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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2307
Cicero, Republic, 1.39


Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam inbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio; non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc, sed ita generatum, ut ne in omnium quidem rerum affluen tiaScipio. Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people . But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The hist cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man . For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even under conditions of great prosperity of every sort is he willing to be isolated from his fellow men . . .


Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam inbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio; non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc, sed ita generatum, ut ne in omnium quidem rerum affluen tiaScipio. Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people . ** But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The first cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man . ** For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even under conditions of great prosperity of every sort is he willing to be isolated from his fellow men . . .


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

8 results
1. Cicero, On Laws, 1.19, 1.37, 1.39, 2.11, 2.16, 2.19-2.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason.
3. Cicero, On Duties, 1.5, 1.8, 1.17, 1.21, 1.50-1.51, 1.53, 1.57-1.59, 1.106-1.125, 1.127-1.129, 1.132, 1.153, 2.8, 2.73, 3.17, 3.21, 3.42, 3.52 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.5. Atque haec quidem quaestio communis est omnium philosophorum; quis est enim, qui nullis officii praeceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat dicere? Sed sunt non nullae disciplinae, quae propositis bonorum et malorum finibus officium omne pervertant. Nam qui summum bonum sic instituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis, non honestate metitur, hic, si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum naturae bonitate vincatur neque amicitiam colere possit nec iustitiam nec liberalitatem; fortis vero dolorem summum malum iudicans aut temperans voluptatem summum bonum statuens esse certe nullo modo potest. 1.8. Nam et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum. Perfectum officium rectum, opinor, vocemus, quoniam Graeci kato/rqwma, hoc autem commune officium kaqh=kon vocant. Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. 1.17. Reliquis autem tribus virtutibus necessitates propositae sunt ad eas res parandas tuendasque, quibus actio vitae continetur, ut et societas hominum coniunctioque servetur et animi excellentia magnitudoque cum in augendis opibus utilitatibusque et sibi et suis comparandis, tum multo magis in his ipsis despiciendis eluceat. Ordo autem et constantia et moderatio et ea, quae sunt his similia, versantur in eo genere, ad quod est adhibenda actio quaedam, non solum mentis agitatio. Iis enim rebus, quae tractantur in vita, modum quendam et ordinem adhibentes honestatem et decus conservabimus. 1.21. Sunt autem privata nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt, aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut lege, pactione, condicione, sorte; ex quo fit, ut ager Arpinas Arpinatium dicatur, Tusculanus Tusculanorum; similisque est privatarum possessionum discriptio. Ex quo, quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae natura fuerant communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat; e quo si quis sibi appetet, violabit ius humanae societatis. 1.50. Optime autem societas hominum coniunctioque servabitur, si, ut quisque erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum conferetur. Sed, quae naturae principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae, repetendum videtur altius; est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate. Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate; neque ulla re longius absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes. 1.51. Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium autem communia hominum videntur ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri in permultas potest: Homó, qui erranti cómiter monstrát viam, Quasi lúmen de suo lúmine accendát, facit. Nihiló minus ipsi lúcet, cum illi accénderit. Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; 1.53. Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa infinita discedatur, propior est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maxime homines coniunguntur; interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia, forum, fana, porticus, viae, leges, iura: iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines praeterea et familiaritates multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae. Artior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum; ab illa enim immensa societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur. 1.57. Sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea, quae cum re publica est uni cuique nostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiars, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt. 1.58. Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus,proximi liberi totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps bene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est. Quam ob rem necessaria praesidia vitae debentur iis maxime, quos ante dixi, vita autem victusque communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes, consolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime, estque ea iucundissima amicitia, quam similitudo morum coniugavit. 1.59. Sed in his omnibus officiis tribuendis videndum erit, quid cuique maxime necesse sit, et quid quisque vel sine nobis aut possit consequi aut non possit. Ita non iidem erunt necessitudinum gradus, qui temporum; suntque officia, quae aliis magis quam aliis debeantur; ut vicinum citius adiuveris in fructibus percipiendis quam aut fratrem aut familiarem, at, si lis in iudicio sit, propinquum potius et amicum quam vicinum defenderis. Haec igitur et talia circumspicienda sunt in omni officio et consuetudo exercitatioque capienda, ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus et addendo deducendoque videre, quae reliqui summa fiat, ex quo, quantum cuique debeatur, intellegas. 1.106. Ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis praestantia, eamque contemni et reici oportere; sin sit quispiam, qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendae modum. Itaque victus cultusque corporis ad valetudinem referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem. Atque etiam si considerare volumus, quae sit in natura excellentia et dignitas, intellegemus, quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria et delicate ac molliter vivere quamque honestum parce, continenter, severe, sobrie. 1.107. Intellegendum etiam cst duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates. 1.108. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem ei)/rwna Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit. 1.109. Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium quemque, quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio ° Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis ne Xenocratem quidem, severissimum philosophorum, ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 1.110. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugte natura. 1.111. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. 1.112. Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 1.113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 1.114. Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus. 1.115. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores, divitiae, opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubertur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia alius mavult excellere. 1.116. Quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f. in iure civili, Pauli filius Africanus in re militari. Quidam autem ad eas laudes, quas a patribus acceperunt, addunt aliquam suam, ut hic idem Africanus eloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam; quod idem fecit Timotheus Cononis filius, qui cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quam pater, ad eam laudem doctrinae et ingenii gloriam adiecit. Fit autem interdum, ut non nulli omissa imitatione maiorum suum quoddam institutum consequantur, maximeque in eo plerumque elaborant ii, qui magna sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus. 1.117. Haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus, quid deceat, complecti animo et cogitatione debemus; in primis autem constituendum est, quos nos et quales esse velimus et in quo genere vitae, quae deliberatio est omnium difficillima. Ineunte enim adulescentia, cum est maxima imbecillitas consilii, tur id sibi quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit, quod maxime adamavit; itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo genere cursuque vivendi, quam potuit, quod optimum esset, iudicare. 1.118. Nam quodHerculem Prodicus dicit, ut est apud Xenophontem, cum primum pubesceret, quod tempus a natura ad deligendum, quam quisque viam vivendi sit ingressurus, datum est, exisse in solitudinem atque ibi sedentem diu secum multumque dubitasse, cum duas cerneret vias, unam Voluptatis, alteram Virtutis, utram ingredi melius esset, hoc Herculi Iovis satu edito potuit fortasse contingere, nobis non item, qui imitamur, quos cuique visum est, atque ad eorum studia institutaque impellimur; plerumque autem parentium praeceptis imbuti ad eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur; alii multitudinis iudicio feruntur, quaeque maiori parti pulcherrima videntur, ea maxime exoptant; non nulli tamen sive felicitate quadam sive bonitate naturae sine parentium disciplina rectam vitae secuti sunt viam. 1.119. Illud autem maxime rarum genus est eorum, qui aut excellenti ingenii magnitudine aut praeclara eruditione atque doctrina aut utraque re ornati spatium etiam deliberandi habuerunt, quem potissimum vitae cursum sequi vellent; in qua deliberatione ad suam cuiusque naturam consilium est omne revocandum. Nam cum in omnibus, quae aguntur, ex eo, quo modo quisque natus est, ut supra dictum est, quid deceat, exquirimus, tum in tota vita constituenda multo est ei rei cura maior adhibenda, ut constare in perpetuitate vitae possimus nobismet ipsis nec in ullo officio claudicare. 1.120. Ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna proximam, utriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae, sed naturae magis; multo enim et firmior est et constantior, ut fortuna non numquam tamquam ipsa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur. Qui igitur ad naturae suae non vitiosae genus consilium vivendi omne contulerit, is constantiam teneat (id enim maxime decet), nisi forte se intellexerit errasse in deligendo genere vitae. Quod si acciderit (potest autem accidere), facienda morum institutorumque mutatio est. Eam mutationem si tempora adiuvabunt, facilius commodiusque faciemus; sin minus, sensim erit pedetemptimque facienda, ut amicitias, quae minus delectent et minus probentur, magis decere censent sapientes sensim diluere quam repente praecidere. 1.121. Commutato autem genere vitae omni ratione curandum est, ut id bono consilio fecisse videamur. Sed quoniam paulo ante dictum est imitandos esse maiores, primum illud exceptum sit, ne vitia sint imitanda, deinde si natura non feret, ut quaedam imitari posit (ut superioris filius Africani, qui hunc Paulo natum adoptavit, propter infirmitatem valetudinis non tam potuit patris similis esse, quam ille fuerat sui); si igitur non poterit sive causas defensitare sive populum contionibus tenere sive bella gerere, illa tamen praestare debebit, quae erunt in ipsius potestate, iustitiam, fidem, liberalitatem, modestiam, temperantiam, quo minus ab eo id, quod desit, requiratur. Optima autem hereditas a patribus traditur liberis omnique patrimonio praestantior gloria virtutis rerumque gestarum, cui dedecori esse nefas et vitium iudicandum est. 1.122. Et quoniam officia non eadem disparibus aetatibus tribuuntur aliaque sunt iuvenum, alia seniorum, aliquid etiam de hac distinctione dicendum est. Est igitur adulescentis maiores natu vereri exque iis deligere optimos et probatissimos, quorum consilio atque auctoritate nitatur; ineuntis enim aetatis inscitia senum constituenda et regenda prudentia est. Maxime autem haec aetas a libidinibus arcenda est exercendaque in labore patientiaque et animi et corporis, ut eorum et in bellicis et in civilibus officiis vigeat industria. Atque etiam cum relaxare animos et dare se iucunditati volent, caveant intemperantiam, meminerint verecundiae, quod erit facilius, si ne in eius modi quidem rebus maiores natu nolent interesse. 1.123. Senibus autem labores corporis minuendi, exercitationes animi etiam augendae videntur; danda vero opera, ut et amicos et iuventutem et maxime rem publicam consilio et prudentia quam plurimum adiuvent. Nihil autem magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se desidiaeque dedat; luxuria vero cum omni aetati turpis, tum senectuti foedissima est; sin autem etiam libidinum intemperantia accessit, duplex malum est, quod et ipsa senectus dedecus concipit et facit adulescentium impudentioren intemperantiarn. 1.124. Ac ne illud quidem alienum est, de magistratuum, de privatorum, de civium, de peregrinorum officiis dicere. Est igitur proprium munus magistratus intellegere se gerere personam civitatis debereque eius dignitatem et decus sustinere, servare leges, iura discribere, ea fidei suae commissa meminisse. Privatum autem oportet aequo et pari cum civibus iure vivere neque summissum et abiectum neque se efferentem, tum in re publica ea velle, quae tranquilla et honesta sint; talem enim solemus et sentire bonum civem et dicere. 1.125. Peregrini autem atque incolae officium est nihil praeter suum negotium agere, niihil de alio anquirere minimeque esse in aliena re publica curiosum. Ita fere officia reperientur, cum quaeretur, quid deceat, et quid aptum sit personis, temporibus, aetatibus. Nihil est autem, quod tam deceat, quam in omni re gerenda consilioque capiendo servare constantiam. 1.127. Hane naturae tam diligentem fabricam imitata est hominum verecundia. Quae enim natura occultavit, eadem omnes, qui sana mente sunt, removent ab oculis ipsique necessitati dant operam ut quam occultissime pareant; quarumque partium corporis usus sunt necessarii, eas neque partes neque earum usus suis nominibus appellant; quodque facere turpe non est, modo occulte, id dicere obscenum est. Itaque nec actio rerum illarum aperta petulantia vacat nec orationis obscenitas. 1.128. Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui filerunt Stoici paene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea, quae turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa ducamus, illa autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis. Latrocinari, fraudare, adulterare re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene; liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine obscenum; pluraque in ear sententiam ab eisdem contra verecundiam disputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur et ab omni, quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione, fugiamus; status incessus, sessio accubitio, vultus oculi manuum motus teneat illud decorum. 1.129. Quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit. Nec vero histrionibus oratoribusque concedendum est, ut iis haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta. Scaenicorum quidem mos tantam habet vetere disciplina verecundiam, ut in scaenam sine subligaculo prodeat nemo; verentur enim, ne, si quo casn evenerit, ut corporis partes quaedam aperiantur, aspiciantur non decore. Nostro quidem more cum parentibus puberes filii, cum soceris generi non lavantur. Retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia, praesertim natura ipsa magistra et duce. 1.132. Motus autem animorum duplices sunt, alteri cogitationis, alteri appetitus; cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur, appetitus impellit ad agendum. Curandum est igitur, ut cogitatione ad res quam optimas utamur, appetitum rationi oboedientem praebeamus. Et quoniam magna vis orationis est, eaque duplex, altera contentionis, altera sermonis, contentio disceptationibus tribuatur iudiciorum, contionum, senatus, sermo in circulis, disputationibus, congressionibus familiarium versetur, sequatur etiam convivia. Contentionis praecepta rhetorum sunt, nulla sermonis, quamquam haud scio an possint haec quoque esse. Sed discentium studiis inveniuntur magistri, huic autem qui studeant, sunt nulli, rhetorum turba referta omnia; quamquam, quae verborum sententiarumque praecepta sunt, eadem ad sermonem pertinebunt. 1.153. Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex communitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur, idque hoc argumento confirmari potest, quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum affluentibus copiis quamvis omnia, quae cognitione digna sint, summo otio secum ipse consideret et contempletur, tamen, si solitudo tanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. Princepsque omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam sofi/an Graeci vocant—prudentiam enim, quam Graeci fro/nhsin dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur; pertinet igitur ad societatem generis humani; ergo haec cognition anteponenda est. 2.8. Quid est igitur, quod me impediat ea, quae probabilia mihi videantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare atque affirmandi arrogantiam vitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapientia dissidet plurimum? Contra autem omnia disputatur a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere non posset, nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio. Sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror, diligenter. Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima nobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris iis simillimo, qui ista praeclara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra finitima vestris ignota esse nolui. Sed iam ad instituta pergamus. 2.73. In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit, ut suum quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat. Perniciose enim Philippus, in tribunatu cum legem agrariam ferret, quam tamen antiquari facile passus est et in eo vehementer se moderatum praebuit—sed cum in agendo multa populariter, tum illud male, non esse in civitate duo milia hominum, qui rem baberent. Capitalis oratio est, ad aequationem bonorum pertinens; qua peste quae potest esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque constitutae sunt. Nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur hominess, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant. 3.17. Quocirca nec id, quod vere honestum est, fas est cum utilitatis repugtia comparari, nec id, quod communiter appellamus honestum, quod colitur ab iis, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cum emolumentis umquam est comparandum, tamque id honestum, quod in nostram intellegentiam cadit, tuendum conservandumque nobis est quam illud, quod proprie dicitur vereque est honestum, sapientibus; aliter enim teneri non potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio. Sed haec quidem de iis, qui conservatione officiorum existimantur boni. 3.21. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. 3.42. Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae sunt aliisque tradendae, cum iis ipsi egeamus, sed suae cuique utilitati, quod sine alterius iniuria fiat, serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa: Qui stadium, inquit, currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime possit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, quicum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est. 3.52. Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: Quid ais? tu cum horninibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas, ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae? Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est celare, aliud tacere; neque ego nune te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici vilitas; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est. 1.21.  There is, however, no such thing as private ownership established by nature, but property becomes private either through long occupancy (as in the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied territory) or through conquest (is in the case of those who took it in war) or by due process of law, bargain, or purchase, or by allotment. On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar is the assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common property became the property of individuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot; and if anyone appropriates to himself anything beyond that, he will be violating the laws of human society. 1.50.  The interests of society, however, and its common bonds will be best conserved, if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion to the closeness of his relationship. But it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles of fellowship and society that Nature has established among men. The first principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting between all the members of the human race; and that bond of connection is reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity. In no other particular are we farther removed from the nature of beasts; for we admit that they may have courage (horses and lions, for example); but we do not admit that they have justice, equity, and goodness; for they are not endowed with reason or speech. 1.51.  This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common." Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and, though restricted by him to one instance, the principle may be applied very generally: "Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his: No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit." In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to give. 1.53.  Then, too, there are a great many degrees of closeness or remoteness in human society. To proceed beyond the universal bond of our common humanity, there is the closer one of belonging to the same people, tribe, and tongue, by which men are very closely bound together; it is a still closer relation to be citizens of the same city-state; for fellow-citizens have much in common — forum, temples colonnades, streets, statutes, laws, courts, rights of suffrage, to say nothing of social and friendly circles and diverse business relations with many. But a still closer social union exists between kindred. Starting with that infinite bond of union of the human race in general, the conception is now confined to a small and narrow circle. 1.57.  But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, there is no social relation among them all more close, none more close, none more dear than that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; one native land embraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his death he could render her a service? So much the more execrable are those monsters who have torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of outrage and who are and have been engaged in compassing her utter destruction. 1.58.  Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be made to find out where most of our moral obligation is due, country would come first, and parents; for their services have laid us under the heaviest obligation; next come children and the whole family, who look to us alone for support and can have no other protection; finally, our kinsmen, with whom we live on good terms and with whom, for the most part, our lot is one. All needful material assistance is, therefore, due first of all to those whom I have named; but intimate relationship of life and living, counsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even reproof flourish best in friendships. And that friendship is sweetest which is cemented by congeniality of character. 1.59.  But in the performance of all these duties we shall have to consider what is most needful in each individual case and what each individual person can or cannot procure without our help. In this way we shall find that the claims of social relationship, in its various degrees, are not identical with the dictates of circumstances; for there are obligations that are due to one individual rather than to another: for example, one would sooner assist a neighbour in gathering his harvest than either a brother or a friend; but should it be a case in court, one would defend a kinsman and a friend rather than a neighbour. Such questions as these must, therefore, be taken into consideration in every act of moral duty [and we must acquire the habit and keep it up], in order to become good calculators of duty, able by adding and subtracting to strike a balance correctly and find out just how much is due to each individual. 1.106.  From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the dignity of man and that we ought to despise it and cast it from us; but if someone should be found who sets some value upon sensual gratification, he must keep strictly within the limits of moderate indulgence. One's physical comforts and wants, therefore, should be ordered according to the demands of health and strength, not according to the calls of pleasure. And if we will only bear in mind the superiority and dignity of our nature, we shall realize how wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness, and how right it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and sobriety. 1.107.  We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. 1.108.  Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴρων in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity. 1.109.  Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in the case of Catulus — both father and son — and also of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand — the man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings — had no such gracious manner in social intercourse [. . .], and because of that very fact he rose to greatness and fame. Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized. 1.110.  Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is — that is, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural genius. 1.111.  If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general. 1.112.  Indeed, such diversity of character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another [under the same circumstances] a crime. Did Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. 1.113.  How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. 1.114.  Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects; in this respect we should not let actors display more practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom I remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life? We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults we have. 1.115.  To the two above-mentioned characters is added a third, which some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a fourth also, which we assume by our own deliberate choice. Regal powers and military commands, nobility of birth and political office, wealth and influence, and their opposites depend upon chance and are, therefore, controlled by circumstances. But what rôle we ourselves may choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice. And so some turn to philosophy, others to the civil law, and still others to oratory, while in case of the virtues themselves one man prefers to excel in one, another in another. 1.116.  They, whose fathers or forefathers have achieved distinction in some particular field, often strive to attain eminence in the same department of service: for example, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius, in the law; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the army. And to that distinction which they have severally inherited from their fathers some have added lustre of their own; for example, that same Africanus, who crowned his inherited military glory with his own eloquence. Timotheus, Conon's son, did the same: he proved himself not inferior to his father in military renown and added to that distinction the glory of culture and intellectual power. It happens sometimes, too, that a man declines to follow in the footsteps of his fathers and pursues a vocation of his own. And in such callings those very frequently achieve signal success who, though sprung from humble parentage, have set their aims high. 1.117.  All these questions, therefore, we ought to bear thoughtfully in mind, when we inquire into the nature of propriety; but above all we must decide who and what manner of men we wish to be and what calling in life we would follow; and this is the most difficult problem in the world. For it is in the years of early youth, when our judgement is most immature, that each of us decides that his calling in life shall be that to which he has taken a special liking. And thus he becomes engaged in some particular calling and career in life, before he is fit to decide intelligently what is best for him. 1.118.  