Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2385
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.34
NaN


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

11 results
1. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, Academica, 2.124 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 4.64-4.68, 4.74-4.77, 5.12, 5.71, 5.84 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4.64. atque hoc loco similitudines eas, quibus illi uti solent, dissimillimas proferebas. proferebas p. 107, 23 sqq. quis enim ignorat, si plures ex alto emergere velint, propius fore eos quidem ad respirandum, qui ad summam iam aquam aquam iam BE adpropinquent, sed nihilo magis respirare posse quam eos, qui sint in profundo? nihil igitur adiuvat procedere et progredi in virtute, quo minus miserrimus sit, ante quam ad eam pervenerit, quoniam in aqua nihil adiuvat, et, quoniam catuli, qui iam dispecturi dispecturi NV despecturi sunt, caeci aeque et ii, qui modo nati, Platonem quoque necesse est, quoniam nondum videbat sapientiam, aeque caecum caecum ceco R animo ac ac RNV et BE Phalarim fuisse? 4.65. ista similia non sunt, Cato, in quibus quamvis multum processeris tamen illud in eadem causa est, a quo abesse velis, donec evaseris; nec enim ille respirat, ante quam emersit, et catuli aeque caeci, prius quam dispexerunt, dispexerunt Lamb. despexerunt RNV depexerunt BE ac si ita futuri semper essent. illa sunt similia: hebes hebes NV habes BER acies est cuipiam oculorum, corpore alius senescit; senescit Mdv. nescit ERN 1 nestit B languescit N 2 V hi curatione adhibita levantur in dies, valet alter plus cotidie, alter videt. his similes sunt omnes, qui virtuti student; levantur vitiis, levantur erroribus, nisi forte censes Ti. censes Ti. censesti N consesti R censes ca (= causa) V censes ( om. ti) BE Gracchum patrem non beatiorem fuisse 'Aldus primus addidisse videtur' Mdv. quam filium, cum alter stabilire rem publicam studuerit, alter evertere. nec tamen ille erat sapiens— quis enim hoc aut quando aut ubi aut unde?—; sed quia studebat laudi et dignitati, multum in virtute processerat. 4.66. conferam avum avum BE autem avum N avū aut R avum autem V tuum Drusum cum C. Graccho, eius fere aequali? quae hic rei publicae vulnera inponebat, eadem ille sanabat. si nihil est, quod tam miseros faciat quam inpietas et scelus, ut iam omnes insipientes sint miseri, quod profecto sunt, non est tamen aeque miser, qui patriae consulit, et is, qui illam extinctam cupit. Levatio igitur vitiorum magna fit in in E om. BRNV iis, qui habent ad virtutem progressionis aliquantum. 4.67. vestri autem progressionem ad virtutem fieri aiunt, levationem vitiorum fieri negant. at quo at quo RN 2 a quo N 2 ad quod BEV utantur utantur Lamb. utuntur BENV uta|entur ( tertia litt. utrum a an u sit discerni nequit ) R homines acuti argumento ad probandum, operae pretium est considerare. quarum, inquit, artium summae crescere summa ecrescere BE summa crescere R possunt, earum etiam contrariorum summae ... contrariorum om. N contrariorum Lamb. contrariarum BEV contrarium R summa poterit augeri; ad virtutis autem summam accedere nihil potest; ne vitia quidem igitur crescere poterunt, quae sunt virtutum contraria. utrum igitur tandem perspicuisne dubia aperiuntur, an dubiis perspicua tolluntur? atqui hoc perspicuum est, vitia alia in aliis esse maiora, illud dubium, ad id, quod summum del. Lamb. bonum dicitis, ecquaenam possit fieri fieri possit BE accessio. vos autem cum perspicuis dubia debeatis illustrare, dubiis perspicua conamini tollere. 4.68. itaque itaque atque BE rursus rursus cod. Glogav. usus BERN 1 V usi N 2 eadem ratione, qua sum paulo ante paulo ante p. 144,5-14 usus, haerebitis. si enim propterea vitia alia aliis maiora non sunt, quia ne ad finem quidem bonorum eum, quem vos facitis, quicquam potest accedere, quoniam perspicuum est vitia non esse omnium paria, finis bonorum vobis mutandus est. teneamus enim illud necesse est, cum consequens aliquod falsum sit, illud, cuius id consequens id consequens (d ex corr. alt. m. ) N inconsequens BER consequens V sit, non posse esse verum. Quae est igitur causa istarum angustiarum? illarum BE gloriosa ostentatio in constituendo summo bono. cum enim, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse confirmatur, tollitur cura valitudinis, diligentia rei familiaris, administratio rei publicae, ordo gerendorum negotiorum, officia vitae, ipsum denique illud honestum, in quo uno vultis esse omnia, deserendum est. quae diligentissime contra Aristonem dicuntur a Chrysippo. ex ea difficultate illae 'fallaciloquae', fallaciloquae P. Man. fallaci loquele BE facili loquele RN fa- cili al' fallaci loquele V fallaciloquentiae Non. p. 113 ut ait Accius, accius BRN actius E acrius V malitiae natae sunt. 4.74. Nam ex eisdem verborum praestrigiis praestrigiis BEN praestigiis et regna nata vobis sunt et imperia et divitiae, et tantae quidem, ut omnia, quae ubique sint, sapientis esse dicatis. solum praeterea formosum, solum liberum, solum civem, stultos omnia contraria, add. hoc loco Mdv., post contraria Morel. quos etiam insanos esse vultis. haec para/doca illi, nos admirabilia dicamus. quid autem habent admirationis, cum prope accesseris? conferam tecum, quam cuique verbo rem subicias; nulla erit controversia. Omnia peccata paria dicitis. non ego tecum iam ita iocabor, Jocabor N locabor RB locabar E letabor V ut isdem his de his de edd. is de ER ijs de V de B om. N rebus, cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt, aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius. Peccata paria. 4.75. —Quonam modo?—Quia nec honesto quicquam honestius nec turpi turpius.—Perge porro; nam de isto magna dissensio est. illa argumenta propria videamus, cur omnia sint paria peccata.—Ut, inquit, in fidibus pluribus, nisi nisi Se. si nulla earum non ita contenta add. Se. nervis sit, ut concentum servare possit, omnes aeque incontentae sint, sic peccata, quia discrepant, aeque discrepant; paria sunt igitur.