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Cicero, On The Nature Of The Gods, 1.12

nanIn an undertaking so extensive and so arduous, I do not profess to have attained success, though I do claim to have attempted it. At the same time it would be impossible for the adherents of this method to dispense altogether with any standard of guidance. This matter it is true I have discussed elsewhere more thoroughly; but some people are so dull and slow of apprehension that they appear to require repeated explanations. Our position is not that we hold that nothing is true, but that we assert that all true sensations are associated with false ones so closely resembling them that they contain no infallible mark to guide our judgement and assent. From this followed the corollary, that many sensations are probable, that is, though not amounting to a full perception they are yet possessed of a certain distinctness and clearness, and so can serve to direct the conduct of the wise man.

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1. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

69c. from all these things, and self-restraint and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification. And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few ;
2. Cicero, Academica, 2.7-2.8, 2.66, 2.78, 2.94, 2.98-2.99, 2.102-2.105, 2.148 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 5.76 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5.76. Tum Lucius: Mihi vero ista valde probata sunt, quod item fratri puto. Tum mihi Piso: Quid ergo? inquit, dasne adolescenti veniam? an eum discere ea mavis, quae cum plane cum plane BE cum p clare NV comp clare R perdidicerit, perdidicerit NV didicerit R perdiderit BE nihil sciat? Ego vero isti, inquam, permitto. sed nonne meministi licere mihi ista probare, quae sunt a te dicta? quis enim potest ea, quae probabilia videantur ei, non probare? An vero, inquit, quisquam potest probare, quod perceptum, quod comprehensum, quod cognitum non habet? Non est ista, inquam, Piso, magna dissensio. nihil enim est est enim BE aliud, quam ob rem mihi percipi nihil posse videatur, nisi quod percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quicquam posse percipi nisi tale verum, quale falsum esse non possit. itaque haec haec hic BE cum illis est dissensio, cum Peripateticis nulla sane. sed haec haec etiam B omittamus; habent enim et bene longam et satis litigiosam disputationem. 5.76.  To this Lucius replied: "Oh, I am quite convinced by what you have said, and I think my cousin is so too." "How now?" said Piso to me, "Has the young man your consent? or would you rather he should study a system which, when he has mastered it, will lead to his knowing nothing?" "Oh, I leave him his liberty," said I; "but don't you remember that it is quite open to me to approve the doctrines you have stated? Since who can refrain from approving statements that appear to him probable?" "But," said he, "can anyone approve that of which he has not full perception, comprehension and knowledge?" "There is no great need to quarrel about that, Piso," I rejoined. "The only thing that makes me deny the possibility of perception is the Stoics' definition of that faculty; they maintain that nothing can be perceived except a true presentation having such a character as no false presentation can possess. Here then I have a quarrel with the Stoics, but certainly none with the Peripatetics. However let us drop this question, for it involves a very long and somewhat contentious debate.
4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.1-1.4, 1.6-1.7, 1.10-1.11, 1.13-1.14, 1.57-1.61, 2.2, 2.5, 2.168, 3.3, 3.5, 3.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.1. There are a number of branches of philosophy that have not as yet been by any means adequately explored; but the inquiry into the nature of the gods, which is both highly interesting in relation to the theory of the soul, and fundamentally important for the regulation of religion, is one of special difficulty and obscurity, as you, Brutus, are well aware. The multiplicity and variety of the opinions held upon this subject by eminent scholars are bound to constitute a strong argument for the view that philosophy has its origin and starting-point in ignorance, and that the Academic School were well-advised in "withholding assent" from beliefs that are uncertain: for what is more unbecoming than ill‑considered haste? and what is so ill‑considered or so unworthy of the dignity and seriousness proper to a philosopher as to hold an opinion that is not true, or to maintain with unhesitating certainty a proposition not based on adequate examination, comprehension and knowledge? 1.2. As regards the present subject, for example, most thinkers have affirmed that the gods exist, and this is the most probable view and the one to which we are all led by nature's guidance; but Protagoras declared himself uncertain, and Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene held that there are no gods at all. Moreover, the upholders of the divine existence differ and disagree so widely, that it would be a troublesome task to recount their opinions. Many views are put forward about the outward form of the gods, their dwelling-places and abodes, and mode of life, and these topics are debated with the widest variety of opinion among philosophers; but as to the question upon which the whole issue of the dispute principally turns, whether the gods are entirely idle and inactive, taking no part at all in the direction and government of the world, or whether on the contrary all things both were created and ordered by them in the beginning and are controlled and kept in motion by them throughout eternity, here there is the greatest disagreement of all. And until this issue is decided, mankind must continue to labour under the profoundest uncertainty, and to be in ignorance about matters of the highest moment. 