| quae dam quasi semina, neque reliquarum virtutum nec ipsius rei publicae reperiatur ulla institutio. Hi coetus igitur hac, de qua exposui, causa instituti sedem primum certo loco domiciliorum causa constituerunt; quam cum locis manuque saepsissent, eius modi coniunctionem tectorum oppidum vel urbem appellaverunt delubris distinctam spatiisque communibus. Omnis ergo populus, qui est talis coetus multitudinis, qualem exposui, omnis civitas, quae est constitutio populi, omnis res publica, quae, ut dixi, populi res est, consilio quodam regenda est, ut diuturna sit. Id autem consilium primum semper ad eam causam referendum est, quae causa genuit civitatem. | . . . certain seeds, as we may call them, for otherwise no source for the other virtues nor for the State itself could be discovered. Such an assemblage of men, therefore, originating for the reason I have mentioned, established itself in a definite place, at first in order to provide dwellings ; and this place being fortified by its natural situation and by their labours, they called such a collection of dwellings a town or city, and provided it with shrines and gathering places which were common property. Therefore every people, which is such a gathering of large numbers as I have described, every city, which is an orderly settlement of a people, every commonwealth, which, as I said, is "the property of a people," must be governed by some deliberative body if it is to be permanent. And this deliberative body must, in the first place, always owe its beginning to the same cause as that which produced the State itself. |
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| Deinde aut uni tribuendum est aut delectis quibusdam aut suscipiendum est multitudini atque omnibus. Quare cum penes unum est omnium summa rerum, regem illum unum vocamus et regnum eius rei publicae statum. Cum autem est penes delectos, tum illa civitas optimatium arbitrio regi dicitur. Illa autem est civitas popularis (sic enim appellant), in qua in populo sunt omnia. Atque horum trium generum quodvis, si teneat illud vinclum, quod primum homines inter se rei publicae societate devinxit, non perfectum illud quidem neque mea sententia optimum est, sed tolerabile tamen, ut aliud alio possit esse praestantius. Nam vel rex aequus ac sapiens vel delecti ac principes cives vel ipse populus, quamquam id est minime probandum, tamen nullis interiectis iniquitatibus aut cupiditatibus posse videtur aliquo esse non incerto statu. | In the second place, this function must either be granted to one man, or to certain selected citizens, or must be assumed by the whole body of citizens And so when the supreme authority is in the hands of one man, we call him a king, and the form of this State a kingship. When selected citizens hold this power, we say that the State is ruled by an aristocracy. But a popular government (for so it is called) exists when all the power is in the hands of the people. And any one of these three forms of government (if only the bond which originally joined the citizens together in the partnership of the State holds fast), though not perfect or in my opinion the best, is tolerable, though one of them may be superior to another. For either a just and wise king, or a select number of leading citizens, or even the people itself, though this is the least commendable type, can nevertheless, as it seems, form a government that is not unstable, provided that no elements of injustice or greed are mingled with it. |
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| Sed et in regnis nimis expertes sunt ceteri communis iuris et consilii, et in optimatium dominatu vix particeps libertatis potest esse multitudo, cum omni consilio communi ac potestate careat, et cum omnia per populum geruntur quamvis iustum atque moderatum, tamen ipsa aequabilitas est iniqua, cum habet nullos gradus dignitatis. Itaque si Cyrus ille Perses iustissimus fuit sapientissimusque rex, tamen mihi populi res (ea enim est, ut dixi antea, publica) non maxime expetenda fuisse illa videtur, cum regeretur unius nutu ac modo; si Massilienses, nostri clientes, per delectos et principes cives summa iustitia reguntur, inest tamen in ea condicione populi similitudo quaedam servitutis; si Athenienses quibusdam temporibus sublato Areopago nihil nisi populi scitis ac decretis agebant, quoniam distinctos dignitatis gradus non habebant, non tenebat ornatum suum civitas. | But in kingships the subjects have too small a share in the administration of justice and in deliberation , and in aristocracies the masses can hardly have their share of liberty, since they are entirely excluded from deliberation for the common weal and from power ; and when all the power is in the people's hands, even though they exercise it with justice and, moderation, yet the resulting equality itself is inequitable, since it allows no distinctions in rank. Therefore, even though the Persian Cyrus was the most just and wisest of kings, that form of government does not seem to me the most desirable, since "the property of the people " (for that is what a commonwealth is, as I have said) is administered at the nod and caprice of one man ; even though the Massilians, now under our protection, are ruled with the greatest justice by a select number of their leading citizens, such a situation is nevertheless to some extent like slavery for a people; and even though the Athenians at certain periods, after they had deprived the Areopagus of its power, succeeded in carrying on all their public business by the resolutions and decrees of the people, their State, because it had no definite distinctions in rank, could not maintain its fair renown. |
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| Atque hoc loquor de tribus his generibus rerum publicarum non turbatis atque permixtis, sed suum statum tenentibus. Quae genera primum sunt in iis singula vitiis, quae ante dixi, deinde habent perniciosa alia vitia; nullum est enim genus illarum rerum publicarum, quod non habeat iter ad finitimum quoddam malum praeceps ac lubricum. Nam illi regi, ut eum potissimum nominem, tolerabili aut, si voltis, etiam amabili, Cyro, subest ad inmutandi animi licentiam crudelissimus ille Phalaris, cuius in similitudinem dominatus unius proclivi cursu et facile delabitur. Illi autem Massiliensium paucorum et principum administrationi civitatis finitimus est, qui fuit quodam tempore apud Athenienses triginta virorum consensus et factio. Iam Atheniensium populi potestatem omnium rerum ipsi, ne alios requiramus, ad furorem multitudinis licentiamque conversam pesti | I am now speaking of these three forms of government, not when they are confused and mingled with one another, but when they retain their appropriate character. All of them are, in the first place, subject each to the faults I have mentioned, and they suffer from other dangerous faults in addition for before every one of them lies a slippery and precipitous path leading to a certain depraved form that is a close neighbour to it. For underneath the tolerable, or, if you like, the lovable King Cyrus (to cite him as a pre-eminent example) lies the utterly cruel Phalaris, impelling him to an arbitrary change of character ; for the absolute rule of one man will easily and quickly degenerate into a tyranny like his And a close neighbour to the excellent Massilian government, conducted by a few leading citizens, is such a partisan combination of thirty men as once ruled Athens. And as for the absolute power of the Athenian people - not to seek other examples of popular government - when it changed into the fury and licence of a mob . . . |
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| Atque hoc loquor de tribus his generibus rerum publicarum non turbatis atque permixtis, sed suum statum tenentibus. Quae genera primum sunt in iis singula vitiis, quae ante dixi, deinde habent perniciosa alia vitia; nullum est enim genus illarum rerum publicarum, quod non habeat iter ad finitimum quoddam malum praeceps ac lubricum. Nam illi regi, ut eum potissimum nominem, tolerabili aut, si voltis, etiam amabili, Cyro, subest ad inmutandi animi licentiam crudelissimus ille Phalaris, cuius in similitudinem dominatus unius proclivi cursu et facile delabitur. Illi autem Massiliensium paucorum et principum administrationi civitatis finitimus est, qui fuit quodam tempore apud Athenienses triginta virorum consensus et factio. Iam Atheniensium populi potestatem omnium rerum ipsi, ne alios requiramus, ad furorem multitudinis licentiamque conversam pesti | I am now speaking of these three forms of government, not when they are confused and mingled with one another, but when they retain their appropriate character. All of them are, in the first place, subject each to the faults I have mentioned, and they suffer from other dangerous faults in addition for before every one of them lies a slippery and precipitous path leading to a certain depraved form that is a close neighbour to it. For underneath the tolerable, or, if you like, the lovable King Cyrus (to cite him as a pre-eminent example) lies the utterly cruel Phalaris, impelling him to an arbitrary change of character ; for the absolute rule of one man will easily and quickly degenerate into a tyranny like his And a close neighbour to the excellent Massilian government, conducted by a few leading citizens, is such a partisan combination of thirty men as once ruled Athens. ** And as for the absolute power of the Athenian people - not to seek other examples of popular government - when it changed into the fury and licence of a mob . . . |
