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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2293
Cicero, On The Ends Of Good And Evil, 5.88-5.89


sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita. pauca enim, neque ea ipsa enucleate, ab hoc ab hoc enucleate BE de virtute quidem dicta. post enim haec in hac urbe primum a Socrate quaeri coepta, deinde in hunc locum delata sunt, nec dubitatum, dubium R quin in virtute omnis ut bene, sic etiam beate vivendi spes poneretur. quae cum Zeno didicisset a nostris, ut in actionibus praescribi solet, ' de eadem re fecit alio modo '. hoc tu del. P. Man. nunc in illo probas. scilicet vocabulis rerum mutatis inconstantiae crimen ille effugit, nos effugere non possumus! ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli, praeponendam tamen, nec magis expetendam, sed magis sumendam et, si optio esset, eligendam Metelli, Reguli reiciendam; ego, quam ille praeponendam et magis eligendam, beatiorem hanc appello nec ullo minimo minimo RV omnino BE momento plus ei vitae tribuo quam Stoici. But what he said on this subject, however excellent, nevertheless lacks the finishing touches; for indeed about virtue he said very little, and that not clearly expressed. For it was later that these inquiries began to be pursued at Athens by Socrates, first in the city, and afterwards the study was transferred to the place where we now are; and no one doubted that all hope alike of right conduct and of happiness lay in virtue. Zeno having learnt this doctrine from our school proceeded to deal with 'the same matter in another manner,' as the common preamble to an indictment has it. You now approve of this procedure on his part. He, no doubt, can change the names of things and be acquitted of inconsistency, but we cannot! He denies that the life of Metellus was happier than that of Regulus, yet calls it 'preferable'; not more desirable, but 'more worthy of adoption'; and given the choice, that of Metellus is 'to be selected' and that of Regulus 'rejected.' Whereas the life he called 'preferable' and 'more worthy to be selected' I term happier, though I do not assign any the minutest fraction more value to that life than do the Stoics. <


quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt, quibus idem dicant? idem dicant V iā dicant R ilia appellant BE ita, quem ad modum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. bonum appello quicquid secundum naturam est, quod quod V contra malum, nec ego quam BER solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola scola BERV desinis. quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? quanti quidque sit aliter docti et indocti, sed cum constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit—si homines essent, essent V si B se E et R ( in quo s non satis cognosci potest ) usitate loquerentur—, dum res maneant, maneant dett. maneat verba fingant arbitratu suo. What is the difference, except that I call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, — if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, — let them coin new words at their pleasure. <


