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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2307
Cicero, Republic, 3.33


Lactant. Div. Inst. 6.8.6 Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpres eius alius, nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit.. . . True law is right reason in agreement with nature , it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment. . . .


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1. Cicero, On Laws, 1.18-1.19, 1.33-1.34, 2.13, 3.2-3.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.34, 2.39 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.34. Upon the animals she bestowed sensation and motion, and an appetite or impulse to approach things wholesome and retire from things harmful. For man she amplified her gift by the addition of reason, whereby the appetites might be controlled, and alternately indulged and held in check. But the fourth and highest grade is that of beings born by nature good and wise, and endowed from the outset with the innate attributes of right reason and consistency; this must be held to be above the level of man: it is the attribute of god, that is, of the world, which must needs possess that perfect and absolute reason of which I spoke. 2.39. but no being is more perfect than the world, and nothing is better than virtue; therefore virtue is an essential attribute of the world. Again, man's nature is not perfect, yet virtue may be realized in man; how much more readily then in the world! therefore the world possesses virtue. Therefore it is wise, and consequently divine. "Having thus perceived the divinity of the world, we must also assign the same divinity to the stars, which are formed from the most mobile and the purest part of the aether, and are not compounded of any other element besides; they are of a fiery heat and translucent throughout. Hence they too have the fullest right to be pronounced to be living beings endowed with sensation and intelligence.
3. Cicero, On Duties, 1.98-1.100, 1.106-1.113, 3.17 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.98. Quocirca poëtae in magna varietate personarum, etiam vitiosis quid conveniat et quid deceat, videbunt, nobis autem cum a natura constantiae, moderationis, temperantiae, verecundiae partes datae sint, cumque eadem natura doceat non neglegere, quem ad modum nos adversus homines geramus, efficitur, ut et illud, quod ad omnem honestatem pertinet, decorum quam late fusum sit, appareat et hoc, quod spectatur in uno quoque genere virtutis. Ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum. 1.99. Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum. Nam neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti. Est autem, quod differat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam et verecundiam. Iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere; in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori. His igitur expositis, quale sit id, quod decere dicimus, intellectum puto. 1.100. officium autem, quod ab eo ducitur, hanc primum habet viam, quae deducit ad convenientiam conservationemque naturae; quam si sequemur ducem, numquam aberrabimus sequemurque et id, quod acutum et perspicax natura est, et id, quod ad hominum consociationem accommodatum, et id, quod vehemens atque forte. Sed maxima vis decori in hac inest parte, de qua disputamus; neque enim solum corporis, qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accommodati sunt. 1.106. Ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis praestantia, eamque contemni et reici oportere; sin sit quispiam, qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendae modum. Itaque victus cultusque corporis ad valetudinem referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem. Atque etiam si considerare volumus, quae sit in natura excellentia et dignitas, intellegemus, quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria et delicate ac molliter vivere quamque honestum parce, continenter, severe, sobrie. 1.107. Intellegendum etiam cst duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates. 1.108. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem ei)/rwna Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit. 1.109. Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium quemque, quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio ° Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis ne Xenocratem quidem, severissimum philosophorum, ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 1.110. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugte natura. 1.111. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. 1.112. Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 1.113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 3.17. Quocirca nec id, quod vere honestum est, fas est cum utilitatis repugtia comparari, nec id, quod communiter appellamus honestum, quod colitur ab iis, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cum emolumentis umquam est comparandum, tamque id honestum, quod in nostram intellegentiam cadit, tuendum conservandumque nobis est quam illud, quod proprie dicitur vereque est honestum, sapientibus; aliter enim teneri non potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio. Sed haec quidem de iis, qui conservatione officiorum existimantur boni. 1.98.  The poets will observe, therefore, amid a great variety of characters, what is suitable and proper for all — even for the bad. But to us Nature has assigned the rôles of steadfastness, temperance, self-control, and considerateness of others; Nature also teaches us not to be careless in our behaviour towards our fellow-men. Hence we may clearly see how wide is the application not only of that propriety which is essential to moral rectitude in general, but also of the special propriety which is displayed in each particular subdivision of virtue. For, as physical beauty with harmonious symmetry of the limbs engages the attention and delights the eye, for the very reason that all the parts combine in harmony and grace, so this propriety, which shines out in our conduct, engages the approbation of our fellow-men by the order, consistency, and self-control it imposes upon every word and deed. 1.99.  We should, therefore, in our dealings with people show what I may almost call reverence toward all men — not only toward the men who are the best, but toward others as well. For indifference to public opinion implies not merely self-sufficiency, but even total lack of principle. There is, too, a difference between justice and considerateness in one's relations to one's fellow-men. It is the function of justice not to do wrong to one's fellow-men; of considerateness, not to wound their feelings; and in this the essence of propriety is best seen. With the foregoing exposition, I think it is clear what the nature is of what we term propriety. 1.100.  Further, as to the duty which has its source in propriety, the first road on which it conducts us leads to harmony with Nature and the faithful observance of her laws. If we follow Nature as our guide, we shall never go astray, but we shall be pursuing that which is in its nature clear-sighted and penetrating (Wisdom), that which is adapted to promote and strengthen society (Justice), and that which is strong and courageous (Fortitude). But the very essence of propriety is found in the division of virtue which is now under discussion (Temperance). For it is only when they agree with Nature's laws that we should give our approval to the movements not only of the body, but still more of the spirit. 1.106.  From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the dignity of man and that we ought to despise it and cast it from us; but if someone should be found who sets some value upon sensual gratification, he must keep strictly within the limits of moderate indulgence. One's physical comforts and wants, therefore, should be ordered according to the demands of health and strength, not according to the calls of pleasure. And if we will only bear in mind the superiority and dignity of our nature, we shall realize how wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness, and how right it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and sobriety. 1.107.  We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. 1.108.  Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴρων in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity. 1.109.  Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in the case of Catulus — both father and son — and also of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand — the man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings — had no such gracious manner in social intercourse [. . .], and because of that very fact he rose to greatness and fame. Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized. 1.110.  Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is — that is, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural genius. 1.111.  If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general. 1.112.  Indeed, such diversity of character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another [under the same circumstances] a crime. Did Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. 1.113.  How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. 3.17.  For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality against conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated by those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable; but we every-day people must observe and live up to that moral right which comes within the range of our comprehension as jealously as the truly wise men have to observe and live up to that which is morally right in the technical and true sense of the word. For otherwise we cannot maintain such progress as we have made in the direction of virtue. So much for those who have won a reputation for being good men by their careful observance of duty.
