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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2385
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.64-3.71
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17 results
1. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

215e. I am worse than any wild fanatic; I find my heart leaping and my tears gushing forth at the sound of his speech, and I see great numbers of other people having the same experience. When I listened to Pericles and other skilled orators I thought them eloquent, but I never felt anything like this; my spirit was not left in a tumult and had not to complain of my being in the condition of a common slave: whereas the influence of our Marsyas here has often thrown me into such a state
2. Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, 77 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, Academica, 2.108 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind.
5. Cicero, On Duties, 1.136 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.136. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non optemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira exsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus, et vereri et diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul absit,cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. 1.136.  But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of life, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the kind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and consideration toward those with whom we converse. It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly — never at all, unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry, but anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious can be done.
6. Cicero, Philippicae, 2.12 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.24-3.25, 3.40, 3.63, 3.65-3.72, 3.74-3.76, 3.79-3.80, 3.83, 4.11, 4.14, 4.59-4.60, 4.65, 4.76, 4.79, 4.83 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.24. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis St. fr. 3, 385 solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspers vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata aelata G 1 R 1 laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, post obtemperans add. vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest X quae retinent sec. Dav. edd., in v. 17. 8 verba cupiditas — potest delentes. sed ut voluptatis sic cupi- ditatis nomen appositionis locum tenere debebat. de cupiditate autem praedicandam erat 'opinione futuri boni turbatur'; quod cum iam in enuntiato relativo expressum esset, anacoluthon natum est. ad boni 17 V c in mg. adscr. : et quidem magis significat nomen libidinis magnitudinem erroris. itaque in ea cupiditate quae flagrantissima est proprie plerumque nomen hoc ponitur si omnis appetitio opinati boni haec] ut H 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.40. quodsi cui, ut ait idem, simul animus cum re concidit animus rem condidit X corr. V c s , a gravibus illis antiquis philosophis petenda medicina est, non est non V est si non X ab his voluptariis. quam enim isti bonorum copiam dicunt? fac sane esse summum bonum non dolere—quamquam id non vocatur voluptas, sed non necesse est nunc omnia—: idne est, quo traducti luctum levemus? sit sane summum malum dolere: dolore in dolere corr. G 2 K 2 V 2 in eo igitur qui non est, si malo careat, continuone fruitur summo bono? 3.63. Sed haec omnia faciunt opites ita fieri oportere. itaque et Aeschines aescinnes X corr. V c in de cor. 77 Demosthenem demostenem X (de- monstenem K) invehitur, quod is septimo die post filiae mortem hostias immolavisset. at quam quam excopiose X (ex del. V 1 aut c ) quam et copiose s (et in r. B) rhetorice, quam cf. Hier. epist. 60, 14 ( qui Cic. consolationem sequitur ) copiose! quas sententias colligit, quae verba contorquet! ut licere quidvis quodvis V 1 rhetori intellegas. quae nemo probaret, nisi insitum illud in animis haberemus, omnis bonos interitu suorum quam gravissime maerere oportere. ex hoc evenit, ut in animi doloribus alii solitudines captent, ut ait Homerus de Bellerophonte: Qui miser in campis maerens errabat Aleis Z 201 Aleis Be- roaldus alienis ( unde V c errat, tum errat maerens V rec ) Ipse suum cor edens, edens V 2 M evidens X hominum vestigia vitans; vitas X corr. V c et Nioba fingitur lapidea propter aeternum, credo, in cf. Hier. epist. 