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

11 results
1. Democritus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

30a. the things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related to me. For know that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property
3. Cicero, Academica, 1.44, 2.32 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.44. Tum ego Cum Zenone inquam “ut accepimus Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi ut quidem mihi quidem mihi *gp videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et vel ut iam ante et iam ante Dav. ad Lact. epit. 32 et ueluti amantes *g*d Socratem Democritum Anaxagoram Empedoclem omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus imbecillos inbecilles p 1 sgf animos brevia curricula vitae et et om. sgf ut Democritus cf. p. 43, 13 in profundo veritatem esse demersam, demersam gfx dim- smnp m diuersam *d opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil veritati ueritate *g relinqui, deinceps deinceps denique Bentl. densis IACvHeusde ' Cic. filopla/twn ' ( 1836 ) 236 n. 1 omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. cf. Lact. inst. 3, 4, 11. 28, 12 s. 30, 6 Democr. fr. 117 Deiels Emped. fr. 2 D. ( Kranz Herm. 47, 29 n. 2 )
4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 5.7, 5.22-5.26, 5.37, 5.79, 5.84-5.87, 5.89 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5.7. Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit poterit 'emendavisse videtur Aldus' Mdv. poteris sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam illam veterem BE vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii ii edd. hi R hij BENV soli solum R numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps principes R Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, converte te NV convertere R convertere te BE quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum artificiū R officina profecti sunt. Atque ego: At ego R Et ego V 5.22. nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadeam illam sententiam. quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id id ( post vult) om. RNV efficit turpe. ad eas enim res referre, quae agas, quarum una, si quis malo careat, in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquitis. Restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. hos contra singulos dici est melius. sed nunc, quod quod quid BE quid (= quidem) R agimus; 5.23. de illis, cum volemus. Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tamquam tamquam (tanquā R) tranquillitas RN tranquillitas tamquam BE tranquillitas ( om. tamquam) V tranquillitas, quam appellant eu)qumi/an, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea ipsa secl. Se. est est ipsa BE beata vita; quaerimus autem, non quae sit, sit ( utroque loco ) dett. sint sed unde sit. Iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in hunc orbem, quem circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus diximus p. 163, 16 sqq. naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil quod non aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse del. Lamb. ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nec inter eas res quicquam quicquam quitquid BE omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum cum praeterea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necesse est. ergo ergo igitur BE instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium. 5.24. Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul et ortum est, id agit, se ut ut se BE conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum modo se tueatur, qualecumque sit, sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quicquid se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere quam ob ob N 2 ad causam habeat habeat Lamb. habet eum, quem diximus, animi appetitum coeptatque et ea, quae naturae sentit apta, appetere et propulsare contraria. ergo omni animali illud, quod appetit, positum est in eo, quod naturae nature V natura ( etiam B) est accommodatum. ita finis bonorum existit secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque que ER et NV om. B accommodatissime. 5.25. Quoniam Quoniam Q uo R autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur—nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis—, sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint sunt RNV et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret. desiderat RNV 5.26. quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente. 5.37. ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo et in corpore et in animo et in corpore NV et animo et corpore (in bis om. ) BE in animo et corpore ( priore et et poster. in om. ) R perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. quo cognito dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate sua caritate V sua e caritate R sua ecaritate BEN colantur et per se ipsae appetantur. 5.79. Respondebo me non quaerere, inquam, hoc tempore quid virtus efficere possit, sed quid constanter dicatur, quid ipsum a se dissentiat. Quo igitur, igitur ( i. e. quoniam ita quaeris, accuratius dic cur id facias ) om. BE inquit, modo? Quia, cum a Zenone, inquam, hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: 'Virtus ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta est', et Quare? Post vocab. Quare in N reliqua desunt, cum sequatur pravumve quid consentiens quid et q. s. Acad. poster. I 19 sqq. inquit, respondet: add. Se. Quia, nisi quod honestum est, nullum est aliud bonum. Non quaero iam verumne sit; illud dico, ea, quae dicat, praeclare inter se cohaerere. 5.84. dato dato edd. date hoc dandum erit erit est BE illud. Quod vestri non item. 'Tria genera bonorum'; proclivi proclivis V currit oratio. venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra. cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, potes cod. Glogav., Dav. ; potest nisi retexueris illa. paupertas si malum est, mendicus beatus esse esse beatus BE nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. at Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. dolere malum est: in crucem qui agitur, in crucem qui agitur cod. Mor., marg. Crat. ; in crucem quia igitur BE in cruce. Quia igitur RV beatus esse non potest. bonum liberi: misera orbitas. bonum patria: miserum exilium. bonum valitudo: miser miser Mdv. miserum RV om. BE morbus. bonum integritas corporis: misera debilitas. bonum incolumis acies: misera caecitas. quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quo modo sustinebit? sustinebis BE substinebis V sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: eculeo dett. aculeo quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam tam dett., om. BERV docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum. 5.85. Tibi hoc incredibile, quod quod Mdv. quid B quia ERV beatissimum. quid? tuum credibile? si enim ad populum me vocas, eum, qui ita sit affectus, beatum esse numquam probabis; si ad prudentes, alterum fortasse dubitabunt, sitne tantum in virtute, ut ea praediti vel in Phalaridis tauro beati sint, alterum non dubitabunt, quin et Stoici convenientia sibi dicant et vos repugtia. Theophrasti igitur, inquit, tibi liber ille placet de beata vita? Tamen aberramus a proposito, et, ne longius, prorsus, inquam, Piso, si ista mala sunt, placet. Nonne igitur tibi videntur, nonne inquit igitur tibi videntur BE inquit, mala? 5.86. Id quaeris, Id quaeris P. Man. id queres BE Idque res R Id que res V inquam, in quo, utrum respondero, utrum respondero Lamb. utrum respondebo R tibi utrum respondebo V respondebo utrum BE verses te huc atque illuc necesse est. Quo tandem modo? inquit. Quia, si mala sunt, is, qui erit in iis, beatus non erit; si mala non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum. Et ille ridens: Video, inquit, quid agas; ne discipulum abducam, times. Tu vero, inquam, ducas licet, si sequetur; sequatur RV erit enim mecum, si tecum erit. Audi igitur, inquit, Luci; tecum enim mihi enim mihi Lamb. enim (est V) ut ait theophrastus mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, ut ait Theophrastus Lamb. om. BERV Non. consistit constitit ( LBA Lindsay ) Non. in beata vita comparanda; omnis auct.... comparanda Non. p. 256 beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus. hoc mihi cum tuo fratre convenit. vivendi ... convenit Non. p. 271 5.87. quare hoc hoc atque hoc Non. videndum est, possitne nobis hoc ratio philosophorum dare. pollicetur certe. nisi enim id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit, ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet? cur post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pythagoreos, Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem, Locros, ut, cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagoreorum disciplinam eaque, quae Socrates repudiabat, addisceret? cur ipse Pythagoras et Aegyptum lustravit et Persarum magos adiit? cur tantas regiones barbarorum pedibus obiit, tot maria transmisit? cur haec eadem Democritus? qui —vere falsone, quaerere mittimus quaerere mittimus Se. quereremus BER queremus V quae- rere nolumus C.F.W. Mue. —dicitur oculis se se oculis BE privasse; privavisse R certe, ut quam minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patrimonium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos, quid quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam? beatam vitam R quam si etiam in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen ex illa investigatione naturae consequi volebat, bono ut esset animo. id enim ille id enim ille R ideo enim ille BE id ille V id est enim illi summum bonum; eu)qumi/an cet. coni. Mdv. summum bonum eu)qumi/an et saepe a)qambi/an appellat, id est animum terrore liberum. 5.89. quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt, quibus idem dicant? idem dicant V iā dicant R ilia appellant BE ita, quem ad modum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. bonum appello quicquid secundum naturam est, quod quod V contra malum, nec ego quam BER solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola scola BERV desinis. quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? quanti quidque sit aliter docti et indocti, sed cum constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit—si homines essent, essent V si B se E et R ( in quo s non satis cognosci potest ) usitate loquerentur—, dum res maneant, maneant dett. maneat verba fingant arbitratu suo. 5.7.  "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians. 5.22.  Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. 5.23.  "The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. 5.24.  "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. 5.25.  At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. 5.26.  Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.37.  "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.79.  "My reply will be," said I, "that I am not at the present asking what result virtue can produce, but what is a consistent and what a self-contradictory account of it." "How do you mean?" said he. "Why," I said, "first Zeno enunciates the lofty and oracular utterance, 'Virtue need not look outside herself for happiness'; 'Why?' says some one. 'Because,' he answers, 'nothing else is good but what is morally good.' I am not now asking whether this is true; I merely say that Zeno's statements are admirably logical and consistent. 5.84.  Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' 5.85.  You draw the line at this; you can't believe that he is supremely happy. Well, but can one believe what you say either? Call me before a jury of ordinary people, and you will never persuade them that the man so afflicted is happy; refer the case to the learned, and it is possible that on one of the two counts you will be doubtful about their verdict, whether virtue has such efficacy that the virtuous will be happy even in the bull of Phalaris: but on the other, they will find without hesitation that the Stoic doctrine is consistent and yours self-contradictory. 'Ah,' says the Academic, 'then you agree with Theophrastus in his great work On Happiness?' However, we are wandering from the subject; and to cut the matter short, Piso," I said, "I do fully agree with Theophrastus, if misfortunes, as you say, are evils. 5.86.  "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.87.  On this your cousin and I are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is this, can the systems of the philosophers give us happiness? They certainly profess to do so. Whether it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian priests? Why did he later visit Archytas at Tarentum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those branches which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras himself scour Egypt and visit the Persian magi? why did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian lands and sail across those many seas? Why did Democritus do the same? It is related of Democritus (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness? Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should bring him cheerfulness of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles euthumia, or often athambia, that is freedom from alarm. 5.89.  What is the difference, except that I call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, — if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, — let them coin new words at their pleasure.
5. Cicero, On Invention, 15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Cicero, On Duties, 1.80-1.81, 5.24 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.80. Quare expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo, sed cavendum, ne id bellandi magis fuga quam utilitatis ratione faciamus. Bellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur. Fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nec tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti et consilio nec a ratione discedere. 1.81. Quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni est, praecipere cogitatione futura et aliquanto ante constituere, quid accidere possit in utramque partem, et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec committere, ut aliquando dicendum sit: Non putaram. Haec sunt opera magni animi et excelsi et prudentia consilioque fidentis; temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est; sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda. 1.80.  And so diplomacy in the friendly settlement of controversies is more desirable than courage in settling them on the battlefield; but we must be careful not to take that course merely for the sake of avoiding war rather than for the sake of public expediency. War, however, should be undertaken in such a way as to make it evident that it has no other object than to secure peace. But it takes a brave and resolute spirit not to be disconcerted in times of difficulty or ruffled and thrown off one's feet, as the saying is, but to keep one's presence of mind and one's self-possession and not to swerve from the path of reason. 1.81.  Now all this requires great personal courage; but it calls also for great intellectual ability by reflection to anticipate the future, to discover some time in advance what may happen whether for good or for ill, and what must be done in any possible event, and never to be reduced to having to say, "I had not thought of that." These are the activities that mark a spirit strong, high, and self-reliant in its prudence and wisdom. But to mix rashly in the fray and to fight hand to hand with the enemy is but a barbarous and brutish kind of business. Yet when the stress of circumstances demands it, we must gird on the sword and prefer death to slavery and disgrace.
7. Cicero, Lucullus, 15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

8. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.43-5.44, 5.48, 5.50, 5.54-5.66, 5.68-5.80 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5.43. Atque cum atque cum edd. vett. at quicumque X atqui cum V 3 s perturbationes per turbationis ex -es R 1 animi miseriam, sedationes autem vitam efficiant beatam, duplexque ratio perturbationis sit, quod quod quae K aegritudo et metus in malis opinatis, in bonorum autem errore laetitia gestiens libidoque versetur, quae omnia cum quae Bentl. cum s cum omnia ea Sey. consilio et ratione oratione K pugnent, his tu tam gravibus concitationibus tamque ipsis tamque in ipