Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2385
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.16-4.17
NaN
NaN


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

33 results
1. Plato, Laches, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

191d. For I wanted to have your view not only of brave men-at-arms, but also of courage in cavalry and in the entire warrior class; and of the courageous not only in war but in the perils of the sea, and all who in disease and poverty, or again in public affairs, are courageous; and further, all who are not merely courageous against pain or fear, but doughty fighters against desires and pleasures
2. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

4. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

5. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

69d. which has within it passions both fearful and unavoidable—firstly, pleasure, a most mighty lure to evil; next, pains, which put good to rout; and besides these, rashness and fear, foolish counsellors both and anger, hard to dissuade; and hope, ready to seduce. And blending these with irrational sensation and with all-daring lust, they thus compounded in necessary fashion the mortal kind of soul. Wherefore, since they scrupled to pollute the divine, unless through absolute necessity
6. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2.8-2.9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

7. Cicero, On Fate, 41 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

8. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.35 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.35. Nec vero perturbationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt, quas Graeci pa/- qh appellant—poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conveniret conveniret A. Man. conveniet ABERN conveniat V ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt pa/qos . sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur nec eae perturbationes vi aliqua naturali moventur . secl. Mdv. omnesque eae eae ee RV he (h in ras. ) N hec BE; om. ( spatio parvo relicto ) A sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures, aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi h(donh/n appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam. perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac iudicia levitatis. itaque his sapiens semper vacabit. 3.35.  "Moreover the emotions of the mind, which harass and embitter the life of the foolish (the Greek term for these is pathos, and I might have rendered this literally and styled them 'diseases,' but the word 'disease' would not suit all instances; for example, no one speaks of pity, nor yet anger, as a disease, though the Greeks term these pathos. Let us then accept the term 'emotion,' the very sound of which seems to denote something vicious, and these emotions are not excited by any natural influence. The list of the emotions is divided into four classes, with numerous subdivisions, namely sorrow, fear, lust, and that mental emotion which the Stoics call by a name that also denotes a bodily feeling, hēdonē 'pleasure,' but which I prefer to style 'delight,' meaning the sensuous elation of the mind when in a state of exaltation), these emotions, I say, are not excited by any influence of nature; they are all of them mere fancies and frivolous opinions. Therefore the Wise Man will always be free from them.
9. Cicero, On Duties, 1.34, 3.35 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.34. Atque in re publica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli. Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore. 3.35. Cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commoveri necesse est; sed si, cum animum attenderis, turpitudinem videas adiunctam ei rei, quae speciem utilitatis attulerit, tum non utilitas relinquenda est, sed intellegendum, ubi turpitude sit, ibi utilitatem esse non posse. Quodsi nihil est tam contra naturam quam turpitudo (recta enim et convenientia et constantia natura desiderat aspernaturque contraria) nihilque tam secundum naturam quam utilitas, certe in eadem re utilitas et turpitudo esse non potest. Itemque, si ad honestatem nati sumus eaque aut sola expetenda est, ut Zenoni visum est, aut certe omni pondere gravior habenda quam reliqua omnia, quod Aristoteli placet, necesse est, quod honestum sit, id esse aut solum aut summum bonum; quod autem bonum, id certe utile; ita, quicquid honestum, id utile. 1.34.  Then, too, in the case of a state in its external relations, the rights of war must be strictly observed. For since there are two ways of settling a dispute: first, by discussion; second; by physical force; and since the former is characteristic of man, the latter of the brute, we must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of discussion. 3.35.  Now when we meet with expediency in some specious form or other, we cannot help being influenced by it. But if upon closer inspection one sees that there is some immorality connected with what presents the appearance of expediency, then one is not necessarily to sacrifice expediency but to recognize that there can be no expediency where there is immorality. But if there is nothing so repugt to Nature as immorality (for Nature demands right and harmony and consistency and abhors their opposites), and if nothing is so thoroughly in accord with Nature as expediency, then surely expediency and immorality cannot coexist in one and the same object. Again: if we are born for moral rectitude and if that is either the only thing worth seeking, as Zeno thought, or at least to be esteemed as infinitely outweighing everything else, as Aristotle holds, then it necessarily follows that the morally right is either the sole good or the supreme good. Now, that which is good is certainly expedient; consequently, that which is morally right is also expedient.
10. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.20, 3.24-3.25, 3.84, 4.9-4.15, 4.17-4.29, 4.31-4.32, 4.56, 4.72, 4.79 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.20. Etenim si sapiens in aegritudinem aegritudinem -ne G incidere posset, posset semel R 1 posset etiam in misericordiam, posset in invidentiam (non dixi invidiam, quae tum tum (cum G) etiam Bouh., alii aliter, Ciceronem corrigentes est, cum invidetur; ab invidendo autem invidentia recte dici potest, ut effugiamus ut et fug. Non. ambiguum nomen invidiae. posset (posse codd. ) etiam... 12 invidiae Non. 443,15 (10 in invidiam. non dixi in invidentia 11 invidia) quod verbum ductum dictum G 1 K 1 ( cf. Isidor. 10,134 ) est a nimis intuendo fortunam alterius, ut est in Melanippo: quisnam florem Acc. fr. 424 (unde aut quis mortalis fl. Non. 500, 13 num quis non mortalis fl. Ri. num quisnam poetae sit, dubium ) quasnam G 1 liberum invidit meum? male Latine videtur, sed praeclare Accius; ut enim videre, sic invidere florem flore X florē K 2 R c? rectius quam flori . nos consuetudine prohibemur; 3.24. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis St. fr. 3, 385 solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspers vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata aelata G 1 R 1 laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, post obtemperans add. vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest X quae retinent sec. Dav. edd., in v. 17. 8 verba cupiditas — potest delentes. sed ut voluptatis sic cupi- ditatis nomen appositionis locum tenere debebat. de cupiditate autem praedicandam erat 'opinione futuri boni turbatur'; quod cum iam in enuntiato relativo expressum esset, anacoluthon natum est. ad boni 17 V c in mg. adscr. : et quidem magis significat nomen libidinis magnitudinem erroris. itaque in ea cupiditate quae flagrantissima est proprie plerumque nomen hoc ponitur si omnis appetitio opinati boni haec] ut H 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.84. Haec omnia definiunt Stoici, eaque verba quae dixi singularum rerum St. fr. 3, 419 sunt, non, ut videntur, easdem res significant, sed aliquid differunt; quod alio loco alio loco cf. IV, 16 fortasse tractabimus. haec hae V 2 sunt illae fibrae stirpium, quas initio dixi, persequendae et omnes eligendae, et 25 eligendae X ( cf. Colum. 4, 5 Varro rust. 1, 47 ) eliciendae V c ne umquam ulla possit existere. magnum opus et difficile, quis negat? quid autem praeclarum non idem arduum? sed tamen id se effecturam philosophia profitetur, nos modo curationem eius recipiamus. denique ratio una ... 360, 3 recipiamus H Verum haec quidem verum quidem haec W corr. We. actenus K 1 R 1 hactenus, cetera, quotienscumque voletis, et hoc loco et aliis parata vobis erunt. 4.9. Sic prorsus intellego. Utrum igitur mavis? statimne nos vela vela add. G 2 facere an quasi e portu egredientis aegridientis V 1 paululum remigare? Quidnam est istuc? non enim intellego. Quia Chrysippus et Stoici cum de animi perturbationibus St. fr. 3, 483 disputant, magnam partem in his his is? partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt, illa eorum perexigua oratio est, qua medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos esse patiantur, Peripatetici autem ad placandos animos multa adferunt, spinas partiendi et definiendi praetermittunt. quaerebam igitur, utrum panderem vela orationis vela orationis V c (vela or in r. ) s velorationis GKR (o R 2 ) statim an eam ante paululum dialecticorum remis propellerem. propellerem propalarem K 2 Isto modo vero; erit enim hoc totum, quod quaero, ex utroque perfectius. Est id quidem rectius; 4.10. sed post requires, si quid fuerit obscurius. Faciam equidem; tu tamen, ut soles, dices ista ipsa obscura planius quam dicuntur a Graecis. Enitar equidem, sed intento opus est animo, ne ne nemo K 1 omnia dilabantur, si unum aliquid effugerit. Quoniam, quae Graeci pa/qh vocant, nobis perturbationes pathe X perturbationes cf. Aug. civ. 14, 5 appellari magis placet quam morbos, in his explicandis veterem illam equidem Pythagorae primum, dein Platonis discriptionem sequar, qui animum in duas partes dividunt: alteram rationis participem faciunt, fiunt K 1 alteram expertem; in participe rationis ponunt ponunt V rec s pot X tranquillitatem, id est placidam quietamque constantiam, in illa altera motus turbidos cum cum We. tum irae tum cupiditatis, contrarios inimicosque rationi. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia. 4.12. laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta inlecta s iniecta X et sqq. cf. Barlaami eth. sec. Stoicos 2, 11 qui hinc haud pauca adsumpsit. inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura natura s V rec naturae X (-re K) enim omnes ea, Stoic. fr. 3, 438 quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est speciei est H speci est KR ( add. c ) speciest GV cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin BO gL AHClN KR bo gL HC in G bo ga HCin V appellant, nos appellemus appellemus We. appellamus X (apell G) cf. v. 26, fin. 3, 20 voluntatem, eam eam iam V illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante adversante Po. ( cf. p.368, 6; 326, 3; St. fr. 3, 462 a)peiqw=s tw=| lo/gw| w)qou/menon e)pi\ plei=on adversa X (d del. H 1 ) a ratione aversa Or. incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. 4.13. itemque cum ita ita om. H movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. nam cum ratione curatione K 1 (ũ 2 ) animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem iiter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. quoniamque, quoniam quae X praeter K 1 (quae del. V rec ) ut bona natura adpetimus, app. KR 2? (H 367, 24) sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio si cum del. Bentl. ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, appellatur K 1 V rec s eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente; quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur metus; est igitur metus a a Gr.