4. Cicero, Republic, 1.1-1.13, 1.26, 1.31, 1.34, 1.39, 1.52, 1.58, 1.62-1.63, 1.68, 1.70-1.71, 2.3, 2.16, 2.21, 2.33, 2.41, 2.43, 2.59, 3.34, 5.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.1. im petu liberavissent, nec C. Duelius, A. Atilius, L. Metellus terrore Karthaginis, non duo Scipiones oriens incendium belli Punici secundi sanguine suo restinxissent, nec id excitatum maioribus copiis aut Q. Maximus enervavisset aut M. Marcellus contudisset aut a portis huius urbis avolsum P. Africanus compulisset intra hostium moenia. M. vero Catoni, homini ignoto et novo, quo omnes, qui isdem rebus studemus, quasi exemplari ad industriam virtutemque ducimur, certe licuit Tusculi se in otio delectare salubri et propinquo loco. Sed homo demens, ut isti putant, cum cogeret eum necessitas nulla, in his undis et tempestatibus ad summam senectutem maluit iactari quam in illa tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime vivere. Omitto innumerabilis viros, quorum singuli saluti huic civitati fuerunt, et quia sunt haud procul ab aetatis huius memoria, commemorare eos desino, ne quis se aut suorum aliquem praetermissum queratur. Unum hoc definio, tantam esse necessitatem virtutis generi hominum a natura tantumque amorem ad communem salutem defendendam datum, ut ea vis omnia blandimenta voluptatis otiique vicerit. 1.1. Plin. Nat. praef. 7 nec docti/ssimis. †Manium Persium haec le/gere nolo, Iu/nium Congu/m volo. 1.2. Nec vero habere virtutem satis est quasi artem aliquam, nisi utare; etsi ars quidem, cum ea non utare, scientia tamen ipsa teneri potest, virtus in usu sui tota posita est; usus autem eius est maximus civitatis gubernatio et earum ipsarum rerum, quas isti in angulis persot, reapse, non oratione perfectio. Nihil enim dicitur a philosophis, quod quidem recte honesteque dicatur, quod non ab iis partum confirmatumque sit, a quibus civitatibus iura discripta sunt. Unde enim pietas aut a quibus religio? unde ius aut gentium aut hoc ipsum civile quod dicitur? unde iustitia, fides, aequitas? unde pudor, continentia, fuga turpitudinis, adpetentia laudis et honestatis? unde in laboribus et periculis fortitudo? Nempe ab iis, qui haec disciplinis informata alia moribus confirmarunt, sanxerunt autem alia legibus. 1.2. Non. p. 426M Sic, quoniam plura beneficia continet patria et est antiquior parens quam is, qui creavit, maior ei profecto quam parenti debetur gratia. 1.3. Quin etiam Xenocraten ferunt, nobilem in primis philosophum, cum quaereretur ex eo, quid adsequerentur eius discipuli, respondisse, ut id sua sponte facerent, quod cogerentur facere legibus. Ergo ille civis, qui id cogit omnis imperio legumque poena, quod vix paucis persuadere oratione philosophi possunt, etiam iis, qui illa disputant, ipsis est praeferendus doctoribus. Quae est enim istorum oratio tam exquisita, quae sit anteponenda bene constitutae civitati publico iure et moribus? Equidem quem ad modum 'urbes magnas atque imperiosas', ut appellat Ennius, viculis et castellis praeferendas puto, sic eos, qui his urbibus consilio atque auctoritate praesunt, iis, qui omnis negotii publici expertes sint, longe duco sapientia ipsa esse anteponendos. Et quoniam maxime rapimur ad opes augendas generis humani studemusque nostris consiliis et laboribus tutiorem et opulentiorem vitam hominum reddere et ad hanc voluptatem ipsius naturae stimulis incitamur, teneamus eum cursum, qui semper fuit optimi cuiusque, neque ea signa audiamus, quae receptui canunt, ut eos etiam revocent, qui iam processerint. 1.3. Non. p. 526M Nec tantum Karthago habuisset opum sescentos fere annos sine consiliis et disciplina. 1.4. His rationibus tam certis tamque inlustribus opponuntur ab iis, qui contra disputant, primum labores, qui sint re publica defendenda sustinendi, leve sane inpedimentum vigilanti et industrio, neque solum in tantis rebus, sed etiam in mediocribus vel studiis vel officiis vel vero etiam negotiis contemnendum. Adiunguntur pericula vitae, turpisque ab his formido mortis fortibus viris opponitur, quibus magis id miserum videri solet, natura se consumi et senectute, quam sibi dari tempus, ut possint eam vitam, quae tamen esset reddenda naturae, pro patria potissimum reddere. Illo vero se loco copiosos et disertos putant, cum calamitates clarissimorum virorum iniuriasque iis ab ingratis inpositas civibus colligunt. 1.4. Non. p. 276M Cognoscere mehercule, inquit, consuetudinem istam et studium sermonis. 1.5. Hinc enim illa et apud Graecos exempla, Miltiadem, victorem domitoremque Persarum, nondum sanatis volneribus iis, quae corpore adverso in clarissima victoria accepisset, vitam ex hostium telis servatam in civium vinclis profudisse, et Themistoclem patria, quam liberavisset, pulsum atque proterritum non in Graeciae portus per se servatos, sed in barbariae sinus confugisse, quam adflixerat; nec vero levitatis Atheniensium crudelitatisque in amplissimos civis exempla deficiunt; quae nata et frequentata apud illos etiam in gravissumam civitatem nostram dicuntur redundasse; 1.5. Lactant. Div. Inst. 3.16.5 Profecto omnis istorum disputatio, quamquam uberrimos fontes virtutis et scientiae continet, tamen collata cum eorum actis perfectisque rebus vereor ne non tantum videatur attulisse negotii hominibus, quantam oblectationem. 