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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

Cicero, Republic, 3.7

fuisse sapientiam, tamen hoc in ratione utriusque generis interfuit, quod illi verbis et artibus aluerunt naturae principia, hi autem institutis et legibus. Pluris vero haec tulit una civitas, si minus sapientis, quoniam id nomen illi tam restricte tenent, at certe summa laude dignos, quoniam sapientium praecepta et inventa coluerunt. Atque etiam, quot et sunt laudandae civitates et fuerunt, quoniam id est in rerum natura longe maximi consilii, constituere eam rem publicam, quae possit esse diuturna, si singulos numeremus in singulas, quanta iam reperiatur virorum excellentium multitudo! Quodsi aut Italiae Latium aut eiusdem Sabinam aut Volscam gentem, si Samnium, si Etruriam, si magnam illam Graeciam conlustrare animo voluerimus, si deinde Assyrios, si Persas, si Poenos, si haecWe must admit that both these types of learning deserved the name of wisdom, yet the difference between these two classes of men has consisted in the fact that one nourished Nature's first gifts to man by admonition and instruction, while the other did so by institutions and laws. Indeed, our own country alone has produced many men, who, if they have not been "wise," since that name is so carefully restricted, ** have surely deserved the highest praise, since they have fostered the precepts and the discoveries of the wise. And if we consider how many praiseworthy commonwealths exist now and have existed in the past, and remember that the establishment of a State which is stable enough to endure for ages requires by far the highest intellectual powers that nature can produce, what a multitude of great geniuses there must have been, even if we suppose that every such State possessed only one! But if we survey the nations of Italy; the Latins, Sabines, Volscians, Samnites, or Etruscans, if we examine Magna Graecia; ** and then if we consider the Assyrians, the Persians, the Punic peoples, if . . . these . . .

Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

11 results
1. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

875a. the most savage of beasts. The reason thereof is this,—that no man’s nature is naturally able both to perceive what is of benefit to the civic life of men and, perceiving it, to be alike able and willing to practice what is best. For, in the first place, it is difficult to perceive that a true civic art necessarily cares for the public, not the private, interest,—for the public interest bind States together, whereas the private interest rends them asunder,—and to perceive also that it benefits both public and private interests alike when the public interest, rather than the private, is well enacted.
2. Cicero, On Friendship, 18 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.11, 3.75 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.11. de quibus cupio scire quid sentias. Egone quaeris, inquit, inquit N inquam quid sentiam? quos bonos viros, fortes, iustos, moderatos aut audivimus in re publica fuisse aut ipsi vidimus, qui sine ulla doctrina naturam ipsam secuti multa laudabilia fecerunt, eos melius a natura institutos fuisse, quam institui potuissent a philosophia, si ullam aliam probavissent praeter eam, quae nihil aliud in bonis haberet nisi honestum, nihil nisi turpe in malis; ceterae philosophorum disciplinae, omnino alia magis alia, sed tamen omnes, quae rem ullam virtutis expertem expertem virtutis BE aut in bonis aut in malis numerent, eas non modo nihil adiuvare arbitror neque firmare, firmare affirmare (adfirmare A). ' Aut confirmare cum Or. scribendum est aut potius firmare, cui ex altero verbo (adiuvare) praepositio adhaesit' Mdv. quo meliores simus, sed ipsam depravare naturam. nam nisi hoc optineatur, id solum bonum esse, quod honestum sit, nullo modo probari possit beatam vitam virtute effici. quod si ita sit, cur cur N om. ABERV opera philosophiae sit danda nescio. si enim sapiens aliquis miser esse possit, ne ego istam gloriosam memorabilemque virtutem non magno aestimandam putem. 3.75. quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator dictator est BE —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis quam corporis NV quam corporibus ABE corporibus ( om. quam) R —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum uti tum Se. ut tum (ut in ras., sequente ras. 2 vel 3 litt. ) N virtutum ABE ututū R ubi tum V denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit; 3.11.  "That all sounds very fine, Cato," I replied, "but are you aware that you share your lofty pretensions with Pyrrho and with Aristo, who make all things equal in value? I should like to know what your opinion is of them." "My opinion?" he said. "You ask what my opinion is? That those good, brave, just and temperate men, of whom history tells us, or whom we have ourselves seen in our public life, who under the guidance of Nature herself, without the aid of any learning, did many glorious deeds, — that these men were better educated by nature than they could possibly have been by philosophy had they accepted any other system of philosophy than the one that counts Moral Worth the only good and Moral Baseness the only evil. All other philosophical systems — in varying degrees no doubt, but still all, — which reckon anything of which virtue is not an element either as a good or an evil, do not merely, as I hold, give us no assistance or support towards becoming better men, but are actually corrupting to the character. Either this point must be firmly maintained, that Moral Worth is the sole good, or it is absolutely impossible to prove that virtue constitutes happiness. And in that case I do not see why we should trouble to study philosophy. For if anyone who is wise could be miserable, why, I should not set much value on your vaunted and belauded virtue. 3.75.  "Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a better right to the name of 'Master of the People' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man's authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul.
4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.23. Or were these beauties designed for the sake of men, as your school usually maintains? For the sake of wise men? If so, all this vast effort of construction took place on account of a handful of people. For the sake of fools then? But in the first place there was no reason for god to do a service to the wicked and secondly, what good did he do? inasmuch as all fools are beyond question extremely miserable, precisely because they are fools (for what can be mentioned more miserable than folly?), and in the second place because there are so many troubles in life that, though wise men can assuage them by balancing against them life's advantages, fools can neither avoid their approach nor endure their presence. Those on the other hand who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wisdom, failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living being could conceivably possess. I will touch on this a little later;
5. Cicero, On Duties, 1.148, 3.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.148. Quae vero more agentur institutisque civilibus, de iis nihil est praecipiendum; illa enim ipsa praecepta sunt, nec quemquam hoc errore duci oportet, ut, si quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra rnorem consuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sint, idem sibi arbitretur licere; magnis illi et divinis bonis hane licentiam assequebantur. Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum. 3.16. Itaque iis omnes, in quibus est virtutis indoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius aut Aristides iustus nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc iustitiae tamquam a sapiente petitur exemplum; nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem volumus intellegi, nec ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientium. 1.148.  But no rules need to be given about what is done in accordance with the established customs and conventions of a community; for these are in themselves rules; and no one ought to make the mistake of supposing that, because Socrates or Aristippus did or said something contrary to the manners and established customs of their city, he has a right to do the same; it was only by reason of their great and superhuman virtues that those famous men acquired this special privilege. But the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected, for it is inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility nothing can be upright, nothing morally good. 3.16.  Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a natural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios are mentioned as "brave men" or Fabricius is called "the just," it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of courage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one of them the ideal "wise man." For no one of them was wise in the sense in which we wish to have "wise" understood; neither were Marcus Cato and Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed "the wise." Not even the famous Seven were "wise." But because of their constant observance of "mean" duties they bore a certain semblance and likeness to wise men.
6. Cicero, Pro Archia, 16, 15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

15. quaeret quispiam: 'quid? illi ipsi summi viri quorum virtutes litteris proditae sunt istane doctrina quam tu effers laudibus eruditi fuerunt?' difficile est hoc de omnibus confirmare, sed tamen est certum quid quod GEea respondeam. ego multos homines excellenti animo ac virtute fuisse sine doctrina, et sine doctrina et Schütz : et ( om. p : etiam b χ1 ) sine doctrina codd. naturae ipsius habitu prope divino per se ipsos et moderatos et gravis exstitisse fateor; etiam illud adiungo, saepius ad laudem atque virtutem naturam sine doctrina naturae ... doctrina om. Ee quam sine natura valuisse doctrinam. atque idem ego hoc hoc GEe : om. cett. contendo, cum ad naturam eximiam et et GEe : atque cett. inlustrem accesserit ratio quaedam conformatioque oratio ς b1gp conformatio GE : confirmatio cett. doctrinae, tum illud nescio quid praeclarum ac singulare solere exsistere.
7. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.1. Cum 1 et 5 extr. imit. Paschasius Radb. Expos. in ps. 44 l. I praef. in. defensionum laboribus senatoriisque muneribus aut omnino aut magna ex parte essem aliquando liberatus, rettuli rettuli s retuli X Pasch. cf. p. 344, 24 me, Brute, te hortante maxime ad ea studia, quae retenta animo, remissa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa revocavi, et cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, contineretur, hoc mihi Latinis cf. Lact. inst. 3,14, 13 litteris litteris at libris V 2 inlustrandum putavi, non quia philosophia Graecis et litteris et doctoribus percipi non posset, sed meum semper hoc supra semper add. V 2 iudicium fuit omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora, quae quidem digna statuissent, in quibus elaborarent.
8. Plutarch, Moralia, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

10. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.38-2.42 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.116-7.118, 7.123, 7.125 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.116. Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness. 7.117. Now they say that the wise man is passionless, because he is not prone to fall into such infirmity. But they add that in another sense the term apathy is applied to the bad man, when, that is, it means that he is callous and relentless. Further, the wise man is said to be free from vanity; for he is indifferent to good or evil report. However, he is not alone in this, there being another who is also free from vanity, he who is ranged among the rash, and that is the bad man. Again, they tell us that all good men are austere or harsh, because they neither have dealings with pleasure themselves nor tolerate those who have. The term harsh is applied, however, to others as well, and in much the same sense as a wine is said to be harsh when it is employed medicinally and not for drinking at all. 7.118. Again, the good are genuinely in earnest and vigilant for their own improvement, using a manner of life which banishes evil out of sight and makes what good there is in things appear. At the same time they are free from pretence; for they have stripped off all pretence or make-up whether in voice or in look. Free too are they from all business cares, declining to do anything which conflicts with duty. They will take wine, but not get drunk. Nay more, they will not be liable to madness either; not but what there will at times occur to the good man strange impressions due to melancholy or delirium, ideas not determined by the principle of what is choiceworthy but contrary to nature. Nor indeed will the wise man ever feel grief; seeing that grief is irrational contraction of the soul, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics. 7.123. Furthermore, the wise are infallible, not being liable to error. They are also without offence; for they do no hurt to others or to themselves. At the same time they are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since indulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too severe. Again, they say that the wise man never wonders at any of the things which appear extraordinary, such as Charon's mephitic caverns, ebbings of the tide, hot springs or fiery eruptions. Nor yet, they go on to say, will the wise man live in solitude; for he is naturally made for society and action. 7.125. Furthermore, the wise man does all things well, just as we say that Ismenias plays all airs on the flute well. Also everything belongs to the wise. For the law, they say, has conferred upon them a perfect right to all things. It is true that certain things are said to belong to the bad, just as what has been dishonestly acquired may be said, in one sense, to belong to the state, in another sense to those who are enjoying it.They hold that the virtues involve one another, and that the possessor of one is the possessor of all, inasmuch as they have common principles, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Virtues, Apollodorus in his Physics according to the Early School, and Hecato in the third book of his treatise On Virtues.

Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
arcesilaus Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
carneades Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
cicero, and law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 23, 26
cicero, on wise man Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 23
dicaearchus Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
hannibal Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
law of nature, and wise man Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 23, 26
law of nature, transcended written law Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 26
mosaic law, for ordinary people Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 23, 26
panaetius Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
plato Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 23
posidonius Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
punic wars, second Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
scipio africanus, imitatio of alexander the great by Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
scipio africanus, meeting with virtus and voluptas Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
silius italicus, and cicero Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
silius italicus, and ennius Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
silius italicus, and homer Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
silius italicus, and lucretius Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
silius italicus, and the tradition on kingship Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
silius italicus, nekyia in Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
stoics/stoicism, and law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 23, 26
stoics/stoicism, and the sage Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 23, 26
underworld Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 321
wise man, and law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 23, 26
wise man, and stoics Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 23, 26
written law, vis a vis law of nature' Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 26