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| deterrimus et ex hac vel optimatium vel factiosa tyrannica illa vel regia vel etiam persaepe popularis, itemque ex ea genus aliquod ecflorescere ex illis, quae ante dixi, solet, mirique sunt orbes et quasi circumitus in rebus publicis commutationum et vicissitudinum; quos cum cognosse sapientis est, tum vero prospicere inpendentis in gubernanda re publica moderantem cursum atque in sua potestate retinentem magni cuiusdam civis et divini paene est viri. Itaque quartum quoddam genus rei publicae maxime probandum esse sentio, quod est ex his, quae prima dixi, moderatum et permixtum tribus. | . . . and likewise some other form usually arises from those I have mentioned, and remarkable indeed are the periodical revolutions and circular courses followed by the constant changes and sequences in governmental forms. A wise man should be acquainted with these changes, but it calls for great citizens and for a man of almost divine powers to foresee them when they threaten, and, while holding the reins of government, to direct their courses and keep them under his control. Therefore I consider a fourth form of government the most commendable - that form which is a well-regulated mixture of the three which I mentioned at first. |
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| deterrimus et ex hac vel optimatium vel factiosa tyrannica illa vel regia vel etiam persaepe popularis, itemque ex ea genus aliquod ecflorescere ex illis, quae ante dixi, solet, mirique sunt orbes et quasi circumitus in rebus publicis commutationum et vicissitudinum; quos cum cognosse sapientis est, tum vero prospicere inpendentis in gubernanda re publica moderantem cursum atque in sua potestate retinentem magni cuiusdam civis et divini paene est viri. Itaque quartum quoddam genus rei publicae maxime probandum esse sentio, quod est ex his, quae prima dixi, moderatum et permixtum tribus. | . . . and likewise some other form usually arises from those I have mentioned, and remarkable indeed are the periodical revolutions and circular courses followed by the constant changes and sequences in governmental forms. ** A wise man should be acquainted with these changes, but it calls for great citizens and for a man of almost divine powers to foresee them when they threaten, and, while holding the reins of government, to direct their courses and keep them under his control. Therefore I consider a fourth form of government the most commendable - that form which is a well-regulated mixture of the three which I mentioned at first. |
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| Hic Laelius: Scio tibi ita placere, Africane; saepe enim ex te audivi; sed tamen, nisi molestum est, ex tribus istis modis rerum publicarum velim scire quod optimum iudices. Nam vel profuerit aliquod ad cog | Laelius. I know that is your opinion, Africanus, for I have often heard you say so. Nevertheless, if it will not give you too much trouble, I should like to know which you consider the best of the three forms of government of which you have been speaking. For it might help us somewhat to understand . . . |
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| et talis est quaeque res publica, qualis eius aut natura aut voluntas, qui illam regit. Itaque nulla alia in civitate, nisi in qua populi potestas summa est, ullum domicilium libertas habet; qua quidem certe nihil potest esse dulcius, et quae, si aequa non est, ne libertas quidem est. Qui autem aequa potest esse, omitto dicere in regno, ubi ne obscura quidem est aut dubia servitus, sed in istis civitatibus, in quibus verbo sunt liberi omnes? ferunt enim suffragia, mandant inperia, magistratus, ambiuntur, rogantur, sed ea dant, quae, etiamsi nolint, danda sint, et quae ipsi non habent, unde alii petunt; sunt enim expertes imperii, consilii publici, iudicii delectorum iudicum, quae familiarum vetustatibus aut pecuniis ponderantur. In libero autem populo, ut Rhodi, ut Athenis, nemo est civium, qui | Scipio. . . . and every State is such as its ruler's character and will make it. Hence liberty has no dwelling-place in any State except that in which the people's power is the greatest, and surely nothing can be sweeter than liberty ; but if it is not the same for all, it does not deserve the name of liberty. And how can it be the same for all, I will not say in a kingdom, where there is no obscurity or doubt about the slavery of the subject, but even in States where everyone is ostensibly free ? I mean States in which the people vote, elect commanders and officials, are canvassed for their votes, and have bills proposed to them, but really grant only what they would have to grant even if they were unwilling to do so, and are asked to give to others what they do not possess themselves. For they have no share in the governing power, in the deliberative function, or in the courts, over which selected judges preside, for those privileges are granted on the basis of birth or wealth. But in a free nation, such as the Rhodians or the Athenians, there is not one of the citizens who may not hold the offices of State and take an active part in the government . . . |
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| po pulo aliquis unus pluresve divitiores opulentioresque extitissent, tum ex eorum fastidio et superbia nata esse commemorant cedentibus ignavis et inbecillis et adrogantiae divitum succumbentibus. Si vero ius suum populi teneant, negant quicquam esse praestantius, liberius, beatius, quippe qui domini sint legum, iudiciorum, belli, pacis, foederum, capitis unius cuiusque, pecuniae. Hanc unam rite rem publicam, id est rem populi, appellari putant. Itaque et a regum et a patrum dominatione solere in libertatem rem populi vindicari, non ex liberis populis reges requiri aut potestatem atque opes optimatium. | . . . Our authorities say that when one person or a few stand out from the crowd as richer and more prosperous, then, as a result of the haughty and arrogant behaviour of these, there arises a government of one or a few], the cowardly and weak giving way and bowing down to the pride of wealth. But if the people would maintain their rights, they say that no form of government would be superior, either in liberty or happiness, for they themselves would be masters of the laws and the courts, of war and peace, of international agreements, and of every citizen's life and property; this government alone, they believe, can rightly be called a commonwealth, that is, "the property of the people." And it is for that reason, they say, that "the property of the people " is often liberated from the domination of kings or senators, while free peoples do not seek kings or the power and wealth of aristocracies. |
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| Et vero negant oportere indomiti populi vitio genus hoc totum liberi populi repudiari, concordi populo et omnia referente ad incolumitatem et ad libertatem suam nihil esse inmutabilius, nihil firmius; facillimam autem in ea re publica esse concordiam, in qua idem conducat omnibus; ex utilitatis varietatibus, cum aliis aliud expediat, nasci discordias; itaque, cum patres rerum potirentur, numquam constitisse civitatis statum; multo iam id in regnis minus, quorum, ut ait Ennius, 'nulla regni sancta societas nec fides est.' Quare cum lex sit civilis societatis vinculum, ius autem legis aequale, quo iure societas civium teneri potest, cum par non sit condicio civium? Si enim pecunias aequari non placet, si ingenia omnium paria esse non possunt, iura certe paria debent esse eorum inter se, qui sunt cives in eadem re publica. Quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas? | And indeed they claim that this free popular government ought not to be entirely rejected on account of the excesses of an unbridled mob, for, according to them, when a sovereign people is pervaded by a spirit of haimony and tests every measure by the standard of their own safety and liberty, no form of government is less subject to change or more stable. And they insist that harmony is very easily obtainable in a State where the interests of all are the same, for discord arises from conflicting interests, where different measures are advantageous to different citizens. Therefore they maintain that when a senate has been supreme, the State has never had a stable government, and that such stability is less attainable by far in kingdoms, in which, as Ennius says, No sacred partnership or honour is. Therefore, since law is the bond which unites the civic association, and the justice enforced by law is the same for all, by what justice can an association of citizens be held together when there is no equality among the citizens ? For if we cannot agree to equalise men's wealth, and equality of innate ability is impossible, the legal rights at least of those who are citizens of the same commonwealth ought to be equal. For what is a State except an association or partnership in justice ? . . . |
