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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4479
Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 3.69


nanAnd the division from the centre to the circumference which is adjusted in harmony with the soul being thus determined, the soul knows that which is, and adjusts it proportionately because she has the elements proportionately disposed in herself. And when the circle of the Other revolves aright, the result is opinion; but from the regular motion of the circle of the Same comes knowledge. He set forth two universal principles, God and matter, and he calls God mind and cause; he held that matter is devoid of form and unlimited, and that composite things arise out of it; and that it was once in disorderly motion but, inasmuch as God preferred order to disorder, was by him brought together in one place.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

16 results
1. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Aristotle, Heavens, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, Academica, 1.24-1.29, 2.118 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.24. De cf. Lact. inst. 7,3,1 natura autem (id enim sequebatur) ita dicebant docebant *g ut eam dividerent in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, eaque ea qua Man. ex qua Turn. ex eaque Mue. ea nominativus efficeretur efficerentur *gr 1 aliquid. in eo quod efficeret vim esse censebant, in eo autem quod efficeretur tantum modo tantum modo om. *d materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur. sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant—dabitis habitis *g enim profecto ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum inauditis.' 1.25. Nos vero inquit Atticus; quin etiam Graecis licebit utare cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient. VA. Bene sane facis; sed enitar ut ut in p 1 Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce eiusce *gx modi verbis ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus ut aliis multis consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. qualitates s cf. Mart. Cap. 5, 510 igitur appellavi quas poio/thtas Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum sed philosophorum, atque id in multis; dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica, suis utuntur. et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium; s. cf. fin. 3, 3 nat. deor. 1, 44 frg. inc. K 10 Hier. in Gal. 3, 26 aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. quod si Graeci faciunt qui in his rebus tot iam saecla versantur, quanto id nobis magis m. n. *d n. maius p p smn concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur. 1.26. 'Tu vero' inquam Varro bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, ut effecisti, ut fecisti s uti f- RKl. sed etiam verborum. VA. Audebimus ergo inquit 'novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. erit *gpx est w —earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes aliae ex his ortae. principes sunt unius modi et simplices; ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes. itaque aer (hoc inde ab hoc rursus deest s hoc om. *d quoque utimur enim enim iam Ha. pro Latino) et et 1 om. *d ignis et aqua et terra prima primae s sunt; ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum quae gignuntur e terra. ergo illa initia et ut e Graeco vertam elementa dicuntur; e quibus aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare singulares *gw eorumque quattuor quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles Arist. cf. AKail diss. phil. Vind. 11, 90 quoddam esse rebatur. 1.27. Sed subiectam putant putant x -at *d -abant *g omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque effecta efficat Turn. sint, quae tota omnia accipere possit possit x -sunt *g -sint *dn omnibusque modis mutari mutari s ? Dav. -re *g*d atque ex omni parte eoque eque *g eamque Chr. etiam interire, non in nihilum sed in suas partes, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat. quae autem moveantur omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 1.28. et cum ita moveatur illa vis quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro citroque introque p in utroque w versetur, et materiam ipsam totam totam ipsam *g penitus commutari putant et illa effici quae appellant qualia; e quibus in in del. Dav. omni natura cohaerente cohaerente *gp m x cohercente *d et continuata cum omnibus suis partibus unum unum om. *d effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla pars materiae mat. par *g sit nullumque corpus. Partis autem esse mundi omnia quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna (nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat); 1.29. quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse esse 2 om. *g mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum quae sunt sint Mue. ei subiectae quasi prudentiam providentiam Lb. quandam procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quae pertineant pertinent r 1 wm ad homines; quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter dum interdum p 1, idem et item p m inter *g*d seriem causarum Pl. * * * quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni, non no num p numquam quidem quidem om. *g eandem fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa et et s ? Lb. haec *g*d ac Ha. necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum. fortunam — — quod multa eff. inopinata nobis ... causarum Lact. inst. 3, 29, 3, cf. ibid. 18 (ign. rerum atque caus.)
4. Philo of Alexandria, On The Posterity of Cain, 3 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

3. For the face is a portion of an animal; but God is a whole, not a part: so that it becomes necessary to invent for him other parts also, a neck, and a chest, and hands, and moreover a belly, feet, and generative organs, and all the rest of the countless number of internal and external faculties.
