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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



4458
Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 1.73-1.75
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18 results
1. Homer, Iliad, 2.243 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)

2.243. /for he hath taken away, and keepeth his prize by his own arrogant act. of a surety there is naught of wrath in the heart of Achilles; nay, he heedeth not at all; else, son of Atreus, wouldest thou now work insolence for the last time. So spake Thersites, railing at Agamemnon, shepherd of the host. But quickly to his side came goodly Odysseus
2. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, On Duties, 2.31, 2.33-2.38, 2.40-2.46, 2.48-2.49, 2.51 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.31. Honore et gloria et benivolentia civium fortasse non aeque omnes egent, sed tamen, si cui haec suppetunt, adiuvant aliquantum cum ad cetera, tum ad amicitias comparandas. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius; nunc dicamus de gloria, quamquam ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri, sed attingamus, quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus administrandis adiuvat plurimum. Summa igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his: si diligit multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos putat. Haec autem, si est simpliciter breviterque dicendum, quibus rebus pariuntur a singulis, eisdem fere a multitudine. Sed est alius quoque quidam aditus ad multitudinem, ut in universorum animos tamquam influere possimus. 2.33. Fides autem ut habeatur, duabus rebus effici potest, si existimabimur adepti coniunctam cum iustitia prudentiam. Nam et iis fidem habemus, quos plus intellegere quam nos arbitramur quosque et futura prospicere credimus et, cum res agatur in discrimenque ventum sit, expedire rem et consilium ex tempore capere posse; hanc enim utilem homines existimant veramque prudentiam. Iustis autem et fidis hominibus, id est bonis viris, ita fides habetur, ut nulla sit in iis fraudis iniuriaeque suspicio. Itaque his salutem nostram, his fortunas, his liberos rectissime committi arbitramur. 2.34. Harum igitur duarum ad fidem faciendam iustitia plus pollet, quippe cum ea sine prudentia satis habeat auctoritatis, prudentia sine iustitia nihil valet ad faciendam fidem. Quo enim quis versutior et callidior, hoc invisior et suspectior est detracta opinione probitatis. Quam ob rem intellegentiae iustitia coniuncta, quantum volet, habebit ad faciendam fidem virium; iustitia sine prudentia multum poterit, sine iustitia nihil valebit prudentia. 2.35. Sed ne quis sit admiratus, cur, cum inter omnes philosophos constet a meque ipso saepe disputatum sit, qui unam haberet, omnes habere virtutes, nune ita seiungam, quasi possit quisquam, qui non idem prudens sit, iustus esse, alia est illa, cum veritas ipsa limatur in disputatione, subtilitas, alia, cum ad opinionem communem omnis accommodatur oratio. Quam ob rem, ut volgus, ita nos hoc loco loquimur, ut alios fortes, alios viros bonos, alios prudentes esse dicamus; popularibus enim verbis est agendum et usitatis, cum loquimur de opinione populari, idque eodem modo fecit Panaetius. Sed ad propositum revertamur. 2.36. Erat igitur ex iis tribus, quae ad gloriam pertinerent, hoc tertium, ut cum admiratione hominum honore ab iis digni iudicaremur. Admirantur igitur communiter illi quidem omnia, quae magna et praeter opinionem suam animadverterunt, separatim autem, in singulis si perspiciunt necopinata quaedam bona. Itaque eos viros suspiciunt maximisque efferunt laudibus, in quibus existimant se excellentes quasdam et singulares perspicere virtutes, despiciunt autem eos et contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum putant. Non enim omnes eos contemnunt, de quibus male existimant. Nam quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos putant et ad faciendam iniuriam instructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem, sed de iis male existimant. Quam ob rem, ut ante dixi, contemnuntur ii, qui nec sibi nec alteri, ut dicitur, in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria, nulla cura est. 2.37. Admiratione autem afficiuntur ii, qui anteire ceteris virtute putantur et cum omni carere dedecore, tum vero iis vitiis, quibus alii non facile possunt obsistere. Nam et voluptates, blandissimae dominae. maioris partis animos a virtute detorquent et, dolorum cum admoventur faces, praeter modum plerique exterrentur; vita mors, divitiae paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovent. Quae qui in utramque partem excelso animo magnoque despiciunt, cumque aliqua iis ampla et honesta res obiecta est, totos ad se convertit et rapit, tum quis non admiretur splendorem pulchritudinemque virtutis? 