—Hic ambiguo ludimur. aeque enim contingit omnibus fidibus, ut incontentae sint, illud non continuo, ut aeque incontentae. collatio igitur ista te nihil iuvat. nec enim, omnes avaritias si aeque avaritias esse dixerimus, sequetur, ut etiam aequas esse dicamus. Ecce aliud simile dissimile. 4.76. Ut enim, inquit, gubernator aeque peccat, si palearum navem evertit et si auri, item aeque peccat, qui parentem et qui servum iniuria verberat.—Hoc non videre, cuius generis onus navis vehat, id ad gubernatoris artem nil nil om. R pertinere! itaque aurum paleamne paleamne V paleam ne RN paleamve BE portet, ad bene aut ad male guberdum nihil interesse! at quid inter parentem et servulum intersit, intellegi et potest et debet. ergo in guberdo nihil, in officio plurimum interest, quo in genere peccetur. et si in ipsa gubernatione neglegentia est navis eversa, maius est peccatum in auro quam in palea. omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam esse eam, quae communis appellatur prudentia, quam omnes, qui cuique qui cuique cuicumque Mdv. artificio praesunt, debent habere. ita ne hoc quidem modo paria quidem modo paria Lamb. modo paria quidem peccata sunt. 4.77. Urgent tamen et nihil remittunt. Quoniam, inquiunt, omne peccatum inbecillitatis et inconstantiae est, haec autem vitia in omnibus stultis aeque magna sunt, necesse est paria esse peccata. Quasi vero aut concedatur in omnibus stultis aeque magna esse vitia, et eadem inbecillitate et inconstantia L. Tubulum fuisse, qua qua BE quam illum, cuius is condemnatus est rogatione, P. Scaevolam, et quasi nihil inter res quoque ipsas, in quibus peccatur, intersit, ut, quo hae maiores minoresve sint, eo, quae peccentur in his rebus, aut 5.12. De summo autem bono, quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod e)cwteriko/n appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio. sed cum beata vita quaeratur idque sit unum, quod philosophia philosophia dett. philosophiam spectare et sequi debeat, sitne ea tota sita in potestate sapientis an possit aut labefactari aut eripi rebus adversis, in eo non numquam variari inter eos inter eos variari R et dubitari videtur. quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur. quod si ita se habeat, non possit beatam praestare vitam vitam praestare BE sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, delicatior videtur NV ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Theophrastum tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, dum modo plus in virtute teneamus, quam ille tenuit, firmitatis et roboris. Simus igitur contenti his. 5.71. iam non dubitabis, quin earum compotes homines magno animo erectoque viventes semper sint beati, qui omnis motus fortunae mutationesque rerum et temporum levis et inbecillos fore intellegant, si in virtutis certamen venerint. illa enim, quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata, complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita, ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. consistere R ita enim parvae et exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum, ut, quem ad modum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum splendore ne certur quidem. Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est nulla esse dicere; 5.84. dato dato edd. date hoc dandum erit erit est BE illud. Quod vestri non item. 'Tria genera bonorum'; proclivi proclivis V currit oratio. venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra. cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, potes cod. Glogav., Dav. ; potest nisi retexueris illa. paupertas si malum est, mendicus beatus esse esse beatus BE nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. at Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. dolere malum est: in crucem qui agitur, in crucem qui agitur cod. Mor., marg. Crat. ; in crucem quia igitur BE in cruce. Quia igitur RV beatus esse non potest. bonum liberi: misera orbitas. bonum patria: miserum exilium. bonum valitudo: miser miser Mdv. miserum RV om. BE morbus. bonum integritas corporis: misera debilitas. bonum incolumis acies: misera caecitas. quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quo modo sustinebit? sustinebis BE substinebis V sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: eculeo dett. aculeo quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam tam dett., om. BERV docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum. 4.64.  It was at this point that you brought forward those extremely false analogies which the Stoics are so fond of employing. of course everybody knows that if there are several people plunged in deep water and trying to get out, those already approaching the surface, though nearer to breathing, will be no more able actually to breathe than those at the bottom. You infer that improvement and progress in virtue are of no avail to save a man from being utterly wretched, until he has actually arrived at virtue, since to rise in the water is of no avail. Again, since puppies on the point of opening their eyes are as blind as those only just born, it follows that Plato, not having yet attained to the vision of wisdom, was just as blind mentally as Phalaris! 4.65.  "Really, Cato, there is no analogy between progress in virtue and cases such as you describe, in which however far one advances, the situation one wishes to escape from still remains the same until one has actually emerged from it. The man does not breathe until he has risen to the surface; the puppies are as blind before they have opened their eyes as if they were going to be blind always. Good analogies would be these: one man's eyesight is dim, another's general health is weak; apply remedies, and they get better day by day; every day the one is stronger and the other sees better; similarly with all who earnestly pursue virtue; they get better, their vices and errors are gradually reduced. Surely you would not maintain that the elder Tiberius Gracchus was not happier than his son, when the one devoted himself to the service of the state and the other to its destruction. But still the elder Gracchus was not a Wise Man; who ever was? or when, or where, or how? Still he aspired to fame and honour, and therefore had advanced to a high point in virtue. 