1.6. nam vel exilium Camilli vel offensio commemoratur Ahalae vel invidia Nasicae vel expulsio Laenatis vel Opimii damnatio vel fuga Metelli vel acerbissima C. Marii clades principum que caedes vel eorum multorum pestes, quae paulo post secutae sunt. Nec vero iam meo nomine abstinent et, credo, quia nostro consilio ac periculo sese in illa vita atque otio conservatos putant, gravius etiam de nobis queruntur et amantius. Sed haud facile dixerim, cur, cum ipsi discendi aut visendi causa maria tramittant 1.6. Arusianus Messius GL 7.457K A qua isti avocabant. 1.7. salvam esse consulatu abiens in contione populo Romano idem iurante iuravissem, facile iniuriarum omnium compensarem curam et molestiam. Quamquam nostri casus plus honoris habuerunt quam laboris neque tantum molestiae, quantum gloriae, maioremque laetitiam ex desiderio bonorum percepimus quam ex laetitia improborum dolorem. Sed si aliter, ut dixi, accidisset, qui possem queri? cum mihi nihil inproviso nec gravius, quam exspectavissem, pro tantis meis factis evenisset. Is enim fueram, cui cum liceret aut maiores ex otio fructus capere quam ceteris propter variam suavitatem studiorum, in quibus a pueritia vixeram, aut si quid accideret acerbius universis, non praecipuam, sed parem cum ceteris fortunae condicionem subire, non dubitaverim me gravissimis tempestatibus ac paene fulminibus ipsis obvium ferre conservandorum civium causa meisque propriis periculis parere commune reliquis otium. 1.8. Neque enim hac nos patria lege genuit aut educavit, ut nulla quasi alimenta exspectaret a nobis ac tantum modo nostris ipsa commodis serviens tutum perfugium otio nostro suppeditaret et tranquillum ad quietem locum, sed ut plurimas et maximas nostri animi, ingenii, consilii partis ipsa sibi ad utilitatem suam pigneraretur tantumque nobis in nostrum privatum usum, quantum ipsi superesse posset, remitteret. 1.9. Iam illa perfugia, quae sumunt sibi ad excusationem, quo facilius otio perfruantur, certe minime sunt audienda, cum ita dicunt, accedere ad rem publicam plerumque homines nulla re bona dignos, cum quibus comparari sordidum, confligere autem multitudine praesertim incitata miserum et periculosum sit. Quam ob rem neque sapientis esse accipere habenas, cum insanos atque indomitos impetus volgi cohibere non possit, neque liberi cum inpuris atque inmanibus adversariis decertantem vel contumeliarum verbera subire vel expectare sapienti non ferendas iniurias; proinde quasi bonis et fortibus et magno animo praeditis ulla sit ad rem publicam adeundi causa iustior, quam ne pareant inprobis neve ab isdem lacerari rem publicam patiantur, cum ipsi auxilium ferre, si cupiant, non queant. 1.10. Illa autem exceptio cui probari tandem potest, quod negant sapientem suscepturum ullam rei publicae partem, extra quam si eum tempus et necessitas coegerit? quasi vero maior cuiquam necessitas accidere possit, quam accidit nobis; in qua quid facere potuissem, nisi tum consul fuissem? Consul autem esse qui potui, nisi eum vitae cursum tenuissem a pueritia, per quem equestri loco natus pervenirem ad honorem amplissimum? Non igitur potestas est ex tempore, aut cum velis, opitulandi rei publicae, quamvis ea prematur periculis, nisi eo loco sis, ut tibi id facere liceat. 1.11. Maximeque hoc in hominum doctorum oratione mihi mirum videri solet, quod, qui tranquillo mari gubernare se negent posse, quod nec didicerint nec umquam scire curaverint, iidem ad gubernacula se accessuros profiteantur excitatis maximis fluctibus. Isti enim palam dicere atque in eo multum etiam gloriari solent, se de rationibus rerum publicarum aut constituendarum aut tuendarum nihil nec didicisse umquam nec docere, earumque rerum scientiam non doctis hominibus ac sapientibus, sed in illo genere exercitatis concedendam putant. Quare qui convenit polliceri operam suam rei publicae tum denique, si necessitate cogantur? cum, quod est multo proclivius, nulla necessitate premente rem publicam regere nesciant. Equidem, ut verum esset sua voluntate sapientem descendere ad rationes civitatis non solere, sin autem temporibus cogeretur, tum id munus denique non recusare, tamen arbitrarer hanc rerum civilium minime neglegendam scientiam sapienti, propterea quod omnia essent ei praeparanda, quibus nesciret an aliquando uti necesse esset. 