For we cannot all have the experience of Hercules, as we find it in the words of Prodicus in Xenophon; "When Hercules was just coming into youth's estate (the time which Nature has appointed unto every man for choosing the path of life on which he would enter), he went out into a desert place. And as he saw two paths, the path of Pleasure and the path of Virtue, he sat down and debated long and earnestly which one it were better for him to take." This might, perhaps, happen to a Hercules, "scion of the seed of Jove"; but it cannot well happen to us; for we copy each the model he fancies, and we are constrained to adopt their pursuits and vocations. But usually, we are so imbued with the teachings of our parents, that we fall irresistibly into their manners and customs. Others drift with the current of popular opinion and make especial choice of those callings which the majority find most attractive. Some, however, as the result either of some happy fortune or of natural ability, enter upon the right path of life, without parental guidance. 1.119.  There is one class of people that is very rarely met with: it is composed of those who are endowed with marked natural ability, or exceptional advantages of education and culture, or both, and who also have time to consider carefully what career in life they prefer to follow; and in this deliberation the decision must turn wholly upon each individual's natural bent. For we try to find out from each one's native disposition, as was said above, just what is proper for him; and this we require not only in case of each individual act but also in ordering the whole course of one's life; and this last is a matter to which still greater care must be given, in order that we may be true to ourselves throughout all our lives and not falter in the discharge of any duty. 1.120.  But since the most powerful influence in the choice of a career is exerted by Nature, and the next most powerful by Fortune, we must, of course, take account of them both in deciding upon our calling in life; but, of the two, Nature claims the more attention. For Nature is so much more stable and steadfast, that for Fortune to come into conflict with Nature seems like a combat between a mortal and a goddess. If, therefore, he has conformed his whole plan of life to the kind of nature that is his (that is, his better nature), let him go on with it consistently — for that is the essence of Propriety — unless, perchance, he should discover that he has made a mistake in choosing his life work. If this should happen (and it can easily happen), he must change his vocation and mode of life. If circumstances favour such change, it will be effected with greater ease and convenience. If not, it must be made gradually, step by step, just as, when friendships become no longer pleasing or desirable, it is more proper (so wise men think) to undo the bond little by little than to sever it at a stroke. 1.121.  And when we have once changed our calling in life, we must take all possible care to make it clear that we have done so with good reason. But whereas I said a moment ago that we have to follow in the steps of our fathers, let me make the following exceptions: first, we need not imitate their faults; second, we need not imitate certain other things, if our nature does not permit such imitation; for example, the son of the elder Africanus (that Scipio who adopted the younger Africanus, the son of Paulus) could not on account of ill-health be so much like his father as Africanus had been like his. If, then, a man is unable to conduct cases at the bar or to hold the people spell-bound with his eloquence or to conduct wars, still it will be his duty to practise these other virtues, which are within his reach — justice, good faith, generosity, temperance, self-control — that his deficiencies in other respects may be less conspicuous. The noblest heritage, however, that is handed down from fathers to children, and one more precious than any inherited wealth, is a reputation for virtue and worthy deeds; and to dishonour this must be branded as a sin and a shame. 1.122.  Since, too, the duties that properly belong to different times of life are not the same, but some belong to the young, others to those more advanced in years, a word must be said on this distinction also. It is, then, the duty of a young man to show deference to his elders and to attach himself to the best and most approved of them, so as to receive the benefit of their counsel and influence. For the inexperience of youth requires the practical wisdom of age to strengthen and direct it. And this time of life is above all to be protected against sensuality and trained to toil and endurance of both mind and body, so as to be strong for active duty in military and civil service. And even when they wish to relax their minds and give themselves up to enjoyment they should beware of excesses and bear in mind the rules of modesty. And this will be easier, if the young are not unwilling to have their elders join them even in their pleasures. 1.123.  The old, on the other hand, should, it seems, have their physical labours reduced; their mental activities should be actually increased. They should endeavour, too, by means of their counsel and practical wisdom to be of as much service as possible to their friends and to the young, and above all to the state. But there is nothing against which old age has to be more on its guard than against surrendering to feebleness and idleness, while luxury, a vice in any time of life, is in old age especially scandalous. But if excess in sensual indulgence is added to luxurious living, it is a twofold evil; for old age not only disgraces itself; it also serves to make the excesses of the young more shameless. 1.124.  At this point it is not at all irrelevant to discuss the duties of magistrates, of private individuals, [of native citizens,] and of foreigners. It is, then, peculiarly the place of a magistrate to bear in mind that he represents the state and that it is his duty to uphold its honour and its dignity, to enforce the law, to dispense to all their constitutional rights, and to remember that all this has been committed to him as a sacred trust. The private individual ought first, in private relations, to live on fair and equal terms with his fellow-citizens, with a spirit neither servile and grovelling nor yet domineering; and second, in matters pertaining to the state, to labour for her peace and honour; for such a man we are accustomed to esteem and call a good citizen. 1.125.  As for the foreigner or the resident alien, it is his duty to attend strictly to his own concerns, not to pry into other people's business, and under no condition to meddle in the politics of a country not his own. In this way I think we shall have a fairly clear view of our duties when the question arises what is proper and what is appropriate to each character, circumstance, and age. But there is nothing so essentially proper as to maintain consistency in the performance of every act and in the conception of every plan. 1.127.  Man's modesty has followed this careful contrivance of Nature's; all right-minded people keep out of sight what Nature has hidden and take pains to respond to Nature's demands as privately as possible; and in the case of those parts of the body which only serve Nature's needs, neither the parts nor the functions are called by their real names. To perform these functions — if only it be done in private — is nothing immoral; but to speak of them is indecent. And so neither public performance of those acts nor vulgar mention of them is free from indecency. 1.128.  But we should give no heed to the Cynics (or to some Stoics who are practically Cynics) who censure and ridicule us for holding that the mere mention of some actions that are not immoral is shameful, while other things that are immoral we call by their real names. Robbery, fraud, and adultery, for example, are immoral in deed, but it is not indecent to name them. To beget children in wedlock is in deed morally right; to speak of it is indecent. And they assail modesty with a great many other arguments to the same purport. But as for us, let us follow Nature and shun everything that is offensive to our eyes or our ears. So, in standing or walking, in sitting or reclining, in our expression, our eyes, or the movements of our hands, let us preserve what we have called "propriety. 1.129.  In these matters we must avoid especially the two extremes — our conduct and speech should not be effeminate and over-nice, on the one hand, nor coarse and boorish, on the other. And we surely must not admit that, while this rule applies to actors and orators, it is not binding upon us. As for stage-people, their custom, because of its traditional discipline, carries modesty to such a point that an actor would never step out upon the stage without a breech-cloth on, for fear he might make an improper exhibition, if by some accident certain parts of his person should happen to become exposed. And in our own custom grown sons do not bathe with their fathers, nor sons-in‑law with their fathers-in‑law. We must, therefore, keep to the path of this sort of modesty, especially when Nature is our teacher and guide. 1.132.  Our mental operations, moreover, are of two kinds: some have to do with thought, others with impulse. Thought is occupied chiefly with the discovery of truth; impulse prompts to action. We must be careful, therefore, to employ our thoughts on themes as elevating as possible and to keep our impulses under the control of reason. The power of speech in the attainment of propriety is great, and its function is twofold: the first is oratory; the second, conversation. Oratory is the kind of discourse to be employed in pleadings in court and speeches in popular assemblies and in the senate; conversation should find its natural place in social gatherings, in informal discussions, and in intercourse with friends; it should also seek admission at dinners. There are rules for oratory laid down by rhetoricians; there are none for conversation; and yet I do not know why there should not be. But where there are students to learn, teachers are found; there are, however, none who make conversation a subject of study, whereas pupils throng about the rhetoricians everywhere. And yet the same rules that we have for words and sentences in rhetoric will apply also to conversation. 1.153.  My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer to Nature which depend upon the social instinct than those which depend upon knowledge; and this view can be confirmed by the following argument: (1) suppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed such a life that, with an abundance of everything pouring in upon him, he might in perfect peace study and ponder over everything that is worth knowing, still, if the solitude were so complete that he could never see a human being, he would die. And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom — what the Greeks call σοφία; for by prudence, which they call φρόνησις, we understand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and of things to be avoided. (2) Again, that wisdom which I have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods and men and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most important of the virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty which is connected with the social obligation is the most important duty. And (3) service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best seen in the safeguarding of human interests. It is essential, then, to human society; and it should, therefore, be ranked above speculative knowledge. 2.8.  What, then, is to hinder me from accepting what seems to me to be probable, while rejecting what seems to be improbable, and from shunning the presumption of dogmatism, while keeping clear of that recklessness of assertion which is as far as possible removed from true wisdom? And as to the fact that our school argues against everything, that is only because we could not get a clear view of what is "probable," unless a comparative estimate were made of all the arguments on both sides. But this subject has been, I think, quite fully set forth in my "Academics." And although, my dear Cicero, you are a student of that most ancient and celebrated school of philosophy, with Cratippus as your master — and he deserves to be classed with the founders of that illustrious sect — still I wish our school, which is closely related to yours, not to be unknown to you. Let us now proceed to the task in hand. 2.73.  The man in an administrative office, however, must make it his first care that everyone shall have what belongs to him and that private citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of the state. It was a ruinous policy that Philippus proposed when in his tribuneship he introduced his agrarian bill. However, when his law was rejected, he took his defeat with good grace and displayed extraordinary moderation. But in his public speeches on the measure he often played the demagogue, and that time viciously, when he said that "there were not in the state two thousand people who owned any property." That speech deserves unqualified condemnation, for it favoured an equal distribution of property; and what more ruinous policy than that could be conceived? For the chief purpose in the establishment of constitutional state and municipal governments was that individual property rights might be secured. For, although it was by Nature's guidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection of cities. 3.17.  For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality against conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated by those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable; but we every-day people must observe and live up to that moral right which comes within the range of our comprehension as jealously as the truly wise men have to observe and live up to that which is morally right in the technical and true sense of the word. For otherwise we cannot maintain such progress as we have made in the direction of virtue. So much for those who have won a reputation for being good men by their careful observance of duty. 3.21.  Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. 3.42.  And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interest and surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his neighbour's. "When a man enters the foot-race," says Chrysippus with his usual aptness, "it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive with all his might to win; but he ought never with his foot to trip, or with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of life, it is not unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own advantage, but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour. 3.52.  "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?" "It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told.