60, 14 ( qui Cic. consolationem sequitur ) luctu silentium, Hecubam haecubam X (he c ubam V) autem putant propter animi acerbitatem quandam et rabiem fingi in canem esse conversam. sunt autem alii, quos quos V 1 aut c R 2 quo X in luctu cum ipsa solitudine loqui saepe delectat, ut illa apud Ennium Enn. Med. sc. 257 nutrix: Cupi/do cepit mi/seram nunc me pro/loqui Caelo a/tque terrae Me/deai Medeai Turn. Medeae mi/serias. 3.65. Quid ille Terentianus terentianus K 2 mg. V rec terrentianus X ipse se poeniens, poenitens (pen. K)X e a\g TON T e lM w PO g M e NOC fere X id est e(auto timwrou/menos ? Decre/vi tantispe/r decrevi tant. V ( prius t V c ) me minus iniu/riae, Chreme/s, me ... 7 Chreme s V c in r. (s scr. V 1 ) meo gnato fa/cere, dum fia/m miser. hic decernit, ut miser sit. num quis igitur quicquam decernit invitus? malo quidem me quovis dignum deputem— malo se dignum deputat, nisi miser sit. vides Ter. 147. 8. 135 ergo opinionis esse, non naturae malum. Quid, quos res quid quod res H ipsa lugere prohibet? ut apud Homerum cotidianae neces interitusque multorum sedationem maerendi adferunt, apud quem ita dicitur: Namque nimis multos atque omni luce cadentis T 226 cadentis ( i/ptousin ) Man. carentis Cernimus, ut nemo possit maerore vacare. Quo magis est aequum tumulis mandare peremptos Firmo animo et luctum lacrimis finire diurnis. 3.66. Ergo in potestate est abicere dolorem, cum velis, tempori servientem. an est ullum tempus, quoniam quidem res in nostra potestate est, cui cui cum V non ponendae curae et aegritudinis add. Dav. ex s . aut aegritudinis aut curae del. alii ( iam in V curaer sec. Str. ut vid. ) causa serviamus? vides ... 22 serviamus constabat eos, qui concidentem volneribus Cn. Pompeium vidissent, GN. X cum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent, quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil aliud tum egisse, nisi ut remiges hortarentur et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga; posteaquam Tyrum venissent, tum adflictari lamentarique coepisse. timor igitur ab his aegritudinem potuit repellere, ratio ab sapienti viro ab sapienti viro Bentl. ac sapientia vera ( def. Linde Era- nos XII p. 175 ) non poterit? Quid est autem quod plus valeat ad ponendum dolorem, quam cum est intellectum nil nihil KH profici et frustra esse susceptum? si igitur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest; voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem confitendum est. si timor aliquoties ab aegritudine potest repellere ... 351, 6 est H 3.67. Idque idque itaque K 1 indicatur eorum patientia, qui cum multa sint saepe perpessi, facilius ferunt ferant X cf. praef. quicquid accidit, obduruisseque obduruisseque iam Tr. obduruisse quam X (e ex am corr. V 2 ) iam sese sese V contra fortunam arbitrantur, ut ille apud Euripidem: Eur. Phrix. fr. 821 ( Chrys. fr. eth. 482 ) Si mi/hi nunc tristis pri/mum inluxisse/t dies Nec tam ae/rumnoso na/vigavisse/m navigassem X salo, Esse/t dolendi cau/sa, ut iniecto e/culei Freno/ repente ta/ctu exagitantu/r novo; Sed ia/m subactus subiactus GV 1 (i del. 2 ) sub- iectus KRP mi/seriis opto/rpui. obt. KR c defetigatio igitur miseriarum aegritudines cum faciat leniores, intellegi necesse est non rem ipsam causam atque ipsam atque causam W trp. Er. fontem fontem fon in r. V c esse maeroris. 3.68. Philosophi summi nequedum neque nondum X corr. V 3 tamen sapientiam consecuti nonne intellegunt in summo se malo esse? sunt enim insipientes, neque insipientia ullum maius malum est. neque tamen lugent. quid ita? quia huic generi malorum non adfingitur non affingitur V (non af in r. V c n ante g del. idem ) nodfingitur R 1 illa opinio, rectum esse et aequum et ad officium pertinere aegre ferre, quod sapiens non sis, quod idem adfingimus huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est. 3.69. itaque Aristoteles veteres philosophos Arist. fr. 53 accusans, qui existumavissent philosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriosissimos fuisse; sed sed si V se videre, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore. Aristoteles . .. 