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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.68
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31 results
1. Plato, Alcibiades I, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

215e. I am worse than any wild fanatic; I find my heart leaping and my tears gushing forth at the sound of his speech, and I see great numbers of other people having the same experience. When I listened to Pericles and other skilled orators I thought them eloquent, but I never felt anything like this; my spirit was not left in a tumult and had not to complain of my being in the condition of a common slave: whereas the influence of our Marsyas here has often thrown me into such a state
3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.27, 4.64-4.68, 4.74-4.77 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.27. sed hoc sane concedamus. contemnit enim enim om. BE disserendi elegantiam, confuse loquitur. gerendus est mos, modo recte sentiat. et quidem et quidem ARN equidem BEV illud ipsum non nimium probo et tantum tantum A tamen (tn = tamen, pro tm = tantum) patior, philosophum loqui de cupiditatibus finiendis. an potest cupiditas finiri? tollenda est atque extrahenda radicitus. quis est enim, in quo sit cupiditas, quin quin qui N 1 V qui non BE recte cupidus dici possit? ergo et avarus erit, sed finite, et adulter, verum habebit modum, et luxuriosus eodem modo. qualis ista philosophia est, quae non interitum afferat pravitatis, sed sit contenta mediocritate vitiorum? quamquam in hac divisione rem ipsam rem ipsam (ips in ras. ) N remissam BERV remissionem A prorsus probo, probam A 1 reprobo A 2 elegantiam desidero. appellet haec desideria naturae, cupiditatis nomen servet alio, ut eam, cum de avaritia, cum de intemperantia, cum de maximis vitiis loquetur, tamquam capitis accuset. 4.64. atque hoc loco similitudines eas, quibus illi uti solent, dissimillimas proferebas. proferebas p. 107, 23 sqq. quis enim ignorat, si plures ex alto emergere velint, propius fore eos quidem ad respirandum, qui ad summam iam aquam aquam iam BE adpropinquent, sed nihilo magis respirare posse quam eos, qui sint in profundo? nihil igitur adiuvat procedere et progredi in virtute, quo minus miserrimus sit, ante quam ad eam pervenerit, quoniam in aqua nihil adiuvat, et, quoniam catuli, qui iam dispecturi dispecturi NV despecturi sunt, caeci aeque et ii, qui modo nati, Platonem quoque necesse est, quoniam nondum videbat sapientiam, aeque caecum caecum ceco R animo ac ac RNV et BE Phalarim fuisse? 4.65. ista similia non sunt, Cato, in quibus quamvis multum processeris tamen illud in eadem causa est, a quo abesse velis, donec evaseris; nec enim ille respirat, ante quam emersit, et catuli aeque caeci, prius quam dispexerunt, dispexerunt Lamb. despexerunt RNV depexerunt BE ac si ita futuri semper essent. illa sunt similia: hebes hebes NV habes BER acies est cuipiam oculorum, corpore alius senescit; senescit Mdv. nescit ERN 1 nestit B languescit N 2 V hi curatione adhibita levantur in dies, valet alter plus cotidie, alter videt. his similes sunt omnes, qui virtuti student; levantur vitiis, levantur erroribus, nisi forte censes Ti. censes Ti. censesti N consesti R censes ca (= causa) V censes ( om. ti) BE Gracchum patrem non beatiorem fuisse 'Aldus primus addidisse videtur' Mdv. quam filium, cum alter stabilire rem publicam studuerit, alter evertere. nec tamen ille erat sapiens— quis enim hoc aut quando aut ubi aut unde?—; sed quia studebat laudi et dignitati, multum in virtute processerat. 4.66. conferam avum avum BE autem avum N avū aut R avum autem V tuum Drusum cum C. Graccho, eius fere aequali? quae hic rei publicae vulnera inponebat, eadem ille sanabat. si nihil est, quod tam miseros faciat quam inpietas et scelus, ut iam omnes insipientes sint miseri, quod profecto sunt, non est tamen aeque miser, qui patriae consulit, et is, qui illam extinctam cupit. Levatio igitur vitiorum magna fit in in E om. BRNV iis, qui habent ad virtutem progressionis aliquantum. 4.67. vestri autem progressionem ad virtutem fieri aiunt, levationem vitiorum fieri negant. at quo at quo RN 2 a quo N 2 ad quod BEV utantur utantur Lamb. utuntur BENV uta|entur ( tertia litt. utrum a an u sit discerni nequit ) R homines acuti argumento ad probandum, operae pretium est considerare. quarum, inquit, artium summae crescere summa ecrescere BE summa crescere R possunt, earum etiam contrariorum summae ... contrariorum om. N contrariorum Lamb. contrariarum BEV contrarium R summa poterit augeri; ad virtutis autem summam accedere nihil potest; ne vitia quidem igitur crescere poterunt, quae sunt virtutum contraria. utrum igitur tandem perspicuisne dubia aperiuntur, an dubiis perspicua tolluntur? atqui hoc perspicuum est, vitia alia in aliis esse maiora, illud dubium, ad id, quod summum del. Lamb. bonum dicitis, ecquaenam possit fieri fieri possit BE accessio. vos autem cum perspicuis dubia debeatis illustrare, dubiis perspicua conamini tollere. 4.68. itaque itaque atque BE rursus rursus cod. Glogav. usus BERN 1 V usi N 2 eadem ratione, qua sum paulo ante paulo ante p. 144,5-14 usus, haerebitis. si enim propterea vitia alia aliis maiora non sunt, quia ne ad finem quidem bonorum eum, quem vos facitis, quicquam potest accedere, quoniam perspicuum est vitia non esse omnium paria, finis bonorum vobis mutandus est. teneamus enim illud necesse est, cum consequens aliquod falsum sit, illud, cuius id consequens id consequens (d ex corr. alt. m. ) N inconsequens BER consequens V sit, non posse esse verum. Quae est igitur causa istarum angustiarum? illarum BE gloriosa ostentatio in constituendo summo bono. cum enim, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse confirmatur, tollitur cura valitudinis, diligentia rei familiaris, administratio rei publicae, ordo gerendorum negotiorum, officia vitae, ipsum denique illud honestum, in quo uno vultis esse omnia, deserendum est. quae diligentissime contra Aristonem dicuntur a Chrysippo. ex ea difficultate illae 'fallaciloquae', fallaciloquae P. Man. fallaci loquele BE facili loquele RN fa- cili al' fallaci loquele V fallaciloquentiae Non. p. 113 ut ait Accius, accius BRN actius E acrius V malitiae natae sunt. 4.74. Nam ex eisdem verborum praestrigiis praestrigiis BEN praestigiis et regna nata vobis sunt et imperia et divitiae, et tantae quidem, ut omnia, quae ubique sint, sapientis esse dicatis. solum praeterea formosum, solum liberum, solum civem, stultos omnia contraria, add. hoc loco Mdv., post contraria Morel. quos etiam insanos esse vultis. haec para/doca illi, nos admirabilia dicamus. quid autem habent admirationis, cum prope accesseris? conferam tecum, quam cuique verbo rem subicias; nulla erit controversia. Omnia peccata paria dicitis. non ego tecum iam ita iocabor, Jocabor N locabor RB locabar E letabor V ut isdem his de his de edd. is de ER ijs de V de B om. N rebus, cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt, aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius. Peccata paria. 4.75. —Quonam modo?—Quia nec honesto quicquam honestius nec turpi turpius.—Perge porro; nam de isto magna dissensio est. illa argumenta propria videamus, cur omnia sint paria peccata.—Ut, inquit, in fidibus pluribus, nisi nisi Se. si nulla earum non ita contenta add. Se. nervis sit, ut concentum servare possit, omnes aeque incontentae sint, sic peccata, quia discrepant, aeque discrepant; paria sunt igitur.—Hic ambiguo ludimur. aeque enim contingit omnibus fidibus, ut incontentae sint, illud non continuo, ut aeque incontentae. collatio igitur ista te nihil iuvat. nec enim, omnes avaritias si aeque avaritias esse dixerimus, sequetur, ut etiam aequas esse dicamus. Ecce aliud simile dissimile. 4.76. Ut enim, inquit, gubernator aeque peccat, si palearum navem evertit et si auri, item aeque peccat, qui parentem et qui servum iniuria verberat.—Hoc non videre, cuius generis onus navis vehat, id ad gubernatoris artem nil nil om. R pertinere! itaque aurum paleamne paleamne V paleam ne RN paleamve BE portet, ad bene aut ad male guberdum nihil interesse! at quid inter parentem et servulum intersit, intellegi et potest et debet. ergo in guberdo nihil, in officio plurimum interest, quo in genere peccetur. et si in ipsa gubernatione neglegentia est navis eversa, maius est peccatum in auro quam in palea. omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam esse eam, quae communis appellatur prudentia, quam omnes, qui cuique qui cuique cuicumque Mdv. artificio praesunt, debent habere. ita ne hoc quidem modo paria quidem modo paria Lamb. modo paria quidem peccata sunt. 4.77. Urgent tamen et nihil remittunt. Quoniam, inquiunt, omne peccatum inbecillitatis et inconstantiae est, haec autem vitia in omnibus stultis aeque magna sunt, necesse est paria esse peccata. Quasi vero aut concedatur in omnibus stultis aeque magna esse vitia, et eadem inbecillitate et inconstantia L. Tubulum fuisse, qua qua BE quam illum, cuius is condemnatus est rogatione, P. Scaevolam, et quasi nihil inter res quoque ipsas, in quibus peccatur, intersit, ut, quo hae maiores minoresve sint, eo, quae peccentur in his rebus, aut 2.27.  