2.38. Ergo et haec animi despicientia admirabilitatem magnam facit et maxime iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur, mirifica quaedam multitudini videtur, nec iniuria; nemo enim iustus esse potest, qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exsilium, qui egestatem timet, aut qui ea, quae sunt his contraria, aequitati anteponit. Maximeque admirantur eum, qui pecunia non movetur; quod in quo viro perspectum sit, hunc igni spectatum arbitrantur. Itaque illa tria, quae proposita sunt ad gloriarm omnia iustitia conficit, et benivolentiam, quod prodesse vult plurimis, et ob eandem causam fidem et admirationem, quod eas res spernit et neglegit, ad quas plerique inflammati aviditate rapiuntur. 2.40. Atque iis etiam, qui vendunt emunt, conducunt locant contrahendisque negotiis implicantur, iustitia ad rem gerendam necessaria est, cuius tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula iustitiae vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocitur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum, ille autem, qui archipirata dicitur, nisi aequabiliter praedam dispertiat, aut interficiatur a sociis aut relinquatur; quin etiam leges latronum esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, quas observent. Itaque propter aequabilem praedae partitionem et Bardulis Illyrius latro, de quo est apud Theopompum, magnas opes habuit et multo maiores Viriathus Lusitanus; cui quidem etiam exercitus nostri imperatoresque cesserunt; quem C. Laelius, is qui Sapiens usurpatur, praetor fregit et comminuit ferocitatemque eius ita repressit, ut facile bellum reliquis traderet. Cum igitur tanta vis iustitiae sit, ut ea etiam latronum opes firmet atque augeat, quantam eius vim inter leges et iudicia et in constituta re publica fore putamus? 2.41. Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum, ut ait Herodotus, sed etiam apud maiores nostros iustitiae fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati reges constituti. Nam cum premeretur inops multitudo ab iis, qui maiores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem; qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda summos cum infimis pari iure retinebat. Eademque constituendarum legum fuit causa, quae regum. 2.42. Ius enim semper est quaesitum aequabile; neque enim aliter esset ius. Id si ab uno iusto et bono viro consequebantur, erant eo contenti; cum id minus contingeret, leges sunt inventae, quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur. Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero, ut idem etiam prudentes haberentur, nihil erat, quod homines iis auctoribus non posse consequi se arbitrarentur. Omni igitur ratione colenda et retinenda iustitia est cum ipsa per sese (nam aliter iustitia non esset), tum propter amplificationem honoris et gloriae. Sed ut pecuniae non quaerendae solum ratio est, verum etiam collocandae, quae perpetuos sumptus suppeditet, nec solum necessaries, sed etiam liberales, sic gloria et quaerenda et collocanda ratione est. 2.43. Quamquam praeclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam proximam et quasi compendiariam dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut, qualis haberi vellet, talis esset. Quodsi qui simulatione et ii ostentatione et ficto non modo sermone, sed etiam voltu stabilem se gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant. Vera gloria radices agit atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi decidunt, nee simulatum potest quicquam esse diuturnum. Testes sunt permulti in utramque partem, sed brevitatis causa familia contenti erimus una. Ti. enim Gracchus P. f. tam diu laudabitur, dum memoria rerum Romanarum manebit; at eius filii nec vivi probabantur bonis et mortui numerum optinent iure caesorum. Qui igitur adipisci veram gloriam volet, iustitiae fungatur officiis. Ea quae essent, dictum est in libro superiore. 2.44. Sed ut facillime, quales simus, tales esse videamur, etsi in eo ipso vis maxima est, ut simus ii, qui haberi velimus, tamen quaedam praecepta danda sunt. Nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam, quod tibi, mi Cicero, arbitror contigisse, aut aliquo casu atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium coniciuntur atque in eum, quid agat, quem ad modum vivat, inquiritur et, tamquam in clarissima luce versetur, ita nullum obscurum potest nec dictum eius esse nec factum. 2.45. Quorum autem prima aetas propter humilitatem et obscuritatem in hominum ignoratione versatur, ii, simul ac iuvenes esse coeperunt, magna spectare et ad ea rectis studiis debent contendere; quod eo firmiore animo facient, quia non modo non invidetur illi aetati, verum etiam favetur. Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud maiores nostros exstiterunt; semper enim fere bella gerebantur. Tua autem aetas incidit in id bellum, cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera felicitatis parum. Quo tamen in bello cum te Pompeius alae alteri praefecisset, magnam laudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare equitando, iaculando, omni militari labore tolerando. Atque ea quidem tua laus pariter cum re publica cecidit. Mihi autem haec oratio suscepta non de te est, sed de genere toto; quam ob rein pergarnus ad ea, quae restant. 2.46. Ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quam corporis, sic eae res, quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur, gratiores sunt quam illae, quas viribus. Prima igitur commendatio proficiscitur a modestia cum pietate in parentes, in suos benivolentia. Facillime autem et in optimam partem cognoscuntur adulescentes, qui se ad claros et sapientes viros bene consulentes rei publicae contulerunt; quibuscum si frequentes sunt, opinionem afferunt populo eorum fore se similes, quos sibi ipsi delegerint ad imitandum. 2.48. Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sermo sit, in altera contentio, non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio orationis maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam (ea est enim, quam eloquentiam dicimus); sed tamen difficile dictu est, quantopere conciliet animos comitas affabilitasque sermonis. Exstant epistulae et Philippi ad Alexandrum et Antipatri ad Cassandrum et Antigoni ad Philippum filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus); quibus praecipiunt, ut oratione benigna multitudinis animos ad benivolentiam alliciant militesque blande appellando sermone deliniant. Quae autem in multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea saepe universam excitat gloriam ; magna est enim admiratio copiose sapienterque dicentis; quem qui audiunt, intellegere etiam et sapere plus quam ceteros arbitrantur. Si vero inest in oratione mixta modestia gravitas, nihil admirabilius fieri potest, eoque magis, si ea sunt in adulescente. 2.49. Sed cum sint plura causarum genera, quae eloquentiam desiderent, multique in nostra re publica adulescentes et apud iudices et apud populum et apud senatum dicendo laudem assecuti sint, maxima est admiratio in iudiciis. Quorum ratio duplex est. Nam ex accusatione et ex defensione constat; quarum etsi laudabilior est defensio, tamen etiam accusatio probata persaepe est. Dixi paulo ante de Crasso; idem fecit adulescens M. Antonius. Etiam P. Sulpici eloquentiam accusatio illustravit, cum seditiosum et inutilem civem, C. Norbanum, in iudicium vocavit. 2.51. Atque etiam hoc praeceptum officii diligenter tenendum est, ne quem umquam innocentem iudicio capitis arcessas; id enim sine scelere fieri nullo pacto potest. Nam quid est tam inhumanum quam eloquentiam a natura ad salutem hominum et ad conservationem datam ad bonorum pestem perniciemque convertere? Nec tamen, ut hoc fugiendum est, item est habendum religioni nocentem aliquando, modo ne nefarium impiumque, defendere; vult hoc multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas. Iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi, patroni non numquam veri simile, etiamsi minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere, praesertim cum de philosophia scriberem, non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum, Panaetio. Maxime autem et gloria paritur et gratia defensionibus, eoque maior, si quando accidit, ut ei subveniatur, qui potentis alicuius opibus circumveniri urguerique videatur, ut nos et saepe alias et adulescentes contra L. Sullae domitis opes pro Sex. Roscio Amerino fecimus, quae, ut scis, exstat oratio. 2.31.  All men do not, perhaps, stand equally in need of political honour, fame and the good-will of their fellow-citizens; nevertheless, if these honours come to a man, they help in many ways, and especially in the acquisition of friends. But friendship has been discussed in another book of mine, entitled "Laelius." Let us now take up the discussion of Glory, although I have published two books on that subject also. Still, let us touch briefly on it here, since it is of very great help in the conduct of more important business. The highest, truest glory depends upon the following three things: the affection, the confidence, and the mingled admiration and esteem of the people. Such sentiments, if I may speak plainly and concisely, are awakened in the masses in the same way as in individuals. But there is also another avenue of approach to the masses, by which we can, as it were, steal into the hearts of all at once. 2.33.  