5. Plutarch, On The Birth of The Spirit In Timaeus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

6. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 1.3.21 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

7. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 8.2-8.3, 9.1-9.2, 10.1, 10.3-10.4, 10.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Athenagoras, Apology Or Embassy For The Christians, 6.2, 10.2, 18.2, 22.4 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.1.10-7.1.11 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.19 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

11. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.229 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

12. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 3.1-3.3, 3.5-3.14, 3.20, 3.24-3.27, 3.33-3.35, 3.37, 3.40-3.42, 3.48-3.50, 3.52, 3.57-3.58, 3.62-3.63, 3.65-3.68, 3.70-3.80, 3.89, 7.156, 9.44, 9.73 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.1. BOOK 3: PLATONPlato was the son of Ariston and a citizen of Athens. His mother was Perictione (or Potone), who traced back her descent to Solon. For Solon had a brother, Dropides; he was the father of Critias, who was the father of Callaeschrus, who was the father of Critias, one of the Thirty, as well as of Glaucon, who was the father of Charmides and Perictione. Thus Plato, the son of this Perictione and Ariston, was in the sixth generation from Solon. And Solon traced his descent to Neleus and Poseidon. His father too is said to be in the direct line from Codrus, the son of Melanthus, and, according to Thrasylus, Codrus and Melanthus also trace their descent from Poseidon. 3.2. Speusippus in the work entitled Plato's Funeral Feast, Clearchus in his Encomium on Plato, and Anaxilaides in his second book On Philosophers, tell us that there was a story at Athens that Ariston made violent love to Perictione, then in her bloom, and failed to win her; and that, when he ceased to offer violence, Apollo appeared to him in a dream, whereupon he left her unmolested until her child was born.Apollodorus in his Chronology fixes the date of Plato's birth in the 88th Olympiad, on the seventh day of the month Thargelion, the same day on which the Delians say that Apollo himself was born. He died, according to Hermippus, at a wedding feast, in the first year of the 108th Olympiad, in his eightyfirst year. 3.3. Neanthes, however, makes him die at the age of eighty-four. He is thus seen to be six years the junior of Isocrates. For Isocrates was born in the archonship of Lysimachus, Plato in that of Ameinias, the year of Pericles' death. He belonged to the deme Collytus, as is stated by Antileon in his second book On Dates. He was born, according to some, in Aegina, in the house of Phidiades, the son of Thales, as Favorinus states in his Miscellaneous History, for his father had been sent along with others to Aegina to settle in the island, but returned to Athens when the Athenians were expelled by the Lacedaemonians, who championed the Aeginetan cause. That Plato acted as choregus at Athens, the cost being defrayed by Dion, is stated by Athenodorus in the eighth book of a work entitled Walks. 3.5. and that he applied himself to painting and wrote poems, first dithyrambs, afterwards lyric poems and tragedies. He had, they say, a weak voice; this is confirmed by Timotheus the Athenian in his book On Lives. It is stated that Socrates in a dream saw a cygnet on his knees, which all at once put forth plumage, and flew away after uttering a loud sweet note. And the next day Plato was introduced as a pupil, and thereupon he recognized in him the swan of his dream.At first he used to study philosophy in the Academy, and afterwards in the garden at Colonus (as Alexander states in his Successions of Philosophers), as a follower of Heraclitus. Afterwards, when he was about to compete for the prize with a tragedy, he listened to Socrates in front of the theatre of Dionysus, and then consigned his poems to the flames, with the words:Come hither, O fire-god, Plato now has need of thee. 3.6. From that time onward, having reached his twentieth year (so it is said), he was the pupil of Socrates. When Socrates was gone, he attached himself to Cratylus the Heraclitean, and to Hermogenes who professed the philosophy of Parmenides. Then at the age of twenty-eight, according to Hermodorus, he withdrew to Megara to Euclides, with certain other disciples of Socrates. Next he proceeded to Cyrene on a visit to Theodorus the mathematician, thence to Italy to see the Pythagorean philosophers Philolaus and Eurytus, and thence to Egypt to see those who interpreted the will of the gods; and Euripides is said to have accompanied him thither. There he fell sick and was cured by the priests, who treated him with sea-water, and for this reason he cited the line:The sea doth wash away all human ills. 3.7. Furthermore he said that, according to Homer, beyond all men the Egyptians were skilled in healing. Plato also intended to make the acquaintance of the Magians, but was prevented by the wars in Asia. Having returned to Athens, he lived in the Academy, which is a gymnasium outside the walls, in a grove named after a certain hero, Hecademus, as is stated by Eupolis in his play entitled Shirkers:In the shady walks of the divine Hecademus.Moreover, there are verses of Timon which refer to Plato:Amongst all of them Plato was the leader, a big fish, but a sweet-voiced speaker, musical in prose as the cicala who, perched on the trees of Hecademus, pours forth a strain as delicate as a lily. 3.8. Thus the original name of the place was Hecademy, spelt with e. Now Plato was a friend of Isocrates. And Praxiphanes makes them converse about poets at a country-seat where Plato was entertaining Isocrates. And Aristoxenus asserts that he went on service three times, first to Tanagra, secondly to Corinth, and thirdly at Delium, where also he obtained the prize of valour. He mixed together doctrines of Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans and Socrates. In his doctrine of sensible things he agrees with Heraclitus, in his doctrine of the intelligible with Pythagoras, and in political philosophy with Socrates. 