Still, do not let us stickle about form. Epicurus despises the niceties of dialectic; his style neglects distinctions; we must humour him in this, provided that his meaning is correct. But for my own part I cannot cordially approve, I merely tolerate, a philosopher who talks of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible for desire to be kept within bounds? It ought to be destroyed, uprooted altogether. On your principle there is no form of desire whose possessor could not be morally approved. He will be a miser — within limits; an adulterer — in moderation; and a sensualist to correspond. What sort of a philosophy is this, that instead of dealing wickedness its death-blow, is satisfied with moderating our vices? Albeit I quite approve the substance of this classification; it is the form of it to which I take exception. Let him speak of the first class as 'the needs of nature,' and keep the term 'desire' for another occasion, to be put on trial for its life when he comes to deal with Avarice, Intemperance, and all the major vices. 4.64.  It was at this point that you brought forward those extremely false analogies which the Stoics are so fond of employing. of course everybody knows that if there are several people plunged in deep water and trying to get out, those already approaching the surface, though nearer to breathing, will be no more able actually to breathe than those at the bottom. You infer that improvement and progress in virtue are of no avail to save a man from being utterly wretched, until he has actually arrived at virtue, since to rise in the water is of no avail. Again, since puppies on the point of opening their eyes are as blind as those only just born, it follows that Plato, not having yet attained to the vision of wisdom, was just as blind mentally as Phalaris! 4.65.  "Really, Cato, there is no analogy between progress in virtue and cases such as you describe, in which however far one advances, the situation one wishes to escape from still remains the same until one has actually emerged from it. The man does not breathe until he has risen to the surface; the puppies are as blind before they have opened their eyes as if they were going to be blind always. Good analogies would be these: one man's eyesight is dim, another's general health is weak; apply remedies, and they get better day by day; every day the one is stronger and the other sees better; similarly with all who earnestly pursue virtue; they get better, their vices and errors are gradually reduced. Surely you would not maintain that the elder Tiberius Gracchus was not happier than his son, when the one devoted himself to the service of the state and the other to its destruction. But still the elder Gracchus was not a Wise Man; who ever was? or when, or where, or how? Still he aspired to fame and honour, and therefore had advanced to a high point in virtue. 4.66.  Compare your grandfather Drusus with Gaius Gracchus, who was nearly his contemporary. The former strove to heal the wounds which the latter inflicted on the state. If there is nothing that makes men so miserable as impiety and crime, granted that all who are foolish are miserable, as of course they are, nevertheless a man who serves his country is not so miserable as one who longs for its ruin. Therefore those who achieve definite progress towards virtue undergo a great diminution of their vices. 4.67.  Your teachers, however, while allowing progress towards virtue, deny diminution of vice. But it is worth while to examine the argument on which these clever people rely for the proof. Their line is this: In the case of arts or sciences which admit of advancement, the opposite of those arts and sciences will also admit of advance; but virtue is absolute and incapable of increase; therefore the vices also, being the opposite of the virtues, are incapable of gradation. Pray tell me then, does a certainty explain an uncertainty, or does uncertainty disprove a certainty? Now, that some vices are worse than others is certain; but whether the Chief Good, as you Stoics conceive it, can be subject to increase is not certain. Yet instead of employing the certain to throw light on the uncertain, you endeavour to make the uncertain disprove the certain. 4.68.  Therefore you can be checkmated by the same argument as I employed just now. If the proof that one vice cannot be worse than another depends on the fact that the End of Goods, as you conceive it, is itself incapable of increase, then you must alter your End of Goods, since it is certain that the vices of all men are not equal. For we are bound to hold that if a conclusion is false, the premise on which it depends cannot be true."Now what has landed you in this impasse? Simply your pride and vainglory in constructing your Chief Good. To maintain that the only Good is Moral Worth is to do away with the care of one's health, the management of one's estate, participation in politics, the conduct of affairs, the duties of life; nay, to abandon that Moral Worth itself, which according to you is the be‑all and the end‑all of existence; objections that were urged most earnestly against Aristo by Chrysippus. This is the difficulty that gave birth to those 'base conceits deceitful-tongued,' as Attius has it. 4.74.  "The same verbal legerdemain supplies you with your kingdoms and empires and riches, riches so vast that you declare that everything the world contains is the property of the Wise Man. He alone, you say, is handsome, he alone a free man and a citizen: while the foolish are the opposite of all these, and according to you insane into the bargain. The Stoics call these paradoxa, as we might say 'startling truths.' But what is there so startling about them viewed at close quarters? I will consult you as to the meaning you attach to each term; there shall be no dispute. You Stoics say that all transgressions are equal. I won't jest with you now, as I did on the same subjects when you were prosecuting and I defending Lucius Murena. On that occasion I was addressing a jury, not an audience of scholars, and I even had to play to the gallery a little; but now I must reason more closely. 4.75.  Transgressions are equal. — How so, pray? — Because nothing can be better than good or baser than base. — Explain further, for there is much disagreement on this point; let us have your special arguments to prove how all transgressions are equal. — Suppose, says my opponent, of a number of lyres not one is so strung as to be in tune; then all are equally out of tune; similarly with transgressions, since all are departures from rule, all are equally departures from rule; therefore all are equal. — Here we are put off with an equivocation. All the lyres equally are out of tune; but it does not follow that all are equally out of tune. So your comparison does not help you; for it does not follow that because we pronounce every case of avarice equally to be avarice, we must therefore pronounce them all to be equal. 4.76.  Here is another of these false analogies: A skipper, says my adversary, commits an equal transgression if he loses his ship with a cargo of straw and if he does so when laden with gold; similarly a man is an equal transgressor if he beats his parent or his slave without due cause. — Fancy not seeing that the nature of the cargo has nothing to do with the skill of the navigator! so that whether he carries gold or straw makes no differences as regards good or bad seamanship; whereas the distinction between a parent and a mere slave is one that cannot and ought not to be overlooked. Hence the nature of the other upon which the offence is committed, which in navigation makes no difference, in conduct makes all the difference. Indeed in the case of navigation too, if the loss of the ship is due to negligence, the offence is greater with a cargo of gold than with one of straw. For the virtue known generally as prudence is an attribute as we hold of all the arts, and every master craftsman in each branch of art ought to possess it. Hence this proof also of the equality of transgression breaks down. 4.77.  "However, they press the matter, and will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, is a proof of weakness and instability of character; but all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though it were admitted that all foolish people possess an equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though there were no difference also between the respective circumstances in which the transgressions are committed, so that the magnitude of the transgression varies in proportion to the importance of the circumstances!
4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind.
5. Cicero, On Duties, 1.136 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.136. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non optemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira exsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus, et vereri et diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul absit,cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. 1.136.  But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of life, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the kind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and consideration toward those with whom we converse. It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly — never at all, unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry, but anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious can be done.
6. Cicero, De Oratore, 3.65 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Cicero, Pro Murena, 61 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

