Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2385
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.76
NaN


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

20 results
1. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind.
2. Cicero, On Duties, 1.136 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.136. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non optemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira exsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus, et vereri et diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul absit,cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. 1.136.  But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of life, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the kind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and consideration toward those with whom we converse. It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly — never at all, unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry, but anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious can be done.
3. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.24-3.25, 3.40, 3.64-3.71, 3.80, 3.83, 4.11, 4.65, 4.68-4.75, 4.79, 4.83 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.24. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis St. fr. 3, 385 solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspers vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata aelata G 1 R 1 laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, post obtemperans add. vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest X quae retinent sec. Dav. edd., in v. 17. 8 verba cupiditas — potest delentes. sed ut voluptatis sic cupi- ditatis nomen appositionis locum tenere debebat. de cupiditate autem praedicandam erat 'opinione futuri boni turbatur'; quod cum iam in enuntiato relativo expressum esset, anacoluthon natum est. ad boni 17 V c in mg. adscr. : et quidem magis significat nomen libidinis magnitudinem erroris. itaque in ea cupiditate quae flagrantissima est proprie plerumque nomen hoc ponitur si omnis appetitio opinati boni haec] ut H 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.40. quodsi cui, ut ait idem, simul animus cum re concidit animus rem condidit X corr. V c s , a gravibus illis antiquis philosophis petenda medicina est, non est non V est si non X ab his voluptariis. quam enim isti bonorum copiam dicunt? fac sane esse summum bonum non dolere—quamquam id non vocatur voluptas, sed non necesse est nunc omnia—: idne est, quo traducti luctum levemus? sit sane summum malum dolere: dolore in dolere corr. G 2 K 2 V 2 in eo igitur qui non est, si malo careat, continuone fruitur summo bono? 3.64. haec omnia recta vera debita putantes faciunt in dolore, maximeque declaratur declaratur hoc sana cf. Mue. ( off. 1, 61 ) hoc quasi officii iudicio fieri, quod, si qui forte, cum se in luctu esse vellent, aliquid fecerunt humanius aut si hilarius locuti sunt, revocant se rursus ad maestitiam peccatique se insimulant, quod dolere dolore K 1 V 1 intermiserint. pueros vero matres et magistri castigare etiam solent, nec verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus, si quid in domestico luctu hilarius ab is factum est aut dictum, plorare cogunt. Quid? ipsa remissio luctus cum est consecuta intellectumque intellectaque X corr. V c est est om. K 1 nihil profici maerendo, nonne res declarat fuisse totum illud voluntarium? 3.65. Quid ille Terentianus terentianus K 2 mg. V rec terrentianus X ipse se poeniens, poenitens (pen. K)X e a\g TON T e lM w PO g M e NOC fere X id est e(auto timwrou/menos ? Decre/vi tantispe/r decrevi tant. V ( prius t V c ) me minus iniu/riae, Chreme/s, me ... 