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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.82

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15 results
1. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 5.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5.26. quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente. 5.26.  Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs.
4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.25-1.62, 1.69, 1.82, 1.92, 1.95-1.96, 1.100, 1.118-1.119, 1.121, 1.123 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.25. So much, Lucilius, for the doctrines of your school. To show what the older systems are like, I will trace their history from the remotest of your predecessors. Thales of Miletus, who was the first person to investigate these matters, said that water was the first principle of things, but that god was the mind that moulded all things out of water — supposing that gods can exist without sensation; and why did he make mind an adjunct of water, if mind can exist by itself, devoid of body? The view of Anaximander is that the gods are not everlasting but are born and perish at long intervals of time, and that they are worlds, countless in number. But how we conceive of god save as living for ever? 1.26. Next, Anaximenes held that air is god, and that it has a beginning in time, and is immeasurable and infinite in extent, and is always in motion; just as if formless air could be god, especially seeing that it is proper to god to possess not merely some shape but the most beautiful shape; or as if anything that has had a beginning must not necessarily be mortal. Then there is Anaxagoras, the successor of Anaximenes; he was the first thinker to hold that the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and perfected by the rational power of an infinite mind. But in saying this he failed to see that there can be no such thing as sentient and continuous activity in that which is infinite, and that sensation in general can only occur when the subject itself becomes sentient by the impact of a sensation. Further, if he intended his infinite mind to be a definite living creature, it must have some inner principle of life to justify the name. But mind is itself the innermost principle. Mind therefore will have an outer integument of body. 1.27. But this Anaxagoras will not allow; yet mind naked and simple, without any material adjunct to serve as an organ of sensation, seems to elude the capacity of our understanding. Alcmaeon of Croton, who attributed divinity to the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, and also to the soul, did not perceive that he was bestowing immortality on things that are mortal. As for Pythagoras, who believed that the entire substance of the universe is penetrated and pervaded by a soul of which our souls are fragments, he failed to notice that this severance of the souls of men from the world-soul means the dismemberment and rending asunder of god; and that when their souls are unhappy, as happens to most men, then a portion of god is unhappy; which is impossible. 1.28. Again, if the soul of man is divine, why is it not omniscient? Moreover, if the Pythagorean god is pure soul, how is he implanted in, or diffused throughout, the world? Next, Xenophanes endowed the universe with mind, and held that, as being infinite, it was god. His view of mind is as open to objection as that of the rest; but on the subject of infinity he incurs still severer criticism, for the infinite can have no sensation and no contact with anything outside. As for Parmenides, he invents a purely fanciful something resembling a crown — stephanè is his name for it —, an unbroken ring of glowing lights, encircling the sky, which he entitles god; but no one can imagine this to possess divine form, or sensation. He also has many other portentous notions; he deifies war, strife, lust and the like, things which can be destroyed by disease or sleep or forgetfulness or lapse of time; and he also deifies the stars, but this has been criticized in another philosopher and need not be dealt with now in the case of Parmenides. 1.29. Empedocles again among many other blunders comes to grief most disgracefully in his theology. He assigns divinity to the four substances which in his system are the constituent elements of the universe, although manifestly these substances both come into and pass out of existence, and are entirely devoid of sensation. Protagoras also, who declares he has no clear views whatever about the gods, whether they exist or do not exist, or what they are like, seems to have no notion at all of the divine nature. Then in what a maze of error is Democritus involved, who at one moment ranks as gods his roving 'images,' at another the substance that emits and radiates these images, and at another again the scientific intelligence of man! At the same time his denial of immutability and therefore of eternity, to everything whatsoever surely involves a repudiation of deity so absolute as to leave no conception of a divine be remaining! Diogenes of Apollonia makes air a god; but how can air have sensation, or divinity in any shape? 1.30. The inconsistencies of Plato are a long story. In the Timaeus he says that it is impossible to name the father of this universe; and in the Laws he deprecates all inquiry into the nature of the deity. Again, he holds that god is entirely incorporeal (in Greek, asomatos); but divine incorporeity is inconceivable, for an incorporeal deity would necessarily be incapable of sensation, and also of practical wisdom, and of pleasure, all of which are attributes essential to our conception of deity. Yet both in the Timaeus and the Laws he says that the world, the sky, the stars, the earth and our souls are gods, in addition to those in whom we have been taught to believe; but it is obvious that these propositions are both inherently false and mutually destructive. 1.31. Xenophon also commits almost the same errors, though in fewer words; for in his memoir of the sayings of Socrates he represents Socrates as arguing that it is wrong to inquire about the form of god, but also as saying that both the sun and the soul are god, and as speaking at one moment of a single god and at another of several: utterances that involve almost the same mistakes as do those which we quoted from Plato. 1.32. Antisthenes also, in his book entitled The Natural Philosopher, says that while there are many gods of popular belief, there is one god in nature, so depriving divinity of all meaning or substance. Very similarly Speusippus, following his uncle Plato, and speaking of a certain force that governs all things and is endowed with life, does his best to root out the notion of deity from our minds altogether. 1.33. And Aristotle in the Third Book of his Philosophy has a great many confused notions, not disagreeing with the doctrines of his master Plato; at one moment he assigns divinity exclusively to the intellect, at another he says that the world is itself a god, then again he puts some other being over the world, and assigns to this being the rôle of regulating and sustaining the world-motion by means of a sort of inverse rotation; then he says that the celestial heat is god — not realizing that the heavens are a part of that world which elsewhere he himself has entitled god. But how could the divine consciousness which he assigns to the heavens persist in a state of such rapid motion? Where moreover are all the gods of accepted belief, if we count the heavens also as a god? Again, in maintaining that god is incorporeal, he robs him entirely of sensation, and also of wisdom. Moreover, how is motion possible for an incorporeal being, and how, if he is always in motion, can he enjoy tranquillity and bliss? 