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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4479
Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 4.20


nanHe loved Sophocles, particularly in those passages where it seemed as if, in the phrase of the comic poet,A stout Molossian mastiff lent him aid,and where the poet was, in the words of Phrynichus,Nor must, nor blended vintage, but true Pramnian.Thus he would call Homer the Sophocles of epic, and Sophocles the Homer of tragedyHe died at an advanced age of gradual decay, leaving behind him a considerable number of works. I have composed the following epigram upon him:Dost thou not hear? We have buried Polemo, laid here by that fatal scourge of wasted strength. Yet not Polemo, but merely his body, which on his way to the stars he left to moulder in the ground.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

6 results
1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.34, 4.45, 5.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.34. in his primis naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est. nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valitudinem corporis, non valitudinem corporis om. E non valetudinem ( om. cor- poris) edd. summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam et iam NV etiam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt, quae paulo ante paulo ante § 33 omne enim animal ... asperneturque contraria dixi. ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis. Callipho ad virtutem nihil adiunxit nisi voluptatem, Diodorus vacuitatem doloris. * * Mdv. : ' nonnulla exciderunt, quibus Cicero simili forma atque supra (Polemoni et Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt cet. ) dixerit, quae alii prima posuissent; tum rectissime (quemadmodum ante: ergo nata est cet.) subiciebatur de finibus : his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes (consentanei iis, quae posita sunt prima) sunt fines bonorum. Et fortasse etiam Carneadem et Hieronymum no- minarat, sed hic exempli causa solos Aristippum et Stoicos ponit. ' his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes fines sunt fines sunt etiam A bonorum, Aristippo simplex voluptas, Stoicis Stoicis N 2 stoici consentire naturae, quod esse volunt e virtute, id est honeste, vivere, quod ita interpretantur: vivere cum intellegentia rerum earum, quae natura evenirent, eligentem ea, quae essent secundum naturam, reicientemque reficientemque A 1 BERN contraria. 4.45. sed primum illud vide, gravissimam illam vestram sententiam, quae familiam ducit, honestum quod sit, id esse bonum solum bonum solum BERNV honesteque vivere bonorum finem, communem fore vobis cum omnibus, qui in una virtute constituunt finem bonorum, quodque dicitis, informari non posse virtutem, si quicquam, nisi quod honestum sit, numeretur, idem dicetur ab illis, modo quos modo quos BERNV nominavi. mihi autem aequius videbatur Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia naturae acceperat, acceperat V accederat R ac- cederet BE concederat N a communibus initiis progredientem videre ubi primum insisteret et unde causa controversiae nasceretur, non stantem cum iis, qui ne dicerent quidem sua summa bona esse a a N 2 V om. BERN 1 natura profecta, uti isdem argumentis, quibus illi uterentur, isdemque sententiis. 5.14. praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is is his R quidem in patriis institutis add. Brem. manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic hic his R quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli aristotilis R, N ( fort. corr. ex aristotili), V fuisse et Polemonis docet. 2.34.  Whether the list of these primary natural objects of desire includes pleasure or not is a much debated question; but to hold that it includes nothing else but pleasure, neither the limbs, nor the senses, nor mental activity, nor bodily integrity nor health, seems to me to be the height of stupidity. And this is the fountain-head from which one's whole theory of Goods and Evils must necessarily flow. Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus arose the doctrine of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetics, maintaining that the End of Goods is to live in accordance with Nature, that is, to enjoy the primary gifts of Nature's bestowal with the accompaniment of virtue. Callipho coupled with virtue pleasure alone; Diodorus freedom from pain. . . . In the case of all the philosophers mentioned, their End of Goods logically follows: with Aristippus it is pleasure pure and simple; with the Stoics, harmony with Nature, which they interpret as meaning virtuous or morally good life, and further explain this as meaning to live with an understanding of the natural course of events, selecting things that are in accordance with Nature and rejecting the opposite. 4.45.  But first I would have you observe that the most important of all your doctrines, the head of the array, namely that Moral Worth alone is good and that the moral life is the End of Goods, will be shared with you by all those who make the End of Goods consist of virtue alone; and your view that it is impossible to frame a conception of Virtue if anything beside Moral Worth be counted in it, will also be maintained by the philosophers whom I just now mentioned. To my mind it would have been fairer for Zeno in his dispute with Polemo, whose teaching as to the primary impulses of nature he had adopted, to have started from the fundamental tenets which they held in common, and to have marked the point where he first called a halt and where occasion for divergence arose; not to take his stand with thinkers who did not even profess to hold that the Chief Good, as they severally conceived it, was based on natural instinct, and employ the same arguments and the same doctrines as they did. 5.14.  "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo.
2. Lucian, Hermotimus, Or Sects, 84-86, 47 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