7 Chreme s V c in r. (s scr. V 1 ) meo gnato fa/cere, dum fia/m miser. hic decernit, ut miser sit. num quis igitur quicquam decernit invitus? malo quidem me quovis dignum deputem— malo se dignum deputat, nisi miser sit. vides Ter. 147. 8. 135 ergo opinionis esse, non naturae malum. Quid, quos res quid quod res H ipsa lugere prohibet? ut apud Homerum cotidianae neces interitusque multorum sedationem maerendi adferunt, apud quem ita dicitur: Namque nimis multos atque omni luce cadentis T 226 cadentis ( i/ptousin ) Man. carentis Cernimus, ut nemo possit maerore vacare. Quo magis est aequum tumulis mandare peremptos Firmo animo et luctum lacrimis finire diurnis. 3.66. Ergo in potestate est abicere dolorem, cum velis, tempori servientem. an est ullum tempus, quoniam quidem res in nostra potestate est, cui cui cum V non ponendae curae et aegritudinis add. Dav. ex s . aut aegritudinis aut curae del. alii ( iam in V curaer sec. Str. ut vid. ) causa serviamus? vides ... 22 serviamus constabat eos, qui concidentem volneribus Cn. Pompeium vidissent, GN. X cum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent, quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil aliud tum egisse, nisi ut remiges hortarentur et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga; posteaquam Tyrum venissent, tum adflictari lamentarique coepisse. timor igitur ab his aegritudinem potuit repellere, ratio ab sapienti viro ab sapienti viro Bentl. ac sapientia vera ( def. Linde Era- nos XII p. 175 ) non poterit? Quid est autem quod plus valeat ad ponendum dolorem, quam cum est intellectum nil nihil KH profici et frustra esse susceptum? si igitur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest; voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem confitendum est. si timor aliquoties ab aegritudine potest repellere ... 351, 6 est H 3.67. Idque idque itaque K 1 indicatur eorum patientia, qui cum multa sint saepe perpessi, facilius ferunt ferant X cf. praef. quicquid accidit, obduruisseque obduruisseque iam Tr. obduruisse quam X (e ex am corr. V 2 ) iam sese sese V contra fortunam arbitrantur, ut ille apud Euripidem: Eur. Phrix. fr. 821 ( Chrys. fr. eth. 482 ) Si mi/hi nunc tristis pri/mum inluxisse/t dies Nec tam ae/rumnoso na/vigavisse/m navigassem X salo, Esse/t dolendi cau/sa, ut iniecto e/culei Freno/ repente ta/ctu exagitantu/r novo; Sed ia/m subactus subiactus GV 1 (i del. 2 ) sub- iectus KRP mi/seriis opto/rpui. obt. KR c defetigatio igitur miseriarum aegritudines cum faciat leniores, intellegi necesse est non rem ipsam causam atque ipsam atque causam W trp. Er. fontem fontem fon in r. V c esse maeroris. 3.68. Philosophi summi nequedum neque nondum X corr. V 3 tamen sapientiam consecuti nonne intellegunt in summo se malo esse? sunt enim insipientes, neque insipientia ullum maius malum est. neque tamen lugent. quid ita? quia huic generi malorum non adfingitur non affingitur V (non af in r. V c n ante g del. idem ) nodfingitur R 1 illa opinio, rectum esse et aequum et ad officium pertinere aegre ferre, quod sapiens non sis, quod idem adfingimus huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est. 3.69. itaque Aristoteles veteres philosophos Arist. fr. 53 accusans, qui existumavissent philosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriosissimos fuisse; sed sed si V se videre, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore. Aristoteles . .. 352, 3 fore libere redd. Lact. inst. 3, 28, 20 Theophrastus autem moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornicibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset, hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam tamen KR 1 exiguam vitam dedisset; quorum si aetas potuisset esse longinquior, futurum fuisse ut omnibus perfectis artibus omni doctrina hominum vita erudiretur. querebatur quaerebatur VK 2 quaerebat GK 1 (quer-) R igitur se tum, cum illa videre coepisset, extingui. quid? ex ceteris philosophis nonne optumus et gravissumus quisque confitetur multa se ignorare et multa multa V 2 s multi sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda? 3.70. neque tamen, cum se in media stultitia, qua nihil quia n. G 1 est peius, haerere intellegant, aegritudine premuntur; nulla enim admiscetur opinio officiosi doloris. Quid, qui non putant lugendum lungendum GV 1 ( prius n eras. ) iungen- dum KR viris? sqq. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 qualis fuit Q. Maxumus fuitque maxumus G 2 (quae G 1 ) KV ( ss. m. 3 ) ac fortasse R 1 (Q post fuit in r. m. al. ) efferens efferrens GR 1 V filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus paullus RG 1 e corr. V 1 (l eras. ) cf.p. 263, 17; 274, 19; 457, 7 duobus paucis lucius et marcus X diebus amissis amisis G 1 R 1 V 1 filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione consolationem G -ne V conlegimus. 3.71. quid hos aliud placavit nisi quod luctum et maerorem esse non putabant viri? ergo id, quod alii rectum opites aegritudini se solent dedere, id hi turpe putantes aegritudinem reppulerunt. ex quo intellegitur non in natura, sed in opinione esse aegritudinem. Contra dicuntur haec: quis tam demens, ut sua voluntate maereat? natura adfert dolorem, cui quidem Crantor, inquiunt, vester cedendum putat; premit enim atque instat, nec resisti potest. itaque Oileus oileus V ille apud Sophoclem, qui Telamonem antea de Aiacis morte morte V consolatus esset, is cum audivisset audisset K de suo, fractus est. de cuius commutata mente sic dicitur: Nec ve/ro tanta prae/ditus sapie/ntia Soph.fr. 666 Quisqua/m est, quisquamst edd. qui aliorum aeru/mnam dictis a/dlevans Non i/dem, cum fortu/na mutata i/mpetum Conve/rtat, convertit Sey. clade ut subita X corr. s clade su/bita frangatu/r sua, Ut i/lla ad alios di/cta et praecepta e/xcidant. ex p. G 2 haec cum disputant, hoc student efficere, naturae obsisti nullo modo posse; idem iidem Ern. (idem tamen Phil. 2, 91 al. ) hi (= i cf. praef. ) W et Sey. tamen fatentur graviores aegritudines suscipi, quam natura cogat. quae est igitur amentia—? ut nos quoque idem ab illis illis Urs. ex s allis requiramus. 3.80. Sed nescio quo pacto ab eo, quod erat a te a te ante K propositum, aberravit oratio. tu enim de sapiente quaesieras, cui aut malum videri nullum potest, quod vacet turpitudine, aut ita parvum malum, ut id obruatur sapientia vixque appareat, qui qui add. V 2 nihil opinione adfingat adsumatque ad aegritudinem nec id putet esse rectum, tum post rectum add. V c se quam maxume excruciari luctuque confici, quo pravius nihil esse possit. edocuit tamen ratio, ut mihi quidem videtur, cum hoc ipsum proprie non quaereretur hoc tempore, num num V x nunc X num quid We. sed cf. Mue. quod esset malum nisi quod idem dici turpe posset, tamen ut videremus, viderimus V 1 quicquid esset in aegritudine mali, id non naturale esse, sed voluntario iudicio et opinionis errore contractum. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia. 4.65. videamus nunc de bonorum, id est de laetitia et de cupiditate. mihi quidem in tota ratione ea, quae eaque KR pertinet pertinet s pertinent X ad animi perturbationem, una res videtur causam continere, omnis eas esse in nostra potestate, omnis iudicio susceptas, omnis voluntarias. hic igitur error est eripiendus, haec detrahenda opinio haec detrahenda opinio ne consererent Gr atque ut in malis opinatis tolerabilia, tollerabilia X ( corr. R c? ) sic in bonis sedatiora sunt efficienda ea quae magna et laetabilia ducuntur. dicuntur W corr. Wo. atque hoc quidem commune malorum et bonorum, bonorum et malorum G 1 ut, si iam difficile sit persuadere nihil earum rerum, quae perturbent perturbant K 1 animum, aut in bonis aut in malis esse habendum, tamen alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda aliaque ratione malevolus, alia amator, alia rursus anxius, alia timidus corrigendus. 