Secondly, the command of confidence can be secured on two conditions: (1) if people think us possessed of practical wisdom combined with a sense of justice. For we have confidence in those who we think have more understanding than ourselves, who, we believe, have better insight into the future, and who, when an emergency arises and a crisis comes, can clear away the difficulties and reach a safe decision according to the exigencies of the occasion; for that kind of wisdom the world accounts genuine and practical. But (2) confidence is reposed in men who are just and true — that is, good men — on the definite assumption that their characters admit of no suspicion of dishonesty or wrong-doing. And so we believe that it is perfectly safe to entrust our lives, our fortunes, and our children to their care. 2.34.  of these two qualities, then, justice has the greater power to inspire confidence; for even without the aid of wisdom, it has considerable weight; but wisdom without justice is of no avail to inspire confidence; for take from a man his reputation for probity, and the more shrewd and clever he is, the more hated and mistrusted he becomes. Therefore, justice combined with practical wisdom will command all the confidence we can desire; justice without wisdom will be able to do much; wisdom without justice will be of no avail at all. 2.35.  But I am afraid someone may wonder why I am now separating the virtues — as if it were possible for anyone to be just who is not at the same time wise; for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, and I myself have often argued, that he who has one virtue has them all. The explanation of my apparent inconsistency is that the precision of speech we employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated in philosophic discussion, is one thing; and that employed, when we are adapting our language entirely to popular thinking, is another. And therefore I am speaking here in the popular sense, when I call some men brave, others good, and still others wise; for in dealing with popular conceptions we must employ familiar words in their common acceptation; and this was the practice of Panaetius likewise. But let us return to the subject. 2.36.  The third, then, of the three conditions I name as essential to glory is that we be accounted worthy of the esteem and admiration of our fellow-men. While people admire in general everything that is great or better than they expect, they admire in particular the good qualities that they find unexpectedly in individuals. And so they reverence and extol with the highest praises those men in whom they see certain pre-eminent and extraordinary talents; and they look down with contempt upon those who they think have no ability, no spirit, no energy. For they do not despise all those of whom they think ill. For some men they consider unscrupulous, slanderous, fraudulent, and dangerous; they do not despise them, it may be; but they do think ill of them. And therefore, as I said before, those are despised who are "of no use to themselves or their neighbours," as the saying is, who are idle, lazy, and indifferent. 2.37.  On the other hand, those are regarded with admiration who are thought to excel others in ability and to be free from all dishonour and also from those vices which others do not easily resist. For sensual pleasure, a most seductive mistress, turns the hearts of the greater part of humanity away from virtue; and when the fiery trial of affliction draws near, most people are terrified beyond measure. Life and death, wealth and want affect all men most powerfully. But when men, with a spirit great and exalted, can look down upon such outward circumstances, whether prosperous or adverse, and when some noble and virtuous purpose, presented to their minds, converts them wholly to itself and carries them away in its pursuit, who then could fail to admire in them the splendour and beauty of virtue? 2.38.  As, then, this superiority of mind to such externals inspires great admiration, so justice, above all, on the basis of which alone men are called "good men," seems to people generally a quite marvellous virtue — and not without good reason; for no one can be just who fears death or pain or exile or poverty, or who values their opposites above equity. And people admire especially the man who is uninfluenced by money; and if a man has proved himself in this direction, they think him tried as by fire. Those three requisites, therefore, which were presupposed as the means of obtaining glory, are all secured by justice: (1) good-will, for it seeks to be of help to the greatest number; (2) confidence, for the same reason; and (3) admiration, because it scorns and cares nothing for those things, with a consuming passion for which most people are carried away. 2.40.  