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| Et vero negant oportere indomiti populi vitio genus hoc totum liberi populi repudiari, concordi populo et omnia referente ad incolumitatem et ad libertatem suam nihil esse inmutabilius, nihil firmius; facillimam autem in ea re publica esse concordiam, in qua idem conducat omnibus; ex utilitatis varietatibus, cum aliis aliud expediat, nasci discordias; itaque, cum patres rerum potirentur, numquam constitisse civitatis statum; multo iam id in regnis minus, quorum, ut ait Ennius, 'nulla regni sancta societas nec fides est.' Quare cum lex sit civilis societatis vinculum, ius autem legis aequale, quo iure societas civium teneri potest, cum par non sit condicio civium? Si enim pecunias aequari non placet, si ingenia omnium paria esse non possunt, iura certe paria debent esse eorum inter se, qui sunt cives in eadem re publica. Quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas? | And indeed they claim that this free popular government ought not to be entirely rejected on account of the excesses of an unbridled mob, for, according to them, when a sovereign people is pervaded by a spirit of harmony and tests every measure by the standard of their own safety and liberty, no form of government is less subject to change or more stable. And they insist that harmony is very easily obtainable in a State where the interests of all are the same, for discord arises from conflicting interests, where different measures are advantageous to different citizens. Therefore they maintain that when a senate has been supreme, the State has never had a stable government, and that such stability is less attainable by far in kingdoms, in which, as Ennius says, No sacred partnership or honour is. ** Therefore, since law is the bond which unites the civic association, and the justice enforced by law is the same for all, by what justice can an association of citizens be held together when there is no equality among the citizens ? For if we cannot agree to equalise men's wealth, and equality of innate ability is impossible, the legal rights at least of those who are citizens of the same commonwealth ought to be equal. For what is a State except an association or partnership in justice ? . . . |
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| Ceteras vero res publicas ne appellandas quidem putant iis nominibus, quibus illae sese appellari velint. Cur enim regem appellem Iovis optimi nomine hominem dominandi cupidum aut imperii singularis, populo oppresso dominantem, non tyrannum potius? tam enim esse clemens tyrannus quam rex inportunus potest; ut hoc populorum intersit, utrum comi domino an aspero serviant; quin serviant quidem, fieri non potest. Quo autem modo adsequi poterat Lacedaemo illa tum, cum praestare putabatur disciplina rei publicae, ut bonis uteretur iustisque regibus, cum esset habendus rex, quicumque genere regio natus esset? Nam optimatis quidem quis ferat, qui non populi concessu, sed suis comitiis hoc sibi nomen adrogaverunt? Qui enim iudicatur iste optimus? doctrina, artibus, studiis | . . . Indeed they think that States of the other kinds have no right at all to the names which they arrogate to themselves. For why should I give the name of king, the title of Jupiter the Best, to a man who is greedy for personal power and absolute authority, a man who lords it over an oppressed people ? Should I not rather call him tyrant? For tyrants may be merciful as well as oppressive ; so that the only difference between the nations governed by these rulers is that between the slaves of a kind and those of a cruel master; for in any case the subjects must be slaves And how could Sparta, at the time when the mode of life inculcated by her constitution was considered so excellent, be assured of always having good and just kings, when a person of any sort, if he was born of the royal family, had to be accepted as king? As to aristocrats, who could tolerate men that have claimed the title without the people's acquiescence, but merely by their own will? For how is a man adjudged to be "the best"? On the basis of knowledge, skill, learning, and similar qualities surely, not because of his own desire to possess the title ! . . |
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| si fortuito id faciet, tam cito evertetur quam navis, si e vectoribus sorte ductus ad gubernacula accesserit. Quodsi liber populus deliget, quibus se committat, deligetque, si modo salvus esse vult, optimum quemque, certe in optimorum consiliis posita est civitatium salus, praesertim cum hoc natura tulerit, non solum ut summi virtute et animo praeessent inbecillioribus, sed ut hi etiam parere summis velint. Verum hunc optimum statum pravis hominum opinionibus eversum esse dicunt, qui ignoratione virtutis, quae cum in paucis est, tum a paucis iudicatur et cernitur, opulentos homines et copiosos, tum genere nobili natos esse optimos putant. Hoc errore vulgi cum rem publicam opes paucorum, non virtutes tenere coeperunt, nomen illi principes optimatium mordicus tenent, re autem carent eo nomine . Nam divitiae, nomen, opes vacuae consilio et vivendi atque aliis imperandi modo dedecoris plenae sunt et insolentis superbiae, nec ulla deformior species est civitatis quam illa, in qua opulentissimi optimi putantur. | ... If the State leaves the selection of its rulers to chance, it will be as quickly overturned as a ship whose pilot should be chosen by lot from among the passengers. But if a free people chooses the men to whom it is to entrust its fortunes, and, since it desires its own safety, chooses the best men, then certainly the safety of the State depends upon the wisdom of its best men, especially since Nature has provided not only that those men who are superior in virtue and in spirit should rule the weaker, but also that the weaker should be willing to obey the stronger. But they claim that this ideal form of State has been rejected on account of the false notions of men, who, through their ignorance of virtue - for just as virtue is possessed by only a few, so it can be distinguished and perceived by only a few - think that the best men are those who are rich, prosperous, or born of famous families. For when, on account of this mistaken notion of the common people, the State begins to be ruled by the riches, instead of the virtue, of a few men, these rulers tenaciously retain the title, though they do not possess the character, of the "best." For riches, names, and power, when they lack wisdom and the knowledge of how to live and to rule over others, are full of dishonour and insolent pride, nor is there any more depraved type of State than that in which the richest are accounted the best. |
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| si fortuito id faciet, tam cito evertetur quam navis, si e vectoribus sorte ductus ad gubernacula accesserit. Quodsi liber populus deliget, quibus se committat, deligetque, si modo salvus esse vult, optimum quemque, certe in optimorum consiliis posita est civitatium salus, praesertim cum hoc natura tulerit, non solum ut summi virtute et animo praeessent inbecillioribus, sed ut hi etiam parere summis velint. Verum hunc optimum statum pravis hominum opinionibus eversum esse dicunt, qui ignoratione virtutis, quae cum in paucis est, tum a paucis iudicatur et cernitur, opulentos homines et copiosos, tum genere nobili natos esse optimos putant. Hoc errore vulgi cum rem publicam opes paucorum, non virtutes tenere coeperunt, nomen illi principes optimatium mordicus tenent, re autem carent eo nomine . Nam divitiae, nomen, opes vacuae consilio et vivendi atque aliis imperandi modo dedecoris plenae sunt et insolentis superbiae, nec ulla deformior species est civitatis quam illa, in qua opulentissimi optimi putantur. | ... If the State leaves the selection of its rulers to chance, ** it will be as quickly overturned as a ship whose pilot should be chosen by lot from among the passengers. But if a free people chooses the men to whom it is to entrust its fortunes, and, since it desires its own safety, chooses the best men, then certainly the safety of the State depends upon the wisdom of its best men, especially since Nature has provided not only that those men who are superior in virtue and in spirit should rule the weaker, but also that the weaker should be willing to obey the stronger. But they claim that this ideal form of State has been rejected on account of the false notions of men, who, through their ignorance of virtue - for just as virtue is possessed by only a few, so it can be distinguished and perceived by only a few - think that the best men are those who are rich, prosperous, or born of famous families. For when, on account of this mistaken notion of the common people, the State begins to be ruled by the riches, instead of the virtue, of a few men, these rulers tenaciously retain the title, though they do not possess the character, of the "best." For riches, names, and power, when they lack wisdom and the knowledge of how to live and to rule over others, are full of dishonour and insolent pride, nor is there any more depraved type of State than that in which the richest are accounted the best. |