(?) s om. X ratione aversa cautio. cautio Cic. dicere debebat: declinatio 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.15. sed quae iudicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam etiam ilia H quae efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, metus recessum quendam animi et fugam, laetitia profusam hilaritatem, libido lubido K x li bido R effrenatam effrenata X corr. K 2 R c adpetentiam. opinationem autem, quam in omnis definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse inbecillam adsensionem. 4.17. (nam si qui qui quid K 1 (d eras. ) RH doleat eius rebus secundis a quo ipse laedatur, non recte dicatur invidere, ut si Hectori haectori X (ut ... Agamemno om. H) Agamemno; qui autem, cui alterius commoda comoda GRV 1 nihil noceant, tamen eum doleat is frui, is frui is R rec s frui se GR 1 V (se exp. rec ) K 2 fuisse K 1 invideat profecto.) aemulatio autem dupliciter illa quidem dicitur, ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit; nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur— sed ea nihil hoc loco utimur; est enim laudis—, et et om. G est aemulatio aegritudo, est aegritudo aemulatio G 1 si eo eo ea H quod concupierit alius potiatur, ipse careat. obtrectatio autem est, ea quam intellegi zhlotupi/an zelotypian GRV (n ut sequens u in r. ) H (i pro y) zelo t ypiam K volo, aegritudo ex eo, quod alter quoque potiatur eo quod ipse concupiverit. 4.18. misericordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria iniuria K laborantis (nemo enim parricidae patricidae G 1 V aut proditoris supplicio subpl. KH misericordia commovetur); angor aegritudo premens, luctus aegritudo ex eius qui carus fuerit interitu acerbo, maeror aegritudo flebilis, aerumna aegritudo laboriosa, dolor aegritudo crucians, lamentatio aegritudo cum eiulatu, sollicitudo aegritudo cum cogitatione, molestia aegritudo permanens, adflictatio adflictio V (G 1 in lemmate mg. ) aegritudo cum vexatione corporis, desperatio aegritudo sine ulla rerum expectatione meliorum. Quae autem subiecta sunt sub metum, ea sic definiunt: pigritiam metum consequentis laboris,. 4.19. . . terrorem metum pudorem metum dedecoris add. Sey. ( ai)sxu/nh fo/bos a)doci/as pudorem metum sanguinem diffundentem Bai. ( cf. Gell. 19, 6 ); quae coniungenda videntur : pudorem metum dedecoris sanguinem diffundentem concutientem, ex quo fit ut pudorem rubor, terrorem pallor et tremor et dentium crepitus consequatur, laboris; Terrorem metum mali adp. K 1 Terrorem in Timorem corr. et verba terrorem ... 15 consequatur in mg. add. K 2 timorem metum metu mientem V ( add. rec ) metu mentem GKRH mali adpropinquantis, pavorem metum mali... 16 metum add. G 2 in mg. mentem loco loquo K 1 moventem, ex quo illud Ennius: ennius X enni V rec M s (et We. coll. nat. deor. 2, 60 fat. 35 off. 2, 89 al. ) Enn. Alcm. 23 tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi omne mmihi ( vel mihi omnem) exanimato expectorat fere de orat. 3, 154. 218 Non. 16, 7. omnem mihi ex anima expectaret X (expectorat K 2 expectoret B ex- pelleret V rec ) exanimato expectorat ex ... 18 expectorat om. H, exanimationem metum subsequentem et quasi comitem pavoris, conturbationem metum excutientem cogitata, formidinem metum permanentem. 4.20. Voluptatis autem partes hoc modo describunt, descr. cf. 366, 18 describit K 1 ut malevolentia sit voluptas ex malo alterius sine emolumento suo, delectatio declaratio K 1 voluptas suavitate auditus animum deleniens; et qualis est haec aurium, tales sunt oculorum et tactionum sunt toculorum et actionum Non. L 1 sunt et ocul. B adorationum K 1 et odorationum et saporum, qualis haec ... 3 saporum Non. 227, 9 quae sunt omnes unius generis ad perfundendum animum tamquam inliquefactae voluptates. iactatio est voluptas gestiens et se efferens insolentius. 4.21. Quae autem libidini subiecta sunt, ea sic definiuntur, ut ira sit libido poeniendi poen. ex pen. V 2 pun. HV rec eius qui videatur laesisse iniuria, excandescentia autem sit ira nascens et modo modo W ( o)rgh\ e)narxome/nh ) sine modo Non. existens, excandescentia... 9 existens Non. 103, 14 desistens V 3 quae qu/mwsis Graece dicitur, odium Qg M w ClC fere X ira inveterata, inimicitia ira ulciscendi tempus observans, discordia ira acerbior intimo animo animo Lb. ( cf. Th. 1. 1. 4, 940 ) odio et corde concepta, indigentia Idigentia K 1 libido inexplebilis, desiderium libido eius, qui nondum adsit, videndi. distinguunt distingunt X illud etiam, ut libido sit earum rerum, quae dicuntur de quodam aut quibusdam, quae kathgorh/mata K a TH G opphm a T L fere X dialectici appellant, ut habere divitias, capere honores, indigentia diligentia X indigentia s V 3 quod verum videtur, etsi Cic. non bene expressit spa/nin duplici sensu adhiberi ( de re cf. St. fr. 3, 91 rerum ipsarum sit, sit Man. est ( def. Küh. ) ut honorum, ut St. fr. 3, 379 pecuniae. ut pec. et pec. H 4.22. Omnium autem perturbationum fontem esse dicunt intemperantiam, quae est a a in r. G 2 del. ab Arnim ( cf. fr. 3, 475 al. ) a recta ratione del. Bentl. et post mente add. s tota mente a recta ratione defectio sic aversa a praescriptione a praescriptione aperte scriptione V 1 rationis, ut nullo modo adpetitiones animi nec regi nec contineri animi regine cont. V ( add. 3 ) queant. quem ad modum igitur temperantia sedat adpetitiones app. V c et efficit, ut eae aeae K 1 (hae K c )R rectae recte G 1 VH rationi pareant, conservatque considerata iudicia mentis, sic si V 1 huic inimica intemperantia omnem animi statum inflammat conturbat incitat, itaque et aegritudines et metus et reliquae reli q; conturbationes G 1 perturbationes omnes gignuntur ex ea. Quem ad modum, cum sanguis corruptus est aut St. fr. 3, 424 pituita redundat aut bilis, in corpore morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur, sic pravarum opinionum conturbatio et ipsarum inter se repugtia sanitate spoliat animum morbisque perturbat; sit... 372, 8 perturbat ( sine 23 quidam ... 