So also to buyers and sellers, to employers and employed, and to those who are engaged in commercial dealings generally, justice is indispensable for the conduct of business. Its importance is so great, that not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on without some small element of justice. For if a robber takes anything by force or by fraud from another member of the gang, he loses his standing even in a band of robbers; and if the one called the "Pirate Captain" should not divide the plunder impartially, he would be either deserted or murdered by his comrades. Why, they say that robbers even have a code of laws to observe and obey. And so, because of his impartial division of booty, Bardulis, the Illyrian bandit, of whom we read in Theopompus, acquired great power, Viriathus, of Lusitania, much greater. He actually defied even our armies and generals. But Gaius Laelius — the one surnamed "the Wise" — in his praetorship crushed his power, reduced him to terms, and so checked his intrepid daring, that he left to his successors an easy conquest. Since, therefore, the efficacy of justice is so great that it strengthens and augments the power even of robbers, how great do we think its power will be in a constitutional government with its laws and courts? 2.41.  Now it seems to me, at least, that not only among the Medes, as Herodotus tells us, but also among our own ancestors, men of high moral character were made kings in order that the people might enjoy justice. For, as the masses in their helplessness were oppressed by the strong, they appealed for protection to some one man who was conspicuous for his virtue; and, as he shielded the weaker classes from wrong, he managed by establishing equitable conditions to hold the higher and the lower classes in an equality of right. The reason for making constitutional laws was the same as that for making kings. 2.42.  For what people have always sought is equality of rights before the law. For rights that were not open to all alike would be no rights. If the people secured their end at the hands of one just and good man, they were satisfied with that; but when such was not their good fortune, laws were invented, to speak to all men at all times in one and the same voice. This, then, is obvious: nations used to select for their rulers those men whose reputation for justice was high in the eyes of the people. If in addition they were also thought wise, there was nothing that men did not think they could secure under such leadership. Justice is, therefore, in every way to be cultivated and maintained, both for its own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice) and for the enhancement of personal honour and glory. But as there is a method not only of acquiring money but also of investing it so as to yield an income to meet our continuously recurring expenses — both for the necessities and for the more refined comforts of life — so there must be a method of gaining glory and turning it to account. And yet, as Socrates used to express it so admirably 2.43.  "the nearest way to glory — a short cut, as it were — is to strive to be what you wish to be thought to be." For if anyone thinks that he can win lasting glory by pretence, by empty show, by hypocritical talk and looks, he is very much mistaken. True glory strikes deep root and spreads its branches wide; but all pretences soon fall to the ground like fragile flowers, and nothing counterfeit can be lasting. There are very many witnesses to both facts; but, for brevity's sake: I shall confine myself to one family: Tiberius Gracchus, Publius's son, will be held in honour as long as the memory of Rome shall endure; but his sons were not approved by patriots while they lived, and since they are dead they are numbered among those whose murder was justifiable. If, therefore, anyone wishes to win true glory, let him discharge the duties required by justice. And what they are has been set forth in the course of the preceding book. 2.44.  But, although the very essence of the problem is that we actually be what we wish to be thought to be, still some rules may be laid down to enable us most easily to secure the reputation of being what we are. For, if anyone in his early youth has the responsibility of living up to a distinguished name acquired either by inheritance from his father (as, I think, my dear Cicero, is your good fortune) or by some chance or happy combination of circumstances, the eyes of the world are turned upon him; his life and character are scrutinized; and, as if he moved in a blaze of light, not a word and not a deed of his can be kept a secret. 2.45.  