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| Virtute vero gubernante rem publicam quid potest esse praeclarius? cum is, qui inperat aliis, servit ipse nulli cupiditati, cum, quas ad res civis instituit et vocat, eas omnis conplexus est ipse nec leges inponit populo, quibus ipse non pareat, sed suam vitam ut legem praefert suis civibus. Qui si unus satis omnia consequi posset, nihil opus esset pluribus; si universi videre optimum et in eo consentire possent, nemo delectos principes quaereret. Difficultas ineundi consilii rem a rege ad plures, error et temeritas populorum a multitudine ad paucos transtulit. Sic inter infirmitatem unius temeritatemque multorum medium optimates possederunt locum, quo nihil potest esse moderatius; quibus rem publicam tuentibus beatissimos esse populos necesse est vacuos omni cura et cogitatione aliis permisso otio suo, quibus id tuendum est neque committendum, ut sua commoda populus neglegi a principibus putet. | But what can be nobler than the government of the State by virtue? For then the man who rules others is not himself a slave to any passion, but has already acquired for himself all those qualities to which he is training and summoning his fellows. Such a man imposes no laws upon the people that he does not obey himself, but puts his own life before his fellow-citizens as their law. If a single individual of this character could order all things properly in a State, there would be no need of more than one ruler , or if the citizens as a body could see what was best and agree upon it, no one would desire a selected group of rulers. It has been the difficulty of formulating policies that has transferred the power from a king to a larger number; and the perversity and rashness of popular assemblies that have transferred it from the many to the few. Thus, between the weakness of a single ruler and the rashness of the many, aristocracies have occupied that intermediate position which represents the utmost moderation , and in a State ruled by its best men, the citizens must necessarily enjoy the greatest happiness, being freed from all cares and worries, when once they have entrusted the preservation of their tranquillity to others, whose duty it is to guard it vigilantly and never to allow the people to think that their interests aie being neglected by their rulers. |
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| Virtute vero gubernante rem publicam quid potest esse praeclarius? cum is, qui inperat aliis, servit ipse nulli cupiditati, cum, quas ad res civis instituit et vocat, eas omnis conplexus est ipse nec leges inponit populo, quibus ipse non pareat, sed suam vitam ut legem praefert suis civibus. Qui si unus satis omnia consequi posset, nihil opus esset pluribus; si universi videre optimum et in eo consentire possent, nemo delectos principes quaereret. Difficultas ineundi consilii rem a rege ad plures, error et temeritas populorum a multitudine ad paucos transtulit. Sic inter infirmitatem unius temeritatemque multorum medium optimates possederunt locum, quo nihil potest esse moderatius; quibus rem publicam tuentibus beatissimos esse populos necesse est vacuos omni cura et cogitatione aliis permisso otio suo, quibus id tuendum est neque committendum, ut sua commoda populus neglegi a principibus putet. | But what can be nobler than the government of the State by virtue? For then the man who rules others is not himself a slave to any passion, but has already acquired for himself all those qualities to which he is training and summoning his fellows. Such a man imposes no laws upon the people that he does not obey himself, but puts his own life before his fellow-citizens as their law. If a single individual of this character could order all things properly in a State, there would be no need of more than one ruler , or if the citizens as a body could see what was best and agree upon it, no one would desire a selected group of rulers. It has been the difficulty of formulating policies that has transferred the power from a king to a larger number; and the perversity and rashness of popular assemblies that have transferred it from the many to the few. Thus, between the weakness of a single ruler and the rashness of the many, aristocracies have occupied that intermediate position which represents the utmost moderation , and in a State ruled by its best men, the citizens must necessarily enjoy the greatest happiness, being freed from all cares and worries, when once they have entrusted the preservation of their tranquillity to others, whose duty it is to guard it vigilantly and never to allow the people to think that their interests are being neglected by their rulers. |
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| Nam aequabilitas quidem iuris, quam amplexantur liberi populi, neque servari potest (ipsi enim populi, quamvis soluti ecfrenatique sint, praecipue multis multa tribuunt, et est in ipsis magnus dilectus hominum et dignitatum), eaque, quae appellatur aequabilitas, iniquissima est. Cum enim par habetur honos summis et infimis, qui sint in omni populo necesse est, ipsa aequitas iniquissima est; quod in iis civitatibus, quae ab optimis reguntur, accidere non potest. Haec fere, Laeli, et quaedam eiusdem generis ab iis, qui eam formam rei publicae maxime laudant, disputari solent. | For that equality of legal rights of which free peoples are so fond cannot be maintained (for the people themselves, though free and unrestrained, give very many special powers to many individuals, and create great distinctions among men and the honours granted to them), and what is called equality is really most inequitable. For when equal honour is given to the highest and the lowest - for men of both types must exist in every nation - then this very "fairness" is most unfair ; but this cannot happen in States ruled by their best citizens. These arguments and others like them, Laelius, are approximately those which are advanced by men who consider this form of government the best. |
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| Tum Laelius: Quid tu, inquit, Scipio? e tribus istis quod maxime probas? S. Recte quaeris, quod maxime e tribus, quoniam eorum nullum ipsum per se separatim probo anteponoque singulis illud, quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus. Sed si unum ac simplex pro bandum sit, regium pro bem....... pri........ in .................... hoc loco appellatur, occurrit nomen quasi patrium regis, ut ex se natis, ita consulentis suis civibus et eos conservantis stu dios ius quam .....entis.......tem.........is.........tibus ...........uos sustentari unius optimi et summi viri diligentia. | Laelius. But what about yourself, Scipio ? Which of these three forms do you consider the best? Scipio. You are right to ask which I consider the best of the three, for I do not approve of any of them when employed by itself, and consider the form which is a combination of all them superior to any single one of them But if I were compelled to approve one single unmixed form, I might choose the kingship . . . the name of king seems like that of father to us, since the king provides for the citizens as if they were his own children, and is more eager to protect them than . . . |