4.66.  Compare your grandfather Drusus with Gaius Gracchus, who was nearly his contemporary. The former strove to heal the wounds which the latter inflicted on the state. If there is nothing that makes men so miserable as impiety and crime, granted that all who are foolish are miserable, as of course they are, nevertheless a man who serves his country is not so miserable as one who longs for its ruin. Therefore those who achieve definite progress towards virtue undergo a great diminution of their vices. 4.67.  Your teachers, however, while allowing progress towards virtue, deny diminution of vice. But it is worth while to examine the argument on which these clever people rely for the proof. Their line is this: In the case of arts or sciences which admit of advancement, the opposite of those arts and sciences will also admit of advance; but virtue is absolute and incapable of increase; therefore the vices also, being the opposite of the virtues, are incapable of gradation. Pray tell me then, does a certainty explain an uncertainty, or does uncertainty disprove a certainty? Now, that some vices are worse than others is certain; but whether the Chief Good, as you Stoics conceive it, can be subject to increase is not certain. Yet instead of employing the certain to throw light on the uncertain, you endeavour to make the uncertain disprove the certain. 4.68.  Therefore you can be checkmated by the same argument as I employed just now. If the proof that one vice cannot be worse than another depends on the fact that the End of Goods, as you conceive it, is itself incapable of increase, then you must alter your End of Goods, since it is certain that the vices of all men are not equal. For we are bound to hold that if a conclusion is false, the premise on which it depends cannot be true."Now what has landed you in this impasse? Simply your pride and vainglory in constructing your Chief Good. To maintain that the only Good is Moral Worth is to do away with the care of one's health, the management of one's estate, participation in politics, the conduct of affairs, the duties of life; nay, to abandon that Moral Worth itself, which according to you is the be‑all and the end‑all of existence; objections that were urged most earnestly against Aristo by Chrysippus. This is the difficulty that gave birth to those 'base conceits deceitful-tongued,' as Attius has it. 4.74.  "The same verbal legerdemain supplies you with your kingdoms and empires and riches, riches so vast that you declare that everything the world contains is the property of the Wise Man. He alone, you say, is handsome, he alone a free man and a citizen: while the foolish are the opposite of all these, and according to you insane into the bargain. The Stoics call these paradoxa, as we might say 'startling truths.' But what is there so startling about them viewed at close quarters? I will consult you as to the meaning you attach to each term; there shall be no dispute. You Stoics say that all transgressions are equal. I won't jest with you now, as I did on the same subjects when you were prosecuting and I defending Lucius Murena. On that occasion I was addressing a jury, not an audience of scholars, and I even had to play to the gallery a little; but now I must reason more closely. 4.75.  Transgressions are equal. — How so, pray? — Because nothing can be better than good or baser than base. — Explain further, for there is much disagreement on this point; let us have your special arguments to prove how all transgressions are equal. — Suppose, says my opponent, of a number of lyres not one is so strung as to be in tune; then all are equally out of tune; similarly with transgressions, since all are departures from rule, all are equally departures from rule; therefore all are equal. — Here we are put off with an equivocation. All the lyres equally are out of tune; but it does not follow that all are equally out of tune. So your comparison does not help you; for it does not follow that because we pronounce every case of avarice equally to be avarice, we must therefore pronounce them all to be equal. 4.76.  Here is another of these false analogies: A skipper, says my adversary, commits an equal transgression if he loses his ship with a cargo of straw and if he does so when laden with gold; similarly a man is an equal transgressor if he beats his parent or his slave without due cause. — Fancy not seeing that the nature of the cargo has nothing to do with the skill of the navigator! so that whether he carries gold or straw makes no differences as regards good or bad seamanship; whereas the distinction between a parent and a mere slave is one that cannot and ought not to be overlooked. Hence the nature of the other upon which the offence is committed, which in navigation makes no difference, in conduct makes all the difference. Indeed in the case of navigation too, if the loss of the ship is due to negligence, the offence is greater with a cargo of gold than with one of straw. For the virtue known generally as prudence is an attribute as we hold of all the arts, and every master craftsman in each branch of art ought to possess it. Hence this proof also of the equality of transgression breaks down. 4.77.  "However, they press the matter, and will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, is a proof of weakness and instability of character; but all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though it were admitted that all foolish people possess an equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though there were no difference also between the respective circumstances in which the transgressions are committed, so that the magnitude of the transgression varies in proportion to the importance of the circumstances! 5.12.  "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.71.  Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. 5.84.  Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.'