26 constan- tia et 368, 10 itaque... 368, 12 potestate) H conturbat V 1 4.23. ex perturbationibus autem primum morbi conficiuntur, quae vocant illi nosh/mata, eaque quae sunt eis morbis contraria, nosemiata X ( nos emata V) quae habent ad res certas vitiosam offensionem vitiosam offensionem s vitiosa offensione X (-sas -es V rec ) atque fastidium, deinde aegrotationes, quae appellantur a Stoicis a)rrwsth/mata, a pp w CTHM L T L GV ac fere KR (o pro w, a pro L ) idem appositae G 1 isque item oppositae contrariae contraria V 1 offensiones. hoc loco nimium operae opere GKV consumitur a Stoicis, maxime a Chrysippo, crys. G 1 dum morbis corporum comparatur morborum animi similitudo; qua oratione ratione V 1 praetermissa minime necessaria ea, quae rem continent, pertractemus. 4.24. intellegatur igitur perturbationem iactantibus se opinionibus inconstanter et turbide in motu in motu immotus GRV (s del. rec ) H immot os K ( ss. c ) esse semper; cum autem hic fervor concitatioque animi inveteraverit et tamquam in venis medullisque insederit, tum existet existit X (exs. G) existet Küh. ( de fut. cf. p. 378, 14 comm. ad 1, 29 Sen. epist. 85, 9 al. ) inveteravit ... insedit ... existit Sey. et morbus et aegrotatio et offensiones eae, quae sunt eis morbis aegrotationibusque contrariae. Haec, quae dico, cogitatione inter se differunt, re quidem copulata sunt, eaque eaque GRV (eaq K 1 sed; add. 2 ) oriuntur ex libidine et ex laetitia. nam cum est concupita pecunia nec adhibita continuo ratio quasi quaedam Socratica medicina, quae sanaret sanet Bentl. permanet K 1 eam cupiditatem, permanat in venas et inhaeret in visceribus illud malum, existitque existit (exs. KR) qui m. X (que V rec s ) morbus et aegrotatio, quae evelli evelli Wopkens avelli inveterata non possunt, eique morbo nomen est avaritia; 4.25. similiterque similiter quae GKV ceteri morbi, ut gloriae cupiditas, ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam eam s ea X Non. L quae Graece filoguni/a f l L O Gg NlA fere X ( fgL KH -m a GV) dicitur, similiterque ... 7 dicitur Non. 142, 20 ceterique similiter morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur. quae autem sunt his contraria, ea nasci putantur a metu, ut odium mulierum, quale in misogu/nw| Atili est, inmisso gyno X (imm. K guno V 2 immissum K 2 ) Atil. fr. 1 ut in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone de Timone de ti in r. V 2 qui misa/nqrwpos appellatur, quale... 12 appellatur om. H misane p wit oc a appellantur X (misanep wp oc app. V, p fort. ex it ) ut inhospitalitas est: quae omnes aegrotationes animi ex quodam metu nascuntur earum rerum quas fugiunt et oderunt. 4.26. definiunt autem animi aegrotationem opinationem St. fr. 3, 427 vehementem de re non expetenda, tamquam valde expetenda sit, inhaerentem et penitus insitam. quod autem nascitur ex offensione, ita definiunt: opinionem vehementem de re non fugienda inhaerentem et penitus insitam tamquam fugienda; fugienda expetenda KRH haec autem opinatio est iudicatio iuditio K 1 ( add. 2 ) se scire, quod nesciat. aegrotationi autem talia quaedam subiecta sunt: avaritia, ambitio, mulierositas, pervicacia, pervicatia KV ligurritio, vinulentia, vinulentia Non. vinol. X cf. Mue. cuppedia, ambitio ... 23 cuppedia Non. 85, 10 cu pedia G et si qua similia. est autem avaritia opinatio vehemens de pecunia, quasi valde expetenda sit, inhaerens et penitus insita, similisque est eiusdem generis definitio reliquarum. 4.27. offensionum autem definitiones sunt eius modi, eiusdem modi G 1 ut inhospitalitas inhospitalis K 1 RH sit opinio vehemens valde fugiendum esse hospitem, eaque inhaerens et penitus insita; similiterque definitur et mulierum odium, ut Hippolyti, hippoliti GH hyppoliti V et, ut Timonis, generis humani. Atque ut ad valetudinis similitudinem veniamus veniamus s ( cf. utamur) veniam X eaque conlatione consolatione V utamur aliquando, sed parcius quam solent Stoici: ut sunt alii ad alios morbos procliviores St. fr. 3, 423 —itaque dicimus gravidinosos gravidinosos W Non. ( 115, 16 etiam in lemmate ) ut Plin. 18, 139 codd. praeter d cf. Catull. 44, 13 Lucil. 820 (gravedo Marx ) gravedinosos edd. alt. quosdam om. W Non. add. Beroaldus quosdam, quosdam torminosos, itaque ... 9 torminosos Non. 32, 13 et 115, 16 terminosos KRH ( Non. L 1 priore loco ) non quia iam sint, sed quia saepe sint—, sic saepe sint, sic Gr. Lb. saepe sint X saepe, sic Man. ( de iterato sint cf. Sey. ad Lael. 43 ) alii ad metum, alii ad aliam perturbationem; ex quo non quia ia in r. V 2 sed... 11 quo om. K 1 add. c in aliis anxietas, unde anxii, in aliis iracundia dicitur. quae ab ira differt, estque aliud aliud ex illud V rec iracundum esse, aliud iratum, ut differt anxietas ab angore (neque enim omnes anxii, qui anguntur aliquando, nec, nec s haec X qui anxii, semper anguntur), ut nec ... 15 ut om. Non. inter ebrietatem et ebriositatem et ebriositatem om. W Non. L 1 hab. Nonii codd. rell. interest, aliudque que om. G 1 Non. est amatorem esse, aliud amantem. aliud... 17 amantem Non. 444, 1 atque haec aliorum ad alios morbos proclivitas late patet; nam pertinet ad omnes perturbationes; 4.28. in multis etiam etiam enim H s vitiis apparet, sed nomen res non habet. ergo et invidi et malivoli et libidinosi libidinosi Po. ( cf. p. 389, 26.28 ) lividi W et lividi del. We. et timidi et misericordes, quia proclives ad eas perturbationes sunt sunt s om. X proclives (proclive Bentl. ) cum feruntur coni. Mue., sed proclivitas est dia/qesis ; in per- turbationibus proclivi feruntur ( p. 381, 23 ), ad pert. proclives sunt ( cf. v. 7; p. 402, 7; St. fr. 3, 465 ), non quia semper feruntur. ferantur We. haec igitur proclivitas ad suum quodque genus a similitudine corporis aegrotatio dicatur, dicatur Bentl. dicitur dum ea intellegatur ad aegrotandum proclivitas. sed haec in bonis rebus, quod alii ad alia bona sunt aptiores, facilitas nominetur, in malis proclivitas, ut significet lapsionem, in neutris habeat superius nomen. Quo modo autem in St. fr. 3, 425 corpore est morbus, est aegrotatio, est vitium, est vitium Gr. et vit. X sic in animo. morbum appellant totius corporis corruptionem, aegrotationem morbum cum imbecillitate, inb. V vitium, cum partes corporis inter se dissident, ex quo pravitas membrorum, distortio, deformitas. 