1.3. For there are and have been philosophers who hold that the gods exercise no control over human affairs whatever. But if their opinion is the true one, how can piety, reverence or religion exist? For all these are tributes which it is our duty to render in purity and holiness to the divine powers solely on the assumption that they take notice of them, and that some service has been rendered by the immortal gods to the race of men. But if on the contrary the gods have neither the power nor the will to aid us, if they pay no heed to us at all and take no notice of our actions, if they can exercise no possible influence upon the life of men, what ground have we for rendering any sort of worship, honour or prayer to the immortal gods? Piety however, like the rest of the virtues, cannot exist in mere outward show and pretence; and, with piety, reverence and religion must likewise disappear. And when these are gone, life soon becomes a welter of disorder and confusion; 1.4. and in all probability the disappearance of piety towards the gods will entail the disappearance of loyalty and social union among men as well, and of justice itself, the queen of all the virtues. There are however other philosophers, and those of eminence and note, who believe that the whole world is ruled and governed by divine intelligence and reason; and not this only, but also that the gods' providence watches over the life of men; for they think that the cornº and other fruits of the earth, and also the weather and the seasons and the changes of the atmosphere by which all the products of the soil are ripened and matured, are the gift of the immortal gods to the human race; and they adduce a number of things, which will be recounted in the books that compose the present treatise, that are of such a nature as almost to appear to have been expressly constructed by the immortal gods for the use of man. This view was controverted at great length by Carneades, in such a manner as to arouse in persons of active mind a keen desire to discover the truth. 1.6. I observe however that a great deal of talk has been current about the large number of books that I have produced within a short space of time, and that such comment has not been all of one kind; some people have been curious as to the cause of this sudden outburst of philosophical interest on my part, while others have been eager to learn what positive opinions I hold on the various questions. Many also, as I have noticed, are surprised at my choosing to espouse a philosophy that in their view robs the world of daylight and floods it with a darkness as of night; and they wonder at my coming forward so unexpectedly as the champion of a derelict system and one that has long been given up. As a matter of fact however I am no new convert to the study of philosophy. From my earliest youth I have devoted no small amount of time and energy to it, and I pursued it most keenly at the very periods when I least appeared to be doing so, witness the philosophical maxims of which my speeches are full, and my intimacy with the learned men who have always graced my household, as well as those eminent professors, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius, who were my instructors. 1.7. Moreover, if it be true that all the doctrines of philosophy have a practical bearing, I may claim that in my public and private conduct alike I have practised the precepts taught by reason and by theory. If again anyone asks what motive has induced me so late in the day to commit these precepts to writing, there is nothing that I can explain more easily. I was languishing in idle retirement, and the state of public affairs was such that an autocratic form of government had become inevitable. In these circumstances, in the first place I thought that to expound philosophy to my fellow-countrymen was actually my duty in the interests of the commonwealth, since in my judgement it would greatly contribute to the honour and glory of the state to have thoughts so important and so lofty enshrined in Latin literature also; 1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.11. To those again who are surprised at my choice of a system to which to give my allegiance, I think that a sufficient answer has been given in the four books of my Academica. Nor is it the case that I have come forward as the champion of a lost cause and of a position now abandoned. When men die, their doctrines do not perish with them, though perhaps they suffer from the loss of their authoritative exponent. Take for example the philosophical method referred to, that of a purely negative dialectic which refrains from pronouncing any positive judgement. This, after being originated by Socrates, revived by Arcesilas, and reinforced by Carneades, has flourished right down to our own period; though I understand that in Greece itself it is now almost bereft of adherents. But this I ascribe not to the fault of the Academy but to the dullness of mankind. If it is a considerable matter to understand any one of the systems of philosophy singly, how much harder is it to master them all! Yet this is the task that confronts those whose principle is to discover the truth by the method of arguing both for and against all the schools. 