1.34. Nor was his fellow-pupil Xenocrates any wiser on this subject. His volumes On the Nature of the Gods give no intelligible account of the divine form; for he states that there are eight gods: five inhabiting the planets, and in a state of motion; one consisting of all the fixed stars, which are to be regarded as separate members constituting a single deity; seventh he adds the sun, and eighth the moon. But what sensation of bliss these things can enjoy it is impossible to conceive. Another member of the school of Plato, Heracleides of Pontus, filled volume after volume with childish fictions; at one moment he deems the world divine, at another the intellect; he also assigns divinity to the planets, and holds that the deity is devoid of sensation and mutable of form; and again in the same volume he reckons earth and sky as gods. 1.35. Theophrastus also is intolerably inconsistent; at one moment he assigns divine pre‑eminence to mind, at another to the heavens, and then again to the constellations and stars in the heavens. Nor is his pupil, Strato, surnamed the Natural Philosopher, worthy of attention; in his view the sole repository of divine power is nature, which contains in itself the causes of birth, growth and decay, but is entirely devoid of sensation and of form. 1.36. Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno's view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a 'reason' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. 1.37. Zeno's pupil Aristo holds equally mistaken views. He thinks that the form of the deity cannot be comprehended, and he denies the gods sensation, and in fact is uncertain whether god is a living being at all. Cleanthes, who attended Zeno's lectures at the same time as the last-named, at one moment says that the world itself is god, at another gives this name to the mind and soul of the universe, and at another decides that the most unquestionable deity is that remote all‑surrounding fiery atmosphere called the aether, which encircles and embraces the universe on its outer side at an exceedingly lofty altitude; while in the books that he wrote to combat hedonism he babbles like one demented, now imagining gods of some definite shape and form, now assigning full divinity to the stars, now pronouncing that nothing is more divine than reason. The result is that the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence, and desire to make to correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression, has utterly and entirely vanished. 1.38. Persaeus, another pupil of Zeno, says that men have deified those persons who have made some discovery of special utility for civilization, and that useful and health-giving things have themselves been called by divine names; he did not even say that they were discoveries of the gods, but speaks of them as actually divine. But what could be more ridiculous than to award divine honours to things mean and ugly, or to give the rank of gods to men now dead and gone, whose worship could only take the form of lamentation? 1.39. Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. 1.40. He also argues that the god whom men call Jupiter is the aether, and that Neptune is the air which permeates the sea, and the goddess called Ceres the earth; and he deals in the same way with the whole series of the names of the other gods. He also identifies Jupiter with the mighty Law, everlasting and eternal, which is our guide of life and instructress in duty, and which he entitles Necessity or Fate, and the Everlasting Truth of future events; none of which conceptions is of such a nature as to be deemed to possess divinity. 1.41. This is what is contained in his Nature of the Gods, Book I. In Book II he aims at reconciling the myths of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer with his own theology as enunciated in Book I, and so makes out that even the earliest poets of antiquity, who had no notion of these doctrines, were really Stoics. In this he is followed by Diogenes of Babylon, who in his book entitled Minerva rationalizes the myth of the birth of the virgin goddess from Jove by explaining it as an allegory of the processes of nature. 1.42. I have given a rough account of what are more like the dreams of madmen than the considered opinions of philosophers. For they are little less absurd than the outpourings of the poets, harmful as these have been owing to the mere charm of their style. The poets have represented the gods as inflamed by anger and maddened by lust, and have displayed to our gaze their wars and battles, their fights and wounds, their hatreds, enmities and quarrels, their births and deaths, their complaints and lamentations, the utter and unbridled licence of their passions, their adulteries and imprisonments, their unions with human beings and the birth of mortal progeny from an immortal parent. 1.43. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some 'preconception' of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgement. 1.44. You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the uimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) 1.45. We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that 'that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favour, since all such things belong only to the weak.' "If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshipping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man's pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favour alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence. 1.46. For the divine form we have the hints of nature supplemented by the teachings of reason. From nature all men of all races derive the notion of gods as having human shape and none other; for in what other shape do they ever appear to anyone, awake or asleep? But not to make primary concepts the sole test of all things, reason itself delivers the same pronouncement. 1.47. For it seems appropriate that the being who is the most exalted, whether by reason of his happiness or his eternity, should also be the most beautiful; but what disposition of the limbs, what cast of features, what shape or outline can be more beautiful than the human form? You Stoics at least, Lucilius, (for my friend Cotta says one thing at one time and another at another) are wont to portray the skill of the divine creator by enlarging on the beauty as well as the utility of design displayed in all parts of the human figure. 1.48. But if the human figure surpasses the form of all other living beings, and god is a living being, god must possess the shape which is the most beautiful of all; and since it is agreed that the gods are supremely happy, and no one can be happy without virtue, and virtue cannot exist without reason, and reason is only found in the human shape, it follows that the gods possess the form of man. 1.49. Yet their form is not corporeal, but only resembles bodily substance; it does not contain blood, but the semblance of blood. "These discoveries of Epicurus are so acute in themselves and so subtly expressed that not everyone would be capable of appreciating them. Still I may rely on your intelligence, and make my exposition briefer than the subject demands. Epicurus then, as he not merely discerns abstruse and recondite things with his mind's eye, but handles them as tangible realities, teaches that the substance and nature of the gods is such that, in the first place, it is perceived not by the senses but by the mind, and not materially or individually, like the solid objects which Epicurus in virtue of their substantiality entitles steremnia; but by our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods, our minds with the keenest feelings of pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of the nature of a being both blessed and eternal. 