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| Tum Laelius: Quid tu, inquit, Scipio? e tribus istis quod maxime probas? S. Recte quaeris, quod maxime e tribus, quoniam eorum nullum ipsum per se separatim probo anteponoque singulis illud, quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus. Sed si unum ac simplex pro bandum sit, regium pro bem....... pri........ in .................... hoc loco appellatur, occurrit nomen quasi patrium regis, ut ex se natis, ita consulentis suis civibus et eos conservantis stu dios ius quam .....entis.......tem.........is.........tibus ...........uos sustentari unius optimi et summi viri diligentia. | Laelius. But what about yourself, Scipio ? Which of these three forms do you consider the best? Scipio. You are right to ask which I consider the best of the three, for I do not approve of any of them when employed by itself, and consider the form which is a combination of all them superior to any single one of them But if I were compelled to approve one single unmixed form, I might choose the kingship . . . the name of king seems like that of father to us, since the king provides for the citizens as if they were his own children, and is more eager to protect them than ** . . . |
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| Adsunt optimates, qui se melius hoc idem facere profiteantur plusque fore dicant in pluribus consilii quam in uno et eandem tamen aequitatem et fidem. Ecce autem maxima voce clamat populus neque se uni neque paucis velle parere; libertate ne feris quidem quicquam esse dulcius; hac omnes carere, sive regi sive optimatibus serviant. Ita caritate nos capiunt reges, consilio optimates, libertate populi, ut in comparando difficile ad eligendum sit, quid maxime velis. L. Credo, inquit, sed expediri, quae restant, vix poterunt, si hoc incohatum reliqueris. | to be sustained by the care of one man who is the most virtuous and most eminent. But here are the aristocrats, with the claim that they can do this more effectively, and that there will be more wisdom in the counsels of several than in those of one man, and an equal amount of fairness and scrupulousness And here also are the people, shouting with a loud voice that they are willing to obey neither one nor a few, that nothing is sweeter than liberty even to wild beasts, and that all who are slaves, whether to a king or to an aristocracy, are deprived of liberty. Thus kings attract us by our affection for them, aristocracies by their wisdom, and popular governments by then freedom, so that in comparing them it is difficult to say which one prefers. Laelius. No doubt ; but it will be almost impossible to solve the problems that follow, if you abandon this one before reaching a solution. |
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| S. Imitemur ergo Aratum, qui magnis de rebus dicere exordiens a Iove incipiendum putat. L. Quo Iove? aut quid habet illius carminis simile haec oratio? S. Tantum, inquit, ut rite ab eo dicendi principia capiamus, quem unum omnium deorum et hominum regem esse omnes docti indoctique † expoliri consentiunt. Quid? inquit Laelius. Et ille: Quid censes, nisi quod est ante oculos? Sive haec ad utilitatem vitae constituta sunt a principibus rerum publicarum, ut rex putaretur unus esse in caelo, qui nutu, ut ait Homerus, totum Olympum converteret idemque et rex et pater haberetur omnium, magna auctoritas est multique testes, siquidem omnis multos appellari placet, ita consensisse gentes decretis videlicet principum, nihil esse rege melius, quoniam deos omnis censent unius regi numine; sive haec in errore inperitorum posita esse et fabularum similia didicimus, audiamus communis quasi doctores eruditorum hominum, qui tamquam oculis illa viderunt, quae nos vix audiendo cognoscimus. Quinam, inquit Laelius, isti sunt? Et ille: Qui natura omnium rerum pervestiganda senserunt omnem hunc mundum mente | Scipio. Then let us imitate Aratus, who, in beginning the treatment of lofty subjects, thought he must commence with Jupiter. Laelius. With Jupiter ? And what similarity has Aratus' poem with our present discussion ? Scipio. Only this, that is proper for us to begin our discussion with that god who alone is admitted by everyone, learned and unlearned alike, to be king of all gods and men. Laelius. Why ? |
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| S. Imitemur ergo Aratum, qui magnis de rebus dicere exordiens a Iove incipiendum putat. L. Quo Iove? aut quid habet illius carminis simile haec oratio? S. Tantum, inquit, ut rite ab eo dicendi principia capiamus, quem unum omnium deorum et hominum regem esse omnes docti indoctique † expoliri consentiunt. Quid? inquit Laelius. Et ille: Quid censes, nisi quod est ante oculos? Sive haec ad utilitatem vitae constituta sunt a principibus rerum publicarum, ut rex putaretur unus esse in caelo, qui nutu, ut ait Homerus, totum Olympum converteret idemque et rex et pater haberetur omnium, magna auctoritas est multique testes, siquidem omnis multos appellari placet, ita consensisse gentes decretis videlicet principum, nihil esse rege melius, quoniam deos omnis censent unius regi numine; sive haec in errore inperitorum posita esse et fabularum similia didicimus, audiamus communis quasi doctores eruditorum hominum, qui tamquam oculis illa viderunt, quae nos vix audiendo cognoscimus. Quinam, inquit Laelius, isti sunt? Et ille: Qui natura omnium rerum pervestiganda senserunt omnem hunc mundum mente | Scipio. Then let us imitate Aratus, ** who, in beginning the treatment of lofty subjects, thought he must commence with Jupiter. Laelius. With Jupiter ? And what similarity has Aratus' poem with our present discussion ? Scipio. Only this, that is proper for us to begin our discussion with that god who alone is admitted by everyone, learned and unlearned alike, to be king of all gods and men. Laelius. Why ? |
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| nan | Scipio. Why do you imagine, except for the reason that lies before your eyes? It may be that the rulers of States have introduced, for its usefulness in practical life, the belief that there is one king m heaven, who moves all Olympus with a nod, as Homer says, and is both king and father of all ; in that case we have an excellent precedent and the testimony of many witnesses - if all can be called "many" - to the fact that the nations have agreed (to wit, by the decisions of their rulers) that nothing is better than a king, since, as they believe, all the gods are ruled by the authority of one. But if, on the other hand, we have become convinced that these beliefs have their origin in the false ideas of the ignorant and are to be classed as fables, then let us listen to those who may be called the teachers of educated men, to those who, as we may say, have seen with their own eyes things of which we hardly get an inkling through our ears. Laelius. What men are these ? Scipio. Those who by searching out the nature of all things have come to realize that the whole universe is ruled by a single mind . . . |
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| nan | Scipio. Why do you imagine, except for the reason that lies before your eyes? It may be that the rulers of States have introduced, for its usefulness in practical life, the belief that there is one king in heaven, who moves all Olympus with a nod, as Homer says, ** and is both king and father of all ; in that case we have an excellent precedent and the testimony of many witnesses - if all can be called "many" - to the fact that the nations have agreed (to wit, by the decisions of their rulers) that nothing is better than a king, since, as they believe, all the gods are ruled by the authority of one. ** But if, on the other hand, we have become convinced that these beliefs have their origin in the false ideas of the ignorant and are to be classed as fables, then let us listen to those who may be called the teachers of educated men, to those who, as we may say, have seen with their own eyes things of which we hardly get an inkling through our ears. Laelius. What men are these ? Scipio. Those who by searching out the nature of all things have come to realize that the whole universe is ruled by a single mind . . . |