1.13. However, to free myself entirely from ill‑disposed criticism, I will now lay before my readers the doctrines of the various schools on the nature of the gods. This is a topic on which it seems proper to summon all the world to sit in judgement and pronounce which of these doctrines is the true one. If it turn out that all the schools agree, or if any one philosopher be found who had discovered the truth, then but not before I will convict the Academy of captiousness. This being so, I feel disposed to cry, in the words of the Young Comrades: O ye gods and O ye mortals, townsmen, gownsmen, hear my call; I invoke, implore, adjure ye, bear ye witness one and all — not about some frivolous trifle such as that of which a character in the play complains — . . . here's a monstrous crime and outrage in the land; Here's a lady who declines a guinea from a lover's hand! 1.14. but to attend in court, try the case, and deliver their verdict as to what opinions we are to hold about religion, piety and holiness, about ritual, about honour and loyalty to oaths, about temples, shrines and solemn sacrifices, and about the very auspices over which I myself preside; for all of these matters ultimately depend upon this question of the nature of the immortal gods. Surely such wide diversity of opinion among men of the greatest learning on a matter of the highest moment must affect even those who think that they possess certain knowledge with a feeling of doubt. 1.57. Then Cotta took up the discussion. "Well, Velleius," he rejoined, with his usual suavity, "unless you had stated a case, you certainly would have had no chance of hearing anything from me. I always find it much easier to think of arguments to prove a thing false than to prove it true. This often happens to me, and did so just now while I was listening to you. Ask me what I think that the divine nature is like, and very probably I shall make no reply; but inquire whether I believe that it resembles the description of it which you have just given, and I shall say that nothing seems to me less likely. But before proceeding to examine your arguments, I will give my opinion of yourself. 1.58. I fancy I have often heard that friend of yours [Lucius Crassus] declare that of all the Roman adherents of Epicureanism he placed you unquestionably first, and that few of those from Greece could be ranked beside you; but knowing his extraordinary esteem for you, I imagined that he was speaking with the partiality of a friend. I myself however, though reluctant to praise you to your face, must nevertheless pronounce that your exposition of an obscure and difficult theme has been most illuminating, and not only exhaustive in its treatment of the subject, but also graced with a charm of style not uncommon in your school. 1.59. When at Athens, I frequently attended the discourses of Zeno, whom our friend Philo used to call the leader of the Epicurean choir; in fact it was Philo who suggested that I should go to him — no doubt in order that I might be better able to judge how completely the Epicurean doctrine may be refuted when I had heard an exposition of it from the head of the school. Now Zeno, unlike most Epicureans, had a style as clear, cogent and elegant as your own. But what often occurred to me in his case happened just now while I was listening to you: I felt annoyed that talents so considerable should have chanced to select (if you will forgive my saying it) so trivial, not to say so stupid, a set of doctrines. 1.60. Not that I propose at the moment to contribute something better of my own. As I said just now, in almost all subjects, but especially in natural philosophy, I am more ready to say what is not true than what is. Inquire of me as to the being and nature of god, and I shall follow the example of Simonides, who having the same question put to him by the great Hiero, requested a day's grace for consideration; next day, when Hiero repeated the question, he asked for two days, and so went on several times multiplying the number of days by two; and when Hiero in surprise asked why he did so, he replied, 'Because the longer I deliberate the more obscure the matter seems to me.' But Simonides is recorded to have been not only a charming poet but also a man of learning and wisdom in other fields, and I suppose that so many acute and subtle ideas came into his mind that he could not decide which of them was truest, and therefore despaired of truth altogether. 1.61. But as for your master Epicurus (for I prefer to join issue with him rather than with yourself), which of his utterances is, I do not say worthy of philosophy, but compatible with ordinary common sense? "In an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first question that we ask is, do the gods exist or do they not? 'It is difficult to deny their existence.' No doubt it would be if the question were to be asked in a public assembly, but in private conversation and in a company like the present it is perfectly easy. This being so, I, who am a high priest, and who hold it to be a duty most solemnly to maintain the rights and doctrines of the established religion, should be glad to be convinced of this fundamental tenet of the divine existence, not as an article of faith merely but as an ascertained fact. For many disturbing reflections occur to my mind, which sometimes make me think that there are no gods at all. 2.2. For my part," rejoined Balbus, "I had rather listen to Cotta again, using the same eloquence that he employed in abolishing false gods to present a picture of the true ones. A philosopher, a pontiff and a Cotta should possess not a shifting and unsettled conception of the immortal gods, like the Academics, but a firm and definite one like our school. As for refuting Epicurus, that has been accomplished and more than achieved already. But I am eager to hear what you think yourself, Cotta." "Have you forgotten," said Cotta, "what I said at the