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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.83
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1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 23.6 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

23.6. שְׁמָעֵנוּ אֲדֹנִי נְשִׂיא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה בְּתוֹכֵנוּ בְּמִבְחַר קְבָרֵינוּ קְבֹר אֶת־מֵתֶךָ אִישׁ מִמֶּנּוּ אֶת־קִבְרוֹ לֹא־יִכְלֶה מִמְּךָ מִקְּבֹר מֵתֶךָ׃ 23.6. ’Hear us, my lord: thou art a mighty prince among us; in the choice of our sepulchres bury thy dead; none of us shall withhold from thee his sepulchre, but that thou mayest bury thy dead.’"
2. Cicero, Academica, 2.108 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind.
4. Cicero, On Duties, 1.136 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.136. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non optemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira exsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus, et vereri et diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul absit,cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. 1.136.  But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of life, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the kind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and consideration toward those with whom we converse. It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly — never at all, unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry, but anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious can be done.
5. Cicero, Letters, 12.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Cicero, Letters, 12.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Cicero, Letters, 12.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

8. Cicero, Epistulae Ad Quintum Fratrem, 12.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

9. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.1-3.7, 3.12-3.21, 3.24-3.25, 3.40, 3.58, 3.61, 3.64-3.72, 3.74, 3.76, 3.80, 3.82, 3.84, 4.11, 4.14-4.15, 4.38, 4.59, 4.63, 4.65, 4.76, 4.79, 4.83 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.1. Quidnam esse, Brute, Quidnam-Brute om. RK cf. praef. cur om. K causae putem, cur, cum constemus ex animo et corpore, corporis curandi tuendique causa quaesita sit ars atque eius ars eius atque X (areius atque K 1, cf. praef. ) corr. Man. utilitas deorum inmortalium de eorum inm. R 1 V 1 inventioni consecrata, animi autem medicina nec tam desiderata desidera GRV ( add. V 1? ) sit, ante quam inventa, nec tam culta, posteaquam cognita est, nec tam multis grata et probata, pluribus etiam suspecta et invisa? an quod corporis gravitatem et dolorem animo iudicamus, animi morbum corpore non sentimus? ita fit ut animus de se ipse tum tum ex cum corr. K 2 iudicet, cum id ipsum, quo iudicatur, aegrotet. 3.2. Quodsi talis nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri et perspicere eademque optima duce cursum vitae conficere possemus, haut haut V 2 aut GK 1 RV 1 haud K 2 B s erat sane quod quisquam rationem ac doctrinam rationem ac doctrinam s ratione ac doctrina X rationedẽ V 2 hac pro ac G 1 et Gr.?) requireret. requiret G 1 nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravati depravati V 1? e corr. B s depravatis X sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina semita G innata virtutum, quae si adolescere adholescere G 1 adol. sed o in r. V 1 liceret, licet in liceret corr. R c licetret G 1 ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. nunc autem, simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate et in summa opinionum perversitate versamur, ut paene cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur. cum vero parentibus redditi, dein reddit idem G reddit idemr R ( et r = require al.m. ) redditidē V 1 (redditi dein V 2 sec. Str. ) redditi idem HK ( demŭ ss. 2 ) redditi demum Gr.(?)B magistris traditi sumus, tum tum ... 9 cedat Non. 416, 32 ita variis imbuimur inb. KR erroribus, ut vanitati veritas et opinioni opinio G 1 confirmatae confirmatae s Non. confirmata X natura naturae K ipsa cedat. 3.3. accedunt etiam poëtae, qui cum magnam speciem doctrinae sapientiaeque prae se tulerunt, audiuntur leguntur ediscuntur et inhaerescunt penitus in mentibus. cum vero eodem quasi maxumus quidam quidem K 1 R 1 H magister populus accessit accessit V c ( cf. rep. 4,9 ) om. X (accedit ante eodem add. multi s ) atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, tum plane inficimur opinionum pravitate a naturaque desciscimus, dessciscimus KR 1 ut nobis optime naturae vim vidisse naturae vim vidisse Mdv. ad fin. 3,62 naturam invidisse videantur, qui nihil melius homini, nihil magis expetendum, nihil praestantius honoribus, imperiis, populari gloria iudicaverunt. ad ad at K quam fertur optumus quisque veramque illam honestatem expetens, expe tens V quam unam natura maxime anquirit, unam s una anquirit Mos. inquirit in summa iitate versatur consectaturque nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis, virtutis del. Bentl. gloriae ( ex gloria V 2 ) del. Bai. sed adumbratam imaginem gloriae. est enim gloria solida quaedam res et expressa, non adumbrata; ea est consentiens laus bonorum, incorrupta et ante incorrupta add. V c vox bene iudicantium de excellenti excellenti ex -te V 1 excellente rell. ( ft. recte cf. de orat. 2, 85 fr. ap. Char. GL. I p. 138, 13 ) virtute, ea virtuti resonat tamquam imago; gloriae post imago add. X exp. V 1 quae quia recte factorum plerumque comes est, non est non est ea H est in r. V c bonis viris repudianda. repudienda in -anda corr. K 1 V 1 3.4. illa autem, quae se eius imitatricem esse volt, uult R e corr. H temeraria atque inconsiderata et plerumque peccatorum vitiorumque laudatrix, fama popularis, simulatione honestatis formam forme G 1 eius pulchritudinemque corrumpit. qua caecitate homines, cum quaedam etiam praeclara cuperent eaque que om. H nescirent nec ubi nec qualia essent, funditus alii everterunt everterent X corr. K 2 R c V 1? suas civitates, alii ipsi occiderunt. atque hi quidem optuma petentes non tam voluntate quam cursus errore falluntur. quid? qui quid qui K c R 2 V 1? e corr. quid- que GR 1 V 1 quiqui K 1 pecuniae cupiditate, qui voluptatum libidine feruntur, quid...12 feruntur om. H quorumque ita perturbantur animi, ut non multum absint ab insania, quod insipientibus contingit contigit G 1 omnibus, quod 14 omnibus del. Ba. is is H his rell. nullane ne om. G 1 est adhibenda curatio? utrum quod minus noceant animi aegrotationes quam corporis, an quod corpora curari possint, animorum medicina nulla sit? 3.5. at et morbi morbi ex moribus K 1 perniciosiores pluresque sunt animi quam corporis; an ... 