Those, on the other hand, whose humble and obscure origin has kept them unknown to the world in their early years ought, as soon as they approach young manhood, to set a high ideal before their eyes and to strive with unswerving zeal towards its realization. This they will do with the better heart, because that time of life is accustomed to find favour rather than to meet with opposition. Well, then, the first thing to recommend to a young man in his quest for glory is that he try to win it, if he can, in a military career. Among our forefathers many distinguished themselves as soldiers; for warfare was almost continuous then. The period of your own youth, however, has coincided with that war in which the one side was too prolific in crime, the other in failure. And yet, when Pompey placed you in command of a cavalry squadron in this war, you won the applause of that great man and of the army for your skill in riding and spear-throwing and for endurance of all the hardships of the soldier's life. But that credit accorded to you came to nothing along with the fall of the republic. The subject of this discussion, however, is not your personal history, but the general theme. Let us, therefore, proceed to the sequel. 2.46.  As, then, in everything else brain-work is far more important than mere hand-work, so those objects which we strive to attain through intellect and reason gain for us a higher degree of gratitude than those which we strive to gain by physical strength. The best recommendation, then, that a young man can have to popular esteem proceeds from self-restraint, filial affection, and devotion to kinsfolk. Next to that, young men win recognition most easily and most favourably, if they attach themselves to men who are at once wise and renowned as well as patriotic counsellors in public affairs. And if they associate constantly with such men, they inspire in the public the expectation that they will be like them, seeing that they have themselves selected them for imitation. 2.48.  But as the classification of discourse is a twofold one — conversation, on the one side; oratory, on the other — there can be no doubt that of the two this debating power (for that is what we mean by eloquence) counts for more toward the attainment of glory; and yet, it is not easy to say how far an affable and courteous manner in conversation may go toward winning the affections. We have, for instance, the letters of Philip to Alexander, of Antipater to Cassander, and of Antigonus to Philip the Younger. The authors of these letters were, as we are informed, three of the wisest men in history; and in them they instruct their sons to woo the hearts of the populace to affection by words of kindness and to keep their soldiers loyal by a winning address. But the speech that is delivered in a debate before an assembly often stirs the hearts of thousands at once; for the eloquent and judicious speaker is received with high admiration, and his hearers think him understanding and wise beyond all others. And, if his speech have also dignity combined with moderation, he will be admired beyond all measure, especially if these qualities are found in a young man. 2.49.  But while there are occasions of many kinds that call for eloquence, and while many young men in our republic have obtained distinction by their speeches in the courts, in the popular assemblies, and in the senate, yet it is the speeches before our courts that excite the highest admiration. The classification of forensic speeches also is a twofold one: they are divided into arguments for the prosecution and arguments for the defence. And while the side of the defence is more honourable, still that of the prosecution also has very often established a reputation. I spoke of Crassus a moment ago; Marcus Antonius, when a youth, had the same success. A prosecution brought the eloquence of Publius Sulpicius into favourable notice, when he brought an action against Gaius Norbanus, a seditious and dangerous citizen. 2.51.  Again, the following rule of duty is to be carefully observed: never prefer a capital charge against any person who may be innocent. For that cannot possibly be done without making oneself a criminal. For what is so unnatural as to turn to the ruin and destruction of good men the eloquence bestowed by Nature for the safety and protection of our fellowmen? And yet, while we should never prosecute the innocent, we need not have scruples against undertaking on occasion the defence of a guilty person, provided he be not infamously depraved and wicked. For people expect it; custom sanctions it; humanity also accepts it. It is always the business of the judge in a trial to find out the truth; it is sometimes the business of the advocate to maintain what is plausible, even if it be not strictly true, though I should not venture to say this, especially in an ethical treatise, if it were not also the position of Panaetius, that strictest of Stoics. Then, too, briefs for the defence are most likely to bring glory and popularity to the pleader, and all the more so, if ever it falls to him to lend his aid to one who seems to be oppressed and persecuted by the influence of someone in power. This I have done on many other occasions; and once in particular, in my younger days, I defended Sextus Roscius of Ameria against the power of Lucius Sulla when he was acting the tyrant. The speech is published, as you know.