1.50. Moreover there is the supremely potent principle of infinity, which claims the closest and most careful study; we must understand that it has the following property, that in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart. This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals, and if the causes of destruction are beyond count, the causes of conservation also are bound to be infinite. "You Stoics are also fond of asking us, Balbus, what is the mode of life of the gods and how they pass their days. 1.51. The answer is, their life is the happiest conceivable, and the one most bountifully furnished with all good things. God is entirely inactive and free from all ties of occupation; he toils not neither does he labour, but he takes delight in his own wisdom and virtue, and knows with absolute certainty that he will always enjoy pleasures at once consummate and everlasting. 1.52. This is the god whom we should call happy in the proper sense of the term; your Stoic god seems to us to be grievously overworked. If the world itself is god, what can be less restful than to revolve at incredible speed round the axis of the heavens without a single moment of respite? but repose is an essential condition of happiness. If on the other hand some god resides within the world as its governor and pilot, maintaining the courses of the stars, the changes of the seasons and all the ordered process of creation, and keeping a watch on land and sea to guard the interests and lives of men, why, what a bondage of irksome and laborious business is his! 1.53. We for our part deem happiness to consist in tranquillity of mind and entire exemption from all duties. For he who taught us all the rest has also taught us that the world was made by nature, without needing an artificer to construct it, and that the act of creation, which according to you cannot be performed without divine skill, is so easy, that nature will create, is creating and has created worlds without number. You on the contrary cannot see how nature can achieve all this without the aid of some intelligence, and so, like the tragic poets, being unable to bring the plot of your drama to a dénouement, you have recourse to a god; 1.54. whose intervention you assuredly would not require if you would but contemplate the measureless and boundless extent of space that stretches in every direction, into which when the mind projects and propels itself, it journeys onward far and wide without ever sighting any margin or ultimate point where it can stop. Well then, in this immensity of length and breadth and height there flits an infinite quantity of atoms innumerable, which though separated by void yet cohere together, and taking hold each of another form unions wherefrom are created those shapes and forms of things which you think cannot be created without the aid of bellows and anvils, and so have saddled us with an eternal master, whom day and night we are to fear; for who would not fear a prying busybody of a god, who foresees and thinks of and notices all things, and deems that everything is his concern? 1.55. An outcome of this theology was first of all your doctrine of Necessity or Fate, heimarmenē, as you termed it, the theory that every event is the result of an eternal truth and an unbroken sequence of causation. But what value can be assigned to a philosophy which thinks that everything happens by fate? it is a belief for old women, and ignorant old women at that. And next follows your doctrine of mantikē, or Divination, which would so steep us in superstition, if we consented to listen to you, that we should be the devotees of soothsayers, augurs, oracle-mongers, seers and interpreters of dreams. 1.56. But Epicurus has set us free from superstitious terrors and delivered us out of captivity, so that we have no fear of beings who, we know, create no trouble for themselves and seek to cause none to others, while we worship with pious reverence the transcendent majesty of nature. "But I fear that enthusiasm for my subject has made me prolix. It was difficult however to leave so vast and splendid a theme unfinished, although really it was not my business to be a speaker so much as a listener. 1.57. Then Cotta took up the discussion. "Well, Velleius," he rejoined, with his usual suavity, "unless you had stated a case, you certainly would have had no chance of hearing anything from me. I always find it much easier to think of arguments to prove a thing false than to prove it true. This often happens to me, and did so just now while I was listening to you. Ask me what I think that the divine nature is like, and very probably I shall make no reply; but inquire whether I believe that it resembles the description of it which you have just given, and I shall say that nothing seems to me less likely. But before proceeding to examine your arguments, I will give my opinion of yourself. 1.58. I fancy I have often heard that friend of yours [Lucius Crassus] declare that of all the Roman adherents of Epicureanism he placed you unquestionably first, and that few of those from Greece could be ranked beside you; but knowing his extraordinary esteem for you, I imagined that he was speaking with the partiality of a friend. I myself however, though reluctant to praise you to your face, must nevertheless pronounce that your exposition of an obscure and difficult theme has been most illuminating, and not only exhaustive in its treatment of the subject, but also graced with a charm of style not uncommon in your school. 1.59. When at Athens, I frequently attended the discourses of Zeno, whom our friend Philo used to call the leader of the Epicurean choir; in fact it was Philo who suggested that I should go to him — no doubt in order that I might be better able to judge how completely the Epicurean doctrine may be refuted when I had heard an exposition of it from the head of the school. Now Zeno, unlike most Epicureans, had a style as clear, cogent and elegant as your own. But what often occurred to me in his case happened just now while I was listening to you: I felt annoyed that talents so considerable should have chanced to select (if you will forgive my saying it) so trivial, not to say so stupid, a set of doctrines. 1.60. Not that I propose at the moment to contribute something better of my own. As I said just now, in almost all subjects, but especially in natural philosophy, I am more ready to say what is not true than what is. Inquire of me as to the being and nature of god, and I shall follow the example of Simonides, who having the same question put to him by the great Hiero, requested a day's grace for consideration; next day, when Hiero repeated the question, he asked for two days, and so went on several times multiplying the number of days by two; and when Hiero in surprise asked why he did so, he replied, 'Because the longer I deliberate the more obscure the matter seems to me.' But Simonides is recorded to have been not only a charming poet but also a man of learning and wisdom in other fields, and I suppose that so many acute and subtle ideas came into his mind that he could not decide which of them was truest, and therefore despaired of truth altogether. 1.61. But as for your master Epicurus (for I prefer to join issue with him rather than with yourself), which of his utterances is, I do not say worthy of philosophy, but compatible with ordinary common sense? "In an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first question that we ask is, do the gods exist or do they not? 