352, 3 fore libere redd. Lact. inst. 3, 28, 20 Theophrastus autem moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornicibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset, hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam tamen KR 1 exiguam vitam dedisset; quorum si aetas potuisset esse longinquior, futurum fuisse ut omnibus perfectis artibus omni doctrina hominum vita erudiretur. querebatur quaerebatur VK 2 quaerebat GK 1 (quer-) R igitur se tum, cum illa videre coepisset, extingui. quid? ex ceteris philosophis nonne optumus et gravissumus quisque confitetur multa se ignorare et multa multa V 2 s multi sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda? 3.70. neque tamen, cum se in media stultitia, qua nihil quia n. G 1 est peius, haerere intellegant, aegritudine premuntur; nulla enim admiscetur opinio officiosi doloris. Quid, qui non putant lugendum lungendum GV 1 ( prius n eras. ) iungen- dum KR viris? sqq. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 qualis fuit Q. Maxumus fuitque maxumus G 2 (quae G 1 ) KV ( ss. m. 3 ) ac fortasse R 1 (Q post fuit in r. m. al. ) efferens efferrens GR 1 V filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus paullus RG 1 e corr. V 1 (l eras. ) cf.p. 263, 17; 274, 19; 457, 7 duobus paucis lucius et marcus X diebus amissis amisis G 1 R 1 V 1 filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione consolationem G -ne V conlegimus. 3.71. quid hos aliud placavit nisi quod luctum et maerorem esse non putabant viri? ergo id, quod alii rectum opites aegritudini se solent dedere, id hi turpe putantes aegritudinem reppulerunt. ex quo intellegitur non in natura, sed in opinione esse aegritudinem. Contra dicuntur haec: quis tam demens, ut sua voluntate maereat? natura adfert dolorem, cui quidem Crantor, inquiunt, vester cedendum putat; premit enim atque instat, nec resisti potest. itaque Oileus oileus V ille apud Sophoclem, qui Telamonem antea de Aiacis morte morte V consolatus esset, is cum audivisset audisset K de suo, fractus est. de cuius commutata mente sic dicitur: Nec ve/ro tanta prae/ditus sapie/ntia Soph.fr. 666 Quisqua/m est, quisquamst edd. qui aliorum aeru/mnam dictis a/dlevans Non i/dem, cum fortu/na mutata i/mpetum Conve/rtat, convertit Sey. clade ut subita X corr. s clade su/bita frangatu/r sua, Ut i/lla ad alios di/cta et praecepta e/xcidant. ex p. G 2 haec cum disputant, hoc student efficere, naturae obsisti nullo modo posse; idem iidem Ern. (idem tamen Phil. 2, 91 al. ) hi (= i cf. praef. ) W et Sey. tamen fatentur graviores aegritudines suscipi, quam natura cogat. quae est igitur amentia—? ut nos quoque idem ab illis illis Urs. ex s allis requiramus. 3.72. Sed plures sunt causae suscipiendi doloris: primum illa opinio mali, quo viso atque persuaso aegritudo aegritudo add. V c insequitur necessario. deinde etiam gratum mortuis se facere, si graviter eos lugeant, arbitrantur. sed ... 16 arbitrantur H accedit superstitio muliebris quaedam; existumant enim diis inmortalibus se facilius satis facturos, si eorum plaga perculsi adflictos se et stratos esse fateantur. sed haec inter se quam repugnent, plerique non vident. laudant enim eos, qui aequo animo moriantur; qui alterius mortem aequo animo ferant, eos putant vituperandos. quasi fieri ullo modo possit, quod in amatorio sermone dici solet, ut quisquam plus alterum diligat quam se. 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. 3.75. additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens. hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paulo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut ut s et X vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu appelletur appellatur K recens. ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli Cariae regis uxor, quae nobile illud Halicarnasi alicarnasi X fecit sepulcrum, quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu eodemque etiam confecta contabuit. huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens; quae tum denique non appellatur appellabatur X corr. V 2 recens, cum vetustate exaruit. Haec igitur officia sunt consolantium, tollere aegritudinem funditus aut sedare aut detrahere aut detr. V ( ss. 2 ) quam plurumum aut supprimere nec pati manare longius aut ad alia traducere. 