18 corporis add. G 2 in mg. hi enim ipsi hi...19 ipsi hoc. . ipso Ba. male: 'ipsi corporis morbi animi morbos efficere possunt eorumque numerum augent' (plures!) cf. p. 405,14 odiosi sunt, quod ad animum pertinent pertine t V eumque sollicitant, solicitant G 1 R 1 V 1 animusque aeger, ut ait Ennius, Enn. sc. 392 semper errat neque pati pati poti Ribb. sed cf. Va. neque perpeti potest, cupere numquam desinit. quibus duobus morbis, ut omittam alios, aegritudine et cupiditate, cupidldatẽ R 1 qui tandem possunt in corpore esse graviores? qui vero probari potest ut sibi mederi animus non possit, cum ipsam medicinam corporis animus invenerit, cumque ad corporum sanationem multum ipsa corpora et natura valeat nec omnes, omnis X corr. V 2 sint Tregd. sunt qui curari se passi sint, continuo etiam convalescant, convalescunt G animi autem, qui se sanari voluerint praeceptisque sapientium paruerint, sine ulla dubitatione sanentur? 3.6. est profecto animi medicina, philosophia; Cur igitur cum constemus ... 319,4 philosophia H cuius auxilium non ut in corporis morbis petendum est foris, omnibusque opibus viribus, et ante viribus add. V c s viribus om. Gr. ut nosmet ipsi nobis mederi possimus, elaborandum est. Quamquam de universa philosophia, quanto opere et expetenda esset et colenda, satis, ut arbitror, dictum est in Hortensio. ortensio G de maxumis autem rebus nihil fere intermisimus postea nec disputare nec scribere. his autem libris exposita sunt ea quae eaque G 1 a a om. K 1 nobis cum familiaribus nostris in Tusculano erant disputata. sed quo niam duobus superioribus de morte et de dolore dictum est, tertius dies disputationis hoc tertium volumen efficiet. 3.7. ut enim in Academiam nostram descendimus inclinato iam in postmeridianum tempus die, poposci eorum aliquem, qui aderant, aliquid quid adherant G 1 causam disserendi. tum res acta sic est: Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo. Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines libidines add. G 2 iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, eiusmodi V ( ss. c ) quae Graeci pa/qh pathe X appellant; ego poteram morbos, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, relique ... 29 usitate ( libere ) H uisit. G 1 ( sic etiam 322, 10; 325,16 ) nisi quid aliud tibi videtur. Mihi vero isto modo. 3.12. Cadere, opinor, in sapientem aegritudinem tibi dixisti videri. Et vero ita existimo. Humanum id quidem, quod ita existumas. non enim silice nati sumus, sed est naturale in animis tenerum e ante silice add. V c non male naturabile X sed bi exp. V 1 ( cf. animabili codd. nat. deor. 2,91 ) natura Lb. quiddam quidam R 1 V 1 ( corr. 1 ) -ddā in r. G 2 atque molle, quod quod quā G 1 aegritudine quasi tempestate quatiatur, sed humanum... 22 quatiatur H nec absurde Crantor ille, qui in in om. X add. s V rec nostra Academia vel in primis fuit nobilis, minime inquit inquid G 1 adsentior is qui istam nescio quam indolentiam magno opere laudant, quae quae V 2 B qui X nec potest ulla ulle G 1 esse nec debet. ne aegrotus sim; sim s si inquit (inquid G 1 P cf. 2 ) fuerat X ( fuat V 2 si exp. et ss. V rec ) corr. Sey. cf. Ps. Plut. Cons. ad Ap. 102c, qui primum ou) ga\r sumfe/romai — e)/cw kai\ tou= dunatou= kai\ tou= sumfe/rontos ou)=san ut sua profert, paulo post addit : ' mh\ ga\r nosoi=men ', fhsi o( a)kadhmaiko\s Kra/ntwr, ' nosh/sasi de\ parei/h tis ai)/sqhsis ' ktl . inquit ut 303, 21 ergo, inquit al. si debet nec aegrotassem. Si X (a apertum post t in V) c exp. V 2? ne aegrotus inquit fuero, sin quid fuerit Vict. sensus adsit, adsit d in r. G 2 absit V c sive secetur quid sive avellatur a corpore. nam istuc nihil dolere dolere ex dolore K 1 R 1 ex dobere (b= lo) V 1 contigit G 1 non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore. non sine... 7 corpore Aug. civ. 14, 9 3.13. sed videamus ne haec oratio sit hominum adsentantium nostrae inbecillitati et indulgentium mollitudini; nos autem audeamus non solum ramos amputare miseriarum, sed omnis radicum fibras fybras X evellere. tamen aliquid relinquetur fortasse; ita sunt altae alta GKV ( corr. 2? ) H stirpes stultitiae; sed relinquetur id solum quod erit necessarium. Illud quidem sic habeto, nisi sanatus animus sit, quod sine philosophia fieri non potest, finem miseriarum nullum fore. sed... 15 fore quam ob rem, quoniam coepimus, tradamus nos ei curandos: sanabimur, si volemus. et progrediar quidem longius: non enim de aegritudine solum, quamquam id quidem quidem in mg. add. R c primum, sed de omni animi, ut ego posui, perturbatione, morbo, ut Graeci volunt, explicabo. et primo, si placet, Stoicorum more agamus, qui breviter astringere solent argumenta; deinde nostro instituto vagabimur. 3.14. Qui fortis est, idem est fidens (quoniam confidens sqq. St. fr. 3, 570 mala consuetudine loquendi loquendum Non. L 1 in vitio ponitur, ductum verbum a a add. V 2 confidendo, quod laudis in ante laudis add. V 2 est). qui autem est fidens, is profecto non extimescit; discrepat enim a timendo qui... 4 a timendo fidens (fidere Quich. ) Non. 443, 9 confidere. confidens Non. atqui, atqui R 2 ( cf. We. ) atque in quem cadit aegritudo, in eundem timor; quarum enim rerum praesentia sumus in aegritudine, easdem inpendentes et venientes inpendentis..venientis e corr. V aut 2 timemus. ita fit ut fortitudini aegritudo repugnet. ita. ... repugnet del. Hei. veri simile est igitur, in quem cadat cadit G aegritudo, cadere in eundem eundem eum Non. timorem et infractionem infractionem V ( exp. rec ) quidem quidem quandam ut v. in mg. R rec animi in quem... 10 animi Non. 122,28 et demissionem. demisionem GKR 1 dimis ionem V 1 quae in quem cadunt, in eundem cadit, ut serviat, ut victum, si quando, si quando aliquando (ali in r. 2 ) V se esse fateatur. quae qui recipit, recipiat idem necesse est timiditatem et ignaviam. non cadunt autem haec in virum fortem: igitur ne aegritudo quidem. at nemo sapiens nisi fortis: non cadet cadit V 2 H cadat K ergo in sapientem aegritudo. 