Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4479
Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers, 10.13


nanApollodorus in his Chronology tells us that our philosopher was a pupil of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes; but in his letter to Eurylochus, Epicurus himself denies it and says that he was self-taught. Both Epicurus and Hermarchus deny the very existence of Leucippus the philosopher, though by some and by Apollodorus the Epicurean he is said to have been the teacher of Democritus. Demetrius the Magnesian affirms that Epicurus also attended the lectures of Xenocrates.The terms he used for things were the ordinary terms, and Aristophanes the grammarian credits him with a very characteristic style. He was so lucid a writer that in the work On Rhetoric he makes clearness the sole requisite.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

11 results
1. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.14, 2.15, 3.1, 3.3-3.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.15.  "Well, do you think I have properly grasped the meaning of the terms, or do I still require lessons in the use of either Greek or Latin? And even supposing that I do not understand what Epicurus says, still I believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek, so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such unintelligible language. Obscurity is excusable on two grounds: it may be deliberately adopted, as in the case of Heraclitus, The surname of the Obscure who bore, So dark his philosophic lore; or the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of the subject and not of the style — an instance of this is Plato's Timaeus. But Epicurus, in my opinion, has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly if he can, nor is he discussing a recondite subject like natural philosophy, nor a technical subject such as mathematics, but a lucid and easy topic, and one that is generally familiar already. And yet you Epicureans do not deny that we understand what pleasure is, but what he means by it; which proves not that we do not understand the real meaning of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology. 3.1.  My dear Brutus. — Were Pleasure to speak for herself, in default of such redoubtable advocates as she now has to defend her, my belief is that she would own defeat. Vanquished by the arguments of our preceding Book, she would yield the victory to true Worth. Indeed she would be lost to shame if she persisted any longer in the battle against Virtue, and rated what is pleasant above what is morally good, or maintained that bodily enjoyment or the mental gratification which springs from it is of higher value than firmness and dignity of character. Let us then give Pleasure her dismissal, and bid her keep within her own domains, lest her charms and blandishments put snares in the way of strict philosophical debate. 3.3.  In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. 3.4.  Thus Logic and Natural Philosophy alike make use of terms unfamiliar even to Greece; Geometry, Music, Grammar also, have an idiom of their own. Even the manuals of Rhetoric, which belong entirely to the practical sphere and to the life of the world, nevertheless employ for purposes of instruction a sort of private and peculiar phraseology. And to leave out of account these liberal arts and accomplishments, even artisans would be unable to preserve the tradition of their crafts if they did not make use of words unknown to us though familiar to themselves. Nay, agriculture itself, a subject entirely unsusceptible of literary refinement, has yet had to coin technical terms to denote the things with which it is occupied. All the more is the philosopher compelled to do likewise; for philosophy is the Science of Life, and cannot treat its subject in language taken from the street.
2. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.14, 2.15, 3.1, 3.3-3.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.14. nam cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi causa uterque venisset, pauca primo inter nos inter nos primo BE de litteris, quarum summum erat in utroque studium, deinde Torquatus: Quoniam nacti te, nacti te VN 2 hac tite A 1 BER, N 1 (ut videtur); hac die A 2 inquit, sumus aliquando otiosum, certe audiam, quid sit, quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt, qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes, eum quem ego arbitror unum vidisse verum maximisque erroribus animos hominum liberavisse et omnia tradidisse, quae pertinerent pertinent R ad bene beateque vivendum. sed existimo te, sicut nostrum Triarium, minus ab eo delectari, quod ista Platonis, Aristoteli, aristoteli A 1 aristotili E aristotilis Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. nam illud illuc NV ad illud A 2 quidem adduci vix possum, ut ea, quae senserit ille, tibi non vera videantur. 