outset, that I find it more easy, especially on such subjects as these, to say what I don't think than what I do? 2.5. how is the latter fact more evident than the former? Nothing but the presence in our minds of a firmly grasped concept of the deity could account for the stability and permanence of our belief in him, a belief which is only strengthened by the passage of the ages and grows more deeply rooted with each successive generation of mankind. In every other case we see that fictitious and unfounded opinions have dwindled away with lapse of time. Who believes that the Hippocentaur or the Chimaera ever existed? Where can you find an old wife senseless enough to be afraid of the monsters of the lower world that were once believed in? The years obliterate the inventions of the imagination, but confirm the judgements of nature. "Hence both in our own nation and among all others reverence for the gods and respect for religion grow continually stronger and more profound. 2.168. These are more or less the things that occurred to me which I thought proper to be said upon the subject of the nature of the gods. And for your part, Cotta, would you but listen to me, you would plead the same cause, and reflect that you are a leading citizen and a pontife, and you would take advantage of the liberty enjoyed by your school of arguing both pro and contra to choose to espouse my side, and preferably to devote to this purpose those powers of eloquence which your rhetorical exercises have bestowed upon you and which the Academy has fostered. For the habit of arguing in support of atheism, whether it be done from conviction or in pretence, is a wicked and impious practice. 3.3. Yes, to be sure, Velleius," replied Cotta; for "I have a very different business before me with Lucilius from what I had with you." "How so, pray?" said Velleius. "Because I think that your master Epicurus does not put up a very strong fight on the question of the immortal gods; he only does not venture to deny their existence so that he may not encounter any ill‑feeling or reproach. But when he asserts that the gods do nothing and care for nothing, and that though they possess limbs like those of men they make no use of those limbs, he seems not to be speaking seriously, and to think it enough if he affirms the existence of blessed and everlasting beings of some sort. 3.5. Very well," rejoined Cotta, "let us then proceed as the argument itself may lead us. But before we come to the subject, let me say a few words about myself. I am considerably influenced by your authority, Balbus, and by the plea that you put forward at the conclusion of your discourse, when you exhorted me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontife. This no doubt meant that I ought to uphold the beliefs about the immortal gods which have come down to us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and duties of religion. For my part I always shall uphold them and always have done so, and no eloquence of anybody, learned or unlearned, shall ever dislodge me from the belief as to the worship of the immortal gods which I have inherited from our forefathers. But on any question of el I am guided by the high pontifes, Titus Coruncanius, Publius Scipio and Publius Scaevola, not by Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, who was both an augur and a philosopher, to whose discourse upon religion, in his famous oration, I would rather listen than to any leader of the Stoics. The religion of the Roman people comprises ritual, auspices, and the third additional division consisting of all such prophetic warnings as the interpreters of the Sybil or the soothsayers have derived from portents and prodigies. While, I have always thought that none of these departments of religion was to be despised, and I have held the conviction that Romulus by his auspices and Numa by his establishment of our ritual laid the foundations of our state, which assuredly could never have been as great as it is had not the fullest measure of divine favour been obtained for it. 3.95. I on my side," replied Cotta, "only desire to be refuted. My purpose was rather to discuss the doctrines I have expounded than to pronounce judgement upon them, and I am confident that you can easily defeat me." "Oh, no doubt," interposed Velleius; "why, he thinks that even our dreams are sent to us by Jupiter — though dreams themselves are not so unsubstantial as a Stoic disquisition on the nature of the gods." Here the conversation ended, and we parted, Velleius thinking Cotta's discourse to be the truer, while I felt that that of Balbus approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth.
5. Cicero, On Duties, 1.6 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.6. Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat, tamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi consentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum, Academicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset. Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus.
6. Cicero, Lucullus, 132 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Cicero, Topica, 97 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

97. nec solum perpetuae actiones sed etiam partes orationis isdem locis adiuvantur, partim propriis partim communibus; ut in principiis, quibus quibus secl. Friedrich ut benevoli, ut dociles, ut attenti sint qui audiant, efficiendum est propriis locis; itemque narrationes ut ad suos fines spectent, id est ut planae sint, ut breves, ut evidentes, ut credibiles, ut moderatae moderatae codd. : moratae edd. vett. , ut cum dignitate. Quae quamquam in tota oratione esse debent, magis tamen sunt propria narrandi.
8. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.8, 1.10, 1.65-1.66, 1.72, 1.76, 1.83-1.84, 1.111, 3.70, 3.76, 4.63, 5.32, 5.121 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.8. itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. fiebat autem ita ut, cum is his G 1 V 1 H qui audire audiri X ( corr. V 2 l e ss. K 2 ) vellet dixisset, quid quod K 1 V 2 sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et et om. V 1 add. 2 Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Philosophia ... 221, 7 narretur H (27 fieri 220, 5 litteris et 220,13 adulescentes 220, 18 dicere bis ) ergo ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c ita nascetur exordium: Malum ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c mihi videtur esse mors. 1.10. num nunc ex. num K 1 te illa terrent, triceps apud inferos Cerberus, Cocyti coyc ti R 1 fremitus, travectio traiectio ex trav. K 1 transv. V c mg. ('al trans') g Trag. inc.111 Acherontis, mento summam aquam aquam trisyll. cf. Lachm. ad Lucr. 6, 552 quam Nonii L 1 A A attingens amnem Bue. adtinget ( vel -it) senextus Nonii L 1 A A enectus siti Tantalus? summam... tantalus Non. 401,29 enectus ... Tantalus Prisc, GL 2, 470, 18 tantulus X ( corr. K 2 ) Nonii et Prisciani pars tum illud, quod Sisyphus sisyphius X ( sed 2. eras. in V. sis. K 1 aut c ) Nonii pars versat versus? cf. Marx ad Lucil. 1375 saxum sudans nitendo neque proficit hilum? tum ... hlium Non. 121,4; 353, 8. fortasse etiam inexorabiles iudices, Minos et Rhadamanthus? apud quos nec te L. Crassus defendet defendet om. RK 1 ( add. 2 ) nec M. Antonius nec, quoniam apud Graecos iudices res agetur, poteris adhibere Demosthenen; demostenen K tibi ipsi pro te erit maxima corona causa dicenda. dicenda causa K haec fortasse metuis et idcirco mortem censes esse sempiternum malum. Adeone me delirare censes, ut ista esse credam? An tu ante G 1 haec non an tu an non ( 2. an in r. ) V 1? credis? Minime vero. Male hercule narras. Cur? quaeso. Quia disertus dissertus KR 1 esse possem, si contra ista dicerem. Quis enim non in eius modi causa? aut quid negotii est haec poëtarum et pictorum portenta convincere? aut convincere Non. 375, 29 1.65. prorsus haec divina mihi videtur vis, quae tot res efficiat et tantas. quid est enim enim s. v. add. G 1 memoria rerum et verborum? quid porro inventio? profecto id, quo ne in deo quidem quidem V 2 s om. X quicquam maius magis V 1 (corr. rec ) intellegi potest. potest R 1 potes G non enim ambrosia deos aut nectare aut Iuventate iuventute V rec pocula ministrante laetari laetare GR 1 (corr. 1 ) V 1 (corr. 2 ) Hom. Y 232 arbitror, nec Homerum audio, qui Ganymeden ganimeden V 1 (corr. 1 ) H ab dis dis ex his R raptum ait ait ex aut K c propter formam, ut ut V Iovi bibere ministraret; ut... ministraret Arus. GL. VII458, 16 non iusta causa, cur Laomedonti tanta tanta add. K c ex tanti V 2 fieret fieret V 2 s fierit X iniuria. fingebat haec Homerus et et add. V 2 humana ad deos transferebat: -ebat in r. V c transferret ad nos ss. K 2 divina mallem ad nos. fingebat... 2 nos Aug. civ. 4, 26 conf. 1,16 quae autem divina? vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse. quid igitur... 15 videtur et quis igitur ( pro aut qui) pri- mus 250, 3 meminisse H ergo animus animusq : K ( ui ss. 2 ) lac. ind. Po. ( suppl. fere sec. § 66 et rep. 6,26 : viget invenit meminit) qui ..., qui del. Lb. quidem Sey. ut ego Eurip. fr. 1018 dico, divinus est, ut Euripides dicere audet, deus. Et quidem, et quidem ex equi- dem V 1 si si add. K c deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. nam ut illa natura caelestis et terra vacat et umore, humore X sic utriusque utrisque V 1 harum rerum humanus animus est expers; sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele inducta primum, haec et deorum est et animorum. Hanc nos sententiam secuti sicuti K his ipsis verbis in Consolatione hoc hoc del. s, sed hoc ut p. 253, 27 de hoc ipso usurpatum est. Cic. distinguit inter hoc argumentum quod suis verbis exprimit et universam Aristotelis sententiam e qua illud ductum est. expressimus: 1.66. 'Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest; nihil nihil quid H enim est est enim Lact. in animis mixtum atque concretum aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur, nihil ne n e V( ss. m. rec. ) aut umidum humidum GV 2 H quidem aut flabile aut igneum. his enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriae vim memoriae in r. V 2 mentis cogitationis habeat, quod et praeterita teneat