3.15. Praeterea necesse est, qui fortis sit, eundem esse magni animi; qui magni animi BK 2 om. X qui autem magni animi V c ( ft. rec- tius cf. 326,11 Str. Phil. 49 p. 60 ) qui magni animi sit, invictum; qui invictus sit, eum eum om. H res humanas despicere atque infra se positas arbitrari. despicere autem nemo potest eas res, eas res nemo potest H propter quas aegritudine adfici potest; post potest add. nisi fortis V c ex quo efficitur fortem virum aegritudine numquam adfici. omnes autem sapientes fortes: non cadit igitur in sapientem aegritudo. Et quem ad modum oculus conturbatus turbatus H non est probe adfectus ad suum munus fungendum, fugendum K 1 V 1 et reliquae partes totumve corpus statu cum est motum, deest officio suo et muneri, sic conturbatus siconturbatus G 1 K 1 adxequendum V 1 animus non est aptus ad exequendum ad ex seq. G munus suum. munus autem animi est ratione bene uti; et sapientis animus ita semper adfectus est, ut ratione optime utatur; numquam igitur est perturbatus. at ad G 1 (14 G 1 K 1 ) aegritudo perturbatio est animi: semper igitur ea sapiens vacabit. primo iam si 325, 6 vacabit H 3.16. Veri etiam simile illud illi G 1 est, qui sit temperans— quem Graeci sw/frona appellant eamque virtutem swfrosu/nhn vocant, quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, non numquam etiam modestiam; sed haud -d haut in r. K 1 scio an recte ea virtus frugalitas appellari possit, quod angustius apud Graecos valet, qui frugi homines xrhsi/mous appellant, id est tantum modo utilis; at illud est latius; omnis enim abstinentia, omnis innocentia (quae apud Graecos usitatum nomen nullum habet, sed habere potest potest om. H a)bla/beian ; a B La BEl in r. V 1 AB D AB e lAN fere K 1 RG 2 ( in litt. evan. aut eras. ) abdabeian H a B La BEl a N V 1 nam est innocentia adfectio affectio KRH talis animi sed praeter a N in r. quae noceat nemini)—reliquas etiam etiam om. H virtutes frugalitas continet. omnis abst.... 19 continet quae nisi tanta esset, et si is angustiis, quibus plerique putant, teneretur, numquam esset L. Pisonis cognomen tanto opere laudatum. 3.17. sed quia, nec qui propter metum praesidium reliquit, relinquit (-id G 1 ) X corr. V 1 aut 2 quod est ignaviae, nec qui propter avaritiam clam depositum depositi G non reddidit, quod est iniustitiae, nec qui propter temeritatem male rem gessit, quod est stultitiae, frugi appellari solet, eo tris virtutes, fortitudinem iustitiam prudentiam, frugalitas complexa est (etsi hoc quidem commune est virtutum; omnes omnis X enim inter se nexae et iugatae sunt hoc quidem est commu- ne ... 326, 1 sunt ( sine nexae et) Non. 47, 7 ): reliqua igitur et quarta virtus sit sit ut sit X sed ut exp. V 2 reliqua igitur est, quarta v. ut sit, ipsa fr. Mdv. ipsa frugalitas. eius enim videtur esse proprium motus animi adpetentis regere et sedare semperque semper quae X corr. R c adversantem aversantem X corr. VCR 2 libidini moderatam in omni re servare constantiam. cui contrarium vitium nequitia dicitur. 3.18. frugalitas, ut opinor, a fruge, qua nihil melius e est e We. terra, nequitia ab eo (etsi erit hoc fortasse durius, sed temptemus: lusisse lu sisse V (l m. 2? ) iusisse R 1 iussisse GKR 2 H putemur, putatos V (ato in r. 2 ut v.; voluitne putato ?) nil GR c ( totum verbum del. R 2 ) si nihil sit) ab eo, quod nequicquam est in tali homine, ex quo idem nihili St. fr. 3, 570 nihili V 2 nihil dic. G ( 2 litt. erasae ) nihil KRV 1 dicitur.—qui sit frugi igitur vel, si mavis, moderatus et temperans, eum necesse est esse esse add. G 2 constantem; qui autem constans, quietum; qui quietus, perturbatione omni vacuum, ergo etiam aegritudine. et sunt illa sapientis: sed ... 326, 13 sapientis H aberit igitur a sapiente aegritudo. Itaque non inscite Heracleotes Dionysius St. fr. 1, 434 dyonisius KR dioni ius V ad ea disputat, quae apud Homerum Achilles queritur hoc, ut opinor, modo: Corque meum penitus turgescit tristibus iris, I 646 Cum decore atque omni me orbatum laude recordor. num manus adfecta recte est, cum in tumore est, aut num aliud quodpiam aliud quodpiam Turn. ex s aliquod ( ex aliquid K 1 ) quippiam X alia quippiam H membrum tumidum ac turgidum non vitiose se habet? 3.19. sic igitur inflatus et tumens animus in vitio est. sapientis autem animus semper vacat vitio, numquam turgescit, numquam tumet; at irati irati V e corr. iratus X cf. 23 sapientis animus eius modi est: numquam igitur sapiens irascitur. nam si irascitur, etiam concupiscit; proprium est enim irati cupere, a quo laesus videatur, ei quam maxumum dolorem inurere. qui autem id concupierit, eum necesse est, si id si id sit G 1 consecutus sit, magno opere magnopere K H (magno opere R) laetari. ex quo fit, ut alieno malo gaudeat; quod quoniam non cadit in sapientem, ne ut irascatur quidem cadit. sapientis... 24 timet ( pro tumet) 21 num ... 23 est 24 at... 327, 6 cadit ( hoc ordine ) H sin sin, non si ( ut dicit Ha. ) R autem caderet in sapientem aegritudo, caderet etiam iracundia; qua quoniam vacat, aegritudine etiam vacabit. 3.20. Etenim si sapiens in aegritudinem aegritudinem -ne G incidere posset, posset semel R 1 posset etiam in misericordiam, posset in invidentiam (non dixi invidiam, quae tum tum (cum G) etiam Bouh., alii aliter, Ciceronem corrigentes est, cum invidetur; ab invidendo autem invidentia recte dici potest, ut effugiamus ut et fug. Non. ambiguum nomen invidiae. posset (posse codd. ) etiam... 12 invidiae Non. 443,15 (10 in invidiam. non dixi in invidentia 11 invidia) quod verbum ductum dictum G 1 K 1 ( cf. Isidor. 10,134 ) est a nimis intuendo fortunam alterius, ut est in Melanippo: quisnam florem Acc. fr. 424 (unde aut quis mortalis fl. Non. 500, 13 num quis non mortalis fl. Ri. num quisnam poetae sit, dubium ) quasnam G 1 liberum invidit meum? male Latine videtur, sed praeclare Accius; ut enim videre, sic invidere florem flore X florē K 2 R c? rectius quam flori . nos consuetudine prohibemur; 3.21. poëta ius suum tenuit et dixit audacius)—cadit igitur in eundem et misereri et invidere. non cadit ... 19 invidere nam qui dolet rebus alicuius adversis, idem alicuius etiam secundis dolet, olet V add. 1 aut 2 solet GK 1 ( corr. 2 ) R 1 ( dolet m. ant. ) ut Theophrastus interitum deplorans Callisthenis sodalis sui, rebus Alexandri prosperis angitur, itaque dicit Callisthenem incidisse in hominem summa potentia summaque fortuna, sed ignarum quem ad modum rebus secundis uti conveniret. atqui, quem ad modum misericordia aegritudo est ex alterius rebus adversis, sic invidentia aegritudo est ex alterius rebus secundis. in quem igitur cadit misereri, in eundem etiam invidere; atqui . . 328, 3 invidere non non nunc K 1 cadit autem invidere in sapientem: ergo ne misereri quidem. quodsi aegre ferre aegre ferre s V rec haec referre X sapiens soleret, misereri etiam soleret. abest ergo a a add. V c sapiente aegritudo. 3.24. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis St. fr. 3, 385 solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspers vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata aelata G 1 R 1 laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, post obtemperans add. vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest X quae retinent sec. Dav. edd., in v. 17. 