2.15. Satisne igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine docendus? et tamen vide, ne, si ego non intellegam quid Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece, ut videor, luculenter sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius, qui ita loquatur, ut non intellegatur. quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, 'cognomento qui skoteino/s perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit', aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis. Epicurus autem, ut opinor, nec non vult, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facili et iam et iam P. Man. etiam (eciam V) in vulgus pervagata loquitur. loquitur (i in ras. ) N loquatur ( etiam A) Quamquam non negatis nos intellegere quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat. e quo efficitur, non ut nos non intellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat. 3.1. Voluptatem quidem, Brute, si ipsa pro se loquatur nec tam pertinaces habeat patronos, concessuram arbitror convictam superiore libro dignitati. etenim sit inpudens, si virtuti diutius repugnet, aut si honestis honestis honestati NV iucunda anteponat aut pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis ex eave natam laetitiam quam gravitatem animi atque constantiam. quare illam quidem dimittamus et suis se finibus tenere tenere (ten ab alt. m. in ras. ) N petere iubeamus, ne blanditiis eius inlecebrisque impediatur disputandi severitas. 3.3. ipse etiam dicit dicit cf. p. 13, 24—29 Epicurus ne ne nec RNV argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. nec enim in Torquati sermone quicquam sermone quicquam VN 2 sermone nec quicquam (quitquam ABE) implicatum inpl. R aut tortuosum fuit, nostraque, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis tum magis nobis, quibus etiam verba parienda sunt inponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur cogitans in omni arte, cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit, multam novitatem nominum esse, cum constituantur earum rerum vocabula, quae in quaque arte versentur. 3.4. itaque et dialectici et physici verbis utuntur iis, quae ipsi Graeciae nota non non BENV om. AR sint, sint Mdv. sunt geometrae vero et musici, grammatici etiam more quodam loquuntur suo. ipsae rhetorum artes, quae sunt totae forenses atque populares, verbis tamen in docendo quasi privatis utuntur ac suis. atque ut omittam has artis elegantes et ingenuas, ne opifices opifices N opificis AER opositis B opifex V quidem tueri sua artificia possent, nisi vocabulis uterentur nobis incognitis, usitatis sibi. quin etiam agri cultura, quae abhorret ab omni politiore elegantia, tamen eas eas V ea res, in quibus versatur, nominibus notavit novis. quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est. ars est enim philosophia vitae, de qua disserens arripere verba de foro non potest. 2.15.  "Well, do you think I have properly grasped the meaning of the terms, or do I still require lessons in the use of either Greek or Latin? And even supposing that I do not understand what Epicurus says, still I believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek, so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such unintelligible language. Obscurity is excusable on two grounds: it may be deliberately adopted, as in the case of Heraclitus, The surname of the Obscure who bore, So dark his philosophic lore; or the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of the subject and not of the style — an instance of this is Plato's Timaeus. But Epicurus, in my opinion, has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly if he can, nor is he discussing a recondite subject like natural philosophy, nor a technical subject such as mathematics, but a lucid and easy topic, and one that is generally familiar already. And yet you Epicureans do not deny that we understand what pleasure is, but what he means by it; which proves not that we do not understand the real meaning of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology. 3.1.  My dear Brutus. — Were Pleasure to speak for herself, in default of such redoubtable advocates as she now has to defend her, my belief is that she would own defeat. Vanquished by the arguments of our preceding Book, she would yield the victory to true Worth. Indeed she would be lost to shame if she persisted any longer in the battle against Virtue, and rated what is pleasant above what is morally good, or maintained that bodily enjoyment or the mental gratification which springs from it is of higher value than firmness and dignity of character. Let us then give Pleasure her dismissal, and bid her keep within her own domains, lest her charms and blandishments put snares in the way of strict philosophical debate. 3.3.  In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. 3.4.  Thus Logic and Natural Philosophy alike make use of terms unfamiliar even to Greece; Geometry, Music, Grammar also, have an idiom of their own. Even the manuals of Rhetoric, which belong entirely to the practical sphere and to the life of the world, nevertheless employ for purposes of instruction a sort of private and peculiar phraseology. And to leave out of account these liberal arts and accomplishments, even artisans would be unable to preserve the tradition of their crafts if they did not make use of words unknown to us though familiar to themselves. Nay, agriculture itself, a subject entirely unsusceptible of literary refinement, has yet had to coin technical terms to denote the things with which it is occupied. All the more is the philosopher compelled to do likewise; for philosophy is the Science of Life, and cannot treat its subject in language taken from the street.
3. Cicero, In Pisonem, 70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Horace, Sermones, 1.4.53 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.140-1.145, 5.1081-5.1086 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