3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V 3.79. ne ne n onne K ( ss. 2 ) illa quidem firmissima consolatio est, quamquam quamquam quidquam K 1 et usitata est et saepe prodest: non tibi hoc soli. prodest haec quidem, ut dixi, dixi p. 345, 13 sed nec semper nec omnibus; sunt enim qui respuant; sed refert, quo modo adhibeatur. ut enim enim om. G 1 tulerit quisque eorum qui sapienter tulerunt, non quo quisque incommodo adfectus sit, praedicandum est. Chrysippi crys. KR chris. G ad veritatem firmissima est, ad tempus aegritudinis difficilis. magnum opus opus s onus X est probare maerenti illum suo iudicio et, quod se se exp. V 2 ita putet oportere facere, maerere. Nimirum igitur, ut in causis non semper utimur eodem statu—sic enim appellamus controversiarum genera—, sed ad tempus, ad controversiae naturam, ad personam accommodamus, sic in aegritudine lenienda, quam lenienda. nam quam X nam del. s quisque curationem recipere possit, videndum est. nimirum ... 26 est H 3.80. Sed nescio quo pacto ab eo, quod erat a te a te ante K propositum, aberravit oratio. tu enim de sapiente quaesieras, cui aut malum videri nullum potest, quod vacet turpitudine, aut ita parvum malum, ut id obruatur sapientia vixque appareat, qui qui add. V 2 nihil opinione adfingat adsumatque ad aegritudinem nec id putet esse rectum, tum post rectum add. V c se quam maxume excruciari luctuque confici, quo pravius nihil esse possit. edocuit tamen ratio, ut mihi quidem videtur, cum hoc ipsum proprie non quaereretur hoc tempore, num num V x nunc X num quid We. sed cf. Mue. quod esset malum nisi quod idem dici turpe posset, tamen ut videremus, viderimus V 1 quicquid esset in aegritudine mali, id non naturale esse, sed voluntario iudicio et opinionis errore contractum. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia. 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.59. ad te at V 1 igitur mihi iam convertenda omnis oratio est; simulas enim quaerere te de sapiente, quaeris autem fortasse de te. Earum eorum s earum X igitur perturbationum, quas exposui, variae sunt curationes. nam neque omnis aegritudo una ratione sedatur sadatur V (alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti aut invidenti adhibenda adhibenda add. G 2 medicina); est etiam in omnibus quattuor perturbationibus illa distinctio, utrum ad universam perturbationem, quae est aspernatio rationis aut aut V adpetitus vehementior, an ad singulas, ut ad metum lubidinem libid. K 1 V reliquas reliquas V 1 (que add. 3 ) reliquias GKR melius adhibeatur oratio, et utrum illudne non videatur aegre ferundum, ex quo suscepta sit aegritudo, an omnium rerum tollenda tollenda s toleranda X omnino omni V 1 aegritudo, ut, si quis aegre ferat se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse, an hominem aegre ferre nihil oportere. nimirum hoc melius, ne, si si add. K c forte de paupertate non persuaseris, sit aegritudini concedendum; aegritudine autem sublata propriis rationibus, quibus heri usi sumus, quodam modo etiam paupertatis malum tollitur. 4.60. sed omnis eius modi perturbatio animi animi enim V 1 placatione abluatur illa quidem, cum doceas nec nec s V 3 et X bonum illud esse, ex quo laetitia aut aut V et G 1 libido oriatur, nec malum, ex quo aut metus aut aegritudo; verum tamen haec est certa et propria sanatio, si doceas ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quicquam aut naturale aut necessarium, ut ut aut R 1 V ipsam ipsa GRV 1 aegritudinem leniri videmus, cum obicimus obicibus GKR maerentibus imbecillitatem inbecil itatem G animi ecfeminati, cumque eorum gravitatem constantiamque gravitate constantiaque GRV 1 laudamus, qui non turbulente humana patiantur. quod quidem solet eis etiam accidere, qui illa mala esse censent, ferenda ferendum K tamen aequo animo arbitrantur. arbitratur GRV 1 putat puta GRV 1 aliquis aliquid K idem fuit fort. in R (aliqui esse) esse voluptatem bonum, alius autem pecuniam; tamen et ille ab intemperantia et hic ab avaritia hic abaritia V 1 avocari potest. illa autem altera ratio et oratio, et oratio om. V quae simul et opinionem falsam falsa GRV 1 tollit et et om. K 1 aegritudinem aegritudine GRV 1 detrahit, est ea quidem utilior, sed raro proficit neque est ad volgus adhibenda. 