1.12. Haec pluribus a me verbis dicta sunt ob eam causam, quod his libris erat instituta et suscepta mihi de re publica disputatio; quae ne frustra haberetur, dubitationem ad rem publicam adeundi in primis debui tollere. Ac tamen si qui sunt, qui philosophorum auctoritate moveantur, dent operam parumper atque audiant eos, quorum summa est auctoritas apud doctissimos homines et gloria; quos ego existimo, etiamsi qui ipsi rem publicam non gesserint, tamen, quoniam de re publica multa quaesierint et scripserint, functos esse aliquo rei publicae munere. Eos vero septem, quos Graeci sapientis nominaverunt, omnis paene video in media re publica esse versatos. Neque enim est ulla res, in qua propius ad deorum numen virtus accedat humana, quam civitatis aut condere novas aut conservare iam conditas. 1.13. Quibus de rebus, quoniam nobis contigit, ut iidem et in gerenda re publica aliquid essemus memoria dignum consecuti et in explicandis rationibus rerum civilium quandam facultatem non modo usu, sed etiam studio discendi et docendi † essemus auctores, cum superiores alii fuissent in disputationibus perpoliti, quorum res gestae nullae invenirentur, alii in gerendo probabiles, in disserendo rudes. Nec vero nostra quaedam est instituenda nova et a nobis inventa ratio, sed unius aetatis clarissimorum ac sapientissimorum nostrae civitatis virorum disputatio repetenda memoria est, quae mihi tibique quondam adulescentulo est a P. Rutilio Rufo, Smyrnae cum simul essemus compluris dies, exposita, in qua nihil fere, quod magno opere ad rationes omnium rerum pertineret, est praetermissum. 1.26. Tum Tubero: Videsne, Africane, quod paulo ante secus tibi videbatur, doc lis, quae videant ceteri. Quid porro aut praeclarum putet in rebus humanis, qui haec deorum regna perspexerit, aut diuturnum, qui cognoverit, quid sit aeternum, aut gloriosum, qui viderit, quam parva sit terra, primum universa, deinde ea pars eius, quam homines incolant, quamque nos in exigua eius parte adfixi plurimis ignotissimi gentibus speremus tamen nostrum nomen volitare et vagari latissime? 1.31. Tum Tubero: Non dissentio a te, Laeli, sed quaero, quae tu esse maiora intellegas. L. Dicam mehercule et contemnar a te fortasse, cum tu ista caelestia de Scipione quaesieris, ego autem haec, quae videntur ante oculos esse, magis putem quaerenda. Quid enim mihi L. Pauli nepos, hoc avunculo, nobilissima in familia atque in hac tam clara re publica natus, quaerit, quo modo duo soles visi sint, non quaerit, cur in una re publica duo senatus et duo paene iam populi sint? Nam, ut videtis, mors Tiberii Gracchi et iam ante tota illius ratio tribunatus divisit populum unum in duas partis; obtrectatores autem et invidi Scipionis initiis factis a P. Crasso et Appio Claudio tenent nihilo minus illis mortuis senatus alteram partem dissidentem a vobis auctore Metello et P. Mucio neque hunc, qui unus potest, concitatis sociis et nomine Latino, foederibus violatis, triumviris seditiosissimis aliquid cotidie novi molientibus, bonis viris locupletibus perturbatis his tam periculosis rebus subvenire patiuntur. 1.34. Cum id et Philus et Manilius et Mummius admodum adproba vissent Diom. GL I, p. 365 Keil Nullum est exemplum, cui malimus adsimulare rem publicam. Non. p. 85M, p. 289M Quare, si placet, deduc orationem tuam de caelo ad haec citeriora. non solum ob eam causam fieri volui, quod erat aequum de re publica potissimum principem rei publicae dicere, sed etiam quod memineram persaepe te cum Panaetio disserere solitum coram Polybio, duobus Graecis vel peritissimis rerum civilium, multaque colligere ac docere, optimum longe statum civitatis esse eum, quem maiores nostri nobis reliquissent. Qua in disputatione quoniam tu paratior es, feceris, ut etiam pro his dicam, si, de re publica quid sentias, explicaris, nobis gratum omnibus. 1.39. Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam inbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio; non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc, sed ita generatum, ut ne in omnium quidem rerum affluen tia 1.52. Virtute vero guberte rem publicam quid potest esse praeclarius? cum is, qui inperat aliis, servit ipse nulli cupiditati, cum, quas ad res civis instituit et vocat, eas omnis conplexus est ipse nec leges inponit populo, quibus ipse non pareat, sed suam vitam ut legem praefert suis civibus. Qui si unus satis omnia consequi posset, nihil opus esset pluribus; si universi videre optimum et in eo consentire possent, nemo delectos principes quaereret. Difficultas ineundi consilii rem a rege ad plures, error et temeritas populorum a multitudine ad paucos transtulit. Sic inter infirmitatem unius temeritatemque multorum medium optimates possederunt locum, quo nihil potest esse moderatius; quibus rem publicam tuentibus beatissimos esse populos necesse est vacuos omni cura et cogitatione aliis permisso otio suo, quibus id tuendum est neque committendum, ut sua commoda populus neglegi a principibus putet. 