187e. The reason why he has traduced the young men may be seen in Plato himself. In the case of Alcibiades, he says in the dialogue named from him that he did not begin to have converse with Socrates until he had passed out of his early bloom, when all who lusted for his body had deserted him. He tells us this at the beginning of the dialogue. The contradictory things which he says in the case of Charmides may be learned from the dialogue itself by anyone who wishes. For he represents him inconsistently
7. Gellius, Attic Nights, 2.9.4 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 4.14, 7.28, 7.176 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.14. Elementary Principles of Monarchy, in four books, dedicated to Alexander.To Arybas.To Hephaestion.On Geometry, two books.These works comprise in all 224,239 lines.Such was his character, and yet, when he was unable to pay the tax levied on resident aliens, the Athenians put him up for sale. And Demetrius of Phalerum purchased him, thereby making twofold restitution, to Xenocrates of his liberty, and to the Athenians of their tax. This we learn from Myronianus of Amastris in the first book of his Chapters on Historical Parallels. He succeeded Speusippus and was head of the school for twenty-five years from the archonship of Lysimachides, beginning in the second year of the 110th Olympiad. He died in his 82nd year from the effects of a fall over some utensil in the night.Upon him I have expressed myself as follows: 7.28. And in very truth in this species of virtue and in dignity he surpassed all mankind, ay, and in happiness; for he was ninety-eight when he died and had enjoyed good health without an ailment to the last. Persaeus, however, in his ethical lectures makes him die at the age of seventy-two, having come to Athens at the age of twenty-two. But Apollonius says that he presided over the school for fifty-eight years. The manner of his death was as follows. As he was leaving the school he tripped and fell, breaking a toe. Striking the ground with his fist, he quoted the line from the Niobe:I come, I come, why dost thou call for me?and died on the spot through holding his breath. 7.176. His end was as follows. He had severe inflammation of the gums, and by the advice of his doctors he abstained from food for two whole days. As it happened, this treatment succeeded, so that the doctors were for allowing him to resume his usual diet. To this, however, he would not consent, but declaring that he had already got too far on the road, he went on fasting the rest of his days until his death at the same age as Zeno according to some authorities, having spent nineteen years as Zeno's pupil.My lighter verse on him runs thus:I praise Cleanthes, but praise Hades more,Who could not bear to see him grown so old,So gave him rest at last among the dead,Who'd drawn such load of water while alive.
9. Jerome, Adversus Jovinianum, 2.14 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

10. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 76

11. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 29



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
armstrong,david Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 147
atomism Cain (2013), Jerome and the Monastic Clergy: A Commentary on Letter 52 to Nepotian, 98
bailey,cyril Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 147
bion of borysthenes,on apathy Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 147
cicero,verbal coinages Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 147
cleomedes Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206
demetrius of laconia Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206
epicureanism,associated with flattery Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54
epicureans,hedonism Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206
epicurus,on friendship/patronage Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54
flattery Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54
frankness,relationship with friendship Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54
greece/greeks,portrayed as flatterers Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54
indelli,giovanni Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 147
jensen,christian Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54
leucippus Cain (2013), Jerome and the Monastic Clergy: A Commentary on Letter 52 to Nepotian, 98
mcosker,michael Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 147
oltramare,andré Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 147
patronage,(greek) development of system Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54
patronage,and frankness Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54
patronage,risk of destruction by flattery Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54
patronage Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54
plato Cain (2013), Jerome and the Monastic Clergy: A Commentary on Letter 52 to Nepotian, 98
pleasure Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206
quirinus Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 147
stoicism Cain (2013), Jerome and the Monastic Clergy: A Commentary on Letter 52 to Nepotian, 98
stoics/stoicism,condemned by horace Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 147
telos Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206
thersites Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206
tsouna(-mckirahan),voula Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 147
xenocrates Cain (2013), Jerome and the Monastic Clergy: A Commentary on Letter 52 to Nepotian, 98
zeno' Cain (2013), Jerome and the Monastic Clergy: A Commentary on Letter 52 to Nepotian, 98
zoepffel,renate Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 54