61. multitudine aut in aliquo conventu agrestium, audacius paulo de studiis humanitatis quae et mihi et vobis nota et iucunda iucunda ed. V, Lambinus : iudicanda codd. ( etiam B ) sunt disputabo. in M. Marco Catone, iudices, haec bona quae videmus divina et egregia ipsius scitote esse propria; quae non numquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a natura verum verum sed y1 a magistro. fuit enim quidam summo ingenio vir, Zeno, cuius inventorum aemuli Stoici nomitur. huius sententiae sunt et praecepta eius modi huiusmodi w, Halm . sapientem gratia numquam moveri, numquam cuiusquam delicto ignoscere; neminem misericordem esse nisi stultum et levem; viri non esse neque exorari neque placari; solos sapientes esse, si distortissimi sint, formosos, si mendicissimi, divites, si servitutem serviant, reges; nos autem qui sapientes non sumus simus Wesenberg fugitivos, exsules, hostis, insanos denique esse dicunt; omnia peccata esse paria; omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit; sapientem nihil opinari, nullius rei paenitere, nulla in re falli, sententiam mutare numquam.
8. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.24-3.25, 3.29, 3.32, 3.34, 3.40, 3.61, 3.64-3.67, 3.69-3.72, 3.74, 3.76-3.78, 3.80, 3.82-3.83, 4.11, 4.14, 4.38, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.65, 4.67, 4.76, 4.79, 4.83, 5.34 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.24. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis St. fr. 3, 385 solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspers vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata aelata G 1 R 1 laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, post obtemperans add. vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest X quae retinent sec. Dav. edd., in v. 17. 8 verba cupiditas — potest delentes. sed ut voluptatis sic cupi- ditatis nomen appositionis locum tenere debebat. de cupiditate autem praedicandam erat 'opinione futuri boni turbatur'; quod cum iam in enuntiato relativo expressum esset, anacoluthon natum est. ad boni 17 V c in mg. adscr. : et quidem magis significat nomen libidinis magnitudinem erroris. itaque in ea cupiditate quae flagrantissima est proprie plerumque nomen hoc ponitur si omnis appetitio opinati boni haec] ut H 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.29. haec igitur praemeditatio futurorum malorum lenit eorum adventum, quae venientia longe ante videris. itaque apud Euripiden a Theseo dicta laudantur; licet Eurip. fr. 964 euripidĕ K thesseo GKR 1 enim, ut saepe facimus, in Latinum illa convertere: Nam qui hae/c audita a do/cto meminisse/m viro, Futu/ras mecum co/mmentabar mi/serias: Aut mo/rtem acerbam aut alt. aut add. G 2 exilii X e/xili maesta/m fugam Aut se/mper aliquam mo/lem meditaba/r mali, Ut, si/ qua invecta di/ritas casu/ foret, Ne me i/nparatum cu/ra lacerare/t repens. lacerare trepens G 1 R 1 3.32. Sed est, isdem de rebus quod dici possit subtilius, si prius Epicuri sententiam viderimus. qui censet Epic. fr. 444 necesse esse omnis in aegritudine esse, qui se in malis esse arbitrentur, sive illa ante provisa et expectata sint sive inveteraverint. nam neque vetustate minui mala nec fieri praemeditata leviora, stultamque etiam esse meditationem futuri mali aut fortasse ne futuri quidem: satis esse odiosum malum omne, cum venisset; cum venisset ex conv. K 2 qui autem semper cogitavisset accidere posse aliquid adversi, ei fieri illud sempiternum malum; si vero ne futurum quidem sit, sit ex si V c frustra suscipi miseriam voluntariam; voluntariam add. GR 1 in fine pag. ita semper angi aut accipiendo aut cogitando malo. 3.34. Principio male reprehendunt praemeditationem rerum futurarum. nihil est enim quod tam optundat optundat V (at in r. ) R c optundet GR 1 obtundet HK 1 (-at 2 ) elevetque aegritudinem quam perpetua in omni vita cogitatio nihil esse quod non accidere possit, quam meditatio condicionis conditionis X humanae, quam vitae lex commentatioque parendi, quae non hoc adfert, ut semper maereamus, sed ut numquam. neque enim, qui rerum naturam, qui vitae varietatem, qui inbecillitatem imb. KR c H generis humani cogitat, maeret, cum haec cogitat, sed tum vel vel om. H maxime sapientiae fungitur munere: utrumque enim consequitur, ut et considerandis rebus humanis proprio ad proprio in mg. adscr. non V rec philosophiae fruatur fruatur fungatur Man. ( sed phil. off. est 'id quod homini praestare potest ac debet philo- sophia' ) officio et adversis casibus triplici consolatione sanetur, sanentur X corr. K 2 R 2 V 2 primum quod nihil ei accidit nisi quod posse accidere diu cogitaverit, suppl. Po. cogitavit pro -erit Dav. quae cogitatio una maxime molestias omnis extenuat et diluit, deinde quod humana humane humana humane humane KV 1 (hu- mana add. 2 ) H humana G human e R ( del. c ) cf. Ps. Plut. cons. ad Ap. 118 c fe/rein ta\ a)nqrw/pina a)nqrwpi/nws ferenda intellegit, postremo quod videt malum nullum esse nisi culpam, culpam autem nullam esse, cum id, quod ab homine non potuerit praestari, praestari vel praecaveri R vet sed cf. ( etiam ad ea quae hic antecedunt ) epist. 6,1, 4 ( et 9,16,5 ) evenerit. nihil ... 336,2 evenerit H 3.40. quodsi cui, ut ait idem, simul animus cum re concidit animus rem condidit X corr. V c s , a gravibus illis antiquis philosophis petenda medicina est, non est non V est si non X ab his voluptariis. quam enim isti bonorum copiam dicunt? fac sane esse summum bonum non dolere—quamquam id non vocatur voluptas, sed non necesse est nunc omnia—: idne est, quo traducti luctum levemus? sit sane summum malum dolere: dolore in dolere corr. G 2 K 2 V 2 in eo igitur qui non est, si malo careat, continuone fruitur summo bono? 3.61. Omnibus enim modis fulciendi sunt, qui ruunt nec cohaerere possunt propter magnitudinem aegritudinis. ex quo ipsam aegritudinem lu/phn a\gP HN fere X ( L ex A V) Chrysippus quasi Chrys. fr. eth. 485 solutionem totius hominis appellatam omnibus modis... 12 appellat putat. appellat amputat KR 1 V ( cf. H et praef. ) Quae tota poterit evelli explicata, ut ut aut V 1 principio dixi, dixi cf. p. 329, 2sqq. causa aegritudinis; est enim nulla alia nisi opinio et iudicium magni praesentis atque urgentis mali. est... 15 mali itaque et dolor corporis, cuius est morsus acerrumus, perferetur perferetur X ( cf. Po. comm. ad 1, 29 ) perfertur V c spe proposita boni, et acta aetas honeste ac splendide tantam adfert consolationem, ut eos qui ita vixerint aut non attingat aegritudo aegritudo del. Dav. aut perleviter pungat animi dolor. Sed ad hanc opinionem magni mali cum illa etiam opinio accessit oportere, rectum esse, rectū esse esse scr. V c ad officium pertinere ferre perferre V ( sed per in r. rec ) illud aegre quod acciderit, tum denique efficitur illa gravis aegritudinis perturbatio. tum ... 