4.29. itaque illa duo, morbus et aegrotatio, ex totius valetudinis corporis conquassatione et perturbatione gignuntur, vitium autem integra valetudine ipsum ex se cernitur. sed in animo tantum modo cogitatione possumus morbum ab aegrotatione seiungere, vitiositas autem est habitus aut adfectio in tota vita inconstans et a se ipsa dissentiens. ita fit, ut in altera corruptione opinionum morbus efficiatur et aegrotatio, in altera inconstantia et repugtia. non enim omne vitium paris habet dissensiones, paris h. dissensiones Bentl. partis h. dissentientis X (-ent V c, ent in r. ). ceterum totus locus negle- genter a Cic. scriptus ut eorum, qui non longe a sapientia absunt, adfectio est illa quidem discrepans sibi ipsa, dum est insipiens, sed non distorta nec prava. morbi autem et aegrotationes aegrotationis X ( corr. K 2 ) partes sunt vitiositatis, sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem partes, quaestio est. 4.31. et ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam suavitate eaque ea quae X dicitur dicuntur G 1 pulchritudo, sic in animo opinionum iudiciorumque aequabilitas et constantia cum firmitate quadam et stabilitate virtutem subsequens aut virtutis vim ipsam continens pulchritudo vocatur. itemque viribus corporis et nervis et efficacitati similes similibus quoque similibus quoque Man. similibusque verbis animi vires nomitur. velocitas autem corporis celeritas appellatur, quae eadem ingenii etiam laus habetur propter animi multarum rerum brevi tempore percursionem. propter ... percursiones Non. 161, 20 ( s. l. percursionem) percussionem X ( corr. V rec periussionem K 1 ) Illud animorum corporumque dissimile, St. fr. 3, 426 quod animi valentes morbo temptari non possunt, temptari non possunt ut c. Bentl. sed cf. Galen de Hipp. et Pl. 409, 1 M. al. corpora corpora autem p. G ( exp. 2 ) possunt; sed corporum offensiones sine culpa accidere possunt, animorum non item, quorum omnes morbi et perturbationes ex aspernatione rationis eveniunt. veniunt H itaque in in om. H hominibus solum existunt; nam bestiae simile quiddam quidam GR 1 V 1 ( corr. R 2 V c ) faciunt, sed in perturbationes non incidunt. 4.32. inter acutos autem et inter hebetes hebetes non item est K 1 ( corr. 1 etc ) interest, quod ingeniosi, ut aes Corinthium in aeruginem, aerugine GRV sic illi in morbum et incidunt tardius et recreantur ocius, hebetes non item. nec vero in omnem morbum ac perturbationem animus ingeniosi cadit; †non enim non enim in ulla Bentl. sunt enim multa Mdv. non enim ad omnia vitia aeque propensa est natura humana: sunt enim multa fere desiderat Po. ( cf. p. 402, 8 ) multa ecferata eff. KV c? et immania; quaedam autem humanitatis quoque habent primam speciem, ut misericordia aegritudo metus. Aegrotationes autem morbique animorum St. fr. 3, 430 difficilius evelli posse putantur quam summa illa vitia, quae virtutibus sunt contraria. morbis enim manentibus vitia sublata esse non possunt, quia del. Lb. quia] qui Dav. non tam celeriter satur quam illa tolluntur. sed ut. .. 377, 12 tolluntur ( sine 377, 1 inter 377, 6 immania) H 4.56. At etiam etiam enim Sey. sed cf. p. 383, 14 aemulari utile est, obtrectare, obtrectari X misereri. cur misereare potius quam feras opem, si id facere possis? an sine misericordia liberales esse non possumus? non enim suscipere ipsi aegritudines propter alios debemus, sed alios, si possumus, levare aegritudine. obtrectare vero alteri aut illa vitiosa aemulatione, quae rivalitati similis est, aemulari quid habet utilitatis, cum sit aemulantis angi alieno bono quod ipse non habeat, obtrectantis opt. G autem angi alieno bono, quod id etiam alius habeat? qui qui s quis GKCRV quid K 1 (quis id M) app. V c id adprobari possit, aegritudinem suscipere pro experientia, si quid habere velis? nam nam B s non X solum habere velle summa dementia est. Mediocritates autem malorum quis laudare recte possit? 4.72. Stoici vero et sapientem amaturum esse St. fr. 3, 652 dicunt et amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt. qui si qui si quin V quis est in rerum natura sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio, sine cura, sine suspirio, sit sane; vacat enim omni libidine; haec autem de libidine oratio est. sin autem est aliquis amor, ut est certe, qui nihil absit aut non multum ab insania, qualis in Leucadia est: si quidem sit quisquam Turpil. 115 deus, cui cuii Ribb. ad V ego sim curae — 4.79. Ubi sunt ergo isti, qui iracundiam utilem dicunt —potest utilis esse insania?—aut naturalem? an an s hanc X quicquam est secundum est sec. s es sec. R esse sec. GKV naturam, quod fit repugte ratione? quo modo autem, si naturalis esset ira, ira add. G 2 aut alius alio magis iracundus esset, aut finem haberet prius quam esset aut finem ... 4 esset add. V 3 ulta, ulta Man. ulla ulciscendi lubido, aut quemquam paeniteret, quod fecisset fecisse V 1 per iram? ut Alexandrum regem videmus, qui cum interemisset Clitum clitum iditum K familiarem suum, vix a se manus abstinuit; tanta vis fuit paenitendi. quibus cognitis quis est qui dubitet dubitat K quin hic quoque motus animi sit totus opinabilis ac voluntarius? Quis enim dubitarit quin aegrotationes animi, qualis est avaritia, gloriae cupiditas, ex eo, quod magni magna V aestumetur ea res ex qua animus aegrotat, oriantur? oriantur s oriatur unde intellegi debet perturbationem quoque omnem esse in opinione.
11. Septuagint, 4 Maccabees, 5.12, 8.6-8.7, 8.10, 9.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)