'It is difficult to deny their existence.' No doubt it would be if the question were to be asked in a public assembly, but in private conversation and in a company like the present it is perfectly easy. This being so, I, who am a high priest, and who hold it to be a duty most solemnly to maintain the rights and doctrines of the established religion, should be glad to be convinced of this fundamental tenet of the divine existence, not as an article of faith merely but as an ascertained fact. For many disturbing reflections occur to my mind, which sometimes make me think that there are no gods at all. 1.62. But mark how generously I deal with you. I will not attack those tenets which are shared by your school with all other philosophers — for example the one in question, since almost all men, and I myself no less than any other, believe that the gods exist, and this accordingly I do not challenge. At the same time I doubt the adequacy of the argument which you adduce to prove it. You said that a sufficient reason for our admitting that the gods exist was the fact that all the nations and races of mankind believe it. But argument is both inconclusive and untrue. In the first place, how do you know what foreign races believe? For my part I think that there are many nations so uncivilized and barbarous as to have no notion of any gods at all. 1.69. This is a very common practice with your school. You advance a paradox, and then, when you want to escape censure, you adduce in support of it some absolute impossibility; so that you would have done better to abandon the point in dispute rather than to offer so shameless a defence. For instance, Epicurus saw that if the atoms travelled downwards by their own weight, we should have no freedom of the will, since the motion of the atoms would be determined by necessity. He therefore invented a device to escape from determinism (the point had apparently escaped the notice of Democritus): he said that the atom while travelling vertically downward by the force of gravity makes a very slight swerve to the side. 1.82. For we have often seen temples robbed and images of gods carried off from the holiest shrines by our fellow-countrymen, but no one ever even heard of an Egyptian laying profane hands on a crocodile or ibis or cat. What therefore do you infer? that the Egyptians do not believe their sacred bull Apis to be a god? Precisely as much as you believe the Saviour Juno of your native place to be a goddess. You never see her even in your dreams unless equipped with goat-skin, spear, buckler and slippers turned up at the toe. Yet that is not the aspect of the Argive Juno, nor of the Roman. It follows that Juno has one form for the Argives, another for the people of Lanuvium, and another for us. And indeed our Jupiter of the Capitol is not the same as the Africans' Juppiter Ammon. 1.92. Did you think they were all out of their minds because they pronounced that god can exist without hands or feet? Does not even a consideration of the adaptation of man's limbs to their functions convince you that the gods do not require human limbs? What need is there for feet without walking, or for hands if nothing has to be grasped, or for the rest of the list of the various parts of the body, in which nothing is useless, nothing without a reason, nothing superfluous, so that no art can imitate the cunning of nature's handiwork? It seems then that god will have a tongue, and will not speak; teeth, a palate, a throat, for no use; the organs that nature has attached to the body for the purpose of procreation — these god will possess, but to no purpose; and not only the external but also the internal organs, the heart, lungs, liver and the rest, which if they are not useful are assuredly not beautiful — since your school holds that god possesses bodily parts because of their beauty. 1.95. As for your saying that the gods are male and female, well, you must see what the consequence of that will be. For my part, I am at a loss to imagine how your great founder arrived at such notions. All the same you never cease vociferating that we must on no account relinquish the divine happiness and immortality. But what prevents god from being happy without having two legs? and why cannot your 'beatitude' or 'beatity,' whichever form we are to use — and either is certainly a hard mouthful, but words have to be softened by use — but whatever it is, why can it not apply to the sun yonder, or to this world of ours, or to some eternal intelligence devoid of bodily shape and members? 1.96. Your only answer is: 'I have never seen a happy sun or world.' Well, but have you ever seen any other world but this one? No, you will reply. Then why did you venture to assert the existence of, not thousands and thousands, but a countless number of worlds? 'That is what reason teaches.' Then will not reason teach you that when we seek to find a being who shall be supremely excellent, and happy and eternal as well — and nothing else constitutes divinity —, even as that being will surpass us in immortality, so also will it surpass us in mental excellence, and even as in mental excellence, so also in bodily. Why then, if we are inferior to god in all else, are we his equals in form? for man came nearer to the divine image in virtue than in outward aspect. 1.100. Then you censured those who argued from the splendour and the beauty of creation, and who, observing the world itself, and the parts of the world, the sky and earth and sea, and the sun, moon and stars that adorn them, and discovering the laws of the seasons and their periodic successions, conjectured that there must exist some supreme and transcendent being who had created these things, and who imparted motion to them and guided and governed them. Though this guess may be wide of the mark, I can see what they are after; but as for you, what mighty masterpiece pray do you adduce as apparently the creation of divine intelligence, leading you to conjecture that gods exist? 'We have an idea of god implanted in our minds,' you say. Yes, and an idea of Jupiter with a beard, and Minerva in a helmet; but do you therefore believe that those deities are really like that? 1.118. Take again those who have asserted that the entire notion of the immortal gods is a fiction invented by wise men in the interest of the state, to the end that those whom reason was powerless to control might be led in the path of duty by religion; surely this view was absolutely and entirely destructive of religion. Or Prodicus of Ceos,',WIDTH,)" onmouseout="nd();"º who said that the gods were personifications of things beneficial to the life of man — pray what religion was left by his theory? 1.119. Or those who teach that brave or famous or powerful men have been deified after death, and that it is these who are the real objects of the worship, prayers and adoration which we are accustomed to offer — are not they entirely devoid of all sense of religion? This theory was chiefly developed by Euhemerus, who was translated and imitated especially by our poet Ennius. Yet Euhemerus describes the death and burial of certain gods; are we then to think of him as upholding religion, or rather as utterly and entirely destroying it? I say nothing of the holy and awe‑inspiring sanctuary of Eleusis, Where tribes from earth's remotest confines seek Initiation, and I pass over Samothrace and those occult mysteries Which throngs of worshippers at dead of night In forest coverts deep do celebrate at Lemnos, since such mysteries when interpreted and rationalized prove to have more to do with natural science than with theology. 1.121. for who could form a mental picture of such images? who could adore them and deem them worthy of worship or reverence? "Epicurus however, in abolishing divine beneficence and divine benevolence, uprooted and exterminated all religion from the human heart. For while asserting the supreme goodness and excellence of the divine nature, he yet denies to god the attribute of benevolence — that is to say, he does away with that which is the most essential element of supreme goodness and excellence. For what can be better or more excellent than kindness and beneficence? Make out god to be devoid of either, and you make him devoid of all love, affection or esteem for any other being, human or divine. It follows not merely that the gods do not care for mankind, but that they have no care for one another. How much more truth there is in the Stoics, whom you censure! They hold that all wise men are friends, even when strangers to each other, since nothing is more lovable than virtue, and he that attains to it will have our esteem in whatever country he dwells. 