4.65. videamus nunc de bonorum, id est de laetitia et de cupiditate. mihi quidem in tota ratione ea, quae eaque KR pertinet pertinet s pertinent X ad animi perturbationem, una res videtur causam continere, omnis eas esse in nostra potestate, omnis iudicio susceptas, omnis voluntarias. hic igitur error est eripiendus, haec detrahenda opinio haec detrahenda opinio ne consererent Gr atque ut in malis opinatis tolerabilia, tollerabilia X ( corr. R c? ) sic in bonis sedatiora sunt efficienda ea quae magna et laetabilia ducuntur. dicuntur W corr. Wo. atque hoc quidem commune malorum et bonorum, bonorum et malorum G 1 ut, si iam difficile sit persuadere nihil earum rerum, quae perturbent perturbant K 1 animum, aut in bonis aut in malis esse habendum, tamen alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda aliaque ratione malevolus, alia amator, alia rursus anxius, alia timidus corrigendus. 4.76. nam ut illa praeteream, quae sunt furoris, futuris K 1 furoris haec ipsa per sese sese V ( exp. 3 ) quam habent levitatem, quae videntur esse mediocria, Iniu/riae Ter. Eun. 59–63 Suspi/ciones i/nimicitiae induciae RV indu/tiae Bellu/m pax rursum! ince/rta haec si tu si tu s sit ut X ( prius t exp. V 3 ) po/stules Ratio/ne certa fa/cere, nihilo plu/s plus add. G 2 agas, Quam si/ des operam, ut cu/m ratione insa/nias. haec inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis quem non ipsa pravitate deterreat? est etiam etiam Man. enim illud, quod in omni perturbatione dicitur, demonstrandum, nullam esse nisi opinabilem, nisi iudicio susceptam, nisi voluntariam. etenim si naturalis amor esset, amor esset ex amorem et K c et amarent omnes et semper amarent et idem amarent, et idem amarent om. H neque alium pudor, alium cogitatio, alium satietas deterreret. etenim ... 26 deterreret H deterret G 1 Ira vero, quae quae -ae in r. V 2 quam diu perturbat animum, dubitationem insaniae non habet, cuius inpulsu imp. KR existit etiam inter fratres tale iurgium: 4.79. Ubi sunt ergo isti, qui iracundiam utilem dicunt —potest utilis esse insania?—aut naturalem? an an s hanc X quicquam est secundum est sec. s es sec. R esse sec. GKV naturam, quod fit repugte ratione? quo modo autem, si naturalis esset ira, ira add. G 2 aut alius alio magis iracundus esset, aut finem haberet prius quam esset aut finem ... 4 esset add. V 3 ulta, ulta Man. ulla ulciscendi lubido, aut quemquam paeniteret, quod fecisset fecisse V 1 per iram? ut Alexandrum regem videmus, qui cum interemisset Clitum clitum iditum K familiarem suum, vix a se manus abstinuit; tanta vis fuit paenitendi. quibus cognitis quis est qui dubitet dubitat K quin hic quoque motus animi sit totus opinabilis ac voluntarius? Quis enim dubitarit quin aegrotationes animi, qualis est avaritia, gloriae cupiditas, ex eo, quod magni magna V aestumetur ea res ex qua animus aegrotat, oriantur? oriantur s oriatur unde intellegi debet perturbationem quoque omnem esse in opinione. 4.83. itaque non fortuito factum videtur, sed a te ratione propositum, ut separatim de aegritudine et de ceteris perturbationibus disputaremus; in ea est enim fons miseriarum et caput. sed et alt. et om. V aegritudinis et reliquorum animi morborum una sanatio est, omnis opinabilis esse et voluntarios ea reque requae GKR (quae ... videatur in r. K 1 ) suscipi, quod ita rectum esse videatur. hunc errorem quasi radicem malorum omnium stirpitus stirpitus Statil. Max. ap. Char. GL. 2, 219, 25 philosophia se extracturam pollicetur.
8. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, 1 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

9. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 1.38 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

10. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

441c. and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason.
11. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.2.2, 2.3.5, 2.4.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

12. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.2.5-4.2.6, 4.2.8-4.2.18, 4.6.24-4.6.27, 4.6.35-4.6.37, 4.6.40-4.6.41 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

13. Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.2.6-7.2.7, 19.1, 19.1.15-19.1.16 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

14. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.110 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.