5. Cicero, On Laws, 1.15, 2.38 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10, 1.19, 2.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.19. What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research; 2.95. So Aristotle says brilliantly: 'If there were beings who had always lived beneath the earth, in comfortable, well‑lit dwellings, decorated with statues and pictures and furnished with all the luxuries enjoyed by persons thought to be supremely happy, and who though they had never come forth above the ground had learnt by report and by hearsay of the existence of certain deities or divine powers; and then if at some time the jaws of the earth were opened and they were able to escape from their hidden abode and to come forth into the regions which we inhabit; when they suddenly had sight of the earth and the seas and the sky, and came to know of the vast clouds and mighty winds, and beheld the sun, and realized not only its size and beauty but also its Ptolemaic in causing the day by shedding light over all the sky, and, after night had darkened the earth, they then saw the whole sky spangled and adorned with stars, and the changing phases of the moon's light, now waxing and now waning, and the risings and settings of all these heavenly bodies and their courses fixed and changeless throughout all eternity, — when they saw these things, surely they would think that the gods exist and that these mighty marvels are their handiwork.'
7. Cicero, On Duties, 1.85 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.85. Omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt, duo Platonis praecepta teneant, unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut, quaecumque agunt, ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum, alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Ut enim tutela, sic procuratio rei publicae ad eorum utilitatem, qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum, quibus commissa est, gerenda est. Qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam; ex quo evenit, ut alii populares, alii studiosi optimi cuiusque videantur, pauci universorum. 1.85.  Those who propose to take charge of the affairs of government should not fail to remember two of Plato's rules: first, to keep the good of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every action conform to that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in serving the interests of some one party to betray the rest. For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one's care, not of those to whom it is entrusted. Now, those who care for the interests of a part of the citizens and neglect another part, introduce into the civil service a dangerous element — dissension and party strife. The result is that some are found to be loyal supporters of the democratic, others of the aristocratic party, and few of the nation as a whole.
8. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.23, 1.224, 3.65 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.23. repetamque non ab incunabulis nostrae veteris puerilisque doctrinae quendam ordinem praeceptorum, sed ea, quae quondam accepi in nostrorum hominum eloquentissimorum et omni dignitate principum disputatione esse versata; non quo illa contemnam, quae Graeci dicendi artifices et doctores reliquerunt, sed cum illa pateant in promptuque sint omnibus, neque ea interpretatione mea aut ornatius explicari aut planius exprimi possint, dabis hanc veniam, mi frater, ut opinor, ut eorum, quibus summa dicendi laus a nostris hominibus concessa est, auctoritatem Graecis anteponam. 1.224. philosophorum autem libros reservet sibi ad huiusce modi Tusculani requiem atque otium, ne, si quando ei dicendum erit de iustitia et fide, mutuetur a Platone; qui, cum haec exprimenda verbis arbitraretur, novam quandam finxit in libris civitatem; usque eo illa, quae dicenda de iustitia putabat, a vitae consuetudine et a civitatum moribus abhorrebant.