23 perturbatio om. H 3.64. haec omnia recta vera debita putantes faciunt in dolore, maximeque declaratur declaratur hoc sana cf. Mue. ( off. 1, 61 ) hoc quasi officii iudicio fieri, quod, si qui forte, cum se in luctu esse vellent, aliquid fecerunt humanius aut si hilarius locuti sunt, revocant se rursus ad maestitiam peccatique se insimulant, quod dolere dolore K 1 V 1 intermiserint. pueros vero matres et magistri castigare etiam solent, nec verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus, si quid in domestico luctu hilarius ab is factum est aut dictum, plorare cogunt. Quid? ipsa remissio luctus cum est consecuta intellectumque intellectaque X corr. V c est est om. K 1 nihil profici maerendo, nonne res declarat fuisse totum illud voluntarium? 3.65. Quid ille Terentianus terentianus K 2 mg. V rec terrentianus X ipse se poeniens, poenitens (pen. K)X e a\g TON T e lM w PO g M e NOC fere X id est e(auto timwrou/menos ? Decre/vi tantispe/r decrevi tant. V ( prius t V c ) me minus iniu/riae, Chreme/s, me ... 7 Chreme s V c in r. (s scr. V 1 ) meo gnato fa/cere, dum fia/m miser. hic decernit, ut miser sit. num quis igitur quicquam decernit invitus? malo quidem me quovis dignum deputem— malo se dignum deputat, nisi miser sit. vides Ter. 147. 8. 135 ergo opinionis esse, non naturae malum. Quid, quos res quid quod res H ipsa lugere prohibet? ut apud Homerum cotidianae neces interitusque multorum sedationem maerendi adferunt, apud quem ita dicitur: Namque nimis multos atque omni luce cadentis T 226 cadentis ( i/ptousin ) Man. carentis Cernimus, ut nemo possit maerore vacare. Quo magis est aequum tumulis mandare peremptos Firmo animo et luctum lacrimis finire diurnis. 3.66. Ergo in potestate est abicere dolorem, cum velis, tempori servientem. an est ullum tempus, quoniam quidem res in nostra potestate est, cui cui cum V non ponendae curae et aegritudinis add. Dav. ex s . aut aegritudinis aut curae del. alii ( iam in V curaer sec. Str. ut vid. ) causa serviamus? vides ... 22 serviamus constabat eos, qui concidentem volneribus Cn. Pompeium vidissent, GN. X cum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent, quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil aliud tum egisse, nisi ut remiges hortarentur et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga; posteaquam Tyrum venissent, tum adflictari lamentarique coepisse. timor igitur ab his aegritudinem potuit repellere, ratio ab sapienti viro ab sapienti viro Bentl. ac sapientia vera ( def. Linde Era- nos XII p. 175 ) non poterit? Quid est autem quod plus valeat ad ponendum dolorem, quam cum est intellectum nil nihil KH profici et frustra esse susceptum? si igitur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest; voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem confitendum est. si timor aliquoties ab aegritudine potest repellere ... 351, 6 est H 3.67. Idque idque itaque K 1 indicatur eorum patientia, qui cum multa sint saepe perpessi, facilius ferunt ferant X cf. praef. quicquid accidit, obduruisseque obduruisseque iam Tr. obduruisse quam X (e ex am corr. V 2 ) iam sese sese V contra fortunam arbitrantur, ut ille apud Euripidem: Eur. Phrix. fr. 821 ( Chrys. fr. eth. 482 ) Si mi/hi nunc tristis pri/mum inluxisse/t dies Nec tam ae/rumnoso na/vigavisse/m navigassem X salo, Esse/t dolendi cau/sa, ut iniecto e/culei Freno/ repente ta/ctu exagitantu/r novo; Sed ia/m subactus subiactus GV 1 (i del. 2 ) sub- iectus KRP mi/seriis opto/rpui. obt. KR c defetigatio igitur miseriarum aegritudines cum faciat leniores, intellegi necesse est non rem ipsam causam atque ipsam atque causam W trp. Er. fontem fontem fon in r. V c esse maeroris. 3.69. itaque Aristoteles veteres philosophos Arist. fr. 53 accusans, qui existumavissent philosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriosissimos fuisse; sed sed si V se videre, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore. Aristoteles . .. 352, 3 fore libere redd. Lact. inst. 3, 28, 20 Theophrastus autem moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornicibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset, hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam tamen KR 1 exiguam vitam dedisset; quorum si aetas potuisset esse longinquior, futurum fuisse ut omnibus perfectis artibus omni doctrina hominum vita erudiretur. querebatur quaerebatur VK 2 quaerebat GK 1 (quer-) R igitur se tum, cum illa videre coepisset, extingui. quid? ex ceteris philosophis nonne optumus et gravissumus quisque confitetur multa se ignorare et multa multa V 2 s multi sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda? 3.70. neque tamen, cum se in media stultitia, qua nihil quia n. G 1 est peius, haerere intellegant, aegritudine premuntur; nulla enim admiscetur opinio officiosi doloris. Quid, qui non putant lugendum lungendum GV 1 ( prius n eras. ) iungen- dum KR viris? sqq. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 qualis fuit Q. Maxumus fuitque maxumus G 2 (quae G 1 ) KV ( ss. m. 3 ) ac fortasse R 1 (Q post fuit in r. m. al. ) efferens efferrens GR 1 V filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus paullus RG 1 e corr. V 1 (l eras. ) cf.p. 263, 17; 274, 19; 457, 7 duobus paucis lucius et marcus X diebus amissis amisis G 1 R 1 V 1 filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione consolationem G -ne V conlegimus. 3.71. quid hos aliud placavit nisi quod luctum et maerorem esse non putabant viri? ergo id, quod alii rectum opites aegritudini se solent dedere, id hi turpe putantes aegritudinem reppulerunt. ex quo intellegitur non in natura, sed in opinione esse aegritudinem. Contra dicuntur haec: quis tam demens, ut sua voluntate maereat? natura adfert dolorem, cui quidem Crantor, inquiunt, vester cedendum putat; premit enim atque instat, nec resisti potest. itaque Oileus oileus V ille apud Sophoclem, qui Telamonem antea de Aiacis morte morte V consolatus esset, is cum audivisset audisset K de suo, fractus est. de cuius commutata mente sic dicitur: Nec ve/ro tanta prae/ditus sapie/ntia Soph.fr. 666 Quisqua/m est, quisquamst edd. qui aliorum aeru/mnam dictis a/dlevans Non i/dem, cum fortu/na mutata i/mpetum Conve/rtat, convertit Sey. clade ut subita X corr. s clade su/bita frangatu/r sua, Ut i/lla ad alios di/cta et praecepta e/xcidant. ex p. G 2 haec cum disputant, hoc student efficere, naturae obsisti nullo modo posse; idem iidem Ern. (idem tamen Phil. 2, 91 al. ) hi (= i cf. praef. ) W et Sey. tamen fatentur graviores aegritudines suscipi, quam natura cogat. quae est igitur amentia—? ut nos quoque idem ab illis illis Urs. ex s allis requiramus. 