4. Cicero, Republic, 1.69, 6.13, 6.29 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.69. Quod ita cum sit, ex tribus primis generibus longe praestat mea sententia regium, regio autem ipsi praestabit id, quod erit aequatum et temperatum ex tribus optimis rerum publicarum modis. Placet enim esse quiddam in re publica praestans et regale, esse aliud auctoritati principum inpartitum ac tributum, esse quasdam res servatas iudicio voluntatique multitudinis. Haec constitutio primum habet aequabilitatem quandam magnam, qua carere diutius vix possunt liberi, deinde firmitudinem, quod et illa prima facile in contraria vitia convertuntur, ut existat ex rege dominus, ex optimatibus factio, ex populo turba et confusio, quodque ipsa genera generibus saepe conmutantur novis, hoc in hac iuncta moderateque permixta conformatione rei publicae non ferme sine magnis principum vitiis evenit. Non est enim causa conversionis, ubi in suo quisque est gradu firmiter collocatus et non subest, quo praecipitet ac decidat. 6.13. Sed quo sis, Africane, alacrior ad tutandam rem publicam, sic habeto: omnibus, qui patriam conservaverint, adiuverint, auxerint, certum esse in caelo definitum locum, ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruantur; nihil est enim illi principi deo, qui omnem mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, acceptius quam concilia coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur; harum rectores et conservatores hinc profecti huc revertuntur. 6.29. Hanc tu exerce optimis in rebus! sunt autem optimae curae de salute patriae, quibus agitatus et exercitatus animus velocius in hanc sedem et domum suam pervolabit; idque ocius faciet, si iam tum, cum erit inclusus in corpore, eminebit foras et ea, quae extra erunt, contemplans quam maxime se a corpore abstrahet. Namque eorum animi, qui se corporis voluptatibus dediderunt earumque se quasi ministros praebuerunt inpulsuque libidinum voluptatibus oboedientium deorum et hominum iura violaverunt, corporibus elapsi circum terram ipsam volutantur nec hunc in locum nisi multis exagitati saeculis revertuntur. Ille discessit; ego somno solutus sum.
5. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 31 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

31. for Homer is constantly in the habit of calling kings shepherds of their People. But nature has appropriated this appellation as more peculiarly belonging to the good, since the wicked are rather tended by others than occupied in serving them; for they are led captive by strong wine, and by beauty, and by delicate eating, and sweetmeats, and by the arts of cooks and confectioners, to say nothing of the thirst of gold, and silver, and other things of a higher character. But men of the other class are not allured or led astray by any thing, but are rather inclined to admonish those whom they perceive to be caught in the toils of pleasure. VI.
6. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 1.8, 1.13, 1.17, 1.21, 1.23, 1.28, 1.51, 1.57-1.72, 1.74-1.84, 2.6, 3.41, 3.45, 3.48, 3.87-3.90, 4.43-4.45, 27.4, 38.8, 45.3 (1st cent. CE

3.45.  The three most conspicuous forms of government — governments based on law and justice and enjoying the favour of heaven and fortune — are expressly named. One is the first to come into existence and the most practicable — that which forms the subject of the present address — where we have a city, or a number of peoples, or the whole world, well ordered by one good man's judgment and virtue; second, the so‑called "aristocracy 3.48.  To these forms of government — three in number, as I have said — are opposed three degenerate forms not based on law: The first is "tyranny," where one man's high-handed use of force is the ruin of others. Next comes oligarchy, harsh and unjust, arising from the aggrandizement of a certain few wealthy rascals at the expense of the needy masses. 27.4.  But the man that is gentle and has a properly ordered character, easily endures the rudeness of the others, and acts like a gentleman himself, trying to the best of his ability to bring the ignorant chorus into a proper demeanour by means of fitting rhythm and melody. And he introduces appropriate topics of conversation and by his tact and persuasiveness attempts to get those present to be more harmonious and friendly in their intercourse with one another. 45.3.  For what we have now obtained we might have had then, and we might have employed the present opportunity toward obtaining further grants. However that may be, when I had experienced at the hands of the present Emperor a benevolence and an interest in me whose magnitude those who were there know full well, though if I speak of it now I shall greatly annoy certain persons — and possibly the statement will not even seem credible, that one who met with such esteem and intimacy and friendship should have neglected all these things and have given them scant attention, having formed a longing for the confusion and bustle here at home, to put it mildly — for all that, I did not employ that opportunity or the goodwill of the Emperor for any selfish purpose, not even to a limited degree, for example toward restoring my ruined fortunes or securing some office or emolument, but anything that it was possible to obtain I turned in your direction and I had eyes only for the welfare of the city.