4.68. haec laetitia quam turpis sit, satis est diligenter attendentem penitus videre. Et ut turpes sunt, qui ecferunt haec 13 effe om. V 1, add. V rec in mg., runt se eadem m. in r. se laetitia tum cum hecferunt K haec ferunt G qui efferunt R (i et ef m. rec. ) fruuntur Veneriis voluptatibus, sic flagitiosi, quiaesinflammato K 1 inflamato GRV qui eas inflammato animo concupiscunt. totus vero iste, qui volgo appellatur appellantur V 1 amor—nec nec ex ne V c hercule invenio, quo nomine alio possit appellari—, tantae levitatis est, ut nihil videam quod putem conferendum. quem Caecilius fr. 259 deum qui non summum putet, aut stultum aut rerum esse imperitum existumat, existumat s existumet X Cui cui Ciceroni trib. Mue. cuii Ribb. i/n manu sit, quem e/sse demente/m demente GRV 1 velit, Quem sa/pere, quem sana/ri, sanari Man. insanare K 1 insanire GRVK c quem in morbum i/nici, Quem co/ntra amari, quem e/xpeti, quem arce/ssier. hunc fere versum excidisse statuit Bentl. : quem odio esse, quem contemni, quem excludi foras arces sier Bentl. arcessiri (arcesciri V 1 )X o praeclaram emendatricem vitae poëticam, quae amo- 4.69. rem amore X ( in K s in fine eras. ) flagitii et levitatis auctorem in concilio deorum conlocandum conlocari dum G 1 putet! de comoedia loquor, quae, si haec flagitia non non s nos X ( cf.p.381, 26 ) nos non Ro b b. p. 103 probaremus, nulla esset omnino; quid ait ex tragoedia princeps ille Argonautarum? argonautarū V (rū in r. V c ) Tu/ me amoris tumamoris K tum ea moris R ma/gis quam honoris se/rvavisti servavisti Crat. servasti gra/tia. Ennius Med. exul 278 quid ergo? hic amor Medeae quanta miseriarum excitavit incendia! atque ea tamen apud alium poëtam patri dicere audet se se s V 3 sed X Trag. inc. 174 coniugem habuisse illum, Amor quem dederat, qui plus pollet potiorque est est G ( exp. 1 est ss. 2 ) patre. 4.70. Sed poëtas ludere sinamus, quorum fabulis in hoc flagitio versari ipsum videmus Iovem: ad at G 1 magistros virtutis philosophos veniamus, qui amorem quimorem quā orem K 1 -i amorem in r. G 2 negant stupri esse St. fr. 3, 653 Epic. 483 et in eo litigant cum Epicuro non multum, ut opinio mea fert, mentiente. quis est enim iste ista K 1 amor amicitiae? cur neque deformem adulescentem quisquam amat neque formosum senem? mihi quidem haec in Graecorum gymnasiis nata consuetudo videtur, in quibus isti liberi et concessi sunt amores. bene ergo Ennius: Ennius sc. 395 Fla/giti flagitii X cives G(?)R rec princi/pium est nudare i/nter civis co/rpora. qui ut sint, quod fieri posse video, pudici, solliciti tamen et anxii sunt, eoque magis, quod se ipsi continent et coërcent. 4.71. atque, ut muliebris amores omittam, quibus maiorem licentiam natura concessit, quis aut de Ganymedi ganumedi K nymedi G 1 ganymedis V rec raptu dubitat, quid poëtae velint, aut non intellegit, quid apud Euripidem et loquatur et cupiat Eurip. Chrysippo p. 632 N. Laius? quid denique homines doctissimi et summi poë- tae de se ipsis et carminibus edunt edunt Lb. edant cf. praef. et cantibus? fortis vir in sua re p. cognitus quae de iuvenum amore scribit Alcaeus! nam Anacreontis quidem tota poësis est amatoria. maxume vero omnium flagrasse amore Reginum Ibycum apparet ex scriptis. Atque horum omnium lubidinosos esse amores videmus: philosophi sumus exorti, et et ex G 1 auctore quidem nostro Platone, quem non iniuria Dicaearchus accusat, qui amori auctoritatem tribueremus. 4.72. Stoici vero et sapientem amaturum esse St. fr. 3, 652 dicunt et amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt. qui si qui si quin V quis est in rerum natura sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio, sine cura, sine suspirio, sit sane; vacat enim omni libidine; haec autem de libidine oratio est. sin autem est aliquis amor, ut est certe, qui nihil absit aut non multum ab insania, qualis in Leucadia est: si quidem sit quisquam Turpil. 