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| Sed, si vis, Laeli, dabo tibi testes nec nimis antiquos nec ullo modo barbaros. L. Istos, inquit, volo. S. Videsne igitur minus quadringentorum annorum esse hanc urbem, ut sine regibus sit? L. Vero minus. S. Quid ergo? haec quadringentorum annorum aetas ut urbis et civitatis num valde longa est? L. Ista vero, inquit, adulta vix. S. Ergo his annis quadringentis Romae rex erat? L. Et superbus quidem. S. Quid supra? L. Iustissimus, et deinceps retro usque ad Romulum, qui ab hoc tempore anno sescentesimo rex erat. S. Ergo ne iste quidem pervetus? L. Minime ac prope senescente iam Graecia. S. Cedo, num, Scipio, barbarorum Romulus rex fuit? L. Si, ut Graeci dicunt omnis aut Graios esse aut barbaros, vereor, ne barbarorum rex fuerit; sin id nomen moribus dandum est, non linguis, non Graecos minus barbaros quam Romanos puto. Et Scipio: Atqui ad hoc, de quo agitur, non quaerimus gentem, ingenia quaerimus. Si enim et prudentes homines et non veteres reges habere voluerunt, utor neque perantiquis neque inhumanis ac feris testibus. | Scipio. . . But, if you like, Laelius, I will bring before you witnesses who are neither so very ancient nor by any means barbarians. Laelius. It is such witnesses that I desire. Scipio. Are you aware that it is less than four hundred years since this city was ruled by kings ? Laelius. It is certainly less than that. Scipio. Well, four hundred years is not very long , is it, in the life of a city or State ? Laelius. Hardly enough to bring it to maturity. Scipio. Then there was a king at Rome less than four hundred years ago ? Laelius. Yes, and a proud one. Scipio. And who preceded him ? Laelius. A very just king, and the line reaches all the way back to Romulus, who reigned six hundred years ago. Scipio. Then even he is not very remote from us ? Laelius. Not at all ; for Greece was already approaching old age in his time Scipio. Now tell me : was Romulus a king of barbarians ? Laelius. If, as the Greeks say, all men are either Greeks or barbarians, I am afraid be was, but if that name ought to be applied on the basis of men's manners rather than their language, I do not consider the Greeks less barbarous than the Romans. Scipio. Yet for the purposes of our present subject we consider only character, not race. For if they were sensible men and lived at a period not very remote, who desired to be ruled by kings, then the witnesses I am bringing forward are neither of very ancient date nor uncivilized savage |
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| Sed, si vis, Laeli, dabo tibi testes nec nimis antiquos nec ullo modo barbaros. L. Istos, inquit, volo. S. Videsne igitur minus quadringentorum annorum esse hanc urbem, ut sine regibus sit? L. Vero minus. S. Quid ergo? haec quadringentorum annorum aetas ut urbis et civitatis num valde longa est? L. Ista vero, inquit, adulta vix. S. Ergo his annis quadringentis Romae rex erat? L. Et superbus quidem. S. Quid supra? L. Iustissimus, et deinceps retro usque ad Romulum, qui ab hoc tempore anno sescentesimo rex erat. S. Ergo ne iste quidem pervetus? L. Minime ac prope senescente iam Graecia. S. Cedo, num, Scipio, barbarorum Romulus rex fuit? L. Si, ut Graeci dicunt omnis aut Graios esse aut barbaros, vereor, ne barbarorum rex fuerit; sin id nomen moribus dandum est, non linguis, non Graecos minus barbaros quam Romanos puto. Et Scipio: Atqui ad hoc, de quo agitur, non quaerimus gentem, ingenia quaerimus. Si enim et prudentes homines et non veteres reges habere voluerunt, utor neque perantiquis neque inhumanis ac feris testibus. | Scipio. . . But, if you like, Laelius, I will bring before you witnesses who are neither so very ancient nor by any means barbarians. Laelius. It is such witnesses that I desire. Scipio. Are you aware that it is less than four hundred years since this city was ruled by kings ? Laelius. It is certainly less than that. Scipio. Well, four hundred years is not very long , is it, in the life of a city or State ? Laelius. Hardly enough to bring it to maturity. Scipio. Then there was a king at Rome less than four hundred years ago ? Laelius. Yes, and a proud one. ** Scipio. And who preceded him ? Laelius. A very just king, ** and the line reaches all the way back to Romulus, who reigned six hundred years ago. Scipio. Then even he is not very remote from us ? Laelius. Not at all ; for Greece was already approaching old age in his time Scipio. Now tell me : was Romulus a king of barbarians ? Laelius. If, as the Greeks say, all men are either Greeks or barbarians, I am afraid be was, but if that name ought to be applied on the basis of men's manners rather than their language, I do not consider the Greeks less barbarous than the Romans. Scipio. Yet for the purposes of our present subject we consider only character, not race. For if they were sensible men and lived at a period not very remote, who desired to be ruled by kings, then the witnesses I am bringing forward are neither of very ancient date nor uncivilized savage |
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| Tum Laelius: Video te, Scipio, testimoniis satis instructum, sed apud me, ut apud bonum iudicem, argumenta plus quam testes valent. Tum Scipio: Utere igitur argumento, Laeli, tute ipse sensus tui. Cuius, inquit ille, sensus? S. Si quando, si forte, tibi visus es irasci alicui. L. Ego vero saepius, quam vellem. S. Quid? tum, cum tu es iratus, permittis illi iracundiae dominatum animi tui? L. Non mehercule, inquit, sed imitor Archytam illum Tarentinum, qui cum ad villam venisset et omnia aliter offendisset ac iusserat, 'A te infelicem', inquit vilico, 'quem necassem iam verberibus, nisi iratus essem.' Optime, inquit Scipio. | Laelius. I see that you are plentifully supplied with witnesses, Scipio, but to me, as to any good judge, demonstrations are more convincing than the testimony of witnesses. Scipio. Then, Laelius, make use of an argument from your own feelings Laelius. What feelings are those ? Scipio. Those which you have experienced in case, by any chance, you have ever been conscious of being angry with anyone Laelius. I have been in that state, and oftener than I could wish. Scipio. Well, when you are angry, do you allow your anger to rule your mind ? Laelius. Certainly not, but I imitate the famous Archytas of Tarentum, who, when he found, upon arriving at his country place, that all his orders had been disobeyed, said to his superintendent: "You are at fault, wretched man, and I should have had you flogged to death ere this were I not angry ! |
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| Ergo Archytas iracundiam videlicet dissidentem a ratione seditionem quandam animi vere ducebat eam que consilio sedari volebat; adde avaritiam, adde imperii, adde gloriae cupiditatem, adde libidines; et illud vides, si in animis hominum regale imperium sit, unius fore dominatum, consilii scilicet (ea est enim animi pars optima), consilio autem dominante nullum esse libidinibus, nullum irae, nullum temeritati locum. L. Sic, inquit, est. S. Probas igitur animum ita adfectum? L. Nihil vero, inquit, magis. S. Ergo non probares, si consilio pulso libidines, quae sunt innumerabiles, iracundiaeve tenerent omnia? L. Ego vero nihil isto animo, nihil ita animato homine miserius ducerem. S. Sub regno igitur tibi esse placet omnis animi partes, et eas regi consilio? L. Mihi vero sic placet. S. Cur igitur dubitas, quid de re publica sentias? in qua, si in plures translata res sit, intellegi iam licet nullum fore, quod praesit, inperium, quod quidem, nisi unum sit, esse nullum potest. | Scipio. Excellent! Then Archytas clearly regarded anger, when it disagreed with calm judgment, as a sort of rebellion within the mind, which he desired should be put down by reason. Take as further examples avarice, greed for power and glory, and the passions ; you see, if there is any kingly power in the minds of men, it must be the domination of a single element, and this is reason (for that is the best part of the mind), and, if reason holds dominion, there is no room for the passions, for anger, for rash action. Laelius. That is true. Scipio. Well then, does a mind so governed meet with your approval ? Laelius. Nothing could be better. Scipio. In that case you would not approve if reason should be dethroned, and our innumerable passions, or our anger, should obtain complete domination ? Laelius. I can think of nothing more wretched than such a mind, or than the man that possesses it. Scipio. Then you think that the mind should be a kingdom, all of whose parts are to be ruled reason ? Laelius. I certainly do . Scipio. How then can you be doubtful as to your conclusion about the State ? For if the management of a State is committed to more than one, you can see that there will be no authority at all to take command, for unless such authority is a unit, it can amount to nothing. |
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| Tum Laelius: Quid, quaeso, interest inter unum et plures, si iustitia est in pluribus? Et Scipio: Quoniam testibus meis intellexi, Laeli, te non valde moveri, non desinam te uti teste, ut hoc, quod dico, probem. Me, inquit ille, quonam modo? S. Quia animum adverti nuper, cum essemus in Formiano, te familiae valde interdicere, ut uni dicto audiens esset. L. Quippe vilico. S. Quid? domi pluresne praesunt negotiis tuis? L. Immo vero unus, inquit. S. Quid? totam domum num quis alter praeter te regit? L. Minime vero. S. Quin tu igitur concedis idem in re publica, singulorum dominatus, si modo iusti sint, esse optimos? L. Adducor, inquit, ut prope modum adsentiar. | Laelius. But let me ask what difference there is between one and many, if the many possess justice. Scipio. As I realise that no great impression has been made upon you by my witnesses, I shall continue using you as my witness in order to prove what I say. Laelius. Me ? In what way ? Scipio. A short time ago, when we were at your place at Formiae, I noticed that you gave your people emphatic orders to obey the directions of one person only. Laelius. Certainly ; my superintendent, of course. Scipio. How about your residence in the city? Are several persons in charge there ? Laelius. Of course not ; only one. Scipio. And no one else but yourself rules your whole household ? Laelius. Certainly not Scipio. Why then will you not admit that in the State likewise, the rule one man is best, if he be just? Laelius. I am almost forced to agree with you. |