15. Origen, Against Celsus, 4.45 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.45. And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth displayed by the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed even what is to their discredit, and thus been led to accept the other and more marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse, and has characterized the story of Lot and his daughters (without examining either its literal or its figurative meaning) as worse than the crimes of Thyestes. The figurative signification of that passage of history it is not necessary at present to explain, nor what is meant by Sodom, and by the words of the angels to him who was escaping thence, when they said: Look not behind you, neither stay in all the surrounding district; escape to the mountain, lest you be consumed; nor what is intended by Lot and his wife, who became a pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his daughters intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him. But let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the history. The nature of actions - good, bad, and indifferent - has been investigated by the Greeks; and the more successful of such investigators lay down the principle that intention alone gives to actions the character of good or bad, and that all things which are done without a purpose are, strictly speaking, indifferent; that when the intention is directed to a becoming end, it is praiseworthy; when the reverse, it is censurable. They have said, accordingly, in the section relating to things indifferent, that, strictly speaking, for a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in established communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to show that such an act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they have assumed the case of a wise man being left with an only daughter, the entire human race besides having perished; and they put the question whether the father can fitly have intercourse with his daughter, in order, agreeably to the supposition, to prevent the extermination of mankind. Is this to be accounted sound reasoning among the Greeks, and to be commended by the influential sect of the Stoics; but when young maidens, who had heard of the burning of the world, though without comprehending (its full meaning), saw fire devastating their city and country, and supposing that the only means left of rekindling the flame of human life lay in their father and themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the desire that the world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse than that of the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics, acts becomingly in having intercourse with his daughter in the case already supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however, that some have taken offense at the desire of Lot's daughters, and have regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two accursed nations - Moab and Ammon - have sprung from that unhallowed intercourse. And yet truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly approving of their conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as blameworthy. Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it admits not only of a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on its own merits.
16. Origen, On First Principles, 4.4.4 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

17. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
action, emotions as Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
appropriateness, terminology of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
assent, voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
beliefs, dispositional and occurrent Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
beliefs, evaluative Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
beliefs, role in emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
brennan, tad Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
cato of utica, in lucan Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
chrysippus, on directive faculty Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), cicero infers voluntariness of emotion from dispensability of second judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), hence emotion voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), roles of the second judgement, explains why distress is misguided even when first judgement is correct, that one's lack of virtue is an evil" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
chrysippus, treatises of, on the law Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero, grief over death of daughter Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
cicero, mourning for the res publica Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
cicero, on beliefs in emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229, 233
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero, philippics Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
cicero, philosophical views Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, his own distress and authorshipof consolation and tusculans Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, on consequent voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, on need in emotion for judgement that reaction appropriate Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, use of many therapies Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cicero, translates prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cleanthes' appeal to indifference" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
cleanthes, stoic Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
consolatio Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
consolation writings, cicero objects to cleanthes, wrong time for dispute Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
contraction (sustole), associated with distress Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
cooper, john Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cylinder analogy Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
demosthenes Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
directive faculty, in emotions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
elevation, associated with delight Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
emotions, as actions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
emotions, emotion voluntary? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
emotions, identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
erskine, a. Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
excessiveness (pleonasmos) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
fourfold classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
frede, michael Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
fresh beliefs Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229, 233
herculaneum papyri Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229, 233
impulse (hormē), impulse not sufficient for action Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
impulses Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, relation to therapy Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
irwin, terence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
kathekei, equivalent expressions for Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
licinius crassus, m. Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
lucan Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
mourning Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
occurrent judgments Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), and prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
plutarch, on mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
poetry, stoic influence in roman Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
pompeius magnus, cn. Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
porcius cato (uticensis), m. Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
psyche, part-based and monistic models Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
rabbow, paul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229, 233
servilius vatia isauricus, p. Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
stobaeus, johannes, as source Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
stoicism, reactions to Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
stoicism Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
superstition Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
therapy, only restricted appeal to indifference Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
therapy, philosophical contributions to therapy (i) voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
time-lapse, effects of, time-lapse needed in consolation Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176
tullia (daughter of cicero) Duffalo, The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate (2006) 65
volition, terminology of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
von arnim, joachim Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
wise person, as unfeeling Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 229
zeno of citium, on mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 176