8 verba cupiditas — potest delentes. sed ut voluptatis sic cupi- ditatis nomen appositionis locum tenere debebat. de cupiditate autem praedicandam erat 'opinione futuri boni turbatur'; quod cum iam in enuntiato relativo expressum esset, anacoluthon natum est. ad boni 17 V c in mg. adscr. : et quidem magis significat nomen libidinis magnitudinem erroris. itaque in ea cupiditate quae flagrantissima est proprie plerumque nomen hoc ponitur si omnis appetitio opinati boni haec] ut H 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.40. quodsi cui, ut ait idem, simul animus cum re concidit animus rem condidit X corr. V c s , a gravibus illis antiquis philosophis petenda medicina est, non est non V est si non X ab his voluptariis. quam enim isti bonorum copiam dicunt? fac sane esse summum bonum non dolere—quamquam id non vocatur voluptas, sed non necesse est nunc omnia—: idne est, quo traducti luctum levemus? sit sane summum malum dolere: dolore in dolere corr. G 2 K 2 V 2 in eo igitur qui non est, si malo careat, continuone fruitur summo bono? 3.58. similiter commemorandis exemplis orbitates quoque liberum liberorum V c praedicantur, eorumque, eorum quoque K 1 qui gravius ferunt, luctus aliorum exemplis leniuntur. sic perpessio ceterorum facit, ut ea quae acciderint multo minora maiora ex minora V c quam quanta sint existimata, videantur. ita fit, sensim cogitantibus ut, quantum sit ementita opinio, appareat. atque hoc idem et Telamo ille declarat: ego cum genui et Theseus: futuras mecum commentabar miserias tum morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli add. R 2, moriturum scivi V 3 et Anaxagoras: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. cf. p. 332, 9 sqq. hi enim omnes diu cogitantes de rebus humanis intellegebant eas nequaquam pro opinione volgi esse extimescendas. extimescendas KR 1 existimescendas R c G existimiscendas G 1 e corr. V et mihi quidem videtur idem fere accidere is qui ante meditantur, quod is quibus medetur dies, nisi quod ratio ratio V ratione GKR ( unde in hoc quae- dam 2? ) quaedam sanat illos, hos ipsa natura intellecto eo quod rem continet, illud illud continet X trp. B malum, quod opinatum sit esse maxumum, nequaquam esse tantum, ut vitam beatam possit evertere. 3.61. Omnibus enim modis fulciendi sunt, qui ruunt nec cohaerere possunt propter magnitudinem aegritudinis. ex quo ipsam aegritudinem lu/phn a\gP HN fere X ( L ex A V) Chrysippus quasi Chrys. fr. eth. 485 solutionem totius hominis appellatam omnibus modis... 12 appellat putat. appellat amputat KR 1 V ( cf. H et praef. ) Quae tota poterit evelli explicata, ut ut aut V 1 principio dixi, dixi cf. p. 329, 2sqq. causa aegritudinis; est enim nulla alia nisi opinio et iudicium magni praesentis atque urgentis mali. est... 15 mali itaque et dolor corporis, cuius est morsus acerrumus, perferetur perferetur X ( cf. Po. comm. ad 1, 29 ) perfertur V c spe proposita boni, et acta aetas honeste ac splendide tantam adfert consolationem, ut eos qui ita vixerint aut non attingat aegritudo aegritudo del. Dav. aut perleviter pungat animi dolor. Sed ad hanc opinionem magni mali cum illa etiam opinio accessit oportere, rectum esse, rectū esse esse scr. V c ad officium pertinere ferre perferre V ( sed per in r. rec ) illud aegre quod acciderit, tum denique efficitur illa gravis aegritudinis perturbatio. tum ... 23 perturbatio om. H 3.64. haec omnia recta vera debita putantes faciunt in dolore, maximeque declaratur declaratur hoc sana cf. Mue. ( off. 1, 61 ) hoc quasi officii iudicio fieri, quod, si qui forte, cum se in luctu esse vellent, aliquid fecerunt humanius aut si hilarius locuti sunt, revocant se rursus ad maestitiam peccatique se insimulant, quod dolere dolore K 1 V 1 intermiserint. pueros vero matres et magistri castigare etiam solent, nec verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus, si quid in domestico luctu hilarius ab is factum est aut dictum, plorare cogunt. Quid? ipsa remissio luctus cum est consecuta intellectumque intellectaque X corr. V c est est om. K 1 nihil profici maerendo, nonne res declarat fuisse totum illud voluntarium? 3.65. Quid ille Terentianus terentianus K 2 mg. V rec terrentianus X ipse se poeniens, poenitens (pen. K)X e a\g TON T e lM w PO g M e NOC fere X id est e(auto timwrou/menos ? Decre/vi tantispe/r decrevi tant. V ( prius t V c ) me minus iniu/riae, Chreme/s, me ... 7 Chreme s V c in r. (s scr. V 1 ) meo gnato fa/cere, dum fia/m miser. hic decernit, ut miser sit. num quis igitur quicquam decernit invitus? malo quidem me quovis dignum deputem— malo se dignum deputat, nisi miser sit. vides Ter. 147. 8. 135 ergo opinionis esse, non naturae malum. Quid, quos res quid quod res H ipsa lugere prohibet? ut apud Homerum cotidianae neces interitusque multorum sedationem maerendi adferunt, apud quem ita dicitur: Namque nimis multos atque omni luce cadentis T 226 cadentis ( i/ptousin ) Man. carentis Cernimus, ut nemo possit maerore vacare. Quo magis est aequum tumulis mandare peremptos Firmo animo et luctum lacrimis finire diurnis. 3.66. Ergo in potestate est abicere dolorem, cum velis, tempori servientem. an est ullum tempus, quoniam quidem res in nostra potestate est, cui cui cum V non ponendae curae et aegritudinis add. Dav. ex s . aut aegritudinis aut curae del. alii ( iam in V curaer sec. Str. ut vid. ) causa serviamus? vides ... 22 serviamus constabat eos, qui concidentem volneribus Cn. Pompeium vidissent, GN. X cum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent, quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil aliud tum egisse, nisi ut remiges hortarentur et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga; posteaquam Tyrum venissent, tum adflictari lamentarique coepisse. timor igitur ab his aegritudinem potuit repellere, ratio ab sapienti viro ab sapienti viro Bentl. ac sapientia vera ( def. Linde Era- nos XII p. 175 ) non poterit? Quid est autem quod plus valeat ad ponendum dolorem, quam cum est intellectum nil nihil KH profici et frustra esse susceptum? si igitur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest; voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem confitendum est. si timor aliquoties ab aegritudine potest repellere ... 351, 6 est H 3.67. Idque idque itaque K 1 indicatur eorum patientia, qui cum multa sint saepe perpessi, facilius ferunt ferant X cf. praef. quicquid accidit, obduruisseque obduruisseque iam Tr. obduruisse quam X (e ex am corr. V 2 ) iam sese sese V contra fortunam arbitrantur, ut ille apud Euripidem: Eur. Phrix. fr. 821 ( Chrys. fr. eth. 482 ) Si mi/hi nunc tristis pri/mum inluxisse/t dies Nec tam ae/rumnoso na/vigavisse/m navigassem X salo, Esse/t dolendi cau/sa, ut iniecto e/culei Freno/ repente ta/ctu exagitantu/r novo; Sed ia/m subactus subiactus GV 1 (i del. 2 ) sub- iectus KRP mi/seriis opto/rpui. obt. KR c defetigatio igitur miseriarum aegritudines cum faciat leniores, intellegi necesse est non rem ipsam causam atque ipsam atque causam W trp. Er. fontem fontem fon in r. V c esse maeroris. 