5.12. and have compassion on your old age by honoring my humane advice? 8.6. Just as I am able to punish those who disobey my orders, so I can be a benefactor to those who obey me. 8.7. Trust me, then, and you will have positions of authority in my government if you will renounce the ancestral tradition of your national life. 8.10. Therefore take pity on yourselves. Even I, your enemy, have compassion for your youth and handsome appearance. 9.4. For we consider this pity of yours which insures our safety through transgression of the law to be more grievous than death itself.
12. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, 2-6, 1 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

13. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 5.1131 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

14. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 2.780-2.782, 2.802-2.806, 2.812 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

15. Vergil, Aeneis, 12.666-12.668 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

12.666. with stroke unfailing. Great Aeneas paused 12.667. in cover of his shield and crouched low down 12.668. upon his haunches. But the driven spear
16. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 32.12-32.13 (1st cent. CE

32.12.  In my own case, for instance, I feel that I have chosen that rôle, not of my own volition, but by the will of some deity. For when divine providence is at work for men, the gods provide, not only good counsellors who need no urging, but also words that are appropriate and profitable to the listener. And this statement of mine should be questioned least of all by you, since here in Alexandria the deity is most in honour, and to you especially does he display his power through almost daily oracles and dreams. Think not, therefore, that the god exercises his watchful care only over sleeping men, disclosing to each in private what is for his good, but that he is indifferent toward them when they are awake and would not disclose to them, in public and collectively, anything beneficial; for often in the past he has given aid to men in their waking moments, and also in broad daylight he has clearly foretold the future. 32.13.  You are acquainted no doubt with the prophetic utterances of Apis here, in neighbouring Memphis, and you know that lads at play announce the purpose of the god, and that this form of divination has proved to be free from falsehood. But your deity, methinks, being more potent, wishes to confer his benefits upon you through the agency of men rather than boys, and in serious fashion, not by means of few words, but with strong, full utterance and in clear terms, instructing you regarding most vital matters — if you are patient — with purpose and persuasiveness.
17. New Testament, 2 Timothy, 2.15 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

2.15. Give diligence to present yourself approved by God, a workman who doesn't need to be ashamed, properly handling the Word of Truth.
18. New Testament, Hebrews, 2.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

2.12. saying, "I will declare your name to my brothers. In the midst of the congregation I will sing your praise.
19. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

20. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

21. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.5, 2.4, 2.26.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

22. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 75.6-75.7, 85.10-85.11, 116.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

23. Apuleius, Apology, 94 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

24. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, 2.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

25. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2.20, 4.26 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

26. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.2.1-4.2.4, 4.5.3-4.5.5, 4.6.5-4.6.6 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

27. Lucian, Demonax, 63 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

28. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 9.211 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

29. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.15, 7.46, 7.110-7.116, 7.129 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.15. After Zeno's death Antigonus is reported to have said, What an audience I have lost. Hence too he employed Thraso as his agent to request the Athenians to bury Zeno in the Ceramicus. And when asked why he admired him, Because, said he, the many ample gifts I offered him never made him conceited nor yet appear poor-spirited.His bent was towards inquiry, and he was an exact reasoner on all subjects. Hence the words of Timon in his Silli:A Phoenician too I saw, a pampered old woman ensconced in gloomy pride, longing for all things; but the meshes of her subtle web have perished, and she had no more intelligence than a banjo. 7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure. 7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 7.112. Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole.Fear is an expectation of evil. Under fear are ranged the following emotions: terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony. Terror is a fear which produces fright; shame is fear of disgrace; nervous shrinking is a fear that one will have to act; consternation is fear due to a presentation of some unusual occurrence; 7.113. panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty. 7.114. Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines:Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.Resentment is anger in an early stage.Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another's ills. Delight is the mind's propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue. 7.115. And as there are said to be certain infirmities in the body, as for instance gout and arthritic disorders, so too there is in the soul love of fame, love of pleasure, and the like. By infirmity is meant disease accompanied by weakness; and by disease is meant a fond imagining of something that seems desirable. And as in the body there are tendencies to certain maladies such as colds and diarrhoea, so it is with the soul, there are tendencies like enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and the like. 7.116. Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness. 7.129. Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations. Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countece show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics.
30. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.15 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