4. Cicero, Republic, 1.1-1.13, 1.26, 1.31, 1.34, 1.41-1.71, 2.3, 2.16, 2.21, 2.33, 2.41, 2.43, 2.59, 2.69, 3.33-3.34, 3.45, 5.2, 6.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.1. im petu liberavissent, nec C. Duelius, A. Atilius, L. Metellus terrore Karthaginis, non duo Scipiones oriens incendium belli Punici secundi sanguine suo restinxissent, nec id excitatum maioribus copiis aut Q. Maximus enervavisset aut M. Marcellus contudisset aut a portis huius urbis avolsum P. Africanus compulisset intra hostium moenia. M. vero Catoni, homini ignoto et novo, quo omnes, qui isdem rebus studemus, quasi exemplari ad industriam virtutemque ducimur, certe licuit Tusculi se in otio delectare salubri et propinquo loco. Sed homo demens, ut isti putant, cum cogeret eum necessitas nulla, in his undis et tempestatibus ad summam senectutem maluit iactari quam in illa tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime vivere. Omitto innumerabilis viros, quorum singuli saluti huic civitati fuerunt, et quia sunt haud procul ab aetatis huius memoria, commemorare eos desino, ne quis se aut suorum aliquem praetermissum queratur. Unum hoc definio, tantam esse necessitatem virtutis generi hominum a natura tantumque amorem ad communem salutem defendendam datum, ut ea vis omnia blandimenta voluptatis otiique vicerit. 1.1. Plin. Nat. praef. 7 nec docti/ssimis. †Manium Persium haec le/gere nolo, Iu/nium Congu/m volo. 1.2. Nec vero habere virtutem satis est quasi artem aliquam, nisi utare; etsi ars quidem, cum ea non utare, scientia tamen ipsa teneri potest, virtus in usu sui tota posita est; usus autem eius est maximus civitatis gubernatio et earum ipsarum rerum, quas isti in angulis persot, reapse, non oratione perfectio. Nihil enim dicitur a philosophis, quod quidem recte honesteque dicatur, quod non ab iis partum confirmatumque sit, a quibus civitatibus iura discripta sunt. Unde enim pietas aut a quibus religio? unde ius aut gentium aut hoc ipsum civile quod dicitur? unde iustitia, fides, aequitas? unde pudor, continentia, fuga turpitudinis, adpetentia laudis et honestatis? unde in laboribus et periculis fortitudo? Nempe ab iis, qui haec disciplinis informata alia moribus confirmarunt, sanxerunt autem alia legibus. 1.2. Non. p. 426M Sic, quoniam plura beneficia continet patria et est antiquior parens quam is, qui creavit, maior ei profecto quam parenti debetur gratia. 1.3. Quin etiam Xenocraten ferunt, nobilem in primis philosophum, cum quaereretur ex eo, quid adsequerentur eius discipuli, respondisse, ut id sua sponte facerent, quod cogerentur facere legibus. Ergo ille civis, qui id cogit omnis imperio legumque poena, quod vix paucis persuadere oratione philosophi possunt, etiam iis, qui illa disputant, ipsis est praeferendus doctoribus. Quae est enim istorum oratio tam exquisita, quae sit anteponenda bene constitutae civitati publico iure et moribus? Equidem quem ad modum 'urbes magnas atque imperiosas', ut appellat Ennius, viculis et castellis praeferendas puto, sic eos, qui his urbibus consilio atque auctoritate praesunt, iis, qui omnis negotii publici expertes sint, longe duco sapientia ipsa esse anteponendos. Et quoniam maxime rapimur ad opes augendas generis humani studemusque nostris consiliis et laboribus tutiorem et opulentiorem vitam hominum reddere et ad hanc voluptatem ipsius naturae stimulis incitamur, teneamus eum cursum, qui semper fuit optimi cuiusque, neque ea signa audiamus, quae receptui canunt, ut eos etiam revocent, qui iam processerint. 1.3. Non. p. 526M Nec tantum Karthago habuisset opum sescentos fere annos sine consiliis et disciplina. 1.4. His rationibus tam certis tamque inlustribus opponuntur ab iis, qui contra disputant, primum labores, qui sint re publica defendenda sustinendi, leve sane inpedimentum vigilanti et industrio, neque solum in tantis rebus, sed etiam in mediocribus vel studiis vel officiis vel vero etiam negotiis contemnendum. Adiunguntur pericula vitae, turpisque ab his formido mortis fortibus viris opponitur, quibus magis id miserum videri solet, natura se consumi et senectute, quam sibi dari tempus, ut possint eam vitam, quae tamen esset reddenda naturae, pro patria potissimum reddere. Illo vero se loco copiosos et disertos putant, cum calamitates clarissimorum virorum iniuriasque iis ab ingratis inpositas civibus colligunt. 1.4. Non. p. 276M Cognoscere mehercule, inquit, consuetudinem istam et studium sermonis. 1.5. Hinc enim illa et apud Graecos exempla, Miltiadem, victorem domitoremque Persarum, nondum sanatis volneribus iis, quae corpore adverso in clarissima victoria accepisset, vitam ex hostium telis servatam in civium vinclis profudisse, et Themistoclem patria, quam liberavisset, pulsum atque proterritum non in Graeciae portus per se servatos, sed in barbariae sinus confugisse, quam adflixerat; nec vero levitatis Atheniensium crudelitatisque in amplissimos civis exempla deficiunt; quae nata et frequentata apud illos etiam in gravissumam civitatem nostram dicuntur redundasse; 1.5. Lactant. Div. Inst. 3.16.5 Profecto omnis istorum disputatio, quamquam uberrimos fontes virtutis et scientiae continet, tamen collata cum eorum actis perfectisque rebus vereor ne non tantum videatur attulisse negotii hominibus, quantam oblectationem. 1.6. nam vel exilium Camilli vel offensio commemoratur Ahalae vel invidia Nasicae vel expulsio Laenatis vel Opimii damnatio vel fuga Metelli vel acerbissima C. Marii clades principum que caedes vel eorum multorum pestes, quae paulo post secutae sunt. Nec vero iam meo nomine abstinent et, credo, quia nostro consilio ac periculo sese in illa vita atque otio conservatos putant, gravius etiam de nobis queruntur et amantius. Sed haud facile dixerim, cur, cum ipsi discendi aut visendi causa maria tramittant 1.6. Arusianus Messius GL 7.457K A qua isti avocabant. 1.7. salvam esse consulatu abiens in contione populo Romano idem iurante iuravissem, facile iniuriarum omnium compensarem curam et molestiam. Quamquam nostri casus plus honoris habuerunt quam laboris neque tantum molestiae, quantum gloriae, maioremque laetitiam ex desiderio bonorum percepimus quam ex laetitia improborum dolorem. Sed si aliter, ut dixi, accidisset, qui possem queri? cum mihi nihil inproviso nec gravius, quam exspectavissem, pro tantis meis factis evenisset. Is enim fueram, cui cum liceret aut maiores ex otio fructus capere quam ceteris propter variam suavitatem studiorum, in quibus a pueritia vixeram, aut si quid accideret acerbius universis, non praecipuam, sed parem cum ceteris fortunae condicionem subire, non dubitaverim me gravissimis tempestatibus ac paene fulminibus ipsis obvium ferre conservandorum civium causa meisque propriis periculis parere commune reliquis otium. 1.8. Neque enim hac nos patria lege genuit aut educavit, ut nulla quasi alimenta exspectaret a nobis ac tantum modo nostris ipsa commodis serviens tutum perfugium otio nostro suppeditaret et tranquillum ad quietem locum, sed ut plurimas et maximas nostri animi, ingenii, consilii partis ipsa sibi ad utilitatem suam pigneraretur tantumque nobis in nostrum privatum usum, quantum ipsi superesse posset, remitteret. 1.9. Iam illa perfugia, quae sumunt sibi ad excusationem, quo facilius otio perfruantur, certe minime sunt audienda, cum ita dicunt, accedere ad rem publicam plerumque homines nulla re bona dignos, cum quibus comparari sordidum, confligere autem multitudine praesertim incitata miserum et periculosum sit. Quam ob rem neque sapientis esse accipere habenas, cum insanos atque indomitos impetus volgi cohibere non possit, neque liberi cum inpuris atque inmanibus adversariis decertantem vel contumeliarum verbera subire vel expectare sapienti non ferendas iniurias; proinde quasi bonis et fortibus et magno animo praeditis ulla sit ad rem publicam adeundi causa iustior, quam ne pareant inprobis neve ab isdem lacerari rem publicam patiantur, cum ipsi auxilium ferre, si cupiant, non queant. 1.10. Illa autem exceptio cui probari tandem potest, quod negant sapientem suscepturum ullam rei publicae partem, extra quam si eum tempus et necessitas coegerit? quasi vero maior cuiquam necessitas accidere possit, quam accidit nobis; in qua quid facere potuissem, nisi tum consul fuissem? Consul autem esse qui potui, nisi eum vitae cursum tenuissem a pueritia, per quem equestri loco natus pervenirem ad honorem amplissimum? Non igitur potestas est ex tempore, aut cum velis, opitulandi rei publicae, quamvis ea prematur periculis, nisi eo loco sis, ut tibi id facere liceat. 1.11. Maximeque hoc in hominum doctorum oratione mihi mirum videri solet, quod, qui tranquillo mari gubernare se negent posse, quod nec didicerint nec umquam scire curaverint, iidem ad gubernacula se accessuros profiteantur excitatis maximis fluctibus. Isti enim palam dicere atque in eo multum etiam gloriari solent, se de rationibus rerum publicarum aut constituendarum aut tuendarum nihil nec didicisse umquam nec docere, earumque rerum scientiam non doctis hominibus ac sapientibus, sed in illo genere exercitatis concedendam putant. Quare qui convenit polliceri operam suam rei publicae tum denique, si necessitate cogantur? cum, quod est multo proclivius, nulla necessitate premente rem publicam regere nesciant. Equidem, ut verum esset sua voluntate sapientem descendere ad rationes civitatis non solere, sin autem temporibus cogeretur, tum id munus denique non recusare, tamen arbitrarer hanc rerum civilium minime neglegendam scientiam sapienti, propterea quod omnia essent ei praeparanda, quibus nesciret an aliquando uti necesse esset. 1.12. Haec pluribus a me verbis dicta sunt ob eam causam, quod his libris erat instituta et suscepta mihi de re publica disputatio; quae ne frustra haberetur, dubitationem ad rem publicam adeundi in primis debui tollere. Ac tamen si qui sunt, qui philosophorum auctoritate moveantur, dent operam parumper atque audiant eos, quorum summa est auctoritas apud doctissimos homines et gloria; quos ego existimo, etiamsi qui ipsi rem publicam non gesserint, tamen, quoniam de re publica multa quaesierint et scripserint, functos esse aliquo rei publicae munere. Eos vero septem, quos Graeci sapientis nominaverunt, omnis paene video in media re publica esse versatos. Neque enim est ulla res, in qua propius ad deorum numen virtus accedat humana, quam civitatis aut condere novas aut conservare iam conditas. 1.13. Quibus de rebus, quoniam nobis contigit, ut iidem et in gerenda re publica aliquid essemus memoria dignum consecuti et in explicandis rationibus rerum civilium quandam facultatem non modo usu, sed etiam studio discendi et docendi † essemus auctores, cum superiores alii fuissent in disputationibus perpoliti, quorum res gestae nullae invenirentur, alii in gerendo probabiles, in disserendo rudes. Nec vero nostra quaedam est instituenda nova et a nobis inventa ratio, sed unius aetatis clarissimorum ac sapientissimorum nostrae civitatis virorum disputatio repetenda memoria est, quae mihi tibique quondam adulescentulo est a P. Rutilio Rufo, Smyrnae cum simul essemus compluris dies, exposita, in qua nihil fere, quod magno opere ad rationes omnium rerum pertineret, est praetermissum. 1.26. Tum Tubero: Videsne, Africane, quod paulo ante secus tibi videbatur, doc lis, quae videant ceteri. Quid porro aut praeclarum putet in rebus humanis, qui haec deorum regna perspexerit, aut diuturnum, qui cognoverit, quid sit aeternum, aut gloriosum, qui viderit, quam parva sit terra, primum universa, deinde ea pars eius, quam homines incolant, quamque nos in exigua eius parte adfixi plurimis ignotissimi gentibus speremus tamen nostrum nomen volitare et vagari latissime? 