsi ( etiam B) recurrant? ut aliquid recurrant ut aliquid cod. Morel. recurrentur aliquid R recurrant aliquid BEV recurrerentur aliquid ( ut vid. ) N 1 recurrerent et aliquid N 2 scire se scire se etiam R gaudeant? ut id aliis narrare gestiant? ut pompa, ludis atque eius modi spectaculis teneantur ob eamque rem vel famem et sitim perferant? quid vero? qui ingenuis ingeniis BER studiis atque artibus delectantur, nonne videmus eos nec valitudinis nec rei familiaris habere rationem omniaque perpeti ipsa cognitione et scientia captos et cum maximis curis et laboribus compensare eam, quam ex discendo capiant, voluptatem? 5.57. itaque ut quisque optime natus institutusque est, esse omnino nolit in vita, si gerendis gerendis gerundis Non. negotiis orbatus possit possit orbatus Non. paratissimis vesci voluptatibus. si gerendis ... voluptatibus Non. p. 416 nam aut privatim aliquid gerere malunt aut, qui altiore animo sunt, capessunt rem publicam honoribus imperiisque adipiscendis aut totos se ad studia doctrinae conferunt. qua in vita tantum abest ut voluptates consectentur, etiam curas, sollicitudines, vigilias perferunt optimaque parte hominis, quae in nobis divina ducenda est, ingenii et mentis acie fruuntur nec voluptatem requirentes nec fugientes laborem. nec vero intermittunt aut admirationem earum rerum, quae sunt ab antiquis repertae, aut investigationem novarum. quo studio cum satiari non possint, possint Ern. possunt omnium ceterarum rerum obliti nihil abiectum, nihil humile cogitant; tantaque est vis talibus in studiis, ut eos etiam, qui sibi alios proposuerunt fines bonorum, quos utilitate aut voluptate dirigunt, tamen in rebus quaerendis explicandisque naturis aetates conterere videamus. 5.58. Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam minora maioribus, minora maioribus maioribus minoribus BE maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis, quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque cognitioque N cognitione rerum caelestium et earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes latentes iacentes R indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum scientia, tum sciendi que (ēdi que ab alt. m. in ras. ) N prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta fortis, iusta Mdv. forti si iusta B E fortis. Si iusta R fortis et iusta (& in N ab alt. m. in ras. ) NV ratio reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeeunte deducimur. omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas teneritas NV Non. temeritas BER ac mollitia mollitia BE Non. mollities RN mollicies V quaedam, in primo ... moll. quaedam Non. p. 495 ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint intellegantur. praeclare enim Plato: Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit! Quare, quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus. 5.74. quin etiam ipsi voluptarii deverticula diverticula BENV quaerunt et virtutes habent in ore totos dies voluptatemque primo dumtaxat primo dumtaxat NV prima dum taxat R dumtaxat primo BE expeti dicunt, quaerunt ... habent ... dicunt Lamb. quaerant ... habeant (habent V) ... dicant (' sententiae satisfaceret : quidni, quum etiam ... quaerant ... habeant ... dicant? ut minus hoc in Calliphonte et Diodoro mirum esse significaretur ' Mdv. ) deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici, qua inpulsi multa faciant faciant Bentl., Ernest. ; faciunt nullam quaerentes voluptatem. Stoici restant. ei quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram rem a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam add. Bentl., Davis. transtulerunt; atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. ita relinquitur sola haec disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus. Quae cum dixisset paulumque parumque BE institisset, Quid est?

12. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 121.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

13. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.7.33 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

14. Straton Historicus, Fragments, 74 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

15. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 5.26-5.27, 5.43-5.45, 5.81, 7.86 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