et futura provideat praevident V Lact. B 2 et complecti possit praesentia. quae sola divina sunt, nec invenietur nec enim inv. Lact. umquam, unde in de G 1 R 1 V ( m 2 ) unde K Lact. ad hominem venire possint nisi a deo. sin... 20 a deo H Animorum 20 a deo Lact. ira 10, 45 (inst. 7,8, 6) singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi seiuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. ita, quicquid est illud, quod sentit quod sapit quod vivit quod viget, caeleste et divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est. nec vero deus ipse, qui intellegitur a nobis, alio modo intellegi potest nisi mens soluta quaedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens nec vero ... 4 movens Lact. inst. 1,5, 25 (7, 3, 4) Salv. gub. dei 1, 1, 14 ipsaque praedita motu sempiterno. nec ... 4 sempiterno mens quaedam est soluta et libera, secreta ... 4 sempiterno Aug. civ. 22,20 hoc e genere atque que V q; sed; in r. R eadem e natura est humana mens.' Ubi igitur aut qualis est ista mens? 1.72. Ita Plato Phaedon 80sqq. enim censebat itaque disseruit, duas ut ante duas eras. in K esse vias duplicesque cursus animorum e corpore excedentium: nam cf. Lact. inst. 7, 10, 10 qui se humanis vitiis contaminavissent et se totos toto GV 1 ( s add. 2 ) R 1 ut v. (s add. ipse, tum lib- ex bib-) libidinibus dedissent, quibus caecati vel velut X (sed ut exp. V vet ) domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinavissent vel re publica violanda rei publicae violandae V 2 fraudes inexpiabiles concepissent, concoepissent GR concęp. K is devium quoddam iter esse, seclusum a concilio deorum; qui autem se integros castosque servavissent, quibusque fuisset minima cum corporibus contagio seseque contagiose seque V 1 ab is semper sevocavissent s evocavissent V ( exp. vet ) essentque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati deorum, is ad illos a quibus essent profecti reditum facilem patere. 1.76. quam cum lego, nihil malo quam has res relinquere, his vero modo auditis multo magis. Veniet tempus, et quidem et quidem V 1 celeriter, sive et sive X sed et exp. V 1 retractabis sive properabis; volat enim aetas. tantum autem abest ab eo ut malum mors sit, quod tibi dudum videbatur, ut verear verear K c ne homini nihil sit non malum aliud certius, nihil bonum aliud certius Jeep certe sed X (sed exp. V vet ) aliud, certe sit We. potius, si quidem vel di dii V 2 ipsi vel cum dis futuri sumus lac. ind. Po. ( suppl. fere: sed iam reliquorum philosophorum de hac re quaeramus sententias) cf. comm. et p.442,18 Quid refert? refers K c Adsunt enim, qui haec non probent. ego autem numquam ita te in hoc sermone dimittam, ulla uti ratione mors ratione mors V ratione ut mors GKR tibi videri malum possit. Qui potest, cum ista cognoverim? Qui possit, rogas? 1.83. fit enim ad punctum temporis. Illud angit vel potius excruciat, discessus ab omnibus is quae sunt bona in vita . vide ne a malis nea malis K ( fuit m vel ni) dici verius possit. quid ego nunc lugeam vitam hominum? vere et iure possum; sed quid necesse est, cum id agam ne post mortem miseros nos putemus fore, etiam vitam efficere deplorando miseriorem? fecimus hoc in eo libro, in quo nosmet ipsos, quantum potuimus, consolati sumus. a malis igitur mors abducit, non a bonis, verum si sqq. Val. Max 8, 9 ext. 3 quaerimus. et quidem hoc ecquidem GRV h q dĕ (= haec quidem) K 1 (hoc quidem ss. 2 ) a Cyrenaico Hegesia he gesia R 1 sic copiose disputatur, ut is a rege Ptolomaeo ptolomeo K ptholomeo GV prohibitus esse dicatur illa in scholis dicere, quod quod V 2 s quo X multi is auditis mortem sibi ipsi consciscerent. -scerent in r. V c 1.84. Callimachi quidem epigramma in Ambraciotam Theombrotum Cleombrotum Callim. ep. 23 cf. p. Scauro § 4. est, quem ait, cum ei nihil accidisset accedisset GR 1 ( e 1 ) K 1 (corr. 2 ) V adversi, e muro se sc. Phaedone in mare abiecisse lecto Platonis libro. eius autem, quem dixi, Hegesiae helesiae X ( sed l ex g V 1 ) liber est liber est add. K 2 *)apokarterw=n, aitoka p te p on fere X) po pro ito voluisse vid. V 2 a it o G 1 ) quo quod W (breviter pro ' qui inscribitur a)pok . quod'?) quo Sey. in quo Bentl. a vita quidem per inediam discedens revocatur ab amicis; quibus respondens vitae humanae enumerat incommoda. possem idem idem Ern. id facere, etsi minus quam ille, quam ille s. v. add. G 1 qui omnino vivere expedire nemini putat. mitto alios: etiamne nobis expedit? qui et domesticis et forensibus solaciis solatiis GK ornamentisque privati certe si ante occidissemus, mors nos a malis, amabilis K 1 non a bonis abstraxisset. 