1.31. Tum Tubero: Non dissentio a te, Laeli, sed quaero, quae tu esse maiora intellegas. L. Dicam mehercule et contemnar a te fortasse, cum tu ista caelestia de Scipione quaesieris, ego autem haec, quae videntur ante oculos esse, magis putem quaerenda. Quid enim mihi L. Pauli nepos, hoc avunculo, nobilissima in familia atque in hac tam clara re publica natus, quaerit, quo modo duo soles visi sint, non quaerit, cur in una re publica duo senatus et duo paene iam populi sint? Nam, ut videtis, mors Tiberii Gracchi et iam ante tota illius ratio tribunatus divisit populum unum in duas partis; obtrectatores autem et invidi Scipionis initiis factis a P. Crasso et Appio Claudio tenent nihilo minus illis mortuis senatus alteram partem dissidentem a vobis auctore Metello et P. Mucio neque hunc, qui unus potest, concitatis sociis et nomine Latino, foederibus violatis, triumviris seditiosissimis aliquid cotidie novi molientibus, bonis viris locupletibus perturbatis his tam periculosis rebus subvenire patiuntur. 1.34. Cum id et Philus et Manilius et Mummius admodum adproba vissent Diom. GL I, p. 365 Keil Nullum est exemplum, cui malimus adsimulare rem publicam. Non. p. 85M, p. 289M Quare, si placet, deduc orationem tuam de caelo ad haec citeriora. non solum ob eam causam fieri volui, quod erat aequum de re publica potissimum principem rei publicae dicere, sed etiam quod memineram persaepe te cum Panaetio disserere solitum coram Polybio, duobus Graecis vel peritissimis rerum civilium, multaque colligere ac docere, optimum longe statum civitatis esse eum, quem maiores nostri nobis reliquissent. Qua in disputatione quoniam tu paratior es, feceris, ut etiam pro his dicam, si, de re publica quid sentias, explicaris, nobis gratum omnibus. 1.41. quae dam quasi semina, neque reliquarum virtutum nec ipsius rei publicae reperiatur ulla institutio. Hi coetus igitur hac, de qua exposui, causa instituti sedem primum certo loco domiciliorum causa constituerunt; quam cum locis manuque saepsissent, eius modi coniunctionem tectorum oppidum vel urbem appellaverunt delubris distinctam spatiisque communibus. Omnis ergo populus, qui est talis coetus multitudinis, qualem exposui, omnis civitas, quae est constitutio populi, omnis res publica, quae, ut dixi, populi res est, consilio quodam regenda est, ut diuturna sit. Id autem consilium primum semper ad eam causam referendum est, quae causa genuit civitatem. 1.42. Deinde aut uni tribuendum est aut delectis quibusdam aut suscipiendum est multitudini atque omnibus. Quare cum penes unum est omnium summa rerum, regem illum unum vocamus et regnum eius rei publicae statum. Cum autem est penes delectos, tum illa civitas optimatium arbitrio regi dicitur. Illa autem est civitas popularis (sic enim appellant), in qua in populo sunt omnia. Atque horum trium generum quodvis, si teneat illud vinclum, quod primum homines inter se rei publicae societate devinxit, non perfectum illud quidem neque mea sententia optimum est, sed tolerabile tamen, ut aliud alio possit esse praestantius. Nam vel rex aequus ac sapiens vel delecti ac principes cives vel ipse populus, quamquam id est minime probandum, tamen nullis interiectis iniquitatibus aut cupiditatibus posse videtur aliquo esse non incerto statu. 1.43. Sed et in regnis nimis expertes sunt ceteri communis iuris et consilii, et in optimatium dominatu vix particeps libertatis potest esse multitudo, cum omni consilio communi ac potestate careat, et cum omnia per populum geruntur quamvis iustum atque moderatum, tamen ipsa aequabilitas est iniqua, cum habet nullos gradus dignitatis. Itaque si Cyrus ille Perses iustissimus fuit sapientissimusque rex, tamen mihi populi res (ea enim est, ut dixi antea, publica) non maxime expetenda fuisse illa videtur, cum regeretur unius nutu ac modo; si Massilienses, nostri clientes, per delectos et principes cives summa iustitia reguntur, inest tamen in ea condicione populi similitudo quaedam servitutis; si Athenienses quibusdam temporibus sublato Areopago nihil nisi populi scitis ac decretis agebant, quoniam distinctos dignitatis gradus non habebant, non tenebat ornatum suum civitas. 1.44. Atque hoc loquor de tribus his generibus rerum publicarum non turbatis atque permixtis, sed suum statum tenentibus. Quae genera primum sunt in iis singula vitiis, quae ante dixi, deinde habent perniciosa alia vitia; nullum est enim genus illarum rerum publicarum, quod non habeat iter ad finitimum quoddam malum praeceps ac lubricum. Nam illi regi, ut eum potissimum nominem, tolerabili aut, si voltis, etiam amabili, Cyro, subest ad inmutandi animi licentiam crudelissimus ille Phalaris, cuius in similitudinem dominatus unius proclivi cursu et facile delabitur. Illi autem Massiliensium paucorum et principum administrationi civitatis finitimus est, qui fuit quodam tempore apud Athenienses triginta virorum consensus et factio. Iam Atheniensium populi potestatem omnium rerum ipsi, ne alios requiramus, ad furorem multitudinis licentiamque conversam pesti 1.45. deterrimus et ex hac vel optimatium vel factiosa tyrannica illa vel regia vel etiam persaepe popularis, itemque ex ea genus aliquod ecflorescere ex illis, quae ante dixi, solet, mirique sunt orbes et quasi circumitus in rebus publicis commutationum et vicissitudinum; quos cum cognosse sapientis est, tum vero prospicere inpendentis in guberda re publica moderantem cursum atque in sua potestate retinentem magni cuiusdam civis et divini paene est viri. Itaque quartum quoddam genus rei publicae maxime probandum esse sentio, quod est ex his, quae prima dixi, moderatum et permixtum tribus. 1.46. Hic Laelius: Scio tibi ita placere, Africane; saepe enim ex te audivi; sed tamen, nisi molestum est, ex tribus istis modis rerum publicarum velim scire quod optimum iudices. Nam vel profuerit aliquod ad cog 1.47. et talis est quaeque res publica, qualis eius aut natura aut voluntas, qui illam regit. Itaque nulla alia in civitate, nisi in qua populi potestas summa est, ullum domicilium libertas habet; qua quidem certe nihil potest esse dulcius, et quae, si aequa non est, ne libertas quidem est. Qui autem aequa potest esse, omitto dicere in regno, ubi ne obscura quidem est aut dubia servitus, sed in istis civitatibus, in quibus verbo sunt liberi omnes? ferunt enim suffragia, mandant inperia, magistratus, ambiuntur, rogantur, sed ea dant, quae, etiamsi nolint, danda sint, et quae ipsi non habent, unde alii petunt; sunt enim expertes imperii, consilii publici, iudicii delectorum iudicum, quae familiarum vetustatibus aut pecuniis ponderantur. In libero autem populo, ut Rhodi, ut Athenis, nemo est civium, qui 1.48. po pulo aliquis unus pluresve divitiores opulentioresque extitissent, tum ex eorum fastidio et superbia nata esse commemorant cedentibus ignavis et inbecillis et adrogantiae divitum succumbentibus. Si vero ius suum populi teneant, negant quicquam esse praestantius, liberius, beatius, quippe qui domini sint legum, iudiciorum, belli, pacis, foederum, capitis unius cuiusque, pecuniae. Hanc unam rite rem publicam, id est rem populi, appellari putant. Itaque et a regum et a patrum dominatione solere in libertatem rem populi vindicari, non ex liberis populis reges requiri aut potestatem atque opes optimatium. 1.49. Et vero negant oportere indomiti populi vitio genus hoc totum liberi populi repudiari, concordi populo et omnia referente ad incolumitatem et ad libertatem suam nihil esse inmutabilius, nihil firmius; facillimam autem in ea re publica esse concordiam, in qua idem conducat omnibus; ex utilitatis varietatibus, cum aliis aliud expediat, nasci discordias; itaque, cum patres rerum potirentur, numquam constitisse civitatis statum; multo iam id in regnis minus, quorum, ut ait Ennius, 'nulla regni sancta societas nec fides est.' Quare cum lex sit civilis societatis vinculum, ius autem legis aequale, quo iure societas civium teneri potest, cum par non sit condicio civium? Si enim pecunias aequari non placet, si ingenia omnium paria esse non possunt, iura certe paria debent esse eorum inter se, qui sunt cives in eadem re publica. Quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas? 1.50. Ceteras vero res publicas ne appellandas quidem putant iis nominibus, quibus illae sese appellari velint. Cur enim regem appellem Iovis optimi nomine hominem domidi cupidum aut imperii singularis, populo oppresso domitem, non tyrannum potius? tam enim esse clemens tyrannus quam rex inportunus potest; ut hoc populorum intersit, utrum comi domino an aspero serviant; quin serviant quidem, fieri non potest. Quo autem modo adsequi poterat Lacedaemo illa tum, cum praestare putabatur disciplina rei publicae, ut bonis uteretur iustisque regibus, cum esset habendus rex, quicumque genere regio natus esset? Nam optimatis quidem quis ferat, qui non populi concessu, sed suis comitiis hoc sibi nomen adrogaverunt? Qui enim iudicatur iste optimus? doctrina, artibus, studiis 1.51. si fortuito id faciet, tam cito evertetur quam navis, si e vectoribus sorte ductus ad gubernacula accesserit. Quodsi liber populus deliget, quibus se committat, deligetque, si modo salvus esse vult, optimum quemque, certe in optimorum consiliis posita est civitatium salus, praesertim cum hoc natura tulerit, non solum ut summi virtute et animo praeessent inbecillioribus, sed ut hi etiam parere summis velint. Verum hunc optimum statum pravis hominum opinionibus eversum esse dicunt, qui ignoratione virtutis, quae cum in paucis est, tum a paucis iudicatur et cernitur, opulentos homines et copiosos, tum genere nobili natos esse optimos putant. Hoc errore vulgi cum rem publicam opes paucorum, non virtutes tenere coeperunt, nomen illi principes optimatium mordicus tenent, re autem carent eo nomine . Nam divitiae, nomen, opes vacuae consilio et vivendi atque aliis imperandi modo dedecoris plenae sunt et insolentis superbiae, nec ulla deformior species est civitatis quam illa, in qua opulentissimi optimi putantur. 1.52. Virtute vero guberte rem publicam quid potest esse praeclarius? cum is, qui inperat aliis, servit ipse nulli cupiditati, cum, quas ad res civis instituit et vocat, eas omnis conplexus est ipse nec leges inponit populo, quibus ipse non pareat, sed suam vitam ut legem praefert suis civibus. Qui si unus satis omnia consequi posset, nihil opus esset pluribus; si universi videre optimum et in eo consentire possent, nemo delectos principes quaereret. Difficultas ineundi consilii rem a rege ad plures, error et temeritas populorum a multitudine ad paucos transtulit. Sic inter infirmitatem unius temeritatemque multorum medium optimates possederunt locum, quo nihil potest esse moderatius; quibus rem publicam tuentibus beatissimos esse populos necesse est vacuos omni cura et cogitatione aliis permisso otio suo, quibus id tuendum est neque committendum, ut sua commoda populus neglegi a principibus putet. 1.53. Nam aequabilitas quidem iuris, quam amplexantur liberi populi, neque servari potest (ipsi enim populi, quamvis soluti ecfrenatique sint, praecipue multis multa tribuunt, et est in ipsis magnus dilectus hominum et dignitatum), eaque, quae appellatur aequabilitas, iniquissima est. Cum enim par habetur honos summis et infimis, qui sint in omni populo necesse est, ipsa aequitas iniquissima est; quod in iis civitatibus, quae ab optimis reguntur, accidere non potest. Haec fere, Laeli, et quaedam eiusdem generis ab iis, qui eam formam rei publicae maxime laudant, disputari solent. 