3.9. Some authorities, amongst them Satyrus, say that he wrote to Dion in Sicily instructing him to purchase three Pythagorean books from Philolaus for 100 minae. For they say he was well off, having received from Dionysius over eighty talents. This is stated by Onetor in an essay upon the theme, Whether a wise man will make money. Further, he derived great assistance from Epicharmus the Comic poet, for he transcribed a great deal from him, as Alcimus says in the essays dedicated to Amyntas, of which there are four. In the first of them he writes thus:It is evident that Plato often employs the words of Epicharmus. Just consider. Plato asserts that the object of sense is that which never abides in quality or quantity, but is ever in flux and change. 3.10. The assumption is that the things from which you take away number are no longer equal nor determinate, nor have they quantity or quality. These are the things to which becoming always, and being never, belongs. But the object of thought is something constant from which nothing is subtracted, to which nothing is added. This is the nature of the eternal things, the attribute of which is to be ever alike and the same. And indeed Epicharmus has expressed himself plainly about objects of sense and objects of thought.a. But gods there always were; never at any time were they wanting, while things in this world are always alike, and are brought about through the same agencies.b. Yet it is said that Chaos was the first-born of the gods.a. How so? If indeed there was nothing out of which, or into which, it could come first.b. What! Then did nothing come first after all?a. No, by Zeus, nor second either 3.11. at least of the things which we are thus talking about now; on the contrary, they existed from all eternity. . . .a. But suppose some one chooses to add a single pebble to a heap containing either an odd or an even number, whichever you please, or to take away one of those already there; do you think the number of pebbles would remain the same?b. Not I.a. Nor yet, if one chooses to add to a cubit-measure another length, or cut off some of what was there already, would the original measure still exist?b. of course not.a. Now consider mankind in this same way. One man grows, and another again shrinks; and they are all undergoing change the whole time. But a thing which naturally changes and never remains in the same state must ever be different from that which has thus changed. And even so you and I were one pair of men yesterday, are another to-day, and again will be another to-morrow, and will never remain ourselves, by this same argument. 3.12. Again, Alcimus makes this further statement: There are some things, say the wise, which the soul perceives through the body, as in seeing and hearing; there are other things which it discerns by itself without the aid of the body. Hence it follows that of existing things some are objects of sense and others objects of thought. Hence Plato said that, if we wish to take in at one glance the principles underlying the universe, we must first distinguish the ideas by themselves, for example, likeness, unity and plurality, magnitude, rest and motion; next we must assume the existence of 3.13. beauty, goodness, justice and the like, each existing in and for itself; in the third place we must see how many of the ideas are relative to other ideas, as are knowledge, or magnitude, or ownership, remembering that the things within our experience bear the same names as those ideas because they partake of them; I mean that things which partake of justice are just, things which partake of beauty are beautiful. Each one of the ideas is eternal, it is a notion, and moreover is incapable of change. Hence Plato says that they stand in nature like archetypes, and that all things else bear a resemblance to the ideas because they are copies of these archetypes. Now here are the words of Epicharmus about the good and about the ideas: 3.14. a. Is flute-playing a thing?b. Most certainly.a. Is man then flute-playing?b. By no means.a. Come, let me see, what is a flute-player? Whom do you take him to be? Is he not a man?b. Most certainly.a. Well, don't you think the same would be the case with the good? Is not the good in itself a thing? And does not he who has learnt that thing and knows it at once become good? For, just as he becomes a flute-player by learning flute-playing, or a dancer when he has learnt dancing, or a plaiter when he has learnt plaiting, in the same way, if he has learnt anything of the sort, whatever you like, he would not be one with the craft but he would be the craftsman. 3.20. Anniceris the Cyrenaic happened to be present and ransomed him for twenty minae – according to others the sum was thirty minae – and dispatched him to Athens to his friends, who immediately remitted the money. But Anniceris declined it, saying that the Athenians were not the only people worthy of the privilege of providing for Plato. Others assert that Dion sent the money and that Anniceris would not take it, but bought for Plato the little garden which is in the Academy. Pollis, however, is stated to have been defeated by Chabrias and afterwards to have been drowned at Helice, his treatment of the philosopher having provoked the wrath of heaven, as Favorinus says in the first book of his Memorabilia. 3.24. and that, on this occasion, as he was going up to the Acropolis along with Chabrias, Crobylus the informer met him and said, What, are you come to speak for the defence? Don't you know that the hemlock of Socrates awaits you? To this Plato replied, As I faced dangers when serving in the cause of my country, so I will face them now in the cause of duty for a friend.He was the first to introduce argument by means of question and answer, says Favorinus in the eighth book of his Miscellaneous History; he was the first to explain to Leodamas of Thasos the method of solving problems by analysis; and the first who in philosophical discussion employed the terms antipodes, element, dialectic, quality, oblong number, and, among boundaries, the plane superficies; also divine providence. 3.25. He was also the first philosopher who controverted the speech of Lysias, the son of Cephalus, which he has set out word for word in the Phaedrus, and the first to study the significance of grammar. And, as he was the first to attack the views of almost all his predecessors, the question is raised why he makes no mention of Democritus. Neanthes of Cyzicus says that, on his going to Olympia, the eyes of all the Greeks were turned towards him, and there he met Dion, who was about to make his expedition against Dionysius. In the first book of the Memorabilia of Favorinus there is a statement that Mithradates the Persian set up a statue of Plato in the Academy and inscribed upon it these words: Mithradates the Persian, the son of Orontobates, dedicated to the Muses a likeness of Plato made by Silanion. 