3.72. Sed plures sunt causae suscipiendi doloris: primum illa opinio mali, quo viso atque persuaso aegritudo aegritudo add. V c insequitur necessario. deinde etiam gratum mortuis se facere, si graviter eos lugeant, arbitrantur. sed ... 16 arbitrantur H accedit superstitio muliebris quaedam; existumant enim diis inmortalibus se facilius satis facturos, si eorum plaga perculsi adflictos se et stratos esse fateantur. sed haec inter se quam repugnent, plerique non vident. laudant enim eos, qui aequo animo moriantur; qui alterius mortem aequo animo ferant, eos putant vituperandos. quasi fieri ullo modo possit, quod in amatorio sermone dici solet, ut quisquam plus alterum diligat quam se. 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. 3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V 3.77. Erit igitur in consolationibus prima medicina docere aut nullum malum esse aut admodum parvum, altera et prius et om. G 1 de communi condicione vitae et proprie, propriae G 1 KVH ( sim. 358, 6 ) si quid sit de ipsius qui maereat disputandum, tertia tertiam H summam esse stultitiam frustra confici maerore, cum intellegas nihil nil G posse profici. nam Cleanthes cleantes X (24 GK 1 ) Cl. fr. 577 quidem sapientem consolatur, qui consolatione non eget. nihil enim enim om. G 1 esse malum, quod turpe non sit, si lugenti persuaseris, non tu illi luctum, sed stultitiam detraxeris; erit... 21 detraxeris ( sine 18 nam... 19 eget) H alienum autem tempus docendi. et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando aegritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes suscipi... 24 Cleanthes om. K Cleanthes del. Ba. sed cf. Va. Op. 2, 130. 409 ipse fateatur. quid enim dicemus, cum Socrates Aisch. Socr. fr. 10 D. Aug. civ. 14, 8 Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse nec quicquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis baiolum interesse, cum se Alcibiades adflictaret lacrimansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret, illam ante dep. add. V 2 —quid dicemus, Cleanthe? acleanthe V (356, 23 cl. in r. V 2 ) o cleanthe Str. p. 58 tum tum ( cf. 356, 23 aliquando)] num edd. aegritudinem X corr. K 1 R c V 1 in illa re, quae aegritudine Alcibiadem adficiebat, mali nihil fuisse? 3.78. quid? illa Lyconis qualia quia GRV 1 (a eras. ) sunt? qui aegritudinem extenuans parvis ait eam rebus moveri, fortunae et corporis incommodis, non animi malis. mali X corr. V 2 quid ergo? illud, quod Alcibiades dolebat, non ex animi malis vitiisque constabat? ad Epicuri consolationem satis est ante dictum. 3.80. Sed nescio quo pacto ab eo, quod erat a te a te ante K propositum, aberravit oratio. tu enim de sapiente quaesieras, cui aut malum videri nullum potest, quod vacet turpitudine, aut ita parvum malum, ut id obruatur sapientia vixque appareat, qui qui add. V 2 nihil opinione adfingat adsumatque ad aegritudinem nec id putet esse rectum, tum post rectum add. V c se quam maxume excruciari luctuque confici, quo pravius nihil esse possit. edocuit tamen ratio, ut mihi quidem videtur, cum hoc ipsum proprie non quaereretur hoc tempore, num num V x nunc X num quid We. sed cf. Mue. quod esset malum nisi quod idem dici turpe posset, tamen ut videremus, viderimus V 1 quicquid esset in aegritudine mali, id non naturale esse, sed voluntario iudicio et opinionis errore contractum. 3.82. et tamen, ut medici uti medici K ( er. n) toto corpore curando minimae etiam parti, si condoluit, medentur, sic philosophia cum universam aegritudinem sustulit, sustulit aegritudinem sustulit tamen si X (sustullit G 1 V 1 condoluit tamen si K 1 medenturaegr. sustulit add. c ) corr. Keil, Quaest. Tull. p. XVIII etiam, si quis error alicunde alicunde Ern. aliunde extitit, si paupertas momordit, si ignominia pupugit, pupigit G 1 R 1 V 1 si quid tenebrarum obfudit exilium, exsilium GV 1 aut eorum quae quaeque (quaeque G) modo X corr. s modo dixi si quid si quid sicut K extitit. etsi singularum rerum sunt propriae consolationes, de quibus audies tu quidem, cum voles. sed ad eundem fontem revertendum est, aegritudinem omnem procul abesse a sapiente, quod iis sit, quod frustra suscipiatur, quod non natura exoriatur, sed iudicio, sed opinione, sed quadam invitatione ad dolendum, cum id decreverimus ita fieri oportere. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia. 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.38. atque idem eidem GRV 1 ita acrem in omnis partis aciem intendit, ut semper videat sedem sibi ac locum sine molestia atque angore vivendi, ut, quemcumque casum fortuna invexerit, hunc apte et quiete ferat. quod qui faciet, non aegritudine solum vacabit, sed etiam perturbationibus reliquis omnibus. his autem vacuus animus perfecte atque absolute obsolute K 1 R beatos adhibeant V (-ant in r. c ) efficit, idemque concitatus et abstractus ab integra certaque ratione non constantiam solum amittit, verum etiam sanitatem. Quocirca mollis et enervata putanda est Peripateticorum ratio et oratio, qui perturbari animos necesse dicunt esse, sed adhibent modum quendam, quem ultra progredi non oporteat. 4.54. Quid? Stoici, qui omnes insipientes insanos esse dicunt, nonne ista conligunt? colligunt G 1 ( corr. 1 ) KcV rec ( ex colig.) remove perturbationes maxumeque maxumequae G 1 RV 1 videbantur K iracundiam: iam videbuntur monstra mostra R 1 nostra G dicere. nunc autem ita ita add. K c disserunt, sic se dicere omnes stultos insanire, ut male olere omne caenum. St. fr. 3, 665 cf. Aug. soliloq. 1, 11, 19 at non semper. commove: senties. sic iracundus non semper iratus est; lacesse: iam videbis furentem. Quid? ista bellatrix iracundia, cum domum rediit, qualis est cum uxore, cum liberis, cum familia? an tum quoque est utilis? est igitur aliquid quod quod add. V 1 perturbata mens melius possit facere quam constans? an quisquam potest sine perturbatione mentis irasci? bene igitur nostri, cum omnia essent in moribus moribus V c s morbus GR 1 V 1 morbis KR e corr. vitia, quod nullum erat iracundia foedius, iracundos solos solus V 1 morosos nominaverunt. 4.59. ad te at V 1 igitur mihi iam convertenda omnis oratio est; simulas enim quaerere te de sapiente, quaeris autem fortasse de te. Earum eorum s earum X igitur perturbationum, quas exposui, variae sunt curationes. nam neque omnis aegritudo una ratione sedatur sadatur V (alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti aut invidenti adhibenda adhibenda add. G 2 medicina); est etiam in omnibus quattuor perturbationibus illa distinctio, utrum ad universam perturbationem, quae est aspernatio rationis aut aut V adpetitus vehementior, an ad singulas, ut ad metum lubidinem libid. K 1 V reliquas reliquas V 1 (que add. 3 ) reliquias GKR melius adhibeatur oratio, et utrum illudne non videatur aegre ferundum, ex quo suscepta sit aegritudo, an omnium rerum tollenda tollenda s toleranda X omnino omni V 1 aegritudo, ut, si quis aegre ferat se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse, an hominem aegre ferre nihil oportere. nimirum hoc melius, ne, si si add. K c forte de paupertate non persuaseris, sit aegritudini concedendum; aegritudine autem sublata propriis rationibus, quibus heri usi sumus, quodam modo etiam paupertatis malum tollitur. 