115 deus, cui cuii Ribb. ad V ego sim curae — 4.73. at id erat deis dehis X (de is V) omnibus curandum, quem ad modum hic frueretur voluptate amatoria! heu me infelicem! —nihil verius. probe et ille: sanusne es, sanun es Wo. qui temere lamentare? sic sic hic Mdv. ( at cf. ita div. 2, 82 ) insanus videtur etiam suis. at at ad KR effecit KRG (tragoediasfeffecit) V rec (affecit V 1 ) efficit s quas tragoedias efficit! Te, te s et X Apo/llo sancte, fe/r opem, teque, amni/potens tequea omnipotens GR tequeaomnipotens K te- que omnipotens V amnipotens Wölfflin ap. Ribb. omnip. vulgo Neptune, i/nvoco, Vosque a/deo, Venti! mundum totum se ad amorem suum sublevandum conversurum putat, Venerem unam excludit ut iniquam: nam quid quid add. K c ego te appellem, Venus? eam prae lubidine lib. V negat curare quicquam: quasi vero ipse non propter lubidinem lib. V tanta flagitia et faciat et dicat. 4.74. —sic igitur adfecto haec adhibenda curatio est, ut et illud quod cupiat ostendatur ostendat s ostendatur Dav. ostendas Bouhier quam leve, quam contemnendum, quam nihili nihil V sit omnino, quam facile vel aliunde vel aliunde bis K 1 vel ali ende G (i in r. et u? ) vel alio modo perfici vel omnino neglegi possit; abducendus etiam est non etiam est non in r. V c numquam ad alia studia sollicitudines curas negotia, loci denique mutatione tamquam aegroti non convalescentes saepe curandus est; 4.75. etiam novo quidam amore veterem amorem Hier. epist. 125, 14 tamquam clavo clavo clava V clavum eiciendum putant; maxume autem admonendus idmonendus V 3 est, quantus sit furor amoris. add. Bai. omnibus enim ex animi perturbationibus est profecto nulla vehementior, ut, si iam ipsa illa accusare accuss. K nolis, stupra dico et corruptelas et adulteria, incesta denique, quorum omnium accusabilis accuss. K est turpitudo,—sed ut haec omittas, omittas ex comitas V 3 perturbatio ipsa mentis in amore foeda per se est. 4.79. Ubi sunt ergo isti, qui iracundiam utilem dicunt —potest utilis esse insania?—aut naturalem? an an s hanc X quicquam est secundum est sec. s es sec. R esse sec. GKV naturam, quod fit repugte ratione? quo modo autem, si naturalis esset ira, ira add. G 2 aut alius alio magis iracundus esset, aut finem haberet prius quam esset aut finem ... 4 esset add. V 3 ulta, ulta Man. ulla ulciscendi lubido, aut quemquam paeniteret, quod fecisset fecisse V 1 per iram? ut Alexandrum regem videmus, qui cum interemisset Clitum clitum iditum K familiarem suum, vix a se manus abstinuit; tanta vis fuit paenitendi. quibus cognitis quis est qui dubitet dubitat K quin hic quoque motus animi sit totus opinabilis ac voluntarius? Quis enim dubitarit quin aegrotationes animi, qualis est avaritia, gloriae cupiditas, ex eo, quod magni magna V aestumetur ea res ex qua animus aegrotat, oriantur? oriantur s oriatur unde intellegi debet perturbationem quoque omnem esse in opinione. 4.83. itaque non fortuito factum videtur, sed a te ratione propositum, ut separatim de aegritudine et de ceteris perturbationibus disputaremus; in ea est enim fons miseriarum et caput. sed et alt. et om. V aegritudinis et reliquorum animi morborum una sanatio est, omnis opinabilis esse et voluntarios ea reque requae GKR (quae ... videatur in r. K 1 ) suscipi, quod ita rectum esse videatur. hunc errorem quasi radicem malorum omnium stirpitus stirpitus Statil. Max. ap. Char. GL. 2, 219, 25 philosophia se extracturam pollicetur.
4. Philodemus, Epigrams, 22 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 1.38 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Horace, Letters, 1.1.100 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Horace, Epodes, 9.3 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