3.26. Heraclides declares that in his youth he was so modest and orderly that he was never seen to laugh outright. In spite of this he too was ridiculed by the Comic poets. At any rate Theopompus in his Hedychares says:There is not anything that is truly one, even the number two is scarcely one, according to Plato.Moreover, Anaxandrides in his Theseus says:He was eating olives exactly like Plato.Then there is Timon who puns on his name thus:As Plato placed strange platitudes. 3.27. Alexis again in the Meropis:You have come in the nick of time. For I am at my wits' end and walking up and down, like Plato, and yet have discovered no wise plan but only tired my legs.And in the Ancylion:You don't know what you are talking about: run about with Plato, and you'll know all about soap and onions.Amphis, too, in the Amphicrates says:a. And as for the good, whatever that be, that you are likely to get on her account, I know no more about it, master, than I do of the good of Plato.b. Just attend. 3.33. It is also said that the epigram on the Eretrians, who were swept out of the country, was written by him:We are Eretrians by race, from Euboea, and lie near Susa. How far, alas, from our native land!And again:Thus Venus to the Muses spoke:Damsels, submit to Venus' yoke,Or dread my Cupid's arms.Those threats, the virgins nine replied,May weigh with Mars, but we derideLove's wrongs, or darts, or charms.And again:A certain person found some gold,Carried it off and, in its stead,Left a strong halter, neatly rolled.The owner found his treasure fled,And, daunted by his fortune's wreck,Fitted the halter to his neck. 3.34. Further, Molon, being his enemy, said, It is not wonderful that Dionysius should be in Corinth, but rather that Plato should be in Sicily. And it seems that Xenophon was not on good terms with him. At any rate, they have written similar narratives as if out of rivalry with each other, a Symposium, a Defence of Socrates, and their moral treatises or Memorabilia. Next, the one wrote a Republic, the other a Cyropaedia. And in the Laws Plato declares the story of the education of Cyrus to be a fiction, for that Cyrus did not answer to the description of him. And although both make mention of Socrates, neither of them refers to the other, except that Xenophon mentions Plato in the third book of his Memorabilia. 3.35. It is said also that Antisthenes, being about to read publicly something that he had composed, invited Plato to be present. And on his inquiring what he was about to read, Antisthenes replied that it was something about the impossibility of contradiction. How then, said Plato, can you write on this subject? thus showing him that the argument refutes itself. Thereupon he wrote a dialogue against Plato and entitled it Sathon. After this they continued to be estranged from one another. They say that, on hearing Plato read the Lysis, Socrates exclaimed, By Heracles, what a number of lies this young man is telling about me! For he has included in the dialogue much that Socrates never said. 3.37. Nowhere in his writings does Plato mention himself by name, except in the dialogue On the Soul and the Apology. Aristotle remarks that the style of the dialogues is half-way between poetry and prose. And according to Favorinus, when Plato read the dialogue On the Soul, Aristotle alone stayed to the end; the rest of the audience got up and went away. Some say that Philippus of Opus copied out the Laws, which were left upon waxen tablets, and it is said that he was the author of the Epinomis. Euphorion and Panaetius relate that the beginning of the Republic was found several times revised and rewritten, and the Republic itself Aristoxenus declares to have been nearly all of it included in the Controversies of Protagoras. 3.40. no one when asleep is good for anything. He also said that the truth is the pleasantest of sounds. Another version of this saying is that the pleasantest of all things is to speak the truth. Again, of truth he speaks thus in the Laws: Truth, O stranger, is a fair and durable thing. But it is a thing of which it is hard to persuade men. His wish always was to leave a memorial of himself behind, either in the hearts of his friends or in his books. He was himself fond of seclusion according to some authorities.His death, the circumstances of which have already been related, took place in the thirteenth year of the reign of King Philip, as stated by Favorinus in the third book of his Memorabilia, and according to Theopompus honours were paid to him at his death by Philip. But Myronianus in his Parallels says that Philo mentions some proverbs that were in circulation about Plato's lice, implying that this was the mode of his death. 3.41. He was buried in the Academy, where he spent the greatest part of his life in philosophical study. And hence the school which he founded was called the Academic school. And all the students there joined in the funeral procession. The terms of his will were as follows:These things have been left and devised by Plato: the estate in Iphistiadae, bounded on the north by the road from the sanctuary at Cephisia, on the south by the Heracleum in Iphistiadae, on the east by the property of Archestratus of Phrearrhi, on the west by that of Philippus of Chollidae: this it shall be unlawful for anyone to sell or alienate, but it shall be the property of the boy Adeimantus to all intents and purposes: 3.42. the estate in Eiresidae which I bought of Callimachus, bounded on the north by the property of Eurymedon of Myrrhinus, on the south by the property of Demostratus of Xypete, on the east by that of Eurymedon of Myrrhinus, and on the west by the Cephisus; three minae of silver; a silver vessel weighing 165 drachmas; a cup weighing 45 drachmas; a gold signet-ring and earring together weighing four drachmas and three obols. Euclides the lapidary owes me three minae. I enfranchise Artemis. I leave four household servants, Tychon, Bictas, Apollonides and Dionysius. 3.48. They say that Zeno the Eleatic was the first to write dialogues. But, according to Favorinus in his Memorabilia, Aristotle in the first book of his dialogue On Poets asserts that it was Alexamenus of Styra or Teos. In my opinion Plato, who brought this form of writing to perfection, ought to be adjudged the prize for its invention as well as for its embellishment. A dialogue is a discourse consisting of question and answer on some philosophical or political subject, with due regard to the characters of the persons introduced and the choice of diction. Dialectic is the art of discourse by which we either refute or establish some proposition by means of question and answer on the part of the interlocutors. 