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| Et Scipio: Tum magis adsentiare, Laeli, si, ut omittam similitudines, uni gubernatori, uni medico, si digni modo sint iis artibus, rectius esse alteri navem committere, aegrum alteri quam multis, ad maiora pervenero. L. Quaenam ista sunt? S. Quid? tu non vides unius inportunitate et superbia Tarquinii nomen huic populo in odium venisse regium? L. Video vero, inquit. S. Ergo etiam illud vides, de quo progrediente oratione plura me dicturum puto, Tarquinio exacto mira quadam exultasse populum insolentia libertatis; tum exacti in exilium innocentes, tum bona direpta multorum, tum annui consules, tum demissi populo fasces, tum provocationes omnium rerum, tum secessiones plebei, tum prorsus ita acta pleraque, ut in populo essent omnia. L. Est, inquit, ut dicis. | Scipio. You will be all the more inclined to agree, Laelius, if, omitting the analogies of the ship and the sick man, more advantageously entrusted to a single pilot and a single physician, if only they be proficient in their professions, I go on to examples of greater importance. Laelius. What examples are these ? Scipio. Are you not aware that it was the insolence and pride of one man, Tarquinius, that made the title of king odious to our people ? Laelius. Certainly I am aware of it . Scipio. Then you are also aware of a fact about which I expect to have more to say in the course of my discussion - that when Tarquinius was driven out, the people showed a strange way of rejoicing in their unwonted liberty; then it was that innocent men were driven into exile, then that the property of many citizens was pillaged, that the annual consulship was introduced, that the rods were lowered before the people, that appeals were allowed in cases of every sort, that secessions of the plebeians took place, and that, in a word, almost everything was done to give the people full power in all things. |
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| Et Scipio: Tum magis adsentiare, Laeli, si, ut omittam similitudines, uni gubernatori, uni medico, si digni modo sint iis artibus, rectius esse alteri navem committere, aegrum alteri quam multis, ad maiora pervenero. L. Quaenam ista sunt? S. Quid? tu non vides unius inportunitate et superbia Tarquinii nomen huic populo in odium venisse regium? L. Video vero, inquit. S. Ergo etiam illud vides, de quo progrediente oratione plura me dicturum puto, Tarquinio exacto mira quadam exultasse populum insolentia libertatis; tum exacti in exilium innocentes, tum bona direpta multorum, tum annui consules, tum demissi populo fasces, tum provocationes omnium rerum, tum secessiones plebei, tum prorsus ita acta pleraque, ut in populo essent omnia. L. Est, inquit, ut dicis. | Scipio. You will be all the more inclined to agree, Laelius, if, omitting the analogies of the ship and the sick man, more advantageously entrusted to a single pilot and a single physician, if only they be proficient in their professions, ** I go on to examples of greater importance. Laelius. What examples are these ? Scipio. Are you not aware that it was the insolence and pride of one man, Tarquinius, that made the title of king odious to our people ? Laelius. Certainly I am aware of it . Scipio. Then you are also aware of a fact about which I expect to have more to say in the course of my discussion - that when Tarquinius was driven out, the people showed a strange way of rejoicing in their unwonted liberty; then it was that innocent men were driven into exile, then that the property of many citizens was pillaged, that the annual consulship was introduced, that the rods were lowered before the people, ** that appeals were allowed in cases of every sort, that secessions of the plebeians took place, and that, in a word, almost everything was done to give the people full power in all things. ** |
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| Est vero, inquit Scipio, in pace et otio; licet enim lascivire, dum nihil metuas, ut in navi ac saepe etiam in morbo levi. Sed ut ille, qui navigat, cum subito mare coepit horrescere, et ille aeger ingravescente morbo unius opem inplorat, sic noster populus in pace et domi imperat et ipsis magistratibus minatur, recusat, appellat, provocat, in bello sic paret ut regi; valet enim salus plus quam libido. Gravioribus vero bellis etiam sine collega omne imperium nostri penes singulos esse voluerunt, quorum ipsum nomen vim suae potestatis indicat. Nam dictator quidem ab eo appellatur, quia dicitur, sed in nostris libris vides eum, Laeli, magistrum populi appellari. L. Video, inquit. Et Scipio: Sapienter igitur illi vete res | Laelius. What you say is quite true. Scipio. Yes, and it is generally true in times of peace and security, for licence is possible as long as one has nothing to fear ; as, for example, on board a ship, or frequently in the case of an illness that is trivial. But just as the sailor, when the sea suddenly grows rough, and the invalid when his illness becomes severe, both implore the assistance of one man, so our people, that in times of peace and while engaged at home wield authority, threaten even their magistrates, refuse to obey them, and appeal from one to another or to the people, yet in time of war yield obedience to their rulers as to a king , for safety prevails over caprice. Indeed, in wars of more serious import our people have preferred that all the power should be granted to one man without a colleague. And this man's title shows the character of his power, for though he is commonly called "dictator" from the fact that he is "named," yet you know, Laelius, that in our books he is called "master of the people." Laelius. I do. Scipio. Therefore the men of old time acted wisely . . . |
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| Est vero, inquit Scipio, in pace et otio; licet enim lascivire, dum nihil metuas, ut in navi ac saepe etiam in morbo levi. Sed ut ille, qui navigat, cum subito mare coepit horrescere, et ille aeger ingravescente morbo unius opem inplorat, sic noster populus in pace et domi imperat et ipsis magistratibus minatur, recusat, appellat, provocat, in bello sic paret ut regi; valet enim salus plus quam libido. Gravioribus vero bellis etiam sine collega omne imperium nostri penes singulos esse voluerunt, quorum ipsum nomen vim suae potestatis indicat. Nam dictator quidem ab eo appellatur, quia dicitur, sed in nostris libris vides eum, Laeli, magistrum populi appellari. L. Video, inquit. Et Scipio: Sapienter igitur illi vete res | Laelius. What you say is quite true. Scipio. Yes, and it is generally true in times of peace and security, for licence is possible as long as one has nothing to fear ; as, for example, on board a ship, or frequently in the case of an illness that is trivial. But just as the sailor, when the sea suddenly grows rough, and the invalid when his illness becomes severe, both implore the assistance of one man, so our people, that in times of peace and while engaged at home wield authority, threaten even their magistrates, refuse to obey them, and appeal from one to another or to the people, yet in time of war yield obedience to their rulers as to a king , for safety prevails over caprice. Indeed, in wars of more serious import our people have preferred that all the power should be granted to one man without a colleague. And this man's title shows the character of his power, for though he is commonly called "dictator" from the fact that he is "named," ** yet you know, Laelius, that in our books ** he is called "master of the people." Laelius. I do. Scipio. Therefore the men of old time acted wisely . . . |