3. Philostratus The Athenian, Life of Apollonius, 1.7 (2nd cent. CE

1.7. ON reaching the age when children are taught their letters, he showed great strength of memory and power of application; and his tongue affected the Attic dialect, nor was his accent corrupted by the race he lived among. All eyes were turned upon him, for he was, moreover, conspicuous for his beauty. When he reached his fourteenth year, his father brought him to Tarsus, to Euthydemus the teacher from Phoenicia. Now Euthydemus was a good rhetor, and began his education; but, though he was attached to his teacher, he found the atmosphere of the city harsh and strange and little conducive to the philosophic life, for nowhere are men more addicted than here to luxury; jesters and full of insolence are they all; and they attend more to their fine linen than the Athenians did to wisdom; and a stream called the Cydnus runs through their city, along the banks of which they sit like so many water-fowl. Hence the words which Apollonius addresses to them in his letter: Be done with getting drunk upon your water. He therefore transferred his teacher, with his father's consent, to the town of Aegae, which was close by, where he found a peace congenial to one who would be a philosopher, and a more serious school of study and a sanctuary of Asclepius, where that god reveals himself in person to men. There he had as his companions in philosophy followers of Plato and Chrysippus and peripatetic philosophers. And he diligently attended also to the discourses of Epicurus, for he did not despise these either, although it was to those of Pythagoras that he applied himself with unspeakable wisdom and ardor. However, his teacher of the Pythagorean system was not a very serious person, nor one who practiced in his conduct the philosophy he taught; for he was the slave of his belly and appetites, and modeled himself upon Epicurus. And this man was Euxenus from the town of Heraclea in Pontus, and he knew the principles of Pythagoras just as birds know what they learn from men; for the birds will wish you farewell, and say Good day or Zeus help you, and such like, without understanding what they say and without any real sympathy for mankind, merely because they have been trained to move their tongue in a certain manner. Apollonius, however, was like the young eagles who, as long as they are not fully fledged, fly alongside of their parents and are trained by them in flight, but who, as soon as they are able to rise in the air, outsoar the parent birds, especially when they perceive the latter to be greedy and to be flying along the ground in order to snuff the quarry; like them Apollonius attended Euxenus as long as he was a child and was guided by him in the path of argument, but when he reached his sixteenth year he indulged his impulse towards the life of Pythagoras, being fledged and winged thereto by some higher power. Notwithstanding he did not cease to love Euxenus, nay, he persuaded his father to present him with a villa outside the town, where there were tender groves and fountains, and he said to him: Now you live there your own life, but I will live that of Pythagoras.
4. Philostratus The Athenian, Lives of The Sophists, 527 (2nd cent. CE

5. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 4.16-4.17, 4.19 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.16. 3. POLEMOPolemo, the son of Philostratus, was an Athenian who belonged to the deme of Oea. In his youth he was so profligate and dissipated that he actually carried about with him money to procure the immediate gratification of his desires, and would even keep sums concealed in lanes and alleys. Even in the Academy a piece of three obols was found close to a pillar, where he had buried it for the same purpose. And one day, by agreement with his young friends, he burst into the school of Xenocrates quite drunk, with a garland on his head. Xenocrates, however, without being at all disturbed, went on with his discourse as before, the subject being temperance. The lad, as he listened, by degrees was taken in the toils. He became so industrious as to surpass all the other scholars, and rose to be himself head of the school in the 116th Olympiad. 4.17. Antigonus of Carystus in his Biographies says that his father was foremost among the citizens and kept horses to compete in the chariot-race; that Polemo himself had been defendant in an action brought by his wife, who charged him with cruelty owing to the irregularities of his life; but that, from the time when he began to study philosophy, he acquired such strength of character as always to maintain the same unruffled calm of demeanour. Nay more, he never lost control of his voice. This in fact accounts for the fascination which he exercised over Crantor. Certain it is that, when a mad dog bit him in the back of his thigh, he did not even turn pale, but remained undisturbed by all the clamour which arose in the city at the news of what had happened. In the theatre too he was singularly unmoved. 4.19. which, as the same author says, is strong seasoning for meat when it is high. Further, he would not, they say, even sit down to deal with the themes of his pupils, but would argue walking up and down. It was, then, for his love of what is noble that he was honoured in the state. Nevertheless would he withdraw from society and confine himself to the Garden of the Academy, while close by his scholars made themselves little huts and lived not far from the shrine of the Muses and the lecture-hall. It would seem that in all respects Polemo emulated Xenocrates. And Aristippus in the fourth book of his work On the Luxury of the Ancients affirms him to have been his favourite. Certainly he always kept his predecessor before his mind and, like him, wore that simple austere dignity which is proper to the Dorian mode.
6. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 20 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
apollonius of tyana Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
aristotle Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 51
cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 51
conversion, philosophical conversion Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
goods, bodily Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 51
goods, external Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 51
inscription Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
lucian Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
nature, first things according to (lat. prima secundum naturam/prima naturae = gr. prōta kata physin) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 51
philostratus Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
plato Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
polemo Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 51
polemo of laodicea Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
school, philosophical schools Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
school, school fees Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
student, terminology Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
student-teacher relationship Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
sufficiency (of virtue for a happy life) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 51
teacher' Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben, Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity (2020) 233
telos Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 51
virtue Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 51