3.15. Under the influence of the same error (for who could keep the right course when Cicero is in error?), Seneca said: Philosophy is nothing else than the right method of living, or the science of living honourably, or the art of passing a good life. We shall not err in saying that philosophy is the law of living well and honourably. And he who spoke of it as a rule of life, gave to it that which was its due. He evidently did not refer to the common name of philosophy; for, since this is diffused into many sects and systems, and has nothing certain - nothing, in short, respecting which all agree with one mind and one voice - what can be so false as that philosophy should be called the rule of life, since the diversity of its precepts hinders the right way and causes confusion? Or the law of living well, when its subjects are widely discordant? Or the science of passing life, in which nothing else is effected by its repeated contradictions than general uncertainty? For I ask whether he thinks that the Academy is philosophy or not? I do not think that he will deny it. And if this is so, none of these things, therefore, is in agreement with philosophy; which renders all things uncertain, abrogates law, esteems art as nothing, subverts method, distorts rule, entirely takes away knowledge. Therefore all those things are false, because they are inconsistent with a system which is always uncertain, and up to this time explaining nothing. Therefore no system, or science, or law of living well, has been established, except in this the only true and heavenly wisdom, which had been unknown to philosophers. For that earthly wisdom, since it is false, becomes varied and manifold, and altogether opposed to itself. And as there is but one founder and ruler of the world, God, and as truth is one; so wisdom must be one and simple, because, if anything is true and good, it cannot be perfect unless it is the only one of its kind. But if philosophy were able to form the life, no others but philosophers would be good, and all those who had not learned it would be always bad. But since there are, and always have been, innumerable persons who are or have been good without any learning, but of philosophers there has seldom been one who has done anything praiseworthy in his life; who is there, I pray, who does not see that those men are not teachers of virtue, of which they themselves are destitute? For if any one should diligently inquire into their character, he will find that they are passionate, covetous, lustful, arrogant, wanton, and, concealing their vices under a show of wisdom, doing those things at home which they had censured in the schools. Perhaps I speak falsely for the sake of bringing an accusation. Does not Tullius both acknowledge and complain of the same thing? How few, he says, of philosophers are found of such a character, so constituted in soul and life, as reason demands! How few who think true instruction not a display of knowledge, but a law of life! How few who are obedient to themselves, and submit to their own decrees! We may see some of such levity and ostentation, that it would be better for them not to have learned at all; others eagerly desirous of money, others of glory; many the slaves of lusts, so that their speech wonderfully disagrees with their life. Cornelius Nepos also writes to the same Cicero: So far am I from thinking that philosophy is the teacher of life and the completer of happiness, that I consider that none have greater need of teachers of living than many who are engaged in the discussion of this subject. For I see that a great part of those who give most elaborate precepts in their school respect-modesty and self-restraint, live at the same time in the unrestrained desires of all lusts. Seneca also, in his Exhortations, says: Many of the philosophers are of this description, eloquent to their own condemnation: for if you should hear them arguing against avarice, against lust and ambition, you would think that they were making a public disclosure of their own character, so entirely do the censures which they utter in public flow back upon themselves; so that it is right to regard them in no other light than as physicians, whose advertisements contain medicines, but their medicine chests poison. Some are not ashamed of their vices; but they invent defences for their baseness, so that they may appear even to sin with honour. Seneca also says: The wise man will even do things which he will not approve of, that he may find means of passing to the accomplishment of greater things; nor will he abandon good morals, but will adapt them to the occasion; and those things which others employ for glory or pleasure, he will employ for the sake of action. Then he says shortly afterwards: All things which the luxurious and the ignorant do, the wise man also will do, but not in the same manner, and with the same purpose. But it makes no difference with what intention you act, when the action itself is vicious; because acts are seen, the intention is not seen. Aristippus, the master of the Cyrenaics, had a criminal intimacy with Lais, the celebrated courtesan; and that grave teacher of philosophy defended this fault by saying, that there was a great difference between him and the other lovers of Lais, because he himself possessed Lais, whereas others were possessed by Lais. O illustrious wisdom, to be imitated by good men! Would you, in truth, entrust your children to this man for education, that they might learn to possess a harlot? He said that there was some difference between himself and the dissolute, that they wasted their property, whereas he lived in indulgence without any cost. And in this the harlot was plainly the wiser, who had the philosopher as her creature, that all the youth, corrupted by the example and authority of the teacher, might flock together to her without any shame. What difference therefore did it make, with what intention the philosopher betook himself to that most notorious harlot, when the people and his rivals saw him more depraved than all the abandoned? Nor was it enough to live in this manner, but he began also to teach lusts; and he transferred his habits from the brothel to the school, contending that bodily pleasure was the chief good. Which pernicious and shameful doctrine has its origin not in the heart of the philosopher, but in the bosom of the harlot. For why should I speak of the Cynics, who practised licentiousness in public? What wonder if they derived their name and title from dogs, since they also imitated their life? Therefore there is no instruction of virtue in this sect, since even those who enjoin more honourable things either themselves do not practice what they advise; or if they do (which rarely happens), it is not the system which leads them to that which is right, but nature which often impels even the unlearned to praise.
31. Evagrius Ponticus, Praktikos, 38, 81, 84, 35 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

32. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None

33. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.378, 3.391, 3.397, 3.401, 3.409, 3.413-3.416, 3.459