9. Cicero, Republic, 2.21-2.22, 4.5, 6.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.21. Videtisne igitur unius viri consilio non solum ortum novum populum neque ut in cunabulis vagientem relictum, sed adultum iam et paene puberem? Tum Laelius: Nos vero videmus, et te quidem ingressum ratione ad disputandum nova, quae nusquam est in Graecorum libris. Nam princeps ille, quo nemo in scribendo praestantior fuit, aream sibi sumsit, in qua civitatem extrueret arbitratu suo, praeclaram ille quidem fortasse, sed a vita hominum abhorrentem et moribus 2.22. reliqui disseruerunt sine ullo certo exemplari formaque rei publicae de generibus et de rationibus civitatum; tu mihi videris utrumque facturus; es enim ita ingressus, ut, quae ipse reperias, tribuere aliis malis quam, ut facit apud Platonem Socrates, ipse fingere et illa de urbis situ revoces ad rationem, quae a Romulo casu aut necessitate facta sunt, et disputes non vaganti oratione, sed defixa in una re publica. Quare perge, ut instituisti; prospicere enim iam videor te reliquos reges persequente quasi perfectam rem publicam. 4.5. Non. 362M et noster Plato magis etiam quam Lycurgus, omnia qui prorsus iubet esse communia, ne quis civis propriam aut suam rem ullam queat dicere. Non. 308M Ego vero eodem, quo ille Homerum redimitum coronis et delibutum unguentis emittit ex ea urbe, quam sibi ipse fingit. 6.3. Eulog. somn. Scip. 401Or. qui rogo impositus revixisset multaque de inferis secreta narrasset haec, quae de animae immortalitate dicerentur caeloque, non somniantium philosophorum esse commenta nec fabulas incredibiles, quas Epicurei derident, sed prudentium coniecturas.
10. Cicero, Pro Murena, 61 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

61. multitudine aut in aliquo conventu agrestium, audacius paulo de studiis humanitatis quae et mihi et vobis nota et iucunda iucunda ed. V, Lambinus : iudicanda codd. ( etiam B ) sunt disputabo. in M. Marco Catone, iudices, haec bona quae videmus divina et egregia ipsius scitote esse propria; quae non numquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a natura verum verum sed y1 a magistro. fuit enim quidam summo ingenio vir, Zeno, cuius inventorum aemuli Stoici nomitur. huius sententiae sunt et praecepta eius modi huiusmodi w, Halm . sapientem gratia numquam moveri, numquam cuiusquam delicto ignoscere; neminem misericordem esse nisi stultum et levem; viri non esse neque exorari neque placari; solos sapientes esse, si distortissimi sint, formosos, si mendicissimi, divites, si servitutem serviant, reges; nos autem qui sapientes non sumus simus Wesenberg fugitivos, exsules, hostis, insanos denique esse dicunt; omnia peccata esse paria; omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit; sapientem nihil opinari, nullius rei paenitere, nulla in re falli, sententiam mutare numquam.
11. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.2, 1.8, 1.26, 2.4, 2.6-2.9, 2.27, 3.29, 3.32, 3.34, 3.68, 4.1, 4.54, 5.11, 5.32-5.33 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.2. Nam mores et instituta vitae resque domesticas ac familiaris nos profecto et melius tuemur et lautius, latius R 1 rem vero publicam nostri maiores certe melioribus temperaverunt et institutis et legibus. quid loquar de re militari? in qua cum virtute nostri multum valuerunt, tum plus etiam disciplina. iam illa, quae natura, non litteris adsecuti assec. KRH sunt, neque cum Graecia neque ulla cum gente cum ulla gente K sunt conferenda. quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, animi magnitudo K probitas, fides, quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum maioribus nostris comparanda? 1.8. itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. fiebat autem ita ut, cum is his G 1 V 1 H qui audire audiri X ( corr. V 2 l e ss. K 2 ) vellet dixisset, quid quod K 1 V 2 sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et et om. V 1 add. 2 Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Philosophia ... 221, 7 narretur H (27 fieri 220, 5 litteris et 220,13 adulescentes 220, 18 dicere bis ) ergo ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c ita nascetur exordium: Malum ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c mihi videtur esse mors. 1.26. Expone igitur, nisi molestum est, primum, si potes, potest G 1 animos remanere post mortem, tum, si minus id obtinebis obtenebis GR 1 V —est enim arduum—, docebis carere omni malo mortem. ego enim istuc ipsum vereor ne ne me G malum sit non dico carere sensu, sed carendum esse. Auctoribus quidem ad istam sententiam, quam vis obtineri, uti optimis optineri V possumus, quod in omnibus causis et debet et solet valere plurimum, et primum quidem omni antiquitate, quae quo propius propius opius in r. V c aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse quae erant vera vera ss. K c veru ( aaper- tum! ) in vera corr. R cernebant. cercebant G 1 (corr. ipse) R cernebant K cerneba t V (-bat s ) Itaque unum illud erat insitum priscis illis, quos cascos cassos R cassus K 1 ann. 24 appellat Ennius, esse in morte sensum neque excessu vitae sic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret; 2.4. quid futurum putamus, cum adiutore populo, quo utebamur utebamur ex -ntur G 1 antea, nunc minime nos uti posse videamus? est enim philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens est philosophia ... 