1.58. Sed, si vis, Laeli, dabo tibi testes nec nimis antiquos nec ullo modo barbaros. L. Istos, inquit, volo. S. Videsne igitur minus quadringentorum annorum esse hanc urbem, ut sine regibus sit? L. Vero minus. S. Quid ergo? haec quadringentorum annorum aetas ut urbis et civitatis num valde longa est? L. Ista vero, inquit, adulta vix. S. Ergo his annis quadringentis Romae rex erat? L. Et superbus quidem. S. Quid supra? L. Iustissimus, et deinceps retro usque ad Romulum, qui ab hoc tempore anno sescentesimo rex erat. S. Ergo ne iste quidem pervetus? L. Minime ac prope senescente iam Graecia. S. Cedo, num, Scipio, barbarorum Romulus rex fuit? L. Si, ut Graeci dicunt omnis aut Graios esse aut barbaros, vereor, ne barbarorum rex fuerit; sin id nomen moribus dandum est, non linguis, non Graecos minus barbaros quam Romanos puto. Et Scipio: Atqui ad hoc, de quo agitur, non quaerimus gentem, ingenia quaerimus. Si enim et prudentes homines et non veteres reges habere voluerunt, utor neque perantiquis neque inhumanis ac feris testibus. 1.62. Et Scipio: Tum magis adsentiare, Laeli, si, ut omittam similitudines, uni gubernatori, uni medico, si digni modo sint iis artibus, rectius esse alteri navem committere, aegrum alteri quam multis, ad maiora pervenero. L. Quaenam ista sunt? S. Quid? tu non vides unius inportunitate et superbia Tarquinii nomen huic populo in odium venisse regium? L. Video vero, inquit. S. Ergo etiam illud vides, de quo progrediente oratione plura me dicturum puto, Tarquinio exacto mira quadam exultasse populum insolentia libertatis; tum exacti in exilium innocentes, tum bona direpta multorum, tum annui consules, tum demissi populo fasces, tum provocationes omnium rerum, tum secessiones plebei, tum prorsus ita acta pleraque, ut in populo essent omnia. L. Est, inquit, ut dicis. 1.63. Est vero, inquit Scipio, in pace et otio; licet enim lascivire, dum nihil metuas, ut in navi ac saepe etiam in morbo levi. Sed ut ille, qui navigat, cum subito mare coepit horrescere, et ille aeger ingravescente morbo unius opem inplorat, sic noster populus in pace et domi imperat et ipsis magistratibus minatur, recusat, appellat, provocat, in bello sic paret ut regi; valet enim salus plus quam libido. Gravioribus vero bellis etiam sine collega omne imperium nostri penes singulos esse voluerunt, quorum ipsum nomen vim suae potestatis indicat. Nam dictator quidem ab eo appellatur, quia dicitur, sed in nostris libris vides eum, Laeli, magistrum populi appellari. L. Video, inquit. Et Scipio: Sapienter igitur illi vete res 1.68. Tum Laelius: Prorsus, inquit, expressa sunt a te, quae dicta sunt ab illo. S. Atque, ut iam ad sermonis mei auctorem revertar, ex hac nimia licentia, quam illi solam libertatem putant, ait ille ut ex stirpe quadam existere et quasi nasci tyrannum. Nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus principum, sic hunc nimis liberum populum libertas ipsa servitute adficit. Sic omnia nimia, cum vel in tempestate vel in agris vel in corporibus laetiora fuerunt, in contraria fere convertuntur, maximeque id in rebus publicis evenit, nimiaque illa libertas et populis et privatis in nimiam servitutem cadit. Itaque ex hac maxima libertate tyrannus gignitur et illa iniustissima et durissima servitus. Ex hoc enim populo indomito vel potius immani deligitur aliqui plerumque dux contra illos principes adflictos iam et depulsos loco audax, inpurus, consectans proterve bene saepe de re publica meritos, populo gratificans et aliena et sua; cui quia privato sunt oppositi timores, dantur imperia et ea continuantur, praesidiis etiam, ut Athenis Pisistratus, saepiuntur, postremo, a quibus producti sunt, existunt eorum ipsorum tyranni; quos si boni oppresserunt, ut saepe fit, recreatur civitas; sin audaces, fit illa factio, genus aliud tyrannorum, eademque oritur etiam ex illo saepe optimatium praeclaro statu, cum ipsos principes aliqua pravitas de via deflexit. Sic tamquam pilam rapiunt inter se rei publicae statum tyranni ab regibus, ab iis autem principes aut populi, a quibus aut factiones aut tyranni, nec diutius umquam tenetur idem rei publicae modus. 1.70. Sed vereor, Laeli vosque homines amicissimi ac prudentissimi, ne, si diutius in hoc genere verser, quasi praecipientis cuiusdam et docentis et non vobiscum simul considerantis esse videatur oratio mea. Quam ob rem ingrediar in ea, quae nota sunt omnibus, quaesita autem a nobis iam diu. Sic enim decerno, sic sentio, sic adfirmo, nullam omnium rerum publicarum aut constitutione aut discriptione aut disciplina conferendam esse cum ea, quam patres nostri nobis acceptam iam inde a maioribus reliquerunt. Quam, si placet, quoniam ea, quae tenebatis ipsi, etiam ex me audire voluistis, simul et qualis sit et optimam esse ostendam expositaque ad exemplum nostra re publica accommodabo ad eam, si potero, omnem illam orationem, quae est mihi habenda de optimo civitatis statu. Quod si tenere et consequi potuero, cumulate munus hoc, cui me Laelius praeposuit, ut opinio mea fert, effecero. 1.71. Tum Laelius: Tuum vero, inquit, Scipio, ac tuum quidem unius. Quis enim te potius aut de maiorum dixerit institutis, cum sis clarissimis ipse maioribus? aut de optimo statu civitatis? quem si habemus, etsi ne nunc quidem, tum vero quis te possit esse florentior? aut de consiliis in posterum providendis, cum tu duobus huius urbis terroribus depulsis in omne tempus prospexeris? 