1.123. Epicurus is making fun of us, though he is not so much a humorist as a loose and careless writer. For how can holiness exist if the gods pay no heed to man's affairs? Yet what is the meaning of an animate being that pays no heed to anything? "It is doubtless therefore truer to say, as the good friend of us all, Posidonius, argued in the fifth book of his On the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus does not really believe in the gods at all, and that he said what he did about the immortal gods only for the sake of deprecating popular odium. Indeed he could not have been so senseless as really to imagine god to be like a feeble human being, but resembling him only in outline and surface, not in solid substance, and possessing all man's limbs but entirely incapable of using them, an emaciated and transparent being, showing no kindness or beneficence to anybody, caring for nothing and doing nothing at all. In the first place, a being of this nature is an absolute impossibility, and Epicurus was aware of this, and so actually abolishes the gods, although professedly retaining them.
5. Cicero, On Duties, 5.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.7-1.8, 1.11, 1.14, 1.26, 1.77-1.78, 1.119, 2.13-2.14, 3.7, 3.13, 4.7-4.8, 4.58-4.59, 5.11, 5.50, 5.73-5.81, 5.119 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.7. Sed ut Aristoteles, vir summo ingenio, scientia, scientia scientiae X -a pro -ae in r. V 2 copia, cum motus cum motus H commotus GKRV sed cũ supra com V 2 esset Isocratis isocratis V 2 s socratis X rhetoris gloria, dicere docere etiam coepit adulescentes docere s om. X post adulescentes add. decere V 2 et prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere, sic nobis placet nec pristinum dicendi studium deponere et in hac maiore et uberiore arte versari. hanc haen c R 1 enim perfectam philosophiam semper iudicavi, quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere; in quam exercitationem ita nos studiose operam dedimus, del. Mur. operam inpendimus Dav. ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus. audeamus V (a in r. c ) ut nuper tuum post discessum in Tusculano cum essent complures cumplures G 1 R 1 (corr. ipsi) mecum familiares, temptavi, quid in eo genere possem. possem V 2 g possim X ( cf. auderemus v. 20 ) ut enim antea declamitabam causas, quod nemo me diutius fecit, sic haec mihi nunc senilis est declamatio. ponere iubebam, de quo quis audire vellet; ad id aut at id X (at id sed. ex aut id aut sed. K c ) sedens aut ambulans disputabam. 1.8. itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. fiebat autem ita ut, cum is his G 1 V 1 H qui audire audiri X ( corr. V 2 l e ss. K 2 ) vellet dixisset, quid quod K 1 V 2 sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et et om. V 1 add. 2 Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Philosophia ... 221, 7 narretur H (27 fieri 220, 5 litteris et 220,13 adulescentes 220, 18 dicere bis ) ergo ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c ita nascetur exordium: Malum ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c mihi videtur esse mors. 1.11. Atqui pleni libri sunt contra ista ipsa disserentium dissenentium G 1 (dissotium corr. G 1? ) RV 1 ( corr. ipse? ) diserentium K philosophorum. Inepte sane. quis enim est est om. K 1, add. c tam excors, quem ista moveant? commoveant V 2 Si ergo apud inferos miseri non sunt, ne sunt quidem apud inferos ulli. Ita prorsus prossus G existimo. Ubi sunt Inde ab ubi - 223, 24 iam sunt multa in K madore corrupta ergo i, quos miseros dicis, aut quem locum incolunt? si enim sunt, nusquam esse non possunt. Ego vero nusquam esse illos puto. Igitur ne esse quidem? Prorsus isto modo, et tamen miseros miseros cf. Serv. Aen. 4, 20 ob id ipsum quidem, quidem om. K quia nulli sint. 1.14. in primis enim hoc traditur: omne pronuntiatum pronuntiatum eqs. Gell. 16, 8, 8 (Hier. adv. Rufin. 1, 486) (sic sic ex si V c enim mihi in praesentia occurrit ut appellarem a)ci/wma a Il w m a R aciwML V, sed praeter 1. a omnia i. r. V c azioma K azi w ma G 1, utar post alio, si invenero alio si inv. V ( dist. 2? ) alios et inv. GKR melius) —id ergo est pronuntiatum, quod est verum aut falsum. cum igitur dicis: miser M. Crassus, aut hoc dicis: miser est Crassus, ut possit iudicari, verum id falsumne sit, aut nihil dicis omnino. Age, iam concedo non eos s. non add. V 2 sunt V esse miseros, qui mortui sint, quoniam extorsisti, ut faterer, qui omnino non essent, eos ne ne s. v. K 1 miseros quidem esse posse. quid? quid ecce K ante ecce adscr. m (= magister ) K 2, post esse d ( disc. ) K ree qui vivimus, cum moriendum sit, nonne miseri sumus? quae enim potest in vita esse iucunditas, cum dies et noctes cogitandum sit iam iamque esse moriendum? Ecquid ecqui X( W ?) ergo intellegis, quantum mali de humana condicione deieceris? 1.26. Expone igitur, nisi molestum est, primum, si potes, potest G 1 animos remanere post mortem, tum, si minus id obtinebis obtenebis GR 1 V —est enim arduum—, docebis carere omni malo mortem. ego enim istuc ipsum vereor ne ne me G malum sit non dico carere sensu, sed carendum esse. Auctoribus quidem ad istam sententiam, quam vis obtineri, uti optimis optineri V possumus, quod in omnibus causis et debet et solet valere plurimum, et primum quidem omni antiquitate, quae quo propius propius opius in r. V c aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse quae erant vera vera ss. K c veru ( aaper- tum! ) in vera corr. R cernebant. cercebant G 1 (corr. ipse) R cernebant K cerneba t V (-bat s ) Itaque unum illud erat insitum priscis illis, quos cascos cassos R cassus K 1 ann. 24 appellat Ennius, esse in morte sensum neque excessu vitae sic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret; 1.77. catervae veniunt contra dicentium, nec solum Epicureorum, quos equidem non despicio, despatio K 1 sed nescio quo modo doctissimus quisque contemnit, del. Man. acerrume accerume X ( r radd. V c ) autem deliciae meae Dicaearchus contra hanc inmortalitatem imm. GR disseruit. is enim tris libros scripsit, qui Lesbiaci lesbaici K vocantur quod Mytilenis mitilenis RV mityl, G mittil, K sermo habetur, in quibus volt efficere animos esse mortalis. Stoici autem usuram nobis largiuntur tamquam cornicibus: diu mansuros esse post mansuros add. V 2 aiunt animos, semper negant. num non non no V 1 ne V c N (= non) in r. G 1 ita s ista X (unde postea sint V rec ) vis igitur audire, cur, etiamsi ita sit, mors tamen non sit in malis? Ut videtur, sed me nemo de inmortalitate depellet. Laudo id quidem, etsi nihil nimis animis X ( sed a del. V 2 ) oportet confidere; 1.78. movemur enim saepe aliquo acute concluso, labamus mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas. id igitur si acciderit, simus siminus GKR 1 (corr. 1? ) V 1 (corr. 2 ) armati. Sane quidem, sed ne accidat, accidit K 1 V 1 providebo. Num quid igitur est causae, quin quin ex qui K 2 amicos nostros Stoicos dimittamus? eos dico, qui aiunt manere animos, cum e corpore excesserint, excesserint add. K 2 sed non semper. Istos vero qui, quod tota in hac causa difficillimum est, suscipiant, posse animum manere corpore vacantem, illud autem, quod non modo facile ad credendum est, sed eo concesso, quod volunt, consequens, id vero id vero Kl. idcirco (id non concedant Mdv. ) non dant, ut, cum diu permanserit, ne intereat. 