21 fugiens Lact. inst. 3, 25,2 eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa, ut, vel si quis universam velit vituperare, secundo id populo facere possit, vel si in in V 3 in r. eam quam nos maxime sequimur conetur invadere, magna habere possit auxilia e e add. V 2 s om. X a s reliquorum philosophorum disciplinis. est itaque philosophia... 26 disciplinis H Nos autem universae philosophiae vituperatoribus respondimus in Hortensio, pro Academia autem quae dicenda essent, satis accurate in Academicis quattuor libris explicata arbitramur; sed tamen tantum abest ut scribi contra nos nolimus, nolimus ex nolumus R 1 ex uolumus G 1 ut id etiam maxime optemus. in ipsa enim Graecia philosophia tanto ipsa enim Graeciae philosophia tantum Boeth. in honore numquam fuisset, nisi doctissimorum contentionibus dissensionibusque viguisset. viguisset V ( ss. 2 ) cf. praef. crevisset Boeth. 2.6. Quodsi haec studia traducta erunt ad nostros, ne bibliothecis quidem Graecis egebimus, in quibus multitudo infinita librorum propter eorum est multitudinem, qui scripserunt. eadem enim dicuntur a multis, ex quo libris omnia referserunt. ex quibus verbis etiam omnia referserunt Prisc. GL II p. 539,6 quod accidet etiam nostris, si ad haec studia plures confluxerint. confluxerunt GR 1 V 1 H -int K et e corr. R 1? V 1? sed eos, si possumus, excitemus, qui liberaliter eruditi adhibita etiam disserendi elegantia ratione et via philosophantur. philosophentur Sauppe 2.7. est enim quoddam genus eorum qui se se add. K 2 philosophos appellari apellari VG 1 volunt, quorum dicuntur esse Latini sane multi libri; quos non contemno equidem, quippe quos numquam legerim; sed quia profitentur ipsi illi, qui eos scribunt, se neque distincte neque distribute neque eleganter eliganter V 1 R 2? H neque ornate scribere, lectionem sine ulla delectatione neglego. negle go R 1 quid enim dicant et quid sentiant i qui sunt ab ea disciplina, nemo ne add. ed. Lb. in mg. mediocriter quidem doctus ignorat. quam ob rem, quoniam quem ad modum dicant ipsi non laborant, cur legendi sint nisi ipsi inter se qui idem qui idem R quidem GKV 1 H sentiunt, non intellego. intelligo KR c? 2.8. nam, ut Platonem reliquosque Socraticos et deinceps eos, qui ab his profecti sunt, legunt omnes, etiam qui illa aut non adprobant appr. KV c R c (ad|adp. R 1 ) aut non studiosissime consectantur, Philosophia 283, 23 consectantur H consecrantur R 1 V 1 ( corr. R c V c ) Epicurum autem et Metrodorum non fere praeter suos quisquam in manus sumit, sic hos Latinos i soli legunt, qui illa recte dici putant. nobis autem videtur, quicquid litteris mandetur, id commendari omnium eruditorum lectioni lectione K si G 1 decere; nobis... 28 decere H nec, si id id post si del. Ba.; cf. comm. ipsi minus consequi possumus, idcirco minus id ita faciendum esse sentimus. 2.9. Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partis partes K 1 R 1?ecorr. disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset, quid in quaque re re add. in mg. K 2 veri simile esset, inveniri, invenire GK 1 (~i 2 aut c ) RV 1 (i V rec ) sed etiam quod esset ea maxuma dicendi exercitatio. qua qua G princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt. nostra autem memoria Philo, quem nos frequenter audivimus, instituit alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum: ad quam nos consuetudinem a familiaribus nostris adducti in Tusculano, quod datum est temporis nobis, in eo consumpsimus. itaque cum ante meridiem dictioni operam dedissemus, sicut pridie feceramus, post meridiem meridie X (-di V me- ridi ach. G) meridiẽ K 2 R c? cf. de orat.2, 367 et Usener, Jahrb f. Phil. 117 p. 79 in Academiam descendimus. in qua disputationem habitam non quasi narrantes exponimus, exponemus V 2 sed eisdem ex eisdem K (exp. 2 aut 1) fere verbis, ut actum disputatumque est. Est igitur ambulantibus ad hunc modum mundum V 1 sermo ille nobis institutus et a tali et ali V 1 et tali V c quodam ductus ductus Crat. inductus cf. Brut. 21 exordio: 2.27. lamentantis inducunt fortissimos viros, molliunt animos nostros, ita sunt deinde dulces, ut non legantur modo, sed etiam ediscantur. sic ad malam domesticam disciplinam vitamque umbratilem et delicatam cum accesserunt etiam poëtae, nervos omnis virtutis elidunt. elidunt i ex a K c recte igitur a Platone eiciuntur Rep. 398 a eiciuntur s dicuntur V di cuntur G 1 R 1 ducuntur K cf. Min. Fel. 24, 2 al. ex ea civitate, quam finxit fixit G 1 V 1 ( G 1 V 2 ) ille, cum optimos mores et optimum rei p. statum exquireret. at vero nos, docti scilicet a Graecia, haec et a pueritia legimus ediscimus, et a puer. leg. et discimus X corr. Sey. (cf.p.317,11) hanc eruditionem liberalem et doctrinam putamus. Sed quid poëtis irascimur? 