8. Horace, Sermones, 1.2.116-1.2.118, 1.4.111, 1.6.72, 2.3.307 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

9. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 4.1069-4.1073 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

10. Ovid, Ars Amatoria, 2.683-2.684, 2.725-2.728 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

11. Strabo, Geography, 10.4.12 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

12. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.2.8-1.2.11, 1.2.18, 1.16.9-1.16.14, 1.24.18, 2.16.19, 3.1, 4.1.72-4.1.73, 4.1.147, 4.7.1-4.7.11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

13. Plutarch, Dialogue On Love, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

14. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

441c. and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason.
15. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.2.2, 2.3.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

16. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.2.8-4.2.18, 4.6.24-4.6.27, 4.6.35-4.6.37, 4.6.40-4.6.41 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

17. Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.2.6-7.2.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

18. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.36, 7.110, 7.175 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.36. of the many disciples of Zeno the following are the most famous: Persaeus, son of Demetrius, of Citium, whom some call a pupil and others one of the household, one of those sent him by Antigonus to act as secretary; he had been tutor to Antigonus's son Halcyoneus. And Antigonus once, wishing to make trial of him, caused some false news to be brought to him that his estate had been ravaged by the enemy, and as his countece fell, Do you see, said he, that wealth is not a matter of indifference?The following works are by Persaeus:of Kingship.The Spartan Constitution.of Marriage.of Impiety.Thyestes.of Love.Exhortations.Interludes.Four books of Anecdotes.Memorabilia.A Reply to Plato's Laws in seven books. 7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure. 7.175. Antiquities.of the Gods.of Giants.of Marriage.On Homer.of Duty, three books.of Good Counsel.of Gratitude.An Exhortation.of the Virtues.of Natural Ability.of Gorgippus.of Envy.of Love.of Freedom.The Art of Love.of Honour.of Fame.The Statesman.of Deliberation.of Laws.of Litigation.of Education.of Logic, three books.of the End.of Beauty.of Conduct.of Knowledge.of Kingship.of Friendship.On the Banquet.On the Thesis that Virtue is the same in Man and in Woman.On the Wise Man turning Sophist.of Usages.Lectures, two books.of Pleasure.On Properties.On Insoluble Problems.of Dialectic.of Moods or Tropes.of Predicates.This, then, is the list of his works.
19. Origen, Against Celsus, 4.45 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.45. And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth displayed by the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed even what is to their discredit, and thus been led to accept the other and more marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse, and has characterized the story of Lot and his daughters (without examining either its literal or its figurative meaning) as worse than the crimes of Thyestes. The figurative signification of that passage of history it is not necessary at present to explain, nor what is meant by Sodom, and by the words of the angels to him who was escaping thence, when they said: Look not behind you, neither stay in all the surrounding district; escape to the mountain, lest you be consumed; nor what is intended by Lot and his wife, who became a pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his daughters intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him. But let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the history. The nature of actions - good, bad, and indifferent - has been investigated by the Greeks; and the more successful of such investigators lay down the principle that intention alone gives to actions the character of good or bad, and that all things which are done without a purpose are, strictly speaking, indifferent; that when the intention is directed to a becoming end, it is praiseworthy; when the reverse, it is censurable. They have said, accordingly, in the section relating to things indifferent, that, strictly speaking, for a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in established communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to show that such an act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they have assumed the case of a wise man being left with an only daughter, the entire human race besides having perished; and they put the question whether the father can fitly have intercourse with his daughter, in order, agreeably to the supposition, to prevent the extermination of mankind. Is this to be accounted sound reasoning among the Greeks, and to be commended by the influential sect of the Stoics; but when young maidens, who had heard of the burning of the world, though without comprehending (its full meaning), saw fire devastating their city and country, and supposing that the only means left of rekindling the flame of human life lay in their father and themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the desire that the world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse than that of the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics, acts becomingly in having intercourse with his daughter in the case already supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however, that some have taken offense at the desire of Lot's daughters, and have regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two accursed nations - Moab and Ammon - have sprung from that unhallowed intercourse. And yet truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly approving of their conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as blameworthy. Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it admits not only of a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on its own merits.
20. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.7.10



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aelianus Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
anger Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
athenaios Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 78
beliefs, role in emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
chrysippus, on directive faculty Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
chrysippus, treatises of, on the law Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
chrysippus Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 78, 268
cicero, on beliefs in emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero, translates prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero Günther, Brill's Companion to Horace (2012) 139
citations Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
cleanthes (kleanthes) Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
cooper, john Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
crete Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
cylinder analogy Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cyprus Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
diogenes laertios Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
directive faculty, in emotions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
discourse of love vs. philosophy at rome Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 137
emotion Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
epictetus, on exemplary performance Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
epictetus, students of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
epictetus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
epicurus, epicureanism Günther, Brill's Companion to Horace (2012) 139
epicurus/epicureanism, love and sex Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 137
epikouros (epicurus) Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
eros Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
ethics, of stoicism Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
euphemism Günther, Brill's Companion to Horace (2012) 139
euripides Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 78, 268
excessiveness (pleonasmos) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
fable Günther, Brill's Companion to Horace (2012) 139
fear Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
gastronomy Günther, Brill's Companion to Horace (2012) 139
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
god; gods Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
health Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
hellenism Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
herculaneum papyri Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
honourableness Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
horace Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 137
identification in place of simile Günther, Brill's Companion to Horace (2012) 139
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
logos, love Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
lucilius Günther, Brill's Companion to Horace (2012) 139
lucretius Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 78, 268; Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 137
lévy, carlos Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 137
maecenas Günther, Brill's Companion to Horace (2012) 139
manliness Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
montaigne, m. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
musonius rufus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), and prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
ovid, and epicurus Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 137
ovid, ars and remedia as philosophical in their own right Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 137
ovid, as praeceptor amoris Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 137
ovid, erotodidaxis similar to philosophy in Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 137
pain, of mind' Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
philosophy as a way of life Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 137
plutarch, on mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
psyche, part-based and monistic models Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
rome Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
salamis Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268
soul Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 78
strabon Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 78, 268
terence Günther, Brill's Companion to Horace (2012) 139
theophrastus Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 78, 268
volition, terminology of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
von arnim, joachim Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
wolfe, t. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 390
zeno of citium, on mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233