1.119. quo utinam velis passis pas is K 1 (expansis ss. 2 ) V 1 pervehi liceat! sin reflantibus sinereflantibus X sed prius e eras. in V (sine refl. dist. in G et postea in KR) ventis reiciemur, tamen eodem eodem ex eadem K 1 R 1 paulo tardius referamur necesse est. quod autem omnibus necesse est, idne miserum misterium in miserum corr. K 2 esse uni potest? Habes epilogum, ne quid praetermissum aut relictum putes. Ego vero, et quidem et qui idem GR 1 ( in hoc alterum i linea deletum, tum iterum punctis ornatum ab R 2, qui etiam supra et scripsit; voluit ut v. atqui idem) fecit etiam iste me epilogus firmiorem. Optime, inquam. sed nunc quidem valetudini valitudini KR c tribuamus aliquid, cras autem et quot quot s quos X dies erimus in Tusculano, agamus haec et ea potissimum, quae levationem habeant aegritudinum formidinum cupiditatum, qui omnis philosophiae omni philosophia X (phil ophia V 1 ) omnis philosophiae V 2 aut c ex omni ph. K 2 est fructus uberrimus. 2.13. Nullum vero id quidem argumentum est. nam ut agri non omnes frugiferi sunt qui coluntur, falsumque illud Acci: Accius Atr. 234 Accii Probae Mur. acimprobe RK (acĭ pbe) acinprobe GV Probae falsumque ... probae om. H e/tsi in segetem su/nt deteriore/m datae Fruge/s, tamen ipsae ipse KR sua/pte natura natura alt. a in r. G 1 nature nitent K 1 e/nitent, sic animi non omnes culti fructum cultum fructi R 1 ferunt. atque, ut ut add. G 1 in eodem simili verser, ut ager quamvis fertilis sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus; ita est utraque res sine altera debilis. cultura autem animi philosophia est; haec extrahit vitia radicitus et praeparat properat K 1 animos ad satus accipiendos eaque mandat mandat s mundat X is et, ut ita dicam, serit, quae adulta fructus uberrimos ferant. nam... 16 ferant H Agamus igitur, ut coepimus. dic, si vis, de quo disputari velis. 2.14. Dolorem existimo maxumum malorum omnium. Etiamne maius quam dedecus? decus X corr. K 2 R c V c Non audeo id dicere equidem, equidem Ha. quidem (id quidem dicere We. ) et me pudet tam cito de sententia esse deiectum. Magis esset esse X corr. K 2 R c? V c ) pudendum, si in sententia permaneres. quid enim minus est dignum minus est indignum K 1 minus te dignum V (te in r. V c ) quam tibi peius quicquam videri dedecore flagitio turpitudine? quae ut effugias, quis est non modo recusandus, sed non ultro adpetendus app. KV 2? subeundus excipiendus dolor? Ita prorsus existimo. non ultro ... 287,1 existimo Char. GL. I 211,24 (sed sub. et exc. d. est) non om. V 1 add. 2 quare ne sit sane sane om. K summum malum dolor, malum certe est. Videsne igitur, quantum breviter admonitus de doloris terrore deieceris? deiceris V 1 deieceris K sed alt. e del. 2 3.7. ut enim in Academiam nostram descendimus inclinato iam in postmeridianum tempus die, poposci eorum aliquem, qui aderant, aliquid quid adherant G 1 causam disserendi. tum res acta sic est: Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo. Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines libidines add. G 2 iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, eiusmodi V ( ss. c ) quae Graeci pa/qh pathe X appellant; ego poteram morbos, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, relique ... 29 usitate ( libere ) H uisit. G 1 ( sic etiam 322, 10; 325,16 ) nisi quid aliud tibi videtur. Mihi vero isto modo. 3.13. sed videamus ne haec oratio sit hominum adsentantium nostrae inbecillitati et indulgentium mollitudini; nos autem audeamus non solum ramos amputare miseriarum, sed omnis radicum fibras fybras X evellere. tamen aliquid relinquetur fortasse; ita sunt altae alta GKV ( corr. 2? ) H stirpes stultitiae; sed relinquetur id solum quod erit necessarium. Illud quidem sic habeto, nisi sanatus animus sit, quod sine philosophia fieri non potest, finem miseriarum nullum fore. sed... 15 fore quam ob rem, quoniam coepimus, tradamus nos ei curandos: sanabimur, si volemus. et progrediar quidem longius: non enim de aegritudine solum, quamquam id quidem quidem in mg. add. R c primum, sed de omni animi, ut ego posui, perturbatione, morbo, ut Graeci volunt, explicabo. et primo, si placet, Stoicorum more agamus, qui breviter astringere solent argumenta; deinde nostro instituto vagabimur. 4.7. post Amafinium ammafinius K 1 ( alt. m eras. ) autem multi eiusdem aemuli rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt, quodque maxumum argumentum est non dici illa subtiliter, sumtiliter GV 1 quod et tam et tam Dav. etiam X facile ediscantur et ab indoctis probentur, id illi firmamentum esse disciplinae putant. Sed defendat, quod quod s V rec quo X quisque sentit; sunt enim iudicia libera: nos institutum tenebimus nullisque nulliusque Bentl. sed cf. 441, 25 unius disciplinae legibus adstricti, quibus in philosophia necessario pareamus, quid sit in quaque re maxime probabile, semper requiremus. requiremus cf. nat. deor. 2, 96 quod cum saepe alias, tum nuper in Tusculano studiose egimus. itaque expositis tridui disputationibus discipulationibus G 1 quartus dies hoc libro concluditur. ut enim in inferiorem ambulationem descendimus, quod feceramus idem superioribus diebus, acta res est sic: Dicat, si quis volt, qua de re disputari velit. 4.8. Non mihi videtur omni omnia X corr. K 2 R 1 V() animi perturbatione posse sapiens vacare. Aegritudine aegritudine V quidem hesterna disputatione videbatur, nisi forte temporis causa nobis nobis s novis Gr. novi X (nōvi V rec ) adsentiebare. absenti abare G ( et 2) asentiabare R 1 ( ass. 2? ) asentiabaere V 1 assentiebare KV rec Minime vero; nam mihi egregie aegregiae X (agr- V 1 -ie G) probata est oratio tua. Non igitur existumas cadere in sapientem aegritudinem? Prorsus non arbitror. Atqui, si ista perturbare animum sapientis non potest, nulla poterit. quid enim? metusne conturbet? at at s et X earum rerum est absentium metus, quarum praesentium est aegritudo; sublata et sublatus KR igitur aegritudine sublatus est metus. restant duae perturbationes, laetitia gestiens et libido; quae si non cadent in sapientem, semper semper K c ex sip mens erit tranquilla sapientis. 4.58. Sed quoniam suspicor te non tam de sapiente quam de te ipso quaerere—illum enim putas omni perturbatione esse liberum, te vis—, videamus, quanta sint sint V 3 s sit X quae a a B 2 M 2 s om. X philosophia remedia morbis animorum adhibeantur. est enim quaedam medicina certe, nec tam fuit hominum generi infensa atque inimica natura, ut corporibus tot res salutaris, animis nullam nulla GKR nullas V sed s fort. postea additum nullam s invenerit; de quibus hoc etiam est est om. R 1 merita melius, quod corporum adiumenta adhibentur extrinsecus, animorum salus inclusa in is ipsis est. sed quo maior est in eis praestantia et divinior, eo maiore indigent indigent s indiget X diligentia. itaque bene adhibita ratio cernit, quid quod K 1 optumum sit, neglecta neclecta hic X multis implicatur implicabitur K ( def. Ro b b. p. 100 ft. recte ) erroribus. 4.59. ad te at V 1 igitur mihi iam convertenda omnis oratio est; simulas enim quaerere te de sapiente, quaeris autem fortasse de te. Earum eorum s earum X igitur perturbationum, quas exposui, variae sunt curationes. nam neque omnis aegritudo una ratione sedatur sadatur V (alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti aut invidenti adhibenda adhibenda add. G 2 medicina); est etiam in omnibus quattuor perturbationibus illa distinctio, utrum ad universam perturbationem, quae est aspernatio rationis aut aut V adpetitus vehementior, an ad singulas, ut ad metum lubidinem libid. K 1 V reliquas reliquas V 1 (que add. 3 ) reliquias GKR melius adhibeatur oratio, et utrum illudne non videatur aegre ferundum, ex quo suscepta sit aegritudo, an omnium rerum tollenda tollenda s toleranda X omnino omni V 1 aegritudo, ut, si quis aegre ferat se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse, an hominem aegre ferre nihil oportere. nimirum hoc melius, ne, si si add. K c forte de paupertate non persuaseris, sit aegritudini concedendum; aegritudine autem sublata propriis rationibus, quibus heri usi sumus, quodam modo etiam paupertatis malum tollitur. 