2.3. Quam ob rem, ut ille solebat, ita nunc mea repetet oratio populi originem; libenter enim etiam verbo utor Catonis. Facilius autem, quod est propositum, consequar, si nostram rem publicam vobis et nascentem et crescentem et adultam et iam firmam atque robustam ostendero, quam si mihi aliquam, ut apud Platonem Socrates, ipse finxero. 2.16. Tum, id quo retinemus hodie magna cum salute rei publicae, auspiciis plurimum obsecutus est Romulus. Nam et ipse, quod principium rei publicae fuit, urbem condidit auspicato et omnibus publicis rebus instituendis, qui sibi essent in auspiciis, ex singulis tribubus singulos cooptavit augures et habuit plebem in clientelas principum discriptam (quod quantae fuerit utilitati, post videro) multaeque dictione ovium et bovum (quod tum erat res in pecore et locorum possessionibus, ex quo pecuniosi et locupletes vocabantur), non vi et suppliciis coercebat. 2.21. Videtisne igitur unius viri consilio non solum ortum novum populum neque ut in cunabulis vagientem relictum, sed adultum iam et paene puberem? Tum Laelius: Nos vero videmus, et te quidem ingressum ratione ad disputandum nova, quae nusquam est in Graecorum libris. Nam princeps ille, quo nemo in scribendo praestantior fuit, aream sibi sumsit, in qua civitatem extrueret arbitratu suo, praeclaram ille quidem fortasse, sed a vita hominum abhorrentem et moribus 2.33. neque enim serpit, sed volat in optimum statum instituto tuo sermone res publica. S. Post eum Numae Pompilii nepos ex filia rex a populo est Ancus Marcius constitutus, itemque de imperio suo legem curiatam tulit. Qui cum Latinos bello devicisset, adscivit eos in civitatem, atque idem Aventinum et Caelium montem adiunxit urbi, quosque agros ceperat, divisit et silvas maritimas omnis publicavit, quas ceperat, et ad ostium Tiberis urbem condidit colonisque firmavit. Atque ita cum tres et viginti regnavisset annos, est mortuus. Tum Laelius: Laudandus etiam iste rex; sed obscura est historia Romana, siquidem istius regis matrem habemus, ignoramus patrem. S. Ita est, inquit; sed temporum illorum tantum fere regum inlustrata sunt nomina. 2.41. Non. p. 342M Statu esse optimo constitutam rem publicam, quae ex tribus generibus illis, regali et optumati et populari, confusa modice nec puniendo inritet animum inmanem ac ferum. 2.43. Nam in qua re publica est unus aliquis perpetua potestate, praesertim regia, quamvis in ea sit et senatus, ut tum fuit Romae, cum erant reges, ut Spartae Lycurgi legibus, et ut sit aliquod etiam populi ius, ut fuit apud nostros reges, tamen illud excellit regium nomen, neque potest eius modi res publica non regnum et esse et vocari. Ea autem forma civitatis mutabilis maxime est hanc ob causam, quod unius vitio praecipitata in perniciosissimam partem facillime decidit. Nam ipsum regale genus civitatis non modo non est reprehendendum, sed haud scio an reliquis simplicibus longe anteponendum, si ullum probarem simplex rei publicae genus, sed ita, quoad statum suum retinet. Is est autem status, ut unius perpetua potestate et iustitia omnique sapientia regatur salus et aequabilitas et otium civium. Desunt omnino ei populo multa, qui sub rege est, in primisque libertas, quae non in eo est, ut iusto utamur domino, sed ut nul lo 2.59. †Fuerat fortasse aliqua ratio maioribus nostris in illo aere alieno medendi, quae neque Solonem Atheniensem non longis temporibus ante fugerat neque post aliquanto nostrum senatum, cum sunt propter unius libidinem omnia nexa civium liberata nectierque postea desitum; semperque huic generi, cum plebes publica calamitate inpendiis debilitata deficeret, salutis omnium causa aliqua sublevatio et medicina quaesita est. Quo tum consilio praetermisso causa populo nata est, duobus tribunis plebis per seditionem creatis ut potentia senatus atque auctoritas minueretur; quae tamen gravis et magna remanebat sapientissimis et fortissimis et armis et consilio civitatem tuentibus, quorum auctoritas maxime florebat, quod, cum honore longe antecellerent ceteris, voluptatibus erant inferiores nec pecuniis ferme superiores; eoque erat cuiusque gratior in re publica virtus, quod in rebus privatis diligentissime singulos cives opera, consilio, re tuebantur. 3.34. August. C.D. 22.6 nullum bellum suscipi a civitate optima nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute. 3.34. Sed his poenis quas etiam stultissimi sentiunt, egestate, exilio, vinculis, verberibus, elabuntur saepe privati oblata mortis celeritate, civitatibus autem mors ipsa poena est, quae videtur a poena singulos vindicare; debet enim constituta sic esse civitas, ut aeterna sit. Itaque nullus interitus est rei publicae naturalis ut hominis, in quo mors non modo necessaria est, verum etiam optanda persaepe. Civitas autem cum tollitur, deletur, extinguitur, simile est quodam modo, ut parva magnis conferamus, ac si omnis hic mundus intereat et concidat.