5.26. Prognostics of Storms, one book.Concerning Astronomy, one book.Concerning Optics, one book.On Motion, one book.On Music, one book.Concerning Memory, one book.Six books of Homeric Problems.Poetics, one book.Thirty-eight books of Physics according to the lettering.Two books of Problems which have been examined.Two books of Routine Instruction.Mechanics, one book.Problems taken from the works of Democritus, two books.On the Magnet, one book.Analogies, one book.Miscellaneous Notes, twelve books.Descriptions of Genera, fourteen books.Claims advanced, one book.Victors at Olympia, one book.Victors at the Pythian Games, one book.On Music, one book.Concerning Delphi, one book.Criticism of the List of Pythian Victors, one book.Dramatic Victories at the Dionysia, one book.of Tragedies, one book.Dramatic Records, one book.Proverbs, one book.Laws of the Mess-table, one book.Four books of Laws.Categories, one book.De Interpretatione, one book. 5.27. Constitutions of 158 Cities, in general and in particular, democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic, tyrannical.Letters to Philip.Letters of Selymbrians.Letters to Alexander, four books.Letters to Antipater, nine books.To Mentor, one book.To Ariston, one book.To Olympias, one book.To Hephaestion, one book.To Themistagoras, one book.To Philoxenus, one book.In reply to Democritus, one book.Verses beginning Ἁγνὲ θεῶν πρέσβισθ᾽ ἑκατηβόλε (Holy One and Chiefest of Gods, far-darting).Elegiac verses beginning Καλλιτέκνου μητρὸς θύγατερ (Daughter of a Mother blessed with fair offspring).In all 445,270 lines. 5.43. of Old Age, one book.On the Astronomy of Democritus, one book.On Meteorology, one book.On Visual Images or Emanations, one book.On Flavours, Colours and Flesh, one book.of the Order of the World, one book.of Mankind, one book.Compendium of the Writings of Diogenes, one book.Three books of Definitions.Concerning Love, one book.Another Treatise on Love, one book.of Happiness, one book.On Species or Forms, two books.On Epilepsy, one book.On Frenzy, one book.Concerning Empedocles, one book.Eighteen books of Refutative Arguments.Three books of Polemical Objections.of the Voluntary, one book.Epitome of Plato's Republic, two books.On the Diversity of Sounds uttered by Animals of the same Species, one book.of Sudden Appearances, one book.of Animals which bite or gore, one book.of Animals reputed to be spiteful, one book.of the Animals which are confined to Dry Land, one book. 5.44. of those which change their Colours, one book.of Animals that burrow, one book.of Animals, seven books.of Pleasure according to Aristotle, one book.Another treatise on Pleasure, one book.Theses, twenty-four books.On Hot and Cold, one book.On Vertigo and Di5iness, one book.On Sweating Sickness, one book.On Affirmation and Negation, one book.Callisthenes, or On Bereavement, one book.On Fatigues, one book.On Motion, three books.On Precious Stones, one book.On Pestilences, one book.On Fainting, one book.Megarian Treatise, one book.of Melancholy, one book.On Mines, two books.On Honey, one book.Compendium on the Doctrines of Metrodorus, one book.Two books of Meteorology.On Intoxication, one book.Twenty-four books of Laws distinguished by the letters of the alphabet.Ten books of an Epitome of Laws. 5.45. Remarks upon Definitions, one book.On Smells, one book.On Wine and Oil.Introduction to Propositions, eighteen books.of Legislators, three books.of Politics, six books.A Political Treatise dealing with important Crises, four books.of Social Customs, four books.of the Best Constitution, one book.A Collection of Problems, five books.On Proverbs, one book.On Coagulation and Liquefaction, one book.On Fire, two books.On Winds, one book.of Paralysis, one book.of Suffocation, one book.of Mental Derangement, one book.On the Passions, one book.On Symptoms, one book.Two books of Sophisms.On the solution of Syllogisms, one book.Two books of Topics.of Punishment, two books.On Hair, one book.of Tyranny, one book.On Water, three books.On Sleep and Dreams, one book.of Friendship, three books.of Ambition, two books. 5.81. On the Iliad, two books.On the Odyssey, four books.And the following works, each in one book:Ptolemy.Concerning Love.Phaedondas.Maedon.Cleon.Socrates.Artaxerxes.Concerning Homer.Aristides.Aristomachus.An Exhortation to Philosophy.of the Constitution.On the ten years of his own Supremacy.of the Ionians.Concerning Embassies.of Belief.of Favour.of Fortune.of Magimity.of Marriage.of the Beam in the Sky.of Peace.On Laws.On Customs.of Opportunity.Dionysius.Concerning Chalcis.A Denunciation of the Athenians.On Antiphanes.Historical Introduction.Letters.A Sworn Assembly.of Old Age.Rights.Aesop's Fables.Anecdotes. 7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically.

16. Evagrius Ponticus, Praktikos, 10 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

Subjects of this text:

subject	book bibliographic info
academy	Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 153
analogy,emotion	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
animals	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
anthropocentrism	Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 153
archytas,democritus and	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 232
aristo of ceos,aristotelian	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25
aristotle,catharsis	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25
aristotle,engagement with democritus	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 232
aristotle,history of animals	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 190
aristotle,mean a substantive doctrine	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25
aristotle,metaphysics	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 142
aristotle,nicomachean ethics	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 168
aristotle,physiological basis of emotions	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25
aristotle,protrepticus	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 142
aristotle	Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 153; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 168
autonomy	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 232
biological (scientific) psychology	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
bipartition,of the soul	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
body,contribution of body to emotion and its therapy	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25
catharsis,aristotle's application to drama"	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25, 221
cicero,marcus tullius,on ends	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 142
confidence	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
contemplation (lat. contemplatio = gr. theōria)	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 142, 168
cradle arguments	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 142
democritus,concept of euthumiē	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 232
democritus,evidence and sources	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 232
democritus,on law and autonomy	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 232
democritus	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 232
emotion	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
emotions,per contra,aristotle,galen,emotions cannot be understood without physical basis	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25
envy	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
euthumia/-ē	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 232
fear (fright)	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
good temper	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
happiness (lat. beatitudo = gr. eudaimonia)	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 168
hippocrates	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 221
knowledge	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 142
life (lat. vita = gr. bios),theoretical,intellectual or contemplative	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 168
life (lat. vita = gr. bios)	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 168
love	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
mankind	Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 153
mens = gr. nous (mind or intellect),its god-like character	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 168
mens = gr. nous (mind or intellect)	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 142
moral virtue	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
more and less (difference in degree)	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
nature,cosmic	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 190
nature,individual or peculiar	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 190
oikeiōsis = lat. commendatio or conciliatio,of animals	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 190
oikeiōsis = lat. commendatio or conciliatio,towards theoretical virtue	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 142
olympiodorus,neoplatonist	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 221
piso	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 142, 168
pity	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
plato	Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 153
pride,aristo of ceos on pride	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25, 221
pride,theophrastus on pride	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25, 221
psychology	Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 153
pythagoreans (giving a taste); socrates (similars)	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 221
scala naturae	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
self-awareness	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 190
sensation,faculty of	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
socrates,therapy by similars	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 221
suffering,elimination of	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 232
suffering	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 232
theophrastus,aristotelian	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25, 221
theophrastus	Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 153; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 168
therapy,techniques see esp.	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 221
therapy	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 221
thought,faculty of	Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 183
understanding (lat. scientia = gr. episteme)	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 142
virtue,animal	Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 153
virtue,aristotle,virtue aims at the mean,a substantive doctrine	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 25
xenocrates	Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 153
zeno of citium,stoic,hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)'	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 221