3.49. of the Platonic dialogues there are two most general types, the one adapted for instruction and the other for inquiry. And the former is further divided into two types, the theoretical and the practical. And of these the theoretical is divided into the physical and logical, and the practical into the ethical and political. The dialogue of inquiry also has two main divisions, the one of which aims at training the mind and the other at victory in controversy. Again, the part which aims at training the mind has two subdivisions, the one akin to the midwife's art, the other merely tentative. And that suited to controversy is also subdivided into one part which raises critical objections, and another which is subversive of the main position. 3.50. I am not unaware that there are other ways in which certain writers classify the dialogues. For some dialogues they call dramatic, others narrative, and others again a mixture of the two. But the terms they employ in their classification of the dialogues are better suited to the stage than to philosophy. Physics is represented by the Timaeus, logic by the Statesman, Cratylus, Parmenides and Sophist, ethics by the Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus and Symposium, as well as by the Menexenus, Clitophon, the Epistles, Philebus, Hipparchus and the Rivals, and lastly politics by the Republic 3.52. of these the former is a proposition, the latter a conception. Now where he has a firm grasp Plato expounds his own view and refutes the false one, but, if the subject is obscure, he suspends judgement. His own views are expounded by four persons, Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger, the Eleatic Stranger. These strangers are not, as some hold, Plato and Parmenides, but imaginary characters without names, for, even when Socrates and Timaeus are the speakers, it is Plato's doctrines that are laid down. To illustrate the refutation of false opinions, he introduces Thrasymachus, Callicles, Polus, Gorgias, Protagoras, or again Hippias, Euthydemus and the like. 3.57. Now, says Thrasylus, the genuine dialogues are fifty-six in all, if the Republic be divided into ten and the Laws into twelve. Favorinus, however, in the second book of his Miscellaneous History declares that nearly the whole of the Republic is to be found in a work of Protagoras entitled Controversies. This gives nine tetralogies, if the Republic takes the place of one single work and the Laws of another. His first tetralogy has a common plan underlying it, for he wishes to describe what the life of the philosopher will be. To each of the works Thrasylus affixes a double title, the one taken from the name of the interlocutor, the other from the subject. 3.58. This tetralogy, then, which is the first, begins with the Euthyphro or On Holiness, a tentative dialogue; the Apology of Socrates, an ethical dialogue, comes second; the third is Crito or On what is to be done, ethical; the fourth Phaedo or On the Soul, also ethical. The second tetralogy begins with Cratylus or On Correctness of Names, a logical dialogue, which is followed by Theaetetus or On Knowledge, tentative, the Sophist or On Being, a logical dialogue, the Statesman or On Monarchy, also logical. The third tetralogy includes, first, Parmenides or On Ideas, which is logical, next Philebus or On Pleasure, an ethical dialogue, the Banquet or On the Good, ethical, Phaedrus or On Love, also ethical. 3.62. In the first trilogy they place the Republic, Timaeus and Critias; in the second the Sophist, the Statesman and Cratylus; in the third the Laws, Minos and Epinomis; in the fourth Theaetetus, Euthyphro and the Apology; in the fifth Crito, Phaedo and the Epistles. The rest follow as separate compositions in no regular order. Some critics, as has already been stated, put the Republic first, while others start with the greater Alcibiades, and others again with the Theages; some begin with the Euthyphro, others with the Clitophon; some with the Timaeus, others with the Phaedrus; others again with the Theaetetus, while many begin with the Apology. The following dialogues are acknowledged to be spurious: the Midon or Horse-breeder, the Eryxias or Erasistratus, the Alcyon, the Acephali or Sisyphus, the Axiochus, the Phaeacians, the Demodocus, the Chelidon, the Seventh Day, the Epimenides. of these the Alcyon is thought to be the work of a certain Leon, according to Favorinus in the fifth book of his Memorabilia. 3.63. Plato has employed a variety of terms in order to make his system less intelligible to the ignorant. But in a special sense he considers wisdom to be the science of those things which are objects of thought and really existent, the science which, he says, is concerned with God and the soul as separate from the body. And especially by wisdom he means philosophy, which is a yearning for divine wisdom. And in a general sense all experience is also termed by him wisdom, e.g. when he calls a craftsman wise. And he applies the same terms with very different meanings. For instance, the word φαῦλος (slight, plain) is employed by him in the sense of ἁπλοῦς (simple, honest), just as it is applied to Heracles in the Licymnius of Euripides in the following passage:Plain (φαῦλος), unaccomplished, staunch to do great deeds, unversed in talk, with all his store of wisdom curtailed to action. 3.65. The right interpretation of his dialogues includes three things: first, the meaning of every statement must be explained; next, its purpose, whether it is made for a primary reason or by way of illustration, and whether to establish his own doctrines or to refute his interlocutor; in the third place it remains to examine its truth.And since certain critical marks are affixed to his works let us now say a word about these. The cross × is taken to indicate peculiar expressions and figures of speech, and generally any idiom of Platonic usage; the diple ( ) calls attention to doctrines and opinions characteristic of Plato; 3.66. the dotted cross (⨰) denotes select passages and beauties of style; the dotted diple (⋗) editors' corrections of the text; the dotted obelus (÷) passages suspected without reason; the dotted antisigma (Ꜿ) repetitions and proposals for transpositions; the ceraunium the philosophical school; the asterisk (∗) an agreement of doctrine; the obelus (−) a spurious passage. So much for the critical marks and his writings in general. As Antigonus of Carystus says in his Life of Zeno, when the writings were first edited with critical marks, their possessors charged a certain fee to anyone who wished to consult them. 3.67. The doctrines he approved are these. He held that the soul is immortal, that by transmigration it puts on many bodies, and that it has a numerical first principle, whereas the first principle of the body is geometrical; and he defined soul as the idea of vital breath diffused in all directions. He held that it is self-moved and tripartite, the rational part of it having its seat in the head, the passionate part about the heart, while the appetitive is placed in the region of the navel and the liver. 