5. Cicero, Letters To Quintus, 3.5.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.114 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.114. simili precatione praec. X (12 prec. V) Trophonius et Agamedes usi dicuntur; qui cum Apollini apolloni G apollin o K 1 Delphis templum exaedificavissent, exedificavissent RK (-et) venerantes verantes V 1 deum petiverunt mercedem mercedem V non parvam quidem operis et laboris sui: nihil certi, sed quod esset optimum homini. quibus Apollo se id daturum ostendit post eius diei die die K 1 diem tertium; qui ut inluxit, mortui sunt reperti. iudicavisse deum dicunt, et eum quidem deum, cui reliqui dii concessissent, ut praeter ceteros divinaret. adfertur etiam de Sileno fabella quaedam; qui cum a Mida captus esset, hoc ei muneris pro sua missione dedisse scribitur: docuisse regem non nasci homini longe optimum esse, proximum autem quam primum mori.
7. Philo of Alexandria, On The Confusion of Tongues, 46 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

46. For when he sees war stirred up in the midst of tranquil peace, so as to be continued and incessant among all men, both public and private, not existing only among nations and countries, and cities and villages, but also in every house, and between each particular individual; who is there who does not reproach and admonish and seek to correct the foolish men whom he sees, and not by day only, but also by night, his soul being unable to remain tranquil by reason of the hatred of wickedness implanted in his nature?
8. Philo of Alexandria, On The Decalogue, 142 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Philo of Alexandria, On Giants, 30 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

30. But there is nothing which is so great a hindrance to its growth as the fleshly nature. For that, as if it were the principal and most solid foundation of folly and ignorance, is laid down firmly, and then each of the aforenamed evils is built up upon it.
10. Philo of Alexandria, On The Change of Names, 197 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

197. men who weary the ears of those who hear them by everlastingly dwelling on such subjects as these; wisdom is a necessary good; folly is pernicious; temperance is desirable; intemperance is hateful; courage is a thing proper to be cultivated; cowardice must be avoided; justice is advantageous; injustice is disadvantageous; holiness is honourable; unholiness is shameful; piety towards the gods is praiseworthy; impiety is blameable; that which is most akin to the nature of man is to design, and to act, and to speak virtuously; that which is most alien from his nature is to do the contrary of all these things.
11. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 3.77, 3.88-3.89 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

12. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 30 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

13. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 7.9 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
antonius, m. (orator), fears about republics death Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 79
aristotle Giusti, Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries (2018) 249
carthage, in the aeneid Giusti, Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries (2018) 249
cicero, and law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18, 20
cicero, on stoic divine law theory Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
cicero Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 199
ciceros consolatio Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 97
consolation Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 97
cornelius scipio africanus, p. Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 79
death, as preferable to life Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 97
death, as unnatural for republic Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 97
death, greek imagery of Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 79
death, imagery of Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 79, 97
discourses of divine law, in greco-roman sources Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
divine law, as defined by cicero Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
divine law, in greco-roman thought Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
evil Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 71
funera indictiva, of the republic Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 79
human nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 71
immutability, of divine law Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 79
language, linguistic, development, change, history of Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 199
law of nature, and common law Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18
law of nature, and stoicism Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18
law of nature, connection to reason and god Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18, 20
law of nature, transcended written law Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 20
laws Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 199
memmius, c., menenius agrippa, fable of Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 18
mixed constitution Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 18
mosaic law, for ordinary people Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18, 20, 71
names by nature Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 199
natural law, in cicero' Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
natural law Gagarin and Cohen, The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (2005) 429
nature, and virtue Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18
nature natura, natural, law Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 199
nomos (pl. nomoi), and physis Gagarin and Cohen, The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (2005) 429
physis, as nature of things and persons Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 71
reason, rationality ratio Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 199
res publica, immortality of Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 97
res publica, many res publicae Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 79
res publica, optimus status of Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 18
stoics, and divine law theory Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
stoics/stoicism, and law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18, 20
stoics Gagarin and Cohen, The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (2005) 429
stoics and stoicism Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 199
sulpicius rufus, ser., letters of consolation to cicero Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 97
titius Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 97
tullius cicero, m. (cicero), bodily conceptions in de re publica Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 18
tullius cicero, m. (cicero), consolatio of Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 97
tullius cicero, m. (cicero), correspondence with sulpicius rufus Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 97
tullius cicero, m. (cicero), on the mixed constitution Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 18
virtue, and nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18
zeno Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18