1.54. Tum Laelius: Quid tu, inquit, Scipio? e tribus istis quod maxime probas? S. Recte quaeris, quod maxime e tribus, quoniam eorum nullum ipsum per se separatim probo anteponoque singulis illud, quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus. Sed si unum ac simplex pro bandum sit, regium pro bem....... pri........ in .................... hoc loco appellatur, occurrit nomen quasi patrium regis, ut ex se natis, ita consulentis suis civibus et eos conservantis stu dios ius quam .....entis.......tem.........is.........tibus ...........uos sustentari unius optimi et summi viri diligentia. 1.55. Adsunt optimates, qui se melius hoc idem facere profiteantur plusque fore dicant in pluribus consilii quam in uno et eandem tamen aequitatem et fidem. Ecce autem maxima voce clamat populus neque se uni neque paucis velle parere; libertate ne feris quidem quicquam esse dulcius; hac omnes carere, sive regi sive optimatibus serviant. Ita caritate nos capiunt reges, consilio optimates, libertate populi, ut in comparando difficile ad eligendum sit, quid maxime velis. L. Credo, inquit, sed expediri, quae restant, vix poterunt, si hoc incohatum reliqueris. 1.56. S. Imitemur ergo Aratum, qui magnis de rebus dicere exordiens a Iove incipiendum putat. L. Quo Iove? aut quid habet illius carminis simile haec oratio? S. Tantum, inquit, ut rite ab eo dicendi principia capiamus, quem unum omnium deorum et hominum regem esse omnes docti indoctique † expoliri consentiunt. Quid? inquit Laelius. Et ille: Quid censes, nisi quod est ante oculos? Sive haec ad utilitatem vitae constituta sunt a principibus rerum publicarum, ut rex putaretur unus esse in caelo, qui nutu, ut ait Homerus, totum Olympum converteret idemque et rex et pater haberetur omnium, magna auctoritas est multique testes, siquidem omnis multos appellari placet, ita consensisse gentes decretis videlicet principum, nihil esse rege melius, quoniam deos omnis censent unius regi numine; sive haec in errore inperitorum posita esse et fabularum similia didicimus, audiamus communis quasi doctores eruditorum hominum, qui tamquam oculis illa viderunt, quae nos vix audiendo cognoscimus. Quinam, inquit Laelius, isti sunt? Et ille: Qui natura omnium rerum pervestiganda senserunt omnem hunc mundum mente 1.58. Sed, si vis, Laeli, dabo tibi testes nec nimis antiquos nec ullo modo barbaros. L. Istos, inquit, volo. S. Videsne igitur minus quadringentorum annorum esse hanc urbem, ut sine regibus sit? L. Vero minus. S. Quid ergo? haec quadringentorum annorum aetas ut urbis et civitatis num valde longa est? L. Ista vero, inquit, adulta vix. S. Ergo his annis quadringentis Romae rex erat? L. Et superbus quidem. S. Quid supra? L. Iustissimus, et deinceps retro usque ad Romulum, qui ab hoc tempore anno sescentesimo rex erat. S. Ergo ne iste quidem pervetus? L. Minime ac prope senescente iam Graecia. S. Cedo, num, Scipio, barbarorum Romulus rex fuit? L. Si, ut Graeci dicunt omnis aut Graios esse aut barbaros, vereor, ne barbarorum rex fuerit; sin id nomen moribus dandum est, non linguis, non Graecos minus barbaros quam Romanos puto. Et Scipio: Atqui ad hoc, de quo agitur, non quaerimus gentem, ingenia quaerimus. Si enim et prudentes homines et non veteres reges habere voluerunt, utor neque perantiquis neque inhumanis ac feris testibus. 1.59. Tum Laelius: Video te, Scipio, testimoniis satis instructum, sed apud me, ut apud bonum iudicem, argumenta plus quam testes valent. Tum Scipio: Utere igitur argumento, Laeli, tute ipse sensus tui. Cuius, inquit ille, sensus? S. Si quando, si forte, tibi visus es irasci alicui. L. Ego vero saepius, quam vellem. S. Quid? tum, cum tu es iratus, permittis illi iracundiae dominatum animi tui? L. Non mehercule, inquit, sed imitor Archytam illum Tarentinum, qui cum ad villam venisset et omnia aliter offendisset ac iusserat, 'A te infelicem', inquit vilico, 'quem necassem iam verberibus, nisi iratus essem.' Optime, inquit Scipio. 1.60. Ergo Archytas iracundiam videlicet dissidentem a ratione seditionem quandam animi vere ducebat eam que consilio sedari volebat; adde avaritiam, adde imperii, adde gloriae cupiditatem, adde libidines; et illud vides, si in animis hominum regale imperium sit, unius fore dominatum, consilii scilicet (ea est enim animi pars optima), consilio autem domite nullum esse libidinibus, nullum irae, nullum temeritati locum. L. Sic, inquit, est. S. Probas igitur animum ita adfectum? L. Nihil vero, inquit, magis. S. Ergo non probares, si consilio pulso libidines, quae sunt innumerabiles, iracundiaeve tenerent omnia? L. Ego vero nihil isto animo, nihil ita animato homine miserius ducerem. S. Sub regno igitur tibi esse placet omnis animi partes, et eas regi consilio? L. Mihi vero sic placet. S. Cur igitur dubitas, quid de re publica sentias? in qua, si in plures translata res sit, intellegi iam licet nullum fore, quod praesit, inperium, quod quidem, nisi unum sit, esse nullum potest. 1.61. Tum Laelius: Quid, quaeso, interest inter unum et plures, si iustitia est in pluribus? Et Scipio: Quoniam testibus meis intellexi, Laeli, te non valde moveri, non desinam te uti teste, ut hoc, quod dico, probem. Me, inquit ille, quonam modo? S. Quia animum adverti nuper, cum essemus in Formiano, te familiae valde interdicere, ut uni dicto audiens esset. L. Quippe vilico. S. Quid? domi pluresne praesunt negotiis tuis? L. Immo vero unus, inquit. S. Quid? totam domum num quis alter praeter te regit? L. Minime vero. S. Quin tu igitur concedis idem in re publica, singulorum dominatus, si modo iusti sint, esse optimos? L. Adducor, inquit, ut prope modum adsentiar. 1.62. Et Scipio: Tum magis adsentiare, Laeli, si, ut omittam similitudines, uni gubernatori, uni medico, si digni modo sint iis artibus, rectius esse alteri navem committere, aegrum alteri quam multis, ad maiora pervenero. L. Quaenam ista sunt? S. Quid? tu non vides unius inportunitate et superbia Tarquinii nomen huic populo in odium venisse regium? L. Video vero, inquit. S. Ergo etiam illud vides, de quo progrediente oratione plura me dicturum puto, Tarquinio exacto mira quadam exultasse populum insolentia libertatis; tum exacti in exilium innocentes, tum bona direpta multorum, tum annui consules, tum demissi populo fasces, tum provocationes omnium rerum, tum secessiones plebei, tum prorsus ita acta pleraque, ut in populo essent omnia. L. Est, inquit, ut dicis. 1.63. Est vero, inquit Scipio, in pace et otio; licet enim lascivire, dum nihil metuas, ut in navi ac saepe etiam in morbo levi. Sed ut ille, qui navigat, cum subito mare coepit horrescere, et ille aeger ingravescente morbo unius opem inplorat, sic noster populus in pace et domi imperat et ipsis magistratibus minatur, recusat, appellat, provocat, in bello sic paret ut regi; valet enim salus plus quam libido. Gravioribus vero bellis etiam sine collega omne imperium nostri penes singulos esse voluerunt, quorum ipsum nomen vim suae potestatis indicat. Nam dictator quidem ab eo appellatur, quia dicitur, sed in nostris libris vides eum, Laeli, magistrum populi appellari. L. Video, inquit. Et Scipio: Sapienter igitur illi vete res 1.64. iusto quidem rege cum est populus orbatus, 'pectora diu tenet desiderium', sicut ait Ennius, 'post optimi regis obitum'; simul inter Sese sic memorant: 'o Romule, Romule die, Qualem te patriae custodem di genuerunt! O pater, o genitor, o sanguen dis oriundum!' Non eros nec dominos appellabant eos, quibus iuste paruerunt, denique ne reges quidem, sed patriae custodes, sed patres, sed deos; nec sine causa; quid enim adiungunt? Tu produxisti nos intra luminis oras. Vitam, honorem, decus sibi datum esse iustitia regis existimabant. Mansisset eadem voluntas in eorum posteris, si regum similitudo permansisset, sed vides unius iniustitia concidisse genus illud totum rei publicae. L. Video vero, inquit, et studeo cursus istos mutationum non magis in nostra quam in omni re publica noscere. 1.65. Et Scipio: Est omnino, cum de illo genere rei publicae, quod maxime probo, quae sentio, dixero, accuratius mihi dicendum de commutationibus rerum publicarum, etsi minime facile eas in ea re publica futuras puto. Sed huius regiae prima et certissima est illa mutatio: Cum rex iniustus esse coepit, perit illud ilico genus, et est idem ille tyrannus, deterrimum genus et finitimum optimo; quem si optimates oppresserunt, quod ferme evenit, habet statum res publica de tribus secundarium; est enim quasi regium, id est patrium consilium populo bene consulentium principum. Sin per se populus interfecit aut eiecit tyrannum, est moderatior, quoad sentit et sapit, et sua re gesta laetatur tuerique vult per se constitutam rem publicam. Si quando aut regi iusto vim populus attulit regnove eum spoliavit aut etiam, id quod evenit saepius, optimatium sanguinem gustavit ac totam rem publicam substravit libidini suae (cave putes autem mare ullum aut flammam esse tantam, quam non facilius sit sedare quam effrenatam insolentia multitudinem), tum fit illud, quod apud Platonem est luculente dictum, si modo id exprimere Latine potuero; difficile factu est, sed conabor tamen. 1.66. 'Cum' enim inquit 'inexplebiles populi fauces exaruerunt libertatis siti malisque usus ille ministris non modice temperatam, sed nimis meracam libertatem sitiens hausit, tum magistratus et principes, nisi valde lenes et remissi sint et large sibi libertatem ministrent, insequitur, insimulat, arguit, praepotentes, reges, tyrannos vocat.' Puto enim tibi haec esse nota. L. Vero mihi, inquit ille, notissima. 1.67. S. Ergo illa sequuntur: 'eos, qui pareant principibus, agitari ab eo populo et servos voluntarios appellari; eos autem, qui in magistratu privatorum similes esse velint, eosque privatos, qui efficiant, ne quid inter privatum et magistratum differat, ferunt laudibus et mactant honoribus, ut necesse sit in eius modi re publica plena libertatis esse omnia, ut et privata domus omnis vacet dominatione et hoc malum usque ad bestias perveniat, denique ut pater filium metuat, filius patrem neglegat, absit omnis pudor, ut plane liberi sint, nihil intersit, civis sit an peregrinus, magister ut discipulos metuat et iis blandiatur spertque discipuli magistros, adulescentes ut senum sibi pondus adsumant, senes autem ad ludum adulescentium descendant, ne sint iis odiosi et graves; ex quo fit, ut etiam servi se liberius gerant, uxores eodem iure sint, quo viri, inque tanta libertate canes etiam et equi, aselli denique liberi sic incurrant, ut iis de via decedendum sit. Ergo ex hac infinita,' inquit, 'licentia haec summa cogitur, ut ita fastidiosae mollesque mentes evadant civium, ut, si minima vis adhibeatur imperii, irascantur et perferre nequeant; ex quo leges quoque incipiunt neglegere, ut plane sine ullo domino sint.' 1.68. Tum Laelius: Prorsus, inquit, expressa sunt a te, quae dicta sunt ab illo. S. Atque, ut iam ad sermonis mei auctorem revertar, ex hac nimia licentia, quam illi solam libertatem putant, ait ille ut ex stirpe quadam existere et quasi nasci tyrannum. Nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus principum, sic hunc nimis liberum populum libertas ipsa servitute adficit. Sic omnia nimia, cum vel in tempestate vel in agris vel in corporibus laetiora fuerunt, in contraria fere convertuntur, maximeque id in rebus publicis evenit, nimiaque illa libertas et populis et privatis in nimiam servitutem cadit. Itaque ex hac maxima libertate tyrannus gignitur et illa iniustissima et durissima servitus. Ex hoc enim populo indomito vel potius immani deligitur aliqui plerumque dux contra illos principes adflictos iam et depulsos loco audax, inpurus, consectans proterve bene saepe de re publica meritos, populo gratificans et aliena et sua; cui quia privato sunt oppositi timores, dantur imperia et ea continuantur, praesidiis etiam, ut Athenis Pisistratus, saepiuntur, postremo, a quibus producti sunt, existunt eorum ipsorum tyranni; quos si boni oppresserunt, ut saepe fit, recreatur civitas; sin audaces, fit illa factio, genus aliud tyrannorum, eademque oritur etiam ex illo saepe optimatium praeclaro statu, cum ipsos principes aliqua pravitas de via deflexit. Sic tamquam pilam rapiunt inter se rei publicae statum tyranni ab regibus, ab iis autem principes aut populi, a quibus aut factiones aut tyranni, nec diutius umquam tenetur idem rei publicae modus. 