7. Epictetus, Discourses, 3.22.35 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Plutarch, Moralia, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Plutarch, Pericles, 1.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Plutarch, Sulla, 6.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Seneca The Younger, Apocolocyntosis, 8-9, 7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

12. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 1.13.2-1.13.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

13. Silius Italicus, Punica, 15.77-15.100 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

14. Lucian, The Dream, Or The Cock, 2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

15. Lucian, Hercules, 4 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

4. For a long time I stood staring at this in amazement: I knew not what to make of it, and was beginning to feel somewhat nettled, when I was addressed in admirable Greek by a Gaul who stood at my side, and who besides possessing a scholarly acquaintance with the Gallic mythology, proved to be not unfamiliar with our own. ‘Sir,’ he said, ‘I see this picture puzzles you: let me solve the riddle. We Gauls connect eloquence not with Hermes, as you do, but with the mightier Heracles. Nor need it surprise you to see him represented as an old man. It is the prerogative of eloquence, that it reaches perfection in old age; at least if we may believe your poets, who tell us thatYouth is the sport of every random gust,whereas old ageHath that to say that passes youthful wit.Thus we find that from Nestor’s lips honey is distilled; and that the words of the Trojan counsellors are compared to the lily, which, if I have not forgotten my Greek, is the name of a flower.
16. Lucian, Hermotimus, Or Sects, 47, 5, 7, 73, 29 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

29. Her . Much better so, Lycinus. However, I know that, if you go the whole round, you will find no better guides or more expert pilots than the Stoics; if you mean ever to get to Corinth, you will follow them, in the tracks of Chrysippus and Zeno. It is the only way to do it.Ly . Ah, many can play at the game of assertion. Plato's fellow traveller, Epicurus's follower, and all the rest, will tell me just what you do, that I shall never get to Corinth except with whichever of them it is. So I must either believe them all, or disbelieve impartially. The latter is much the safest, until we have found out the truth.
17. Lucian, The Sky-Man, 34 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

18. Lucian, The Dead Come To Life Or The Fisherman, 46 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
animal, sheep Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
antonines (emperors) Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
ascension Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
barbarian Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
biography, of rulers Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
body, nose Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
britain Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
caesar, c. iulius Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
citizenship Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
constantius ii, as julians nemesis Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
desire Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
dio chrysostom Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
dio chrysostom (of prusa) Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 55
dion of prousa Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
divine being, hera Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
divine being, heracles Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
divine being, hermes Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
divine being, zeus Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
economics, wealth Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
ekhthra (enmity) Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
equality Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
glory Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
government, forms of Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 55
greco-roman political theory, philosopher-adviser, ideal of Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
greek Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
hannibal Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
heracles Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 55; Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
hercules Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
hermes Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
homonoia Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
honor Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
imitation Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 55
interpretation, of history Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
interpretation, of myth Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
interpretation, of the emperors life Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
interpretation, politics of Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
julian, against the cynic heraclius Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
julian, and myth Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
julian, as agent of providence Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
julian, as interpreter Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
julian, as theologian Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
julian, life of, as evidence Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
julian, on the ideal of philosopher-ruler Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
julian, refuting the christian hermeneutics of history Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
julian, responding to constructions of constantine as philosopher-ruler Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
king, emperor, alexander the great Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
king, emperor, claudius Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
king, emperor, marcus aurelius Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
king, emperor, trajan Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
kingship Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 55
lykourgos of sparta Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
mithras Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
monarchy Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 55
mythography (allegorical) Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
nature, natural phenomena, cloud Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
nature, natural phenomena, earth, land Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
nature, natural phenomena, heaven, sky Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
paideia, display of Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
passion Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
philia, philoi Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
philosophy, stoic Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
philosophy Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
plutarch Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
politics Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
pompeius magnus, cn. Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
prousa (in bithynia) Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
punic wars, second Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
religion passim, apotheosis Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
religion passim, prayer Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
religion passim, temple, shrine Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
revelation Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
rhetoric, dialogue Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
rhetoric, imagery Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
rhetoric, metaphor Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
rhetoric, satire Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
rome, empire Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273
ruler Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 55
scipio africanus, imitatio of alexander the great by Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
scipio africanus, meeting with virtus and voluptas Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
silius italicus, and cicero Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
silius italicus, and ennius Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
silius italicus, and homer Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
silius italicus, and lucretius Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
silius italicus, and the tradition on kingship Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
silius italicus, nekyia in Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
stasis (factional conflict) Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
statues Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 55
tarsos Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 46
themistius, and dio chrysostom Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
trajan Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173
tyranny' Jażdżewska and Doroszewski,Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire (2024) 55
tyranny Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 274
underworld Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 318
virtue Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun, The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts (2014) 273, 274
zeus Niccolai, Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire (2023) 173