1.111. 'morere, more V 1 ( add. c ) Diagora' inquit; non enim in caelum ascensurus es. magna haec, et nimium fortasse, Graeci putant vel tum potius putabant, isque, qui hoc Diagorae dixit, permagnum existimans tris tris K (r e corr 1 ) R(!)V( i ) tres G Olympionicas una e domo prodire cunctari illum diutius in vita fortunae obiectum inutile putabat ipsi. ipse K 1 Ego autem tibi quidem, quod satis esset, paucis verbis, ut mihi videbar, videbatur V 2 responderam—concesseras enim nullo in malo mortuos esse—; sed ob eam causam contendi ut plura dicerem, quod in desiderio et luctu haec est consolatio maxima. nostrum enim et nostra nostra V causa susceptum dolorem modice ferre debemus, ne nosmet ipsos amare videamur; illa suspicio suspitio K intolerabili intollerabili KRV 1 dolore cruciat, si opinamur eos quibus orbati sumus esse cum aliquo sensu in is malis quibus volgo opitur. hanc excutere opinionem mihimet post mihimet add. V 2 volui radicitus, eoque fui fortasse longior. Tu longior? 3.70. neque tamen, cum se in media stultitia, qua nihil quia n. G 1 est peius, haerere intellegant, aegritudine premuntur; nulla enim admiscetur opinio officiosi doloris. Quid, qui non putant lugendum lungendum GV 1 ( prius n eras. ) iungen- dum KR viris? sqq. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 qualis fuit Q. Maxumus fuitque maxumus G 2 (quae G 1 ) KV ( ss. m. 3 ) ac fortasse R 1 (Q post fuit in r. m. al. ) efferens efferrens GR 1 V filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus paullus RG 1 e corr. V 1 (l eras. ) cf.p. 263, 17; 274, 19; 457, 7 duobus paucis lucius et marcus X diebus amissis amisis G 1 R 1 V 1 filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione consolationem G -ne V conlegimus. 3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V 4.63. itaque non sine causa, cum Orestem fabulam doceret doceret s Prisc. diceret X Euripides, non ... 16 Euripides Prisc. GL. 2, 246, 2 primos tris versus revocasse dicitur Socrates: Neque ta/m terribilis u/lla fando ora/tio oratio s ( e0/pos ) ratio X Prisc. est, Nec fo/rs fors X (sor G 1 fors G 2 ) Prisc. ( audacter dictum pro eo quod fors fert, ut saepe fortuna; sed vix spernendum cf. Forsdeus Att. 4, 10 forte-divinitus Liv. 1, 4, Ov. trist. 5, 3, 13, Vell. 2, 66 al. ) sors vulgo ( pa/qos Eur. ) nec ira cae/litum invectu/m invectum edd. inventum X invictum Prisc. malum, Quod no/n non add. G 2 natura huma/na patiendo e/cferat. neque ... 20 ferat Prisc. GL.3, 426, 7 est autem utilis ad persuadendum ea quae acciderint ferri et posse et oportere oportere V eorum bis V 1 enumeratio eorum qui tulerunt. tullerunt GR ( corr. c ) V ( corr. 3 ) etsi aegritudinis sedatio et hesterna disputatione explicata est et in Consolationis libro, quem in medio—non enim sapientes eramus—maerore et dolore conscripsimus; quodque vetat vertat V 1 St. fr. 3, 484 Chrysippus, ad recentis quasi tumores animi remedium adhibere, id nos fecimus naturaeque vim cum in vim corr. V 3 attulimus, attullimus X (adt. V) ut magnitudini medicinae doloris magnitudo concederet. ut cum magnitudine ... 3 concederet Non. 270, 11 5.32. Adducis aducis R me, ut tibi adsentiar. sed tua quoque vide ne desideretur constantia. adducis...4 constantia add. G 2 in mg. Quonam modo? Quia legi tuum nuper quartum quarum V 1 de finibus; in eo mihi videbare contra Catonem disserens hoc velle ostendere—quod mihi quidem probatur probare KR —inter Zenonem et Peripateticos nihil praeter verborum novitatem interesse. quod si ita est, quid qui G 1 est causae quin, si Zenonis rationi consentaneum sit satis magnam vim in virtute esse ad beate vivendum, liceat idem Peripateticis peripatercis K 1 dicere? rem enim opinor opinior K spectari oportere, non verba. 5.121. Sed quoniam mane est eundum, has quinque dierum disputationes memoria comprehendamus. conpreh. KV equidem me etiam conscripturum arbitror—ubi enim melius uti melius uti G 1 in mg. possumus hoc, cuicuimodi cui'cui'modi R ( sed '' 2 ) est, otio?—, ad Brutumque nostrum hos libros alteros quinque libros hos K hos libros quemadmodum quinque de finibus alteros V b mittemus, a quo non modo inpulsi sumus ad philosophiae philosophiae Non. utroque loco philosophas X (philosophicas R 2 V b ) scriptiones, inpulsi 459, 1 scriptiones Non. 174,20, eadem usque ad 459,1 lacessiti 134,2 verum etiam lacessiti. in quo quantum ceteris profuturi simus, simus Beroaldus sumus non facile dixerim, dixerim GV dixeri m K dixeri- mus R ( sed us, quod fort. ab alia m. additium est, postea expunctum ) s nostris quidem acerbissimis doloribus variisque et undique circumfusis molestiis alia nulla potuit inveniri levatio. alia ... levatio Non. 336, 20 levatio. Finit K
9. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 6.2.32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

6.2.32.  From such impressions arises that ἐνάργεια which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence. Is it not from visions such as these that Vergil was inspired to write â€” "Sudden her fingers let the shuttle fall And all the thread was spilled

Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academica (dialogue of cicero) Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70
academy Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 124
annihilation Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 106
antiochus of ascalon Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 110
argument Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 110
assent / adsensio / adsensus / συγκατάθεσις Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 111
carneades Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 124
choice / decision / αἵρεσις Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 111
cicero Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 271; Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 106
cosmos Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 124
cotta Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 271
de oratore Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70
death, outcome of Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 106
dicaearchus Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 110
eclecticism Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 111
emotions Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70
enargeia, in epistemology Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70
enargeia, in rhetoric Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70
epicureanism Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 124; Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 271
epistemology Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 110
epochē / ἐποχή Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 111
god, gods Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 106
gods Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 124
homer Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 106
law Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 111
marius g. Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 111
panaetius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 110
partitiones oratoriae Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70
philo of larissa Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 110
physics Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 124
plato Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 106; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 110
preconceptions Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 124
probable / probability / probabilitas / πιθανόν Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 111
reader Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 115
religion Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 124
scepticism Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 271; Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 106; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 110, 111
sisyphus Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 106
skepticism, radical and mitigated' Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 38
socrates, and cicero Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 106
stoicism, epistemology Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70
stoicism, xi Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 115, 124
stoicism Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 271
sulla p. cornelius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 111
tantalus Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 106
theophrastus Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 110
topica Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70
truth Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 115
varro Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 115
virgil, and scepticism Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 271
xenocrates Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 110