3.68. Philosophi summi nequedum neque nondum X corr. V 3 tamen sapientiam consecuti nonne intellegunt in summo se malo esse? sunt enim insipientes, neque insipientia ullum maius malum est. neque tamen lugent. quid ita? quia huic generi malorum non adfingitur non affingitur V (non af in r. V c n ante g del. idem ) nodfingitur R 1 illa opinio, rectum esse et aequum et ad officium pertinere aegre ferre, quod sapiens non sis, quod idem adfingimus huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est. 3.69. itaque Aristoteles veteres philosophos Arist. fr. 53 accusans, qui existumavissent philosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriosissimos fuisse; sed sed si V se videre, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore. Aristoteles . .. 352, 3 fore libere redd. Lact. inst. 3, 28, 20 Theophrastus autem moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornicibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset, hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam tamen KR 1 exiguam vitam dedisset; quorum si aetas potuisset esse longinquior, futurum fuisse ut omnibus perfectis artibus omni doctrina hominum vita erudiretur. querebatur quaerebatur VK 2 quaerebat GK 1 (quer-) R igitur se tum, cum illa videre coepisset, extingui. quid? ex ceteris philosophis nonne optumus et gravissumus quisque confitetur multa se ignorare et multa multa V 2 s multi sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda? 3.70. neque tamen, cum se in media stultitia, qua nihil quia n. G 1 est peius, haerere intellegant, aegritudine premuntur; nulla enim admiscetur opinio officiosi doloris. Quid, qui non putant lugendum lungendum GV 1 ( prius n eras. ) iungen- dum KR viris? sqq. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 qualis fuit Q. Maxumus fuitque maxumus G 2 (quae G 1 ) KV ( ss. m. 3 ) ac fortasse R 1 (Q post fuit in r. m. al. ) efferens efferrens GR 1 V filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus paullus RG 1 e corr. V 1 (l eras. ) cf.p. 263, 17; 274, 19; 457, 7 duobus paucis lucius et marcus X diebus amissis amisis G 1 R 1 V 1 filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione consolationem G -ne V conlegimus. 3.71. quid hos aliud placavit nisi quod luctum et maerorem esse non putabant viri? ergo id, quod alii rectum opites aegritudini se solent dedere, id hi turpe putantes aegritudinem reppulerunt. ex quo intellegitur non in natura, sed in opinione esse aegritudinem. Contra dicuntur haec: quis tam demens, ut sua voluntate maereat? natura adfert dolorem, cui quidem Crantor, inquiunt, vester cedendum putat; premit enim atque instat, nec resisti potest. itaque Oileus oileus V ille apud Sophoclem, qui Telamonem antea de Aiacis morte morte V consolatus esset, is cum audivisset audisset K de suo, fractus est. de cuius commutata mente sic dicitur: Nec ve/ro tanta prae/ditus sapie/ntia Soph.fr. 666 Quisqua/m est, quisquamst edd. qui aliorum aeru/mnam dictis a/dlevans Non i/dem, cum fortu/na mutata i/mpetum Conve/rtat, convertit Sey. clade ut subita X corr. s clade su/bita frangatu/r sua, Ut i/lla ad alios di/cta et praecepta e/xcidant. ex p. G 2 haec cum disputant, hoc student efficere, naturae obsisti nullo modo posse; idem iidem Ern. (idem tamen Phil. 2, 91 al. ) hi (= i cf. praef. ) W et Sey. tamen fatentur graviores aegritudines suscipi, quam natura cogat. quae est igitur amentia—? ut nos quoque idem ab illis illis Urs. ex s allis requiramus. 3.72. Sed plures sunt causae suscipiendi doloris: primum illa opinio mali, quo viso atque persuaso aegritudo aegritudo add. V c insequitur necessario. deinde etiam gratum mortuis se facere, si graviter eos lugeant, arbitrantur. sed ... 16 arbitrantur H accedit superstitio muliebris quaedam; existumant enim diis inmortalibus se facilius satis facturos, si eorum plaga perculsi adflictos se et stratos esse fateantur. sed haec inter se quam repugnent, plerique non vident. laudant enim eos, qui aequo animo moriantur; qui alterius mortem aequo animo ferant, eos putant vituperandos. quasi fieri ullo modo possit, quod in amatorio sermone dici solet, ut quisquam plus alterum diligat quam se. 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. 3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V 3.80. Sed nescio quo pacto ab eo, quod erat a te a te ante K propositum, aberravit oratio. tu enim de sapiente quaesieras, cui aut malum videri nullum potest, quod vacet turpitudine, aut ita parvum malum, ut id obruatur sapientia vixque appareat, qui qui add. V 2 nihil opinione adfingat adsumatque ad aegritudinem nec id putet esse rectum, tum post rectum add. V c se quam maxume excruciari luctuque confici, quo pravius nihil esse possit. edocuit tamen ratio, ut mihi quidem videtur, cum hoc ipsum proprie non quaereretur hoc tempore, num num V x nunc X num quid We. sed cf. Mue. quod esset malum nisi quod idem dici turpe posset, tamen ut videremus, viderimus V 1 quicquid esset in aegritudine mali, id non naturale esse, sed voluntario iudicio et opinionis errore contractum. 3.82. et tamen, ut medici uti medici K ( er. n) toto corpore curando minimae etiam parti, si condoluit, medentur, sic philosophia cum universam aegritudinem sustulit, sustulit aegritudinem sustulit tamen si X (sustullit G 1 V 1 condoluit tamen si K 1 medenturaegr. sustulit add. c ) corr. Keil, Quaest. Tull. p. XVIII etiam, si quis error alicunde alicunde Ern. aliunde extitit, si paupertas momordit, si ignominia pupugit, pupigit G 1 R 1 V 1 si quid tenebrarum obfudit exilium, exsilium GV 1 aut eorum quae quaeque (quaeque G) modo X corr. s modo dixi si quid si quid sicut K extitit. etsi singularum rerum sunt propriae consolationes, de quibus audies tu quidem, cum voles. sed ad eundem fontem revertendum est, aegritudinem omnem procul abesse a sapiente, quod iis sit, quod frustra suscipiatur, quod non natura exoriatur, sed iudicio, sed opinione, sed quadam invitatione ad dolendum, cum id decreverimus ita fieri oportere. 3.84. Haec omnia definiunt Stoici, eaque verba quae dixi singularum rerum St. fr. 3, 419 sunt, non, ut videntur, easdem res significant, sed aliquid differunt; quod alio loco alio loco cf. IV, 16 fortasse tractabimus. haec hae V 2 sunt illae fibrae stirpium, quas initio dixi, persequendae et omnes eligendae, et 25 eligendae X ( cf. Colum. 4, 5 Varro rust. 1, 47 ) eliciendae V c ne umquam ulla possit existere. magnum opus et difficile, quis negat? quid autem praeclarum non idem arduum? sed tamen id se effecturam philosophia profitetur, nos modo curationem eius recipiamus. denique ratio una ... 360, 3 recipiamus H Verum haec quidem verum quidem haec W corr. We. actenus K 1 R 1 hactenus, cetera, quotienscumque voletis, et hoc loco et aliis parata vobis erunt. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia. 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.15. sed quae iudicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam etiam ilia H quae efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, metus recessum quendam animi et fugam, laetitia profusam hilaritatem, libido lubido K x li bido R effrenatam effrenata X corr. K 2 R c adpetentiam. opinationem autem, quam in omnis definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse inbecillam adsensionem. 