5.11. cuius multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo Platonis memoria et litteris consecrata plura genera effecit effecit s efficit X dissentientium philosophorum, e quibus nos id potissimum consecuti consecuti con del. V 2 sumus, quo Socratem usum arbitrabamur, arbitramur V 2 s ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus et in omni disputatione, quid esset simillimum veri, quaereremus. quaeremus G 1 K quem morem moyerem G 2 cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias saepe et nuper in Tusculano, ut ad eam eam ( del. c ) R consuetudinem disputaremus. et quadridui quidem sermonem superioribus ad ad a R missimus G 1 K te perscriptum libris misimus, quinto autem die cum eodem in loco consedissemus, sic est propositum, de quo disputaremus: 5.50. quod si est, add. Lb. beata vita glorianda et praedicanda et prae se ferenda est; nihil est enim aliud quod praedicandum et prae se ferendum praeferendum V ( cf. ad 426, 20 ) sit. quibus positis intellegis quid sequatur. Et quidem, nisi ea vita beata est, quae est eadem honesta, sit aliud necesse est melius vita beata; quod erit enim enim add. G 2 honestum, certe fatebuntur esse melius. ita erit beata vita melius aliquid; quo quid potest dici perversius? dicimus itaque sapientem...9 pacem et 14 beata... 427,7 perversius H Quid? cum fatentur satis magnam vim esse in vitiis ad invitusad V miseram vitam, nonne fatendum est eandem vim in virtute virtute B 1 virtutem X virtutum s esse ad beatam vitam? contrariorum enim contraria sunt consequentia. 5.73. An Epic.fr.604 tu me in viola putabas aut in rosa dicere? an Epicuro, qui qui G 1 quia G 2 KRV cf.438,19 tantum modo induit personam philosophi et sibi ipse hoc nomen inscripsit, dicere licebit, licebit alt. i in r. V quod quidem, ut habet se res, me tamen plaudente dicit, nullum sapienti esse tempus, etiamsi uratur torqueatur secetur, quin possit exclamare: quam pro nihilo puto! cum praesertim omne malum dolore definiat defirmat ( vel defirniat) V 1 bonum voluptate, haec nostra honesta turpia inrideat dicatque nos in vocibus Epic.fr.511 occupatos iis sonos fundere, neque quicquam ad nos pertinere nisi quod aut leve aut asperum in corpore sentiatur: huic ergo, ut dixi, non multum differenti a iudicio ferarum oblivisci licebit sui et tum fortunam contemnere, cum sit omne et bonum eius et malum in potestate fortunae, tum dicere se se add. G 2 beatum in summo cruciatu atque tormentis, cum constituerit non modo summum malum esse dolorem, sed etiam solum? 5.74. nec vero illa sibi remedia comparavit ad tolerandum tollerandum X (toll endum G 1 ) dolorem, firmitatem animi, turpitudinis verecundiam, exercitationem consuetudinemque patiendi, praecepta fortitudinis, praecepta fortitudinis del.Sey.sed Cic.l.2,34—41 exercitationem consuetudinemque,postea (cf. maxime 51. 53) praecepta fortitudinis animo proposita (p.313,15sqq.) valere ad tolerandum dolorem exponit (cf.p.285.6 295, 24sqq.fin.2,94.95; 4, 31). cf.etiam Plasberg, Festschrift f. Vahlen p.234 (obloq. Se.,Jb.d.ph.V.29 p.97) duritiam virilem, sed una se dicit recordatione adquiescere praeteritarum voluptatium, voluptatum Bai.cf.Neue 1, 410 ut si quis aestuans, cum vim caloris non non postea add. R 1 facile patiatur, patiatur putatur V 1 recordari velit sese sese s esse X (se V 3 ) aliquando in Arpinati nostro gelidis fluminibus circumfusum fuisse. non enim video, quo modo sedare possint 5.75. mala praesentia praeteritae voluptates—sed cum is is his G 1 KV 1 dicat semper beatum esse sapientem, cui dicere hoc, si si add. G 2 sibi constare vellet, non liceret, quidnam faciendum est is qui nihil expetendum, nihil in bonis ducendum, quod honestate careat, existumant? existumant -a- e corr. R 1 Me quidem auctore auctore ex auctoritate R c etiam Peripatetici veteresque Academici balbuttire balbuttire GR Non. balbut ire V 1 balbutire K aliquando desit me...24 desit Non. 80, 13 aperteque et clara voce audeant dicere beatam vitam in Phalaridis taurum descensuram. decen suram X ( corr. V 3 ) 5.76. sint enim tria genera bonorum, ut ut aut V iam a laqueis Stoicorum, quibus usum me pluribus quam soleo intellego, recedamus, sint sane illa genera bonorum, dum corporis et et s om. X externa iaceant humi et tantum modo, quia sumenda sint, appellentur bona, animi animi Jeep (cf.427,14 443,3 458,6;divini ani- mi bona divina sunt caelumque contingunt) autem illa alii K alia GRV illa add. G 2 divina longe lateque se pandant caelumque contingant; ut, ut del.Lb.sed cf.p.242,25 ea qui adeptus sit, cur eum beatum modo et non beatissimum etiam dixerim? Dolorem vero sapiens extimescet? is enim huic maxime maxime huic G 1 sententiae repugnat. nam nam non V contra mortem nostram atque nostrorum contraque aegritudinem et reliquas animi perturbationes satis esse videmur videmus K superiorum dierum disputationibus armati et parati; dolor esse videtur acerrumus virtutis virtutis We. virtuti istis ard. G adversarius; is ardentis faces intentat, is fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam se debilitaturum minatur. 5.77. huic igitur succumbet virtus, huic beata sapientis et constantis viri vita cedet? caedet RV quam turpe, o dii boni! pueri Spartiatae non ingemescunt ingemiscunt K 1 R c B verberum verberum ex verborum V 1 G 2 dolore laniati. adulescentium greges reges V 1 Lacedaemone vidimus ipsi incredibili contentione contione X (conditione G 1 ) corr. B 1 s certantis pugnis calcibus unguibus morsu denique, cum exanimarentur prius quam victos se faterentur. quae barbaria India vastior aut agrestior? quae...agrestior? Non.415,11 in ea tamen aut... tamen add. V c gente primum sqq. cf.Val.Max.3,3,6 ext.2,6,14 ei, qui sapientes habentur, nudi aetatem agunt et Caucasi nives hiemalemque vim perferunt sine sqq. cf.Val.Max.3,3,6 ext.2,6,14 dolore, cumque ad flammam se adplicaverunt, applicaverunt KRV sine gemitu aduruntur. 5.78. mulieres vero in India, cum est cuius cuiuis V 3 communis Geel ( sed tum plures...nuptae post mortuus legeretur; cf.etiam Se., Jb.d.ph.V.26 p.301 ) earum vir mortuus, in certamen iudiciumque veniunt, quam plurumum ille dilexerit— plures enim singulis solent esse nuptae—; quae est victrix, ea laeta prosequentibus suis una unam V 1 cum viro in rogum imponitur, ponitur G 1 illa ilia cf.Quint.inst.1,3,2 victa quae Se. non male,cf.Claud.de nupt.Hon.64 (superatae cum...maerore in vita remanent Val.M. ) maesta discedit. numquam naturam mos vinceret; vinceret vincit H est enim ea semper invicta; sed nos umbris deliciis delitiis X (deliciis V, sed ci in r scr.,alt. i ss. V 2 ) otio languore langore G desidia animum infecimus, opinionibus maloque more delenitum delinitum V 1 H mollivimus. mollium KR 1 ( corr. 1 aut c )H Aegyptiorum morem quis ignorat? ignoret K quorum inbutae mentes pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificinam carnifici. nam X prius subierint quam ibim aut aspidem aut faelem felem GV cf.nat.deor.1, 82 aut canem aut corcodillum corcodillum GRV corcodrillum KH cf.Th.l.l. violent, volent V 1 quorum etiamsi inprudentes quippiam fecerint, poenam nullam recusent. 5.79. de hominibus loquor; quid? bestiae non frigus, non famem, non montivagos atque silvestris cursus lustrationesque patiuntur? non pro suo sua G 1 partu ita propugt, ut ut K vulnera excipiant, nullos impetus nullos ictus reformident? omitto, quae omittoque p.G 1 V 1 perferant quaeque patiantur ambitiosi honoris causa, laudis studiosi gloriae gratia, amore incensi cupiditatis. plena plana GRV 1 ( corr. 3 ) vita exemplorum exemplum G 1 est. 5.80. Sed adhibeat oratio modum et redeat illuc, unde deflexit. dabit, inquam, dabit, dabit, inquam edd. vett. se in tormenta vita beata nec iustitiam temperantiam in primisque fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam patientia GRVH prosecuta, cum tortoris os viderit, consistet virtutibusque omnibus sine ullo animi terrore ad cruciatum profectis resistet extra extra ( fuit et) R fores, ut ante ante cf.p. 410,8 dixi, limenque lumenque G 1 carceris. quid enim ea foedius, quid deformius sola relicta, a add. Lb. comitatu pulcherrimo pulcherrumo KR segregata? quod tamen fieri nullo pacto potest; nec enim virtutes sine beata vita cohaerere possunt nec illa sine virtutibus. 5.81. itaque eam tergiversari non sinent sinent s V rec Non. sinenti secumque rapient, itaque...6 rapienti Non.41,26 ad quemcumque ipsae ipse X dolorem cruciatumque ducentur. sapientis est enim proprium nihil quod paenitere possit possit add. G 2 facere, nihil invitum, splendide constanter graviter graviter c nstanter R honeste omnia, nihil ita expectare exspectare GRH ( alt.loco ) quasi certo incerto H (inc. alt.loco futurum, nihil, cum acciderit, admirari, ut inopinatum opinatum R 1 ac novum accidisse videatur, omnia ad suum arbitrium referre, suis stare iudiciis. quo quod G ( exp. 2 ) quid sit beatius, mihi certe in mentem venire non potest. numquam...441, 7 sapientis ( om. 441, 12 omnia...14 potest) H 5.119. Quodsi is philosophis, his philosophis XF ii ( vel hi) philosophi corr. s V b vulgo; sed anacoluthon ( C. pergere volebat : semper beatus videtur sapiens cf. p. 418,23 ) tolerari potest, si v. 458,3 si i (et X id ut vid. F ei We. ) scribitur. quorum ea sententia est, ut virtus per se ipsa nihil valeat, omneque, omnesque XF ut v. omneque s quod honestum nos et laudabile esse dicamus, dicimus s id illi cassum cassum ex casus G 1 casum V quiddam et ii iis F vocis sono decoratum esse dicant,— si i si i cf. ad p. 457,21 tamen semper beatum censent esse sapientem, quid tandem a Socrate et Platone profectis perfectis KRH ( in V legi non potest ) philosophis faciendum videtur? uidetur V b (ui solum nunc in V dispicitur ) vides XF iudicas Sey. quorum alii tantam praestantiam in bonis animi esse dicunt, ut ab is is his X iis F corporis et externa obruantur, obruantur F cf. p. 314, 22 fin. 5,91 observant X (observan in V dispicitur observent R 2 ) obscurentur s (observatur pro obruatur Gr. p. 358, 1 ) alii autem haec ne ne nec K bona quidem ducunt, in animo reponunt omnia. haud...458, 8 omnia H
7. Septuagint, 4 Maccabees, 1.1-1.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)

1.1. The subject that I am about to discuss is most philosophical, that is, whether devout reason is sovereign over the emotions. So it is right for me to advise you to pay earnest attention to philosophy. 1.2. For the subject is essential to everyone who is seeking knowledge, and in addition it includes the praise of the highest virtue -- I mean, of course, rational judgment. 1.3. If, then, it is evident that reason rules over those emotions that hinder self-control, namely, gluttony and lust 1.4. it is also clear that it masters the emotions that hinder one from justice, such as malice, and those that stand in the way of courage, namely anger, fear, and pain. 1.5. Some might perhaps ask, "If reason rules the emotions, why is it not sovereign over forgetfulness and ignorance?" Their attempt at argument is ridiculous! 1.6. For reason does not rule its own emotions, but those that are opposed to justice, courage, and self-control; and it is not for the purpose of destroying them, but so that one may not give way to them. 1.7. I could prove to you from many and various examples that reason is domit over the emotions 1.8. but I can demonstrate it best from the noble bravery of those who died for the sake of virtue, Eleazar and the seven brothers and their mother.
8. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Abraham, 237-244, 236 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments, 29 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Plutarch, On The Delays of Divine Vengeance, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 28.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

12. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 199.19-199.20 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

13. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.87 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.
14. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 82

15. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 1

Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academic / academy, the Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
academy, old Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 90
academy Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 108
agency / agent, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
alcinous Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
aristo of chios Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 90
assimilation, to god (homoiōsis theōi) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
atom / atomism Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
brutus m. junius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 90, 91, 92
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44; Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 108
cotta c. aurelius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
criterium / criterion Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
de finibus Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 90
death, outcome of Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 108
desire / tendency / adpetitio Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
diaspora judaism Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
emotions Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 92
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
epicurus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
ethics / ethical theory Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
eudaimonia (flourishing, happiness) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
evil Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
fourth maccabees Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
goal (telos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
god (theos) ix Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
gods / goddesses Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
happiness / εὐδαιμονία Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, theory explained Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 169
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; accepted by aristotle Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 169
nature (phusis) / natural, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
necessity / necessitas / necessarium / ἀνάγκη Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
peripatetics, ethics Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 90
philo of alexandria Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
philosophy, and preparation for death Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 108
plato Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
platonism (middle / imperial) vi–viii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
probable / probability / probabilitas / πιθανόν Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
scepticism Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 108
school (scholē) / sect (hairesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
self-mastery (enkrateia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
soul, immortality of Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 91
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
strength (ischus) / strengthen Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
tantalus Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 108
tranquility (ataraxia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
tusculan disputations Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 90, 91, 92
velleius c. Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
verisimilaritude / veri simile / εἰκός Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 35
vii–viii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 169
zeno of citium Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 90