4.61. quaedam autem sunt aegritudines, quas levare illa ulla V rec medicina nullo modo possit, ut, si quis aegre ferat nihil in se esse virtutis, nihil animi, nihil officii, nihil honestatis, propter mala is is ex si G 2 agatur G 1 quidem angatur, sed alia quaedam sit ad eum admovenda curatio, et talis quidem, quae possit esse omnium etiam de ceteris rebus discrepantium philosophorum. inter omnis enim convenire oportet commotiones animorum a recta ratione aversas esse vitiosas, vitiosas om. V 3 ut, etiamsi vel mala sint illa, quae quae ex quem V 3 metum aegritudinemve, vel vel ...17 vel Bentl. nec ... nec bona, quae cupiditatem laetitiamve moveant, tamen sit vitiosa ipsa commotio. constantem enim quendam volumus, sedatum, gravem, humana omnia spernentem spernentem Anon. ap. Lb. illum esse, quem prementem (praem. GKH)X ( vix Cice- ronianum, licet Sen. de ira 3, 6, 1 dicat : animus quietus semper, omnia infra se premens cf. Tusc. p. 405, 20 omnia subter se habet) praemeditantem Se. magimum et fortem virum virum add. G 3 dicimus. talis autem nec maerens nec timens nec cupiens nec gestiens esse quisquam potest. eorum enim haec sunt, qui eventus quae ventus G 1 ( corr. 1 ) V 1 ( corr. 3 ) humanos superiores quam suos animos esse ducunt. ducunt s di- cunt X 4.65. videamus nunc de bonorum, id est de laetitia et de cupiditate. mihi quidem in tota ratione ea, quae eaque KR pertinet pertinet s pertinent X ad animi perturbationem, una res videtur causam continere, omnis eas esse in nostra potestate, omnis iudicio susceptas, omnis voluntarias. hic igitur error est eripiendus, haec detrahenda opinio haec detrahenda opinio ne consererent Gr atque ut in malis opinatis tolerabilia, tollerabilia X ( corr. R c? ) sic in bonis sedatiora sunt efficienda ea quae magna et laetabilia ducuntur. dicuntur W corr. Wo. atque hoc quidem commune malorum et bonorum, bonorum et malorum G 1 ut, si iam difficile sit persuadere nihil earum rerum, quae perturbent perturbant K 1 animum, aut in bonis aut in malis esse habendum, tamen alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda aliaque ratione malevolus, alia amator, alia rursus anxius, alia timidus corrigendus. 4.67. illud iam supra supra cf. p. 368, 2 diximus, contractionem contractione X corr. V 3 s animi recte fieri numquam posse, elationem posse. aliter enim Naevianus ille gaudet Hector: Hect. profic. 15 haector GK h octor V( e2) Lae/tus sum lauda/ri me abs te, pa/ter, a laudato/ viro, aliter ille apud Trabeam: Trab. fr. 1 Le/na deleni/ta argento argento ex -tum V nu/tum observabi/t meum, Qui/d velim, quid stu/deam. adveniens di/gito impellam ia/nuam, genuam K Fo/res patebunt. de i/nproviso Chry/sis ubi me aspe/xerit, A/lacris ob via/m mihi veniet co/mplexum exopta/ns meum, Mi/hi se dedet. se dedit K sedet V quam haec pulchra putet, ipse iam dicet: Fo/rtunam ipsam antei/bo fortuni/s meis. 4.76. nam ut illa praeteream, quae sunt furoris, futuris K 1 furoris haec ipsa per sese sese V ( exp. 3 ) quam habent levitatem, quae videntur esse mediocria, Iniu/riae Ter. Eun. 59–63 Suspi/ciones i/nimicitiae induciae RV indu/tiae Bellu/m pax rursum! ince/rta haec si tu si tu s sit ut X ( prius t exp. V 3 ) po/stules Ratio/ne certa fa/cere, nihilo plu/s plus add. G 2 agas, Quam si/ des operam, ut cu/m ratione insa/nias. haec inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis quem non ipsa pravitate deterreat? est etiam etiam Man. enim illud, quod in omni perturbatione dicitur, demonstrandum, nullam esse nisi opinabilem, nisi iudicio susceptam, nisi voluntariam. etenim si naturalis amor esset, amor esset ex amorem et K c et amarent omnes et semper amarent et idem amarent, et idem amarent om. H neque alium pudor, alium cogitatio, alium satietas deterreret. etenim ... 26 deterreret H deterret G 1 Ira vero, quae quae -ae in r. V 2 quam diu perturbat animum, dubitationem insaniae non habet, cuius inpulsu imp. KR existit etiam inter fratres tale iurgium: 4.79. Ubi sunt ergo isti, qui iracundiam utilem dicunt —potest utilis esse insania?—aut naturalem? an an s hanc X quicquam est secundum est sec. s es sec. R esse sec. GKV naturam, quod fit repugte ratione? quo modo autem, si naturalis esset ira, ira add. G 2 aut alius alio magis iracundus esset, aut finem haberet prius quam esset aut finem ... 4 esset add. V 3 ulta, ulta Man. ulla ulciscendi lubido, aut quemquam paeniteret, quod fecisset fecisse V 1 per iram? ut Alexandrum regem videmus, qui cum interemisset Clitum clitum iditum K familiarem suum, vix a se manus abstinuit; tanta vis fuit paenitendi. quibus cognitis quis est qui dubitet dubitat K quin hic quoque motus animi sit totus opinabilis ac voluntarius? Quis enim dubitarit quin aegrotationes animi, qualis est avaritia, gloriae cupiditas, ex eo, quod magni magna V aestumetur ea res ex qua animus aegrotat, oriantur? oriantur s oriatur unde intellegi debet perturbationem quoque omnem esse in opinione. 4.83. itaque non fortuito factum videtur, sed a te ratione propositum, ut separatim de aegritudine et de ceteris perturbationibus disputaremus; in ea est enim fons miseriarum et caput. sed et alt. et om. V aegritudinis et reliquorum animi morborum una sanatio est, omnis opinabilis esse et voluntarios ea reque requae GKR (quae ... videatur in r. K 1 ) suscipi, quod ita rectum esse videatur. hunc errorem quasi radicem malorum omnium stirpitus stirpitus Statil. Max. ap. Char. GL. 2, 219, 25 philosophia se extracturam pollicetur. 5.34. quare demus hoc sane Bruto, ut sit beatus semper sapiens—quam sibi conveniat, ipse ipsa X corr. V 2 viderit; gloria quidem huius sententiae quis est illo viro dignior?—, nos tamen teneamus, ut sit idem beatissimus. Et si Zeno Citieus, ticieus R cici eus K 1 advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex, insinuasse se se om. Non. in antiquam philosophiam videtur, advena... 3 videtur Non. 457, 25 huius sententiae gravitas a Platonis auctoritate repetatur, apud quem saepe haec oratio usurpata est, ut nihil praeter virtutem diceretur bonum. velut velud KR in Gorgia Gorg. 470 d Socrates, cum esset ex eo quaesitum, Archelaum arcelaum hic X (arcael.G) Perdiccae filium, qui tum fortunatissimus haberetur, nonne beatum putaret, haud scio inquit;
9. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 164 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

10. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 1.38 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

11. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.310 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

12. Epictetus, Discourses, 2.5.23, 2.11.22, 2.18.12-2.18.14, 3.7.5, 3.16.3, 3.23.30, 3.23.37, 4.4.46-4.4.47 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

13. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 33 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

14. Plutarch, Alcibiades, 4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

15. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

16. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

441c. and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason.
17. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 1.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

18. Seneca The Younger, De Constantia Sapientis, 15.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

19. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.5.2-1.5.3, 2.2.2, 2.3.5, 2.4, 2.4.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

20. Seneca The Younger, On Leisure, 2.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

21. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 78.16, 123.15 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

22. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, 3.11.74 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

23. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.2.8-4.2.18, 4.5.26-4.5.28, 4.6.24-4.6.27, 4.6.35-4.6.37, 4.6.40-4.6.41, 4.7.5 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

24. Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.2.6-7.2.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

25. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, 164 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

26. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.235-3.237 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

27. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 3.62, 7.110, 7.129-7.130, 7.173 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.62. In the first trilogy they place the Republic, Timaeus and Critias; in the second the Sophist, the Statesman and Cratylus; in the third the Laws, Minos and Epinomis; in the fourth Theaetetus, Euthyphro and the Apology; in the fifth Crito, Phaedo and the Epistles. The rest follow as separate compositions in no regular order. Some critics, as has already been stated, put the Republic first, while others start with the greater Alcibiades, and others again with the Theages; some begin with the Euthyphro, others with the Clitophon; some with the Timaeus, others with the Phaedrus; others again with the Theaetetus, while many begin with the Apology. The following dialogues are acknowledged to be spurious: the Midon or Horse-breeder, the Eryxias or Erasistratus, the Alcyon, the Acephali or Sisyphus, the Axiochus, the Phaeacians, the Demodocus, the Chelidon, the Seventh Day, the Epimenides. of these the Alcyon is thought to be the work of a certain Leon, according to Favorinus in the fifth book of his Memorabilia. 7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure. 7.129. Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations. Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countece show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics. 7.130. Their definition of love is an effort toward friendliness due to visible beauty appearing, its sole end being friendship, not bodily enjoyment. At all events, they allege that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. By which it is shown, they think, that love depends upon regard, as Chrysippus says in his treatise of Love, and is not sent by the gods. And beauty they describe as the bloom or flower of virtue.of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country's behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease. 7.173. He was present in the theatre when the poet Sositheus uttered the verse –Driven by Cleanthes' folly like dumb herds,and he remained unmoved in the same attitude. At which the audience were so astonished that they applauded him and drove Sositheus off the stage. Afterwards when the poet apologized for the insult, he accepted the apology, saying that, when Dionysus and Heracles were ridiculed by the poets without getting angry, it would be absurd for him to be annoyed at casual abuse. He used to say that the Peripatetics were in the same case as lyres which, although they give forth sweet sounds, never hear themselves. It is said that when he laid it down as Zeno's opinion that a man's character could be known from his looks, certain witty young men brought before him a rake with hands horny from toil in the country and requested him to state what the man's character was. Cleanthes was perplexed and ordered the man to go away; but when, as he was making off, he sneezed, I have it, cried Cleanthes, he is effeminate.
28. Nag Hammadi, The Tripartite Tractate, 112.20-112.21, 114.6-114.7, 115.10-115.11 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

29. Origen, Against Celsus, 4.45 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.45. And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth displayed by the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed even what is to their discredit, and thus been led to accept the other and more marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse, and has characterized the story of Lot and his daughters (without examining either its literal or its figurative meaning) as worse than the crimes of Thyestes. The figurative signification of that passage of history it is not necessary at present to explain, nor what is meant by Sodom, and by the words of the angels to him who was escaping thence, when they said: Look not behind you, neither stay in all the surrounding district; escape to the mountain, lest you be consumed; nor what is intended by Lot and his wife, who became a pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his daughters intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him. But let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the history. The nature of actions - good, bad, and indifferent - has been investigated by the Greeks; and the more successful of such investigators lay down the principle that intention alone gives to actions the character of good or bad, and that all things which are done without a purpose are, strictly speaking, indifferent; that when the intention is directed to a becoming end, it is praiseworthy; when the reverse, it is censurable. They have said, accordingly, in the section relating to things indifferent, that, strictly speaking, for a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in established communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to show that such an act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they have assumed the case of a wise man being left with an only daughter, the entire human race besides having perished; and they put the question whether the father can fitly have intercourse with his daughter, in order, agreeably to the supposition, to prevent the extermination of mankind. Is this to be accounted sound reasoning among the Greeks, and to be commended by the influential sect of the Stoics; but when young maidens, who had heard of the burning of the world, though without comprehending (its full meaning), saw fire devastating their city and country, and supposing that the only means left of rekindling the flame of human life lay in their father and themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the desire that the world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse than that of the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics, acts becomingly in having intercourse with his daughter in the case already supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however, that some have taken offense at the desire of Lot's daughters, and have regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two accursed nations - Moab and Ammon - have sprung from that unhallowed intercourse. And yet truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly approving of their conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as blameworthy. Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it admits not only of a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on its own merits.
30. Augustine, The City of God, 14.8 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