3.68. And from the centre outwards it encloses the body on all sides in a circle, and is compounded of elements, and, being divided at harmonic intervals, it forms two circles which touch one another twice; and the interior circle, being slit six times over, makes seven circles in all. And this interior circle moves by way of the diagonal to the left, and the other by way of the side to the right. Hence also the one is supreme, being a single circle, for the other interior circle was divided; the former is the circle of the Same, the latter that of the Other, whereby he means that the motion of the soul is the motion of the universe together with the revolutions of the planets. 3.70. This substance, he says, is converted into the four elements, fire, water, air, earth, of which the world itself and all that therein is are formed. Earth alone of these elements is not subject to change, the assumed cause being the peculiarity of its constituent triangles. For he thinks that in all the other elements the figures employed are homogeneous, the scalene triangle out of which they are all put together being one and the same, whereas for earth a triangle of peculiar shape is employed; the element of fire is a pyramid, of air an octahedron, of water an icosahedron, of earth a cube. Hence earth is not transmuted into the other three elements, nor these three into earth. 3.71. But the elements are not separated each into its own region of the universe, because the revolution unites their minute particles, compressing and forcing them together into the centre, at the same time as it separates the larger masses. Hence as they change their shapes, so also do they change the regions which they occupy.And there is one created universe, seeing that it is perceptible to sense, which has been made by God. And it is animate because that which is animate is better than that which is iimate. And this piece of workmanship is assumed to come from a cause supremely good. It was made one and not unlimited because the pattern from which he made it was one. And it is spherical because such is the shape of its maker. 3.72. For that maker contains the other living things, and this universe the shapes of them all. It is smooth and has no organ all round because it has no need of organs. Moreover, the universe remains imperishable because it is not dissolved into the Deity. And the creation as a whole is caused by God, because it is the nature of the good to be beneficent, and the creation of the universe has the highest good for its cause. For the most beautiful of created things is due to the best of intelligible causes; so that, as God is of this nature, and the universe resembles the best in its perfect beauty, it will not be in the likeness of anything created, but only of God. 3.73. The universe is composed of fire, water, air and earth; of fire in order to be visible; of earth in order to be solid; of water and air in order to be proportional. For the powers represented by solids are connected by two mean proportionals in a way to secure the complete unity of the whole. And the universe was made of all the elements in order to be complete and indestructible.Time was created as an image of eternity. And while the latter remains for ever at rest, time consists in the motion of the universe. For night and day and month and the like are all parts of time; for which reason, apart from the nature of the universe, time has no existence. But so soon as the universe is fashioned time exists. 3.74. And the sun and moon and planets were created as means to the creation of time. And God kindled the light of the sun in order that the number of the seasons might be definite and in order that animals might possess number. The moon is in the circle immediately above the earth, and the sun in that which is next beyond that, and in the circles above come the planets. Further, the universe is an animate being, for it is bound fast in animate movement. And in order that the universe which had been created in the likeness of the intelligible living creature might be rendered complete, the nature of all other animals was created. Since then its pattern possesses them, the universe also ought to have them. And thus it contains gods for the most part of a fiery nature; of the rest there are three kinds, winged, aquatic and terrestrial. 3.75. And of all the gods in heaven the earth is the oldest. And it was fashioned to make night and day. And being at the centre it moves round the centre. And since there are two causes, it must be affirmed, he says, that some things are due to reason and others have a necessary cause, the latter being air, fire, earth and water, which are not exactly elements but rather recipients of form. They are composed of triangles, and are resolved into triangles. The scalene triangle and the isosceles triangle are their constituent elements. 3.76. The principles, then, and causes assumed are the two above mentioned, of which God and matter are the exemplar. Matter is of necessity formless like the other recipients of form. of all these there is a necessary cause. For it somehow or other receives the ideas and so generates substances, and it moves because its power is not uniform, and, being in motion, it in turn sets in motion those things which are generated from it. And these were at first in irrational and irregular motion, but after they began to frame the universe, under the conditions possible they were made by God symmetrical and regular. 