1.69. Quod ita cum sit, ex tribus primis generibus longe praestat mea sententia regium, regio autem ipsi praestabit id, quod erit aequatum et temperatum ex tribus optimis rerum publicarum modis. Placet enim esse quiddam in re publica praestans et regale, esse aliud auctoritati principum inpartitum ac tributum, esse quasdam res servatas iudicio voluntatique multitudinis. Haec constitutio primum habet aequabilitatem quandam magnam, qua carere diutius vix possunt liberi, deinde firmitudinem, quod et illa prima facile in contraria vitia convertuntur, ut existat ex rege dominus, ex optimatibus factio, ex populo turba et confusio, quodque ipsa genera generibus saepe conmutantur novis, hoc in hac iuncta moderateque permixta conformatione rei publicae non ferme sine magnis principum vitiis evenit. Non est enim causa conversionis, ubi in suo quisque est gradu firmiter collocatus et non subest, quo praecipitet ac decidat. 1.70. Sed vereor, Laeli vosque homines amicissimi ac prudentissimi, ne, si diutius in hoc genere verser, quasi praecipientis cuiusdam et docentis et non vobiscum simul considerantis esse videatur oratio mea. Quam ob rem ingrediar in ea, quae nota sunt omnibus, quaesita autem a nobis iam diu. Sic enim decerno, sic sentio, sic adfirmo, nullam omnium rerum publicarum aut constitutione aut discriptione aut disciplina conferendam esse cum ea, quam patres nostri nobis acceptam iam inde a maioribus reliquerunt. Quam, si placet, quoniam ea, quae tenebatis ipsi, etiam ex me audire voluistis, simul et qualis sit et optimam esse ostendam expositaque ad exemplum nostra re publica accommodabo ad eam, si potero, omnem illam orationem, quae est mihi habenda de optimo civitatis statu. Quod si tenere et consequi potuero, cumulate munus hoc, cui me Laelius praeposuit, ut opinio mea fert, effecero. 1.71. Tum Laelius: Tuum vero, inquit, Scipio, ac tuum quidem unius. Quis enim te potius aut de maiorum dixerit institutis, cum sis clarissimis ipse maioribus? aut de optimo statu civitatis? quem si habemus, etsi ne nunc quidem, tum vero quis te possit esse florentior? aut de consiliis in posterum providendis, cum tu duobus huius urbis terroribus depulsis in omne tempus prospexeris? 2.3. Quam ob rem, ut ille solebat, ita nunc mea repetet oratio populi originem; libenter enim etiam verbo utor Catonis. Facilius autem, quod est propositum, consequar, si nostram rem publicam vobis et nascentem et crescentem et adultam et iam firmam atque robustam ostendero, quam si mihi aliquam, ut apud Platonem Socrates, ipse finxero. 2.16. Tum, id quo retinemus hodie magna cum salute rei publicae, auspiciis plurimum obsecutus est Romulus. Nam et ipse, quod principium rei publicae fuit, urbem condidit auspicato et omnibus publicis rebus instituendis, qui sibi essent in auspiciis, ex singulis tribubus singulos cooptavit augures et habuit plebem in clientelas principum discriptam (quod quantae fuerit utilitati, post videro) multaeque dictione ovium et bovum (quod tum erat res in pecore et locorum possessionibus, ex quo pecuniosi et locupletes vocabantur), non vi et suppliciis coercebat. 2.21. Videtisne igitur unius viri consilio non solum ortum novum populum neque ut in cunabulis vagientem relictum, sed adultum iam et paene puberem? Tum Laelius: Nos vero videmus, et te quidem ingressum ratione ad disputandum nova, quae nusquam est in Graecorum libris. Nam princeps ille, quo nemo in scribendo praestantior fuit, aream sibi sumsit, in qua civitatem extrueret arbitratu suo, praeclaram ille quidem fortasse, sed a vita hominum abhorrentem et moribus 2.33. neque enim serpit, sed volat in optimum statum instituto tuo sermone res publica. S. Post eum Numae Pompilii nepos ex filia rex a populo est Ancus Marcius constitutus, itemque de imperio suo legem curiatam tulit. Qui cum Latinos bello devicisset, adscivit eos in civitatem, atque idem Aventinum et Caelium montem adiunxit urbi, quosque agros ceperat, divisit et silvas maritimas omnis publicavit, quas ceperat, et ad ostium Tiberis urbem condidit colonisque firmavit. Atque ita cum tres et viginti regnavisset annos, est mortuus. Tum Laelius: Laudandus etiam iste rex; sed obscura est historia Romana, siquidem istius regis matrem habemus, ignoramus patrem. S. Ita est, inquit; sed temporum illorum tantum fere regum inlustrata sunt nomina. 2.41. Non. p. 342M Statu esse optimo constitutam rem publicam, quae ex tribus generibus illis, regali et optumati et populari, confusa modice nec puniendo inritet animum inmanem ac ferum. 2.43. Nam in qua re publica est unus aliquis perpetua potestate, praesertim regia, quamvis in ea sit et senatus, ut tum fuit Romae, cum erant reges, ut Spartae Lycurgi legibus, et ut sit aliquod etiam populi ius, ut fuit apud nostros reges, tamen illud excellit regium nomen, neque potest eius modi res publica non regnum et esse et vocari. Ea autem forma civitatis mutabilis maxime est hanc ob causam, quod unius vitio praecipitata in perniciosissimam partem facillime decidit. Nam ipsum regale genus civitatis non modo non est reprehendendum, sed haud scio an reliquis simplicibus longe anteponendum, si ullum probarem simplex rei publicae genus, sed ita, quoad statum suum retinet. Is est autem status, ut unius perpetua potestate et iustitia omnique sapientia regatur salus et aequabilitas et otium civium. Desunt omnino ei populo multa, qui sub rege est, in primisque libertas, quae non in eo est, ut iusto utamur domino, sed ut nul lo 2.59. †Fuerat fortasse aliqua ratio maioribus nostris in illo aere alieno medendi, quae neque Solonem Atheniensem non longis temporibus ante fugerat neque post aliquanto nostrum senatum, cum sunt propter unius libidinem omnia nexa civium liberata nectierque postea desitum; semperque huic generi, cum plebes publica calamitate inpendiis debilitata deficeret, salutis omnium causa aliqua sublevatio et medicina quaesita est. Quo tum consilio praetermisso causa populo nata est, duobus tribunis plebis per seditionem creatis ut potentia senatus atque auctoritas minueretur; quae tamen gravis et magna remanebat sapientissimis et fortissimis et armis et consilio civitatem tuentibus, quorum auctoritas maxime florebat, quod, cum honore longe antecellerent ceteris, voluptatibus erant inferiores nec pecuniis ferme superiores; eoque erat cuiusque gratior in re publica virtus, quod in rebus privatis diligentissime singulos cives opera, consilio, re tuebantur. 2.69. dici possit. Tum Laelius: Video iam, illum, quem expectabam, virum cui praeficias officio et muneri. Huic scilicet, Africanus, uni paene (nam in hoc fere uno sunt cetera), ut numquam a se ipso intuendo contemplandoque discedat, ut ad imitationem sui vocet alios, ut sese splendore animi et vitae suae sicut speculum praebeat civibus. Ut enim in fidibus aut tibiis atque ut in cantu ipso ac vocibus concentus est quidam tenendus ex distinctis sonis, quem inmutatum aut discrepantem aures eruditae ferre non possunt, isque concentus ex dissimillimarum vocum moderatione concors tamen efficitur et congruens, sic ex summis et infimis et mediis interiectis ordinibus ut sonis moderata ratione civitas consensu August. C.D. 2.21 dissimillimorum concinit; et quae harmonia a musicis dicitur in cantu, ea est in civitate concordia, artissimum atque optimum omni in re publica vinculum incolumitatis, eaque sine iustitia nullo pacto esse potest. 3.33. Lactant. Div. Inst. 6.8.6 Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpres eius alius, nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit. 3.34. August. C.D. 22.6 nullum bellum suscipi a civitate optima nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute. 3.34. Sed his poenis quas etiam stultissimi sentiunt, egestate, exilio, vinculis, verberibus, elabuntur saepe privati oblata mortis celeritate, civitatibus autem mors ipsa poena est, quae videtur a poena singulos vindicare; debet enim constituta sic esse civitas, ut aeterna sit. Itaque nullus interitus est rei publicae naturalis ut hominis, in quo mors non modo necessaria est, verum etiam optanda persaepe. Civitas autem cum tollitur, deletur, extinguitur, simile est quodam modo, ut parva magnis conferamus, ac si omnis hic mundus intereat et concidat. 3.45. S. Venio nunc ad tertium genus illud, in quo esse videbuntur fortasse angustiae. Cum per populum agi dicuntur et esse in populi potestate omnia, cum, de quocumque volt, supplicium sumit multitudo, cum agunt, rapiunt, tenent, dissipant, quae volunt, pot esne tum, Laeli, negare rem esse illam p ub licam? cum populi sint omnia, quoniam quidem populi esse rem volumus rem publicam. Tum Laelius: Ac nullam quidem citius negav e rim esse rem publicam, quam istam, quae tota ....... p.pu......... ni.s.ls.. ..... mo.....obis non placu it Syracusis fuisse rem publicam neq ue Agrigenti neq ue Athenis, cum es se nt tyranni, ne c hic, cum decemviri; ne c video, qui magis in multitudinis dominatu rei publicae nomen appareat, quia primum mihi populus non est, ut tu optime definisti, Scipio, nisi qui consensu iuris continet u r, sed est tam tyrannus iste conventus, quam si esset unus, hoc etiam taetrior, quia nihil ista, quae populi speciem et nomen imitatur, immanius belua est. Nec vero convenit, cum furiosorum bona legibus in adgnatorum potestate sint, quod eorum iam 6.13. Sed quo sis, Africane, alacrior ad tutandam rem publicam, sic habeto: omnibus, qui patriam conservaverint, adiuverint, auxerint, certum esse in caelo definitum locum, ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruantur; nihil est enim illi principi deo, qui omnem mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, acceptius quam concilia coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur; harum rectores et conservatores hinc profecti huc revertuntur.
5. Cicero, Letters To Quintus, 3.5.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Cicero, Pro S. Roscio Amerino, 50 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Varro, On Agriculture, 3.16.3-3.16.4, 3.16.6-3.16.7, 3.16.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

8. Lucan, Pharsalia, 5.118-5.120, 5.130-5.200 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academy Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 97
agency, of the roman senate Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 199
agents, collectives of Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 199
agricola (farmer) Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 227
antipater of tarsus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
appius claudius pulcher Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
aristocracy Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 119
aristotle Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 228
ars (art) Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