3.29. haec igitur praemeditatio futurorum malorum lenit eorum adventum, quae venientia longe ante videris. itaque apud Euripiden a Theseo dicta laudantur; licet Eurip. fr. 964 euripidĕ K thesseo GKR 1 enim, ut saepe facimus, in Latinum illa convertere: Nam qui hae/c audita a do/cto meminisse/m viro, Futu/ras mecum co/mmentabar mi/serias: Aut mo/rtem acerbam aut alt. aut add. G 2 exilii X e/xili maesta/m fugam Aut se/mper aliquam mo/lem meditaba/r mali, Ut, si/ qua invecta di/ritas casu/ foret, Ne me i/nparatum cu/ra lacerare/t repens. lacerare trepens G 1 R 1 3.32. Sed est, isdem de rebus quod dici possit subtilius, si prius Epicuri sententiam viderimus. qui censet Epic. fr. 444 necesse esse omnis in aegritudine esse, qui se in malis esse arbitrentur, sive illa ante provisa et expectata sint sive inveteraverint. nam neque vetustate minui mala nec fieri praemeditata leviora, stultamque etiam esse meditationem futuri mali aut fortasse ne futuri quidem: satis esse odiosum malum omne, cum venisset; cum venisset ex conv. K 2 qui autem semper cogitavisset accidere posse aliquid adversi, ei fieri illud sempiternum malum; si vero ne futurum quidem sit, sit ex si V c frustra suscipi miseriam voluntariam; voluntariam add. GR 1 in fine pag. ita semper angi aut accipiendo aut cogitando malo. 3.34. Principio male reprehendunt praemeditationem rerum futurarum. nihil est enim quod tam optundat optundat V (at in r. ) R c optundet GR 1 obtundet HK 1 (-at 2 ) elevetque aegritudinem quam perpetua in omni vita cogitatio nihil esse quod non accidere possit, quam meditatio condicionis conditionis X humanae, quam vitae lex commentatioque parendi, quae non hoc adfert, ut semper maereamus, sed ut numquam. neque enim, qui rerum naturam, qui vitae varietatem, qui inbecillitatem imb. KR c H generis humani cogitat, maeret, cum haec cogitat, sed tum vel vel om. H maxime sapientiae fungitur munere: utrumque enim consequitur, ut et considerandis rebus humanis proprio ad proprio in mg. adscr. non V rec philosophiae fruatur fruatur fungatur Man. ( sed phil. off. est 'id quod homini praestare potest ac debet philo- sophia' ) officio et adversis casibus triplici consolatione sanetur, sanentur X corr. K 2 R 2 V 2 primum quod nihil ei accidit nisi quod posse accidere diu cogitaverit, suppl. Po. cogitavit pro -erit Dav. quae cogitatio una maxime molestias omnis extenuat et diluit, deinde quod humana humane humana humane humane KV 1 (hu- mana add. 2 ) H humana G human e R ( del. c ) cf. Ps. Plut. cons. ad Ap. 118 c fe/rein ta\ a)nqrw/pina a)nqrwpi/nws ferenda intellegit, postremo quod videt malum nullum esse nisi culpam, culpam autem nullam esse, cum id, quod ab homine non potuerit praestari, praestari vel praecaveri R vet sed cf. ( etiam ad ea quae hic antecedunt ) epist. 6,1, 4 ( et 9,16,5 ) evenerit. nihil ... 336,2 evenerit H 3.68. Philosophi summi nequedum neque nondum X corr. V 3 tamen sapientiam consecuti nonne intellegunt in summo se malo esse? sunt enim insipientes, neque insipientia ullum maius malum est. neque tamen lugent. quid ita? quia huic generi malorum non adfingitur non affingitur V (non af in r. V c n ante g del. idem ) nodfingitur R 1 illa opinio, rectum esse et aequum et ad officium pertinere aegre ferre, quod sapiens non sis, quod idem adfingimus huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est. 4.1. Cum multis locis cum multis locis om. R 1 spatio rubricatori relicto ( add. R 2 ), pallidiore atramento add. K 1? cf. praef. nostrorum hominum ingenia virtutesque, Brute, soleo mirari, tum maxime in is studiis, quae sero admodum admodum V 1(?) expetita in hanc civitatem e Graecia transtulerunt. nam cum a primo urbis ortu regiis graegiis R 1 institutis, partim etiam legibus auspicia, caerimoniae, comitia, provocationes, patrum consilium, consilium. V 1 equitum peditumque discriptio, tota res militaris divinitus esset esse KR 1 constituta, tum progressio admirabilis incredibilisque cursus ad omnem excellentiam factus est dominatu regio re p. res p. X liberata. nec vero hic locus est, ut de moribus institutisque maiorum et disciplina ac temperatione civitatis loquamur; aliis haec locis satis accurate a nobis dicta sunt maximeque in is sex libris, quos de re publica scripsimus. 4.54. Quid? Stoici, qui omnes insipientes insanos esse dicunt, nonne ista conligunt? colligunt G 1 ( corr. 1 ) KcV rec ( ex colig.) remove perturbationes maxumeque maxumequae G 1 RV 1 videbantur K iracundiam: iam videbuntur monstra mostra R 1 nostra G dicere. nunc autem ita ita add. K c disserunt, sic se dicere omnes stultos insanire, ut male olere omne caenum. St. fr. 3, 665 cf. Aug. soliloq. 1, 11, 19 at non semper. commove: senties. sic iracundus non semper iratus est; lacesse: iam videbis furentem. Quid? ista bellatrix iracundia, cum domum rediit, qualis est cum uxore, cum liberis, cum familia? an tum quoque est utilis? est igitur aliquid quod quod add. V 1 perturbata mens melius possit facere quam constans? an quisquam potest sine perturbatione mentis irasci? bene igitur nostri, cum omnia essent in moribus moribus V c s morbus GR 1 V 1 morbis KR e corr. vitia, quod nullum erat iracundia foedius, iracundos solos solus V 1 morosos nominaverunt. 