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| iusto quidem rege cum est populus orbatus, 'pectora diu tenet desiderium', sicut ait Ennius, 'post optimi regis obitum'; simul inter Sese sic memorant: 'o Romule, Romule die, Qualem te patriae custodem di genuerunt! O pater, o genitor, o sanguen dis oriundum!' Non eros nec dominos appellabant eos, quibus iuste paruerunt, denique ne reges quidem, sed patriae custodes, sed patres, sed deos; nec sine causa; quid enim adiungunt? Tu produxisti nos intra luminis oras. Vitam, honorem, decus sibi datum esse iustitia regis existimabant. Mansisset eadem voluntas in eorum posteris, si regum similitudo permansisset, sed vides unius iniustitia concidisse genus illud totum rei publicae. L. Video vero, inquit, et studeo cursus istos mutationum non magis in nostra quam in omni re publica noscere. | . . . indeed when a people is orphaned by the loss of a just king, as Ennius says, For many a day doth sorrow fill their breasts, Whenever a goodly king hath met his end ; In grief one to another thus they speak : O Romulus, O Romulus divine, A mighty bulwark of our native land Wast thou, - sent down from heaven to our need ; O sire, O father, blood from gods derived ! Neither "masters" nor "lords" did they call those men whom they lawfully obeyed, nay, not "kings" either, but "guardians of the fatherland," "fathers," "gods" ; and not without reason, for what is the next line ? To realms of light thy people hast thou led. They thought that life, honour, and glory had been granted to them through the justice of their king. And the same goodwill toward kings would have abided in their descendants had the true image of kingship abided; but, as you know, it was through the injustice of one man alone that this whole form of government was overthrown Laelius. I know it, and am eager to learn the course taken by such changes of government, not merely in our own State, but in all others as well. |
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| iusto quidem rege cum est populus orbatus, 'pectora diu tenet desiderium', sicut ait Ennius, 'post optimi regis obitum'; simul inter Sese sic memorant: 'o Romule, Romule die, Qualem te patriae custodem di genuerunt! O pater, o genitor, o sanguen dis oriundum!' Non eros nec dominos appellabant eos, quibus iuste paruerunt, denique ne reges quidem, sed patriae custodes, sed patres, sed deos; nec sine causa; quid enim adiungunt? Tu produxisti nos intra luminis oras. Vitam, honorem, decus sibi datum esse iustitia regis existimabant. Mansisset eadem voluntas in eorum posteris, si regum similitudo permansisset, sed vides unius iniustitia concidisse genus illud totum rei publicae. L. Video vero, inquit, et studeo cursus istos mutationum non magis in nostra quam in omni re publica noscere. | . . . indeed when a people is orphaned by the loss of a just king, as Ennius says, For many a day doth sorrow fill their breasts, Whenever a goodly king hath met his end ; In grief one to another thus they speak : O Romulus, O Romulus divine, A mighty bulwark of our native land You were, - sent down from heaven to our need ; O sire, O father, blood from gods derived ! Neither "masters" nor "lords" did they call those men whom they lawfully obeyed, nay, not "kings" either, but "guardians of the fatherland," "fathers," "gods" ; and not without reason, for what is the next line ? To realms of light thy people hast thou led. ** They thought that life, honour, and glory had been granted to them through the justice of their king. And the same goodwill toward kings would have abided in their descendants had the true image of kingship abided; but, as you know, it was through the injustice of one man alone that this whole form of government was overthrown Laelius. I know it, and am eager to learn the course taken by such changes of government, not merely in our own State, but in all others as well. |
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| Et Scipio: Est omnino, cum de illo genere rei publicae, quod maxime probo, quae sentio, dixero, accuratius mihi dicendum de commutationibus rerum publicarum, etsi minime facile eas in ea re publica futuras puto. Sed huius regiae prima et certissima est illa mutatio: Cum rex iniustus esse coepit, perit illud ilico genus, et est idem ille tyrannus, deterrimum genus et finitimum optimo; quem si optimates oppresserunt, quod ferme evenit, habet statum res publica de tribus secundarium; est enim quasi regium, id est patrium consilium populo bene consulentium principum. Sin per se populus interfecit aut eiecit tyrannum, est moderatior, quoad sentit et sapit, et sua re gesta laetatur tuerique vult per se constitutam rem publicam. Si quando aut regi iusto vim populus attulit regnove eum spoliavit aut etiam, id quod evenit saepius, optimatium sanguinem gustavit ac totam rem publicam substravit libidini suae (cave putes autem mare ullum aut flammam esse tantam, quam non facilius sit sedare quam effrenatam insolentia multitudinem), tum fit illud, quod apud Platonem est luculente dictum, si modo id exprimere Latine potuero; difficile factu est, sed conabor tamen. | Scipio. When I have set forth my ideas in regard to the form of State which I consider the best, I shall have to take up in greater detail those changes to which States are liable, though I think it will not be at all easy for any such changes to take place in the State which I have in mind. But the first and most certain of these changes is the one that takes place in kingships : when the king begins to be unjust, that form of government is immediately at an end, and the king has become a tyrant. This is the worst sort of government, though closely related to the best. If the best men overthrow it, as usually happens, then the State is in the second of its three stages; for this form is similar to a kingship, being one in which a paternal council of leading men makes good provision for the people's welfare. But if the people themselves have killed or driven out the tyrant, they govern rather moderately, as long as they are wise and prudent, and, delighting in their exploit, they endeavour to maintain the government they have themselves set up. But if the people ever rebel against a just king and deprive him of his kingdom, or, as happens more frequently, taste the blood of the aristocracy and subject the whole State to their own caprices (and do not dream, Laelius, that any sea or any conflagration is so powerful that it cannot be more easily subdued than an unbridled multitude enjoying unwonted power), then we have a condition which is splendidly described by Plato, if only I can reproduce his description in Latin; it is difficult, but I will attempt it. |
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| Et Scipio: Est omnino, cum de illo genere rei publicae, quod maxime probo, quae sentio, dixero, accuratius mihi dicendum de commutationibus rerum publicarum, etsi minime facile eas in ea re publica futuras puto. Sed huius regiae prima et certissima est illa mutatio: Cum rex iniustus esse coepit, perit illud ilico genus, et est idem ille tyrannus, deterrimum genus et finitimum optimo; quem si optimates oppresserunt, quod ferme evenit, habet statum res publica de tribus secundarium; est enim quasi regium, id est patrium consilium populo bene consulentium principum. Sin per se populus interfecit aut eiecit tyrannum, est moderatior, quoad sentit et sapit, et sua re gesta laetatur tuerique vult per se constitutam rem publicam. Si quando aut regi iusto vim populus attulit regnove eum spoliavit aut etiam, id quod evenit saepius, optimatium sanguinem gustavit ac totam rem publicam substravit libidini suae (cave putes autem mare ullum aut flammam esse tantam, quam non facilius sit sedare quam effrenatam insolentia multitudinem), tum fit illud, quod apud Platonem est luculente dictum, si modo id exprimere Latine potuero; difficile factu est, sed conabor tamen. | Scipio. When I have set forth my ideas in regard to the form of State which I consider the best, I shall have to take up in greater detail those changes to which States are liable, though I think it will not be at all easy for any such changes to take place in the State which I have in mind. But the first and most certain of these changes is the one that takes place in kingships : when the king begins to be unjust, that form of government is immediately at an end, and the king has become a tyrant. This is the worst sort of government, though closely related to the best. If the best men overthrow it, as usually happens, then the State is in the second of its three stages; for this form is similar to a kingship, being one in which a paternal council of leading men makes good provision for the people's welfare. But if the people themselves have killed or driven out the tyrant, they govern rather moderately, as long as they are wise and prudent, and, delighting in their exploit, they endeavour to maintain the government they have themselves set up. But if the people ever rebel against a just king and deprive him of his kingdom, or, as happens more frequently, taste the blood of the aristocracy and subject the whole State to their own caprices (and do not dream, Laelius, that any sea or any conflagration is so powerful that it cannot be more easily subdued than an unbridled multitude enjoying unwonted power), then we have a condition which is splendidly described by Plato, ** if only I can reproduce his description in Latin; it is difficult, but I will attempt it. |
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