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aglauros Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 183
anger (orgē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
anthropology Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
antiochus, emotions of Mermelstein, Power and Emotion in Ancient Judaism: Community and Identity in Formation (2021) 35
antiochus, power struggles of Mermelstein, Power and Emotion in Ancient Judaism: Community and Identity in Formation (2021) 35
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; for christians, esp. pity and love Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; for philo, repentance and pity Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
appetite (epithumia), definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 136
appetite (epithumia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 136
aristotle, pain as an emotion Mermelstein, Power and Emotion in Ancient Judaism: Community and Identity in Formation (2021) 35
aristotle Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
arius didymus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
belief/s, nature of Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
belief/s, role in emotion Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
bonhöffer, adolf Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
camillus, (marcus furius) Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 11
causes, as bodies Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
causes, causal determinism Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
causes, of assent Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
causes, of impulses Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
cautery Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
cherishing Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
christianity, and cultural psychology Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 11
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), distress is judgement that there is present harm and it is appropriate to feel a sinking Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), four generic emotions, pleasure, distress, appetite, fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29, 136
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), in pleasure and distress the harm or benefit is present, in appetite and fear future Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 136
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), intellectualist account of emotions as identical with judgements (contrast zeno) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 136
cicero, division of emotions Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
cicero, emotions Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
cicero, on erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
cicero, recta ratio Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
clement of alexandria, church father, but is oikeiōsis sterktikē Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
clement of alexandria, church father, hope and love for god compatible with apatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
clement of alexandria, church father, this love makes apatheia possible Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
climacus, christian ascetic, love for god bestows or is apatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
cognition, as element of emotion Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 10
cognitive theory Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
cooper, john Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
cynics/cynicism Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
desire, distinguished p leasure and love, desire involves a lack Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
desire (epithumia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
determinism Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
diadochus, bishopof photice, love for god makes apatheia possible Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
disease Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
distress, definition Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29
distress Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29
distress (lupē, grief, pain) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
drugs Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
eagerness (prothumia) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
elite, social and cultural, study largely, confined to Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 10
emotion, in the classical world Mermelstein, Power and Emotion in Ancient Judaism: Community and Identity in Formation (2021) 35
emotion, in the hebrew bible Mermelstein, Power and Emotion in Ancient Judaism: Community and Identity in Formation (2021) 35
emotions, and structure of thought Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 10
emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
emotions, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
emotions, conservatism of Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 11
emotions, emotion more concerned with present and future than with past Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 136
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
emotions, identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29
emotions, lexicalization of Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 10
emotions, stoic views Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
emotions, the judgements are about harm or benefit at hand and the appropriate reaction to it, illustrated for pleasure, distress, appetite, fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
emotions passions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
envy Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 10
epistle, pastorals Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
eunoia (good intent), as eupathic response Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
eupatheiai, equanimous states, aspasmos, agapēsis are eupatheiai in stoics Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
eupatheiai, include erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
evagrius, desert father, apatheia produces, and is produced by, love (agapē) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
evil Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
exhortation Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
fabius maximus, quintus Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 11
fear, power and Mermelstein, Power and Emotion in Ancient Judaism: Community and Identity in Formation (2021) 35
fear, stoic division of emotions Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
fear (phobos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
frankness Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
frede, michael Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29
galen, accuses stoics of indeterminism Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
galen Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
good, the Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
good intent (eunoia), as eupathic response Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
good spirits, as eupathic response Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
goodwill, as eupathic response Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
green, o. h. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29
herse Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 183
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
invidentia Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 181
invidia, active vs. passive Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 183
invidia, personification of Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 183
invidia, righteous Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 183
inwood, brad Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
jealousy Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
ledbetter, grace m. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29
lexicalization of emotions Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 10
love, erotic or sexual, eupathic Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
love, erotic or sexual, ordinary Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
love, love for god compatible with apatheia in clement and many christians, with various causal relations between the two Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
love, parental love Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
love (amorous) / lust (philia, erōs) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
love of various things (philomatheia, philomousia, ktl.) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
lust Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
marius, (gaius) Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 11
martyrdom, emotions and Mermelstein, Power and Emotion in Ancient Judaism: Community and Identity in Formation (2021) 35
martyrs as gladiators, power-over and Mermelstein, Power and Emotion in Ancient Judaism: Community and Identity in Formation (2021) 35
metaphor Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
middle platonism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
morality Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
oikeiōsis, unity of mankind, oikeiōsis borrowed by clement of alexandria to describe love for god Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
ortony, andrew Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 29, 136
pain, emotion and Mermelstein, Power and Emotion in Ancient Judaism: Community and Identity in Formation (2021) 35
passion Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
passions emotions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
past, present, future, stoics think emotions do not concern past harm or benefit Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 136
pastoral epistles Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
pastorals Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
pedagogy Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
philo, clement of alexandria, basil Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
philo Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
philo of alexandria, jewish philosopher, pity valued and compatible with apatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
philosopher, moral Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
philosopher, speech of Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
phthonos Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 181
pity, in catharsis Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
pity, pity rejected by stoics as pathos Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
pity, power and Mermelstein, Power and Emotion in Ancient Judaism: Community and Identity in Formation (2021) 35
pity Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232; Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 181
plato, pleasure, distress, appetite, fear highlighted Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 136
platonism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
platonism (middle / imperial) vi–viii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
pleasure (hēdonē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
plutarch Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
poor, and shame Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 10
ps.-makarios (makarios, desert father, mentor of evagrius) , love for god makes apatheia possible' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
psychic humans/powers Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91
psychology, cultural, emotions Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 181
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
recta ratio Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
saces Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 181
sejanus Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 11
seneca Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
sense of shame Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 10
sicknesses (nosemata), conflated with pathe Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
soul, war of Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
stobaeus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
stoicism, and the emotions Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 181
stoicism, greek Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
stoicism, passions Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
stoicism, vice, disease Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
stoicism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 91; Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
structure of thought, and emotion Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 10
suicide, anger Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
suicide, passions as unnatural Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
suicide, recta ratio Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
tetrachord (passions) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
therapy, moral Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
thesaurus linguae latinae, nn. Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 11, 183
trajan Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 11
turnus Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (2005) 181
value (axia) / valuation Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
vice Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
virtus, ethical Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 18
voelke, andré-jean Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
ware, kallistos Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 389
welcoming Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 232
word/the word, rational Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
word/the word, scalpel Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 124
zeno (of citium) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 185
zeno of citium, stoic, four generic emotions distress, pleasure, appetite, fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 136
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 136, 389