5.11. cuius multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo Platonis memoria et litteris consecrata plura genera effecit effecit s efficit X dissentientium philosophorum, e quibus nos id potissimum consecuti consecuti con del. V 2 sumus, quo Socratem usum arbitrabamur, arbitramur V 2 s ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus et in omni disputatione, quid esset simillimum veri, quaereremus. quaeremus G 1 K quem morem moyerem G 2 cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias saepe et nuper in Tusculano, ut ad eam eam ( del. c ) R consuetudinem disputaremus. et quadridui quidem sermonem superioribus ad ad a R missimus G 1 K te perscriptum libris misimus, quinto autem die cum eodem in loco consedissemus, sic est propositum, de quo disputaremus: 5.32. Adducis aducis R me, ut tibi adsentiar. sed tua quoque vide ne desideretur constantia. adducis...4 constantia add. G 2 in mg. Quonam modo? Quia legi tuum nuper quartum quarum V 1 de finibus; in eo mihi videbare contra Catonem disserens hoc velle ostendere—quod mihi quidem probatur probare KR —inter Zenonem et Peripateticos nihil praeter verborum novitatem interesse. quod si ita est, quid qui G 1 est causae quin, si Zenonis rationi consentaneum sit satis magnam vim in virtute esse ad beate vivendum, liceat idem Peripateticis peripatercis K 1 dicere? rem enim opinor opinior K spectari oportere, non verba. 5.33. Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum et testificaris, quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant: nos in diem vivimus; quodcumque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus, itaque soli sumus liberi. verum tamen, quoniam de constantia paulo ante diximus, non ego hoc loco id quaerendum puto, verumne sit, verumne scit K 1 verume sit G 1 quod Zenoni placuerit quodque eius auditori audituri G Aristoni, bonum esse solum, quod honestum esset, sed si ita esset, tum tum exp. V rec (C?) fueritne consentaneum, ut totum add. Po. sed, ni ita esset, num consentaneum esset, tum ut Se. ( sed agitur de Zenonis doctrina cf .v. 29 sqq. ), alia alii ( ad tum cf. parad. 29 fin. 4,33 al. ) hoc beate vivere in una virtute poneret.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academic philosophy, attitude towards auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 273
academy Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 32
andronicus of rhodes Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 273
antiochus Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 273; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 273
appropriate actions Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 198
arcesilaus Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 32
aristotle, cicero on Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
aristotle, nicomachean ethics Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 173
aristotle Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 173
auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 273
authority, argument from, of plato Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 34
authority (lat. auctoritas) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 34
burkert, w. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
cicero, marcus tullius, and auctoritas Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 34
cicero, marcus tullius, on the nature of the gods Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 34
cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 82
cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 34, 173
cicero, on philosophy Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
cicero, on plato and aristotle Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
cicero Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
cyrenaics Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 82
epicurus, on pain Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 82
forschner, maximilian Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 198
goods, bodily Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 173
goods, external Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 173
hadot, pierre Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 198
happiness Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
philosophical works, gorgias Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 173
philosophical works, menexenos Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 173
plato, cicero on Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
plato, theory of forms Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
plato Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 173
posidonius Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 198
praemeditatio futurorum malorum Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 82
pythagoras, pythagoreans Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
reader Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 32
reason (lat. ratio = gr. logos) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 34
refutation Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 32
skepticism Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 32
socrates Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 32
soul Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
sufficiency (of virtue for a happy life) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 34, 173
tusculan disputations Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 82
virtue' Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 292
zeno of citium Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 273