14.8. Those emotions which the Greeks call εὐπαθείαι, and which Cicero calls constantiœ, the Stoics would restrict to three; and, instead of three perturbations in the soul of the wise man, they substituted severally, in place of desire, will; in place of joy, contentment; and for fear, caution; and as to sickness or pain, which we, to avoid ambiguity, preferred to call sorrow, they denied that it could exist in the mind of a wise man. Will, they say, seeks the good, for this the wise man does. Contentment has its object in good that is possessed, and this the wise man continually possesses. Caution avoids evil, and this the wise man ought to avoid. But sorrow arises from evil that has already happened; and as they suppose that no evil can happen to the wise man, there can be no representative of sorrow in his mind. According to them, therefore, none but the wise man wills, is contented, uses caution; and that the fool can do no more than desire, rejoice, fear, be sad. The former three affections Cicero calls constantiœ, the last four perturbationes. Many, however, calls these last passions; and, as I have said, the Greeks call the former εὐπαθείαι, and the latter πάθη . And when I made a careful examination of Scripture to find whether this terminology was sanctioned by it, I came upon this saying of the prophet: There is no contentment to the wicked, says the Lord; Isaiah 57:21 as if the wicked might more properly rejoice than be contented regarding evils, for contentment is the property of the good and godly. I found also that verse in the Gospel: Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them? Matthew 7:12 which seems to imply that evil or shameful things may be the object of desire, but not of will. Indeed, some interpreters have added good things, to make the expression more in conformity with customary usage, and have given this meaning, Whatsoever good deeds that you would that men should do unto you. For they thought that this would prevent any one from wishing other men to provide him with unseemly, not to say shameful gratifications - luxurious banquets, for example - on the supposition that if he returned the like to them he would be fulfilling this precept. In the Greek Gospel, however, from which the Latin is translated, good does not occur, but only, All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them, and, as I believe, because good is already included in the word would; for He does not say desire. Yet though we may sometimes avail ourselves of these precise proprieties of language, we are not to be always bridled by them; and when we read those writers against whose authority it is unlawful to reclaim, we must accept the meanings above mentioned in passages where a right sense can be educed by no other interpretation, as in those instances we adduced partly from the prophet, partly from the Gospel. For who does not know that the wicked exult with joy? Yet there is no contentment for the wicked, says the Lord. And how so, unless because contentment, when the word is used in its proper and distinctive significance, means something different from joy? In like manner, who would deny that it were wrong to enjoin upon men that whatever they desire others to do to them they should themselves do to others, lest they should mutually please one another by shameful and illicit pleasure? And yet the precept, Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them, is very wholesome and just. And how is this, unless because the will is in this place used strictly, and signifies that will which cannot have evil for its object? But ordinary phraseology would not have allowed the saying, Be unwilling to make any manner of lie, Sirach 7:13 had there not been also an evil will, whose wickedness separates if from that which the angels celebrated, Peace on earth, of good will to men. Luke 2:14 For good is superfluous if there is no other kind of will but good will. And why should the apostle have mentioned it among the praises of charity as a great thing, that it rejoices not in iniquity, unless because wickedness does so rejoice? For even with secular writers these words are used indifferently. For Cicero, that most fertile of orators, says, I desire, conscript fathers, to be merciful. And who would be so pedantic as to say that he should have said I will rather than I desire, because the word is used in a good connection? Again, in Terence, the profligate youth, burning with wild lust, says, I will nothing else than Philumena. That this will was lust is sufficiently indicated by the answer of his old servant which is there introduced: How much better were it to try and banish that love from your heart, than to speak so as uselessly to inflame your passion still more! And that contentment was used by secular writers in a bad sense that verse of Virgil testifies, in which he most succinctly comprehends these four perturbations - Hence they fear and desire, grieve and are content The same author had also used the expression, the evil contentments of the mind. So that good and bad men alike will, are cautious, and contented; or, to say the same thing in other words, good and bad men alike desire, fear, rejoice, but the former in a good, the latter in a bad fashion, according as the will is right or wrong. Sorrow itself, too, which the Stoics would not allow to be represented in the mind of the wise man, is used in a good sense, and especially in our writings. For the apostle praises the Corinthians because they had a godly sorrow. But possibly some one may say that the apostle congratulated them because they were penitently sorry, and that such sorrow can exist only in those who have sinned. For these are his words: For I perceive that the same epistle has made you sorry, though it were but for a season. Now I rejoice, not that you were made sorry, but that you sorrowed to repentance; for you were made sorry after a godly manner, that you might receive damage by us in nothing. For godly sorrow works repentance to salvation not to be repented of, but the sorrow of the world works death. For, behold, this selfsame thing that you sorrowed after a godly sort, what carefulness it wrought in you! 2 Corinthians 7:8-11 Consequently the Stoics may defend themselves by replying, that sorrow is indeed useful for repentance of sin, but that this can have no place in the mind of the wise man, inasmuch as no sin attaches to him of which he could sorrowfully repent, nor any other evil the endurance or experience of which could make him sorrowful. For they say that Alcibiades (if my memory does not deceive me), who believed himself happy, shed tears when Socrates argued with him, and demonstrated that he was miserable because he was foolish. In his case, therefore, folly was the cause of this useful and desirable sorrow, wherewith a man mourns that he is what he ought not to be. But the Stoics maintain not that the fool, but that the wise man, cannot be sorrowful.
31. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.7.10



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aeschines Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
alcibiades Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
alcinous, middle platonist author of didasklikos Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
anger, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
anger Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; emotions accepted by stoics during training Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 52
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; reasons for and against apatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; some emotions for stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 52
apatheia\u2003 Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
apollodorus Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
appropriate (kathēkon) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
assent, voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
ataraxia, freedom from disturbance Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
beliefs, role in emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
body Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
bonhöffer, adolf Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 52
brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
caston, victor Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
chrysippus, on directive faculty Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
chrysippus, on moral development Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), appetite is judgement that there is future benefit and it is appropriate to reach for it Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), at least one of the two judgements false Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 32, 182
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), cicero infers voluntariness of emotion from dispensability of second judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), concentrates therapy on second judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 32
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), distress is judgement that there is present harm and it is appropriate to feel a sinking Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), fear is judgement that there is future harm and it is appropriate to avoid it Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), hence emotion voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), intellectualist account of emotions as identical with judgements (contrast zeno) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), or about the appropriateness of actual expansion or contraction Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), pleasure is judgement that there is present benefit and it is appropriate to feel expansion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), roles of the second judgement, easier to cure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 32
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), roles of the second judgement, explains why distress is misguided even when first judgement is correct, that one's lack of virtue is an evil" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 32, 176
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), with two judgements Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 32
chrysippus, treatises of, on erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
chrysippus, treatises of, on lives Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
chrysippus, treatises of, on the law Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
chrysippus Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 82
cicero, on beliefs in emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero, on remorse Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, his own distress and authorshipof consolation and tusculans Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, on consequent voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, on need in emotion for judgement that reaction appropriate Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 32, 176
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, translation of pathos as perturbatio Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, use of many therapies Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cicero, translates prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
cleanthes' appeal to indifference" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cleanthes, stoic Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cleese, john Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
cognitive theory Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
consolation writings, cicero objects to cleanthes, wrong time for dispute Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cooper, john Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cylinder analogy Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cyrenaics Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 82
democritus, presocratic, euthumia, cheerfulness Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
diano, c. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
directive faculty, in emotions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
distress, definition Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
distress Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
eleuthereia\u2003 Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
emotions, as contumacious Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
emotions, causal interconnections Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
emotions, emotion voluntary? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
emotions, identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30, 32, 46, 52
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
emotions, moral emotions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
emotions, the judgements are about harm or benefit at hand and the appropriate reaction to it, illustrated for pleasure, distress, appetite, fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
emotions passions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
epibole (effort or resolve) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
epictetus, stoic, certain emotions useful in training Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 52
epictetus Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
epicureans, freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
epicureans Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
epicurus, on pain Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 82
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
eupatheiai, equanimous states, euthumia (cheerfulness) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
eupatheiai, include erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
euthumia, cheerfulness, tranquillity Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
evagrius, desert father Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 52
excessiveness (pleonasmos) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
faults, as source of distress Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
fear, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
freud Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
herculaneum papyri Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
heresy heterodoxy Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, relation to therapy Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 32, 52, 182
jews hebrew Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
ledbetter, grace m. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
love, erotic or sexual, eupathic Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
material humans/powers Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), and prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
passions emotions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
philodemus, epicurean Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
physiognomics Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
pity, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
plato Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
pleasure, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
plutarch, on mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, tranquillity Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
pneumatic humans/powers Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
posidonius, on remorse Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
praemeditatio futurorum malorum Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 82
progressing, emotions can be useful to the progressing novice Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 52
prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
prothumia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 52
psyche, part-based and monistic models Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
psychic humans/powers Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
pyrrhonian sceptics, ataraxia freedom from disturbance Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
pyrrhonian sceptics, causal interconnection of emotions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
rabbow, paul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
sachs, david Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
sage, stoic Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 32, 52
savior jesus, christ, and son Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
schofield, malcolm Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
seneca, the younger, stoic, tranquillity (euthumia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
seneca Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
sex, and erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
socrates, and alcibiades Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
stoicism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
therapeia\u2003 Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
therapy, only restricted appeal to indifference Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
therapy, philosophical contributions to therapy (i) voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
time-lapse, effects of, time-lapse needed in consolation Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
tranquillity Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
tusculan disputations Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 82
vices emotions, passions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
virtue, in erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
virtue Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 103
volition, terminology of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 46
von arnim, joachim Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
white, stephen Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 32
zeno of citium, on erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
zeno of citium, on mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
zeno of citium, republic Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 182
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176