asmis, elizabeth Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 119
atkins, e.m. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
augustine Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 224, 260
aviaries Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
bees Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
belief, doxastic Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
caesar c. julius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
chrysippus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
cicero, m. tullius, speeches of Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 227
cicero, m. tullius Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204, 227, 228
cicero, on property Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
cicero Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327; Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
cincinnatus Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 227
citizens and citizenship Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 227, 228
civitas (city-state) Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
collegia Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 199
comic poets, community interests Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
common good Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 222
commonwealth Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
consensus Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 222; Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 199
consent Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 224
constitution, main forms Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 131
constitution / constitutio Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
cornelius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
cosmopolitanism Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 194
de re publica Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 119, 120, 131, 138, 139
de re publica (cicero) Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204, 227, 228
de re rustica (varro), allegory in Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
de re rustica (varro), dialogue form in Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
de re rustica (varro), dinner parties in Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
de re rustica (varro), engagement with ciceros dialogues Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204, 227, 228
de re rustica (varro), etymologies in Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
de re rustica (varro), intellectual program of Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 228
de re rustica (varro), metaphor in Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 228
de re rustica (varro), moralizing in Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
de re rustica (varro), use of greek sources in Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 228
death Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
democracy Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 119, 138
deontology Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
dream of scipio Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 194
durkheim, émile Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
emergent social entities Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 199
empire Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 260
epicureanism Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 97
equality Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 224
farm owners, roman Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 227, 228
fatherland Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 194
fides (good faith) Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 138, 139
freedom (political) Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 224
freedom / libertas Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 113
future Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 113
good Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 97
group mind Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 199
happiness Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 96, 97
honourableness Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
hope Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 260
human nature Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 194
ideal Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 45, 113
imperium, praedium as metaphor for Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 228
impulse / impetus / impulsus / ὁρμή Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
inequality Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 224
institutions Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
intentionality, shared Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
ius Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 119, 120, 131, 139
judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
justice, guaranteed by law Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 139
justice Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 222
justice / iustitia Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 45, 112, 113
kingship Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 119
laelius c. Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
law, as guarantor of justice Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 131, 138
law Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 139; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 45, 113
laws (ius)/legislation Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 96
locke, john Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 223
love Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 260
lucullus, l. licinius Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
mai angelus Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 113
memmius, c., menenius agrippa, fable of Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 18
merula, cornelius Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
metaphor, approach to Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 228
mixed constitution Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 18
nature, and value Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
nature Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 194
norms, political Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 199
novus homo Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
panaetius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 45
paradoxa stoicorum Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 131
pastures Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 228
people (populus) Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 223, 260
persuasion Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 224
philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 227, 228
physics Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 194
plato Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 96, 97, 224; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112, 113
pleasure and delight, excessive pursuit of Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
pohlenz, m. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
polis Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 227, 228
political participation/service Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 194
politics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
pompey / pompeius magnus g. Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
populus Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 120; Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
praedium (estate) Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 228
production and profit, as primary goal of pastio villatica (animal husbandry of the villa) Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
production and profit, bifurcation from pleasure Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
production and profit, ethics of Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
property-ownership Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
property Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 223
psychological mode, attitude Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
religion Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 97
republicanism Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 222, 224
res publica, definition of Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 119, 120, 131, 138, 139
res publica, optimus status of Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 18
res publica Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 96, 194, 222, 223, 248, 260; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 139; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
res publica (cicero) Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196
righteousness / recta officia / κατόρθωσις κατορθώματα Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 45
roman history Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 260
roman society, collectives in Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 199
roman society, senate of Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 199
rome Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 260
scaevola the augur q. mucius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
scepticism Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
seneca Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 194
serranus Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 227
shared intentionality Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
sicily Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
slaves and/or slavery Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 228
sociability Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 194, 248
societas Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 196, 199
society / societas Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 45
somnium scipionis Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 113
statesman Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 113
stoicism, xi Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 97, 248
stoicism Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 228
theory Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 45, 112
translation Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 223
truth Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 97
tubero q. aelius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 112
tullius cicero, m. (cicero), bodily conceptions in de re publica Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 18
tullius cicero, m. (cicero), on the mixed constitution Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 18
twelve tables Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 138
tyranny Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 131, 138
utilitarianism, utility' Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 327
utility, shared Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 120
veianii (brothers) Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 204
virtue Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 194
will / voluntas / βούλησις Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 45
wisdom / sapientia Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 113
zetzel, james Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 119