4.38. atque idem eidem GRV 1 ita acrem in omnis partis aciem intendit, ut semper videat sedem sibi ac locum sine molestia atque angore vivendi, ut, quemcumque casum fortuna invexerit, hunc apte et quiete ferat. quod qui faciet, non aegritudine solum vacabit, sed etiam perturbationibus reliquis omnibus. his autem vacuus animus perfecte atque absolute obsolute K 1 R beatos adhibeant V (-ant in r. c ) efficit, idemque concitatus et abstractus ab integra certaque ratione non constantiam solum amittit, verum etiam sanitatem. Quocirca mollis et enervata putanda est Peripateticorum ratio et oratio, qui perturbari animos necesse dicunt esse, sed adhibent modum quendam, quem ultra progredi non oporteat. 4.59. ad te at V 1 igitur mihi iam convertenda omnis oratio est; simulas enim quaerere te de sapiente, quaeris autem fortasse de te. Earum eorum s earum X igitur perturbationum, quas exposui, variae sunt curationes. nam neque omnis aegritudo una ratione sedatur sadatur V (alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti aut invidenti adhibenda adhibenda add. G 2 medicina); est etiam in omnibus quattuor perturbationibus illa distinctio, utrum ad universam perturbationem, quae est aspernatio rationis aut aut V adpetitus vehementior, an ad singulas, ut ad metum lubidinem libid. K 1 V reliquas reliquas V 1 (que add. 3 ) reliquias GKR melius adhibeatur oratio, et utrum illudne non videatur aegre ferundum, ex quo suscepta sit aegritudo, an omnium rerum tollenda tollenda s toleranda X omnino omni V 1 aegritudo, ut, si quis aegre ferat se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse, an hominem aegre ferre nihil oportere. nimirum hoc melius, ne, si si add. K c forte de paupertate non persuaseris, sit aegritudini concedendum; aegritudine autem sublata propriis rationibus, quibus heri usi sumus, quodam modo etiam paupertatis malum tollitur. 4.63. itaque non sine causa, cum Orestem fabulam doceret doceret s Prisc. diceret X Euripides, non ... 16 Euripides Prisc. GL. 2, 246, 2 primos tris versus revocasse dicitur Socrates: Neque ta/m terribilis u/lla fando ora/tio oratio s ( e0/pos ) ratio X Prisc. est, Nec fo/rs fors X (sor G 1 fors G 2 ) Prisc. ( audacter dictum pro eo quod fors fert, ut saepe fortuna; sed vix spernendum cf. Forsdeus Att. 4, 10 forte-divinitus Liv. 1, 4, Ov. trist. 5, 3, 13, Vell. 2, 66 al. ) sors vulgo ( pa/qos Eur. ) nec ira cae/litum invectu/m invectum edd. inventum X invictum Prisc. malum, Quod no/n non add. G 2 natura huma/na patiendo e/cferat. neque ... 20 ferat Prisc. GL.3, 426, 7 est autem utilis ad persuadendum ea quae acciderint ferri et posse et oportere oportere V eorum bis V 1 enumeratio eorum qui tulerunt. tullerunt GR ( corr. c ) V ( corr. 3 ) etsi aegritudinis sedatio et hesterna disputatione explicata est et in Consolationis libro, quem in medio—non enim sapientes eramus—maerore et dolore conscripsimus; quodque vetat vertat V 1 St. fr. 3, 484 Chrysippus, ad recentis quasi tumores animi remedium adhibere, id nos fecimus naturaeque vim cum in vim corr. V 3 attulimus, attullimus X (adt. V) ut magnitudini medicinae doloris magnitudo concederet. ut cum magnitudine ... 3 concederet Non. 270, 11 4.65. videamus nunc de bonorum, id est de laetitia et de cupiditate. mihi quidem in tota ratione ea, quae eaque KR pertinet pertinet s pertinent X ad animi perturbationem, una res videtur causam continere, omnis eas esse in nostra potestate, omnis iudicio susceptas, omnis voluntarias. hic igitur error est eripiendus, haec detrahenda opinio haec detrahenda opinio ne consererent Gr atque ut in malis opinatis tolerabilia, tollerabilia X ( corr. R c? ) sic in bonis sedatiora sunt efficienda ea quae magna et laetabilia ducuntur. dicuntur W corr. Wo. atque hoc quidem commune malorum et bonorum, bonorum et malorum G 1 ut, si iam difficile sit persuadere nihil earum rerum, quae perturbent perturbant K 1 animum, aut in bonis aut in malis esse habendum, tamen alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda aliaque ratione malevolus, alia amator, alia rursus anxius, alia timidus corrigendus. 4.76. nam ut illa praeteream, quae sunt furoris, futuris K 1 furoris haec ipsa per sese sese V ( exp. 3 ) quam habent levitatem, quae videntur esse mediocria, Iniu/riae Ter. Eun. 59–63 Suspi/ciones i/nimicitiae induciae RV indu/tiae Bellu/m pax rursum! ince/rta haec si tu si tu s sit ut X ( prius t exp. V 3 ) po/stules Ratio/ne certa fa/cere, nihilo plu/s plus add. G 2 agas, Quam si/ des operam, ut cu/m ratione insa/nias. haec inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis quem non ipsa pravitate deterreat? est etiam etiam Man. enim illud, quod in omni perturbatione dicitur, demonstrandum, nullam esse nisi opinabilem, nisi iudicio susceptam, nisi voluntariam. etenim si naturalis amor esset, amor esset ex amorem et K c et amarent omnes et semper amarent et idem amarent, et idem amarent om. H neque alium pudor, alium cogitatio, alium satietas deterreret. etenim ... 26 deterreret H deterret G 1 Ira vero, quae quae -ae in r. V 2 quam diu perturbat animum, dubitationem insaniae non habet, cuius inpulsu imp. KR existit etiam inter fratres tale iurgium: 4.79. Ubi sunt ergo isti, qui iracundiam utilem dicunt —potest utilis esse insania?—aut naturalem? an an s hanc X quicquam est secundum est sec. s es sec. R esse sec. GKV naturam, quod fit repugte ratione? quo modo autem, si naturalis esset ira, ira add. G 2 aut alius alio magis iracundus esset, aut finem haberet prius quam esset aut finem ... 4 esset add. V 3 ulta, ulta Man. ulla ulciscendi lubido, aut quemquam paeniteret, quod fecisset fecisse V 1 per iram? ut Alexandrum regem videmus, qui cum interemisset Clitum clitum iditum K familiarem suum, vix a se manus abstinuit; tanta vis fuit paenitendi. quibus cognitis quis est qui dubitet dubitat K quin hic quoque motus animi sit totus opinabilis ac voluntarius? Quis enim dubitarit quin aegrotationes animi, qualis est avaritia, gloriae cupiditas, ex eo, quod magni magna V aestumetur ea res ex qua animus aegrotat, oriantur? oriantur s oriatur unde intellegi debet perturbationem quoque omnem esse in opinione. 4.83. itaque non fortuito factum videtur, sed a te ratione propositum, ut separatim de aegritudine et de ceteris perturbationibus disputaremus; in ea est enim fons miseriarum et caput. sed et alt. et om. V aegritudinis et reliquorum animi morborum una sanatio est, omnis opinabilis esse et voluntarios ea reque requae GKR (quae ... videatur in r. K 1 ) suscipi, quod ita rectum esse videatur. hunc errorem quasi radicem malorum omnium stirpitus stirpitus Statil. Max. ap. Char. GL. 2, 219, 25 philosophia se extracturam pollicetur.
10. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , 40.19-40.22, 41.29-41.31 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

11. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 154 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

12. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 1.38 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

13. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.310 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

14. Philo of Alexandria, On The Virtues, 195 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

195. On which account, I imagine, that nobility herself, if God were to invest her with the form and organs of a man, would stand before those obstinate and unworthy descendants and speak thus: "Relationship is not measured by blood alone, where truth is the judge, but by a similarity of actions, and by a careful imitation of the conduct of your ancestors. But you have pursued an opposite line of conduct, thinking hateful such actions as are dear to me, and loving such deeds as are hateful to me; for in my eyes modesty, and truth, and moderation, and a due government of the passions, and simplicity, and innocence, are honourable, but in your opinion they are dishonourable; and to me all shameless behaviour is hateful, and all falsehood, and all immoderate indulgence of the passions, and all pride, and all wickedness. But you look upon these things as near and dear to you.
15. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 3.129-3.132 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

16. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 2.57 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

17. New Testament, Romans, 9.1-9.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

9.1. I tell the truth in Christ. I am not lying, my conscience testifying with me in the Holy Spirit 9.2. that I have great sorrow and unceasing pain in my heart.
18. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, 441d, 449a, 450c, 441c (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

441c. and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason.
19. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 1.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

20. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.5.2-1.5.3, 1.16.7, 2.2.2, 2.2.5, 2.3.4-2.3.5, 2.4, 2.4.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

21. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 113.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

22. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 3.1.25, 3.7.4, 4.2.8-4.2.18, 4.3.1-4.3.2, 4.4.24, 4.6.24-4.6.27, 4.6.35-4.6.37, 4.6.40-4.6.41, 4.7.5, 4.7.14, 4.7.16-4.7.17, 4.7.37 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

23. Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.2.6-7.2.7, 19.1, 19.1.15-19.1.16 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

24. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, 154 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

25. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.235 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

26. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.110, 7.114 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure. 7.114. Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines:Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.Resentment is anger in an early stage.Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another's ills. Delight is the mind's propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue.
27. Origen, Against Celsus, 4.45 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.45. And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth displayed by the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed even what is to their discredit, and thus been led to accept the other and more marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse, and has characterized the story of Lot and his daughters (without examining either its literal or its figurative meaning) as worse than the crimes of Thyestes. The figurative signification of that passage of history it is not necessary at present to explain, nor what is meant by Sodom, and by the words of the angels to him who was escaping thence, when they said: Look not behind you, neither stay in all the surrounding district; escape to the mountain, lest you be consumed; nor what is intended by Lot and his wife, who became a pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his daughters intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him. But let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the history. The nature of actions - good, bad, and indifferent - has been investigated by the Greeks; and the more successful of such investigators lay down the principle that intention alone gives to actions the character of good or bad, and that all things which are done without a purpose are, strictly speaking, indifferent; that when the intention is directed to a becoming end, it is praiseworthy; when the reverse, it is censurable. They have said, accordingly, in the section relating to things indifferent, that, strictly speaking, for a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in established communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to show that such an act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they have assumed the case of a wise man being left with an only daughter, the entire human race besides having perished; and they put the question whether the father can fitly have intercourse with his daughter, in order, agreeably to the supposition, to prevent the extermination of mankind. Is this to be accounted sound reasoning among the Greeks, and to be commended by the influential sect of the Stoics; but when young maidens, who had heard of the burning of the world, though without comprehending (its full meaning), saw fire devastating their city and country, and supposing that the only means left of rekindling the flame of human life lay in their father and themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the desire that the world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse than that of the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics, acts becomingly in having intercourse with his daughter in the case already supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however, that some have taken offense at the desire of Lot's daughters, and have regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two accursed nations - Moab and Ammon - have sprung from that unhallowed intercourse. And yet truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly approving of their conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as blameworthy. Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it admits not only of a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on its own merits.
28. Augustine, The City of God, 9.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call παθη, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term goods to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Attic that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus. The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasi, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was immediately to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas by Virgil when he says, He stands immovable by tears, Nor tenderest words with pity hears.
29. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.7.10



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aaron Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
abraham, humanity of Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
abraham, kingship of Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
abraham, moderation of Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
alcinous, middle platonist author of didasklikos Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
anger, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
anger Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
antiochus of ascalon Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 67
appropriate (kathēkon) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
assent, voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 46
augustine Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
beliefs, role in emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
bites, sharp, little contractions caused by appearance of evil Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 38
caston, victor Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
cherubim, chet, sons of Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
children Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 137
chrysippus, on directive faculty Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
chrysippus, on involuntary feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), appetite is judgement that there is future benefit and it is appropriate to reach for it Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), contraction/expansion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 38
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), distress is judgement that there is present harm and it is appropriate to feel a sinking Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), fear is judgement that there is future harm and it is appropriate to avoid it Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), hence emotion voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 46
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), intellectualist account of emotions as identical with judgements (contrast zeno) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), or about the appropriateness of actual expansion or contraction Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30, 31
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), pleasure is judgement that there is present benefit and it is appropriate to feel expansion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), tears, if not assented to, could illustrate idea of first movements, but chrysippus does not make use of this Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), the second judgement is about the appropriateness of actual or imagined pursuit or avoidance Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 31
chrysippus, treatises of, on the law Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero, on beliefs in emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 237
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, possible early reference to first movements Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
cicero, translates prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
consolatory literature Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
contraction, expansion, a perceptible spatial movement of the physical soul in the chest Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 38, 70
contraction, expansion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 31
cooper, john Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 237
cylinder analogy Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
dead, death Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
demetrius Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 137
diano, c. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
directive faculty, in emotions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
distress, definition Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
distress Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
emotions, causation of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
emotions, emotion voluntary? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 46
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 237
emotions, identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30, 31, 38, 45, 46
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
emotions, the judgements are about harm or benefit at hand and the appropriate reaction to it, illustrated for pleasure, distress, appetite, fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
enslaved people, enslavement Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
epictetus, stoic, prothumia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
epicureans Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 237
excessiveness (pleonasmos) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
fear, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
feelings, physical alterations underlying Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
first movements, 2 kinds. mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 67, 70
first movements, 8 bad thoughts converted to 7 cardinal sins by gregory the great Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
first movements, allow time for checking emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
first movements, because distinct from assent and judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 67
first movements, expounded by seneca, perhaps earlier by cicero, but examples in aristotle and (possibly) chrysippus not yet recognized as such Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
freud Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
gentiles (ethnē) Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 237
grief Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 163
grief (lupē) Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
grief and mourning Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
griffin, miriam Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
helmbold, w.c. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 31
herculaneum papyri Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
hieronymus of rhodes, aristotelian, no time to check anger Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
holler, ernst Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
humanity of abraham Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
imagination Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
impressions, in aristotle Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 237
impulse (hormē), impulse not sufficient for action Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
inwood, brad Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 31
ledbetter, grace m. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
love and friendship Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 137
mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
moderation Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
mourning customs Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), and prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
origins of error, value as source Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
pangs in epicureanism Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 137
passions, freedom from Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
passions (pathē) Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
paul, and passions (pathē) Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
paul Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
philodemus, epicurean Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
philodemus Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 137
pity, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
pleasure, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
plutarch, as source Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
plutarch, on mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, time available to check anger Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
posidonius, on causes of emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
pre-emotions, criticism Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
pre-emotions, origins of stoic concept Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
prothumia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
psyche, part-based and monistic models Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 237
rist, john Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
roman assembly, correspondence Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
sachs, david Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
sage Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 163; Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
sarah, abraham mourning Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
sarah, death of Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
seneca, on anger Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
seneca, the younger, stoic, contrast with emotion, which is a voluntary judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
seneca, the younger, stoic, first movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 67
seneca, the younger, stoic, hence emotion subject to therapy Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
sorabji, richard Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
soul Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 163
stoics, grief and Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
stoics, stoicism Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
tabula of cebes Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
the sage, passions and Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
therapy, philosophical contributions to therapy (i) voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 46, 70
therapy of the soul Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 163
tieleman, teun Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 38
time-lapse, effects of, how much time is available for checking anger? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
time Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 163
virtue Gunderson, The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White (2022) 94
volition, terminology of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 46, 70
von arnim, joachim Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
weeping, involuntary Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
zeno of citium, on mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
zeno of citium, stoic, not recognize first movements' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 70
εὐπάθεια Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
μετριοπάθεια Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387
ἀπάθεια Birnbaum and Dillon, Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2020) 387