3.77. For the two causes existed even before the world was made, as well as becoming in the third place, but they were not distinct, merely traces of them being found, and in disorder. When the world was made, they too acquired order. And out of all the bodies there are the universe was fashioned. He holds God, like the soul, to be incorporeal. For only thus is he exempt from change and decay. As already stated, he assumes the Ideas to be causes and principles whereby the world of natural objects is what it is. 3.78. On good and evil he would discourse to this effect. He maintained that the end to aim at is assimilation to God, that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness, but that it needs in addition, as instruments for use, first, bodily advantages like health and strength, sound senses and the like, and, secondly, external advantages such as wealth, good birth and reputation. But the wise man will be no less happy even if he be without these things. Again, he will take part in public affairs, will marry, and will refrain from breaking the laws which have been made. And as far as circumstances allow he will legislate for his own country, unless in the extreme corruption of the people he sees that the state of affairs completely justifies his abstention. 3.79. He thinks that the gods take note of human life and that there are superhuman beings. He was the first to define the notion of good as that which is bound up with whatever is praiseworthy and rational and useful and proper and becoming. And all these are bound up with that which is consistent and in accord with nature.He also discoursed on the propriety of names, and indeed he was the first to frame a science for rightly asking and answering questions, having employed it himself to excess. And in the dialogues he conceived righteousness to be the law of God because it is stronger to incite men to do righteous acts, that malefactors may not be punished after death also. 3.80. Hence to some he appeared too fond of myths. These narratives he intermingles with his works in order to deter men from wickedness, by reminding them how little they know of what awaits them after death. Such, then, are the doctrines he approved.He used also to divide things, according to Aristotle, in the following manner. Goods are in the mind or in the body, or external. For example, justice, prudence, courage, temperance and such like are in the mind; beauty, a good constitution, health and strength in the body; while friends, the welfare of one's country and riches are amongst external things. 3.89. The last division includes the man who is himself of a generous and high-minded spirit. He too is said to be noble. And this indeed is the highest form of nobility. Thus, of nobility, one kind depends on excellent ancestors, another on princely ancestors, a third on illustrious ancestors, while the fourth is due to the individual's own beauty and worth.Beauty has three divisions. The first is the object of praise, as of form fair to see. Another is serviceable; thus an instrument, a house and the like are beautiful for use. Other things again which relate to customs and pursuits and the like are beautiful because beneficial. of beauty, then, one kind is matter for praise, another is for use, and another for the benefit it procures. 7.156. And there are five terrestrial zones: first, the northern zone which is beyond the arctic circle, uninhabitable because of the cold; second, a temperate zone; a third, uninhabitable because of great heats, called the torrid zone; fourth, a counter-temperate zone; fifth, the southern zone, uninhabitable because of its cold.Nature in their view is an artistically working fire, going on its way to create; which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, or fashioning breath. And the soul is a nature capable of perception. And they regard it as the breath of life, congenital with us; from which they infer first that it is a body and secondly that it survives death. Yet it is perishable, though the soul of the universe, of which the individual souls of animals are parts, is indestructible. 9.44. His opinions are these. The first principles of the universe are atoms and empty space; everything else is merely thought to exist. The worlds are unlimited; they come into being and perish. Nothing can come into being from that which is not nor pass away into that which is not. Further, the atoms are unlimited in size and number, and they are borne along in the whole universe in a vortex, and therby generate all composite things – fire, water, air, earth; for even these are conglomerations of given atoms. And it is because of their solidity that these atoms are impassive and unalterable. The sun and the moon have been composed of such smooth and spherical masses [i.e. atoms], and so also the soul, which is identical with reason. We see by virtue of the impact of images upon our eyes. 9.73. Who knoweth if to die be but to live,And that called life by mortals be but death?So too Empedocles:So to these mortal may not list nor lookNor yet conceive them in his mind;and before that:Each believes naught but his experience.And even Heraclitus: Let us not conjecture on deepest questions what is likely. Then again Hippocrates showed himself two-sided and but human. And before them all Homer:Pliant is the tongue of mortals; numberless the tales within it;andAmple is of words the pasture, hither thither widely ranging;andAnd the saying which thou sayest, back it cometh later on thee,where he is speaking of the equal value of contradictory sayings.
13. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 15.14.1 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

14. Origen, Against Celsus, 6.71 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

6.71. Celsus accordingly, as not understanding the doctrine relating to the Spirit of God (for the natural man receives not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned ), weaves together (such a web) as pleases himself, imagining that we, in calling God a Spirit, differ in no respect in this particular from the Stoics among the Greeks, who maintain that God is a Spirit, diffused through all things, and containing all things within Himself. Now the superintendence and providence of God does extend through all things, but not in the way that spirit does, according to the Stoics. Providence indeed contains all things that are its objects, and comprehends them all, but not as a containing body includes its contents, because they also are body, but as a divine power does it comprehend what it contains. According to the philosophers of the Porch, indeed, who assert that principles are corporeal, and who on that account make all things perishable, and who venture even to make the God of all things capable of perishing, the very Word of God, who descends even to the lowest of mankind, would be - did it not appear to them to be too gross an incongruity - nothing else than a corporeal spirit; whereas, in our opinion - who endeavour to demonstrate that the rational soul is superior to all corporeal nature, and that it is an invisible substance, and incorporeal - God the Word, by whom all things were made, who came, in order that all things might be made by the Word, not to men only, but to what are deemed the very lowest of things, under the dominion of nature alone, would be no body. The Stoics, then, may consign all things to destruction by fire; we, however, know of no incorporeal substance that is destructible by fire, nor (do we believe) that the soul of man, or the substance of angels, or of thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers, can be dissolved by fire.
15. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria, 26.7-26.15 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

16. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.98



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academy Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 52, 60
animal Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 131
antiochus Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 52, 60
antiochus of ascalon Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 131
antipater of tarsus Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
apuleius Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 846
argument Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 846
aristocles Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 60
aristotle Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 52, 60
athenagoras Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820, 839, 846
atomism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 118
atticus, platonist Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 839
breath, warm breath Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
christ Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130
chrysippus Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 131
clement of alexandria Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820, 839, 846
cognition Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
crantor Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
demiurge/craftsman Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 131
democritus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 118
demonstration Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130
diogenes laertius Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 118
elements Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 60
euripides Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 118
eusebius of caesarea Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130
extension in three dimensions Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
father Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 839
form Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
forms Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 60
galen Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820
geometrical principle Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
god, and space Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 846
god, as corporeal Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 846
god, stoic Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 131
god Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820
hippolytus Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 839
intellect, cosmic and human Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 131
jews Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130
life (βίος) Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130
limit Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
logos Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 839
matter, divisibility Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 60
matter, stoic Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 131
maximus of tyre Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820
norden, eduard, nous, god as Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820, 839
numerical principle Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
nurse Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820
part of a whole (soul as, etc.) Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 131
pattern (isagogical) Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130
peripatetic Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 846
philosophy Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820, 846
plato Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 52, 60; Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 131; Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820, 839, 846; Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 118
platonism, middle Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820, 839, 846
platonism Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 839, 846
plutarch Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 846
pneuma (spiritus) Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
posidonius Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
principles/ archai Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 52, 60
prophecies Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130
pyrrho Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 118
qualities Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 60
scripture Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130
soul Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820
speusippus Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
stoicism, athenagoras Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 839, 846
stoicism, cosmic religion Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 839
stoicism Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 846
stoicism and stoic doctrine Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189
syllogism Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130
theophrastus Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 60; Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 131
thrasyllus Motta and Petrucci, Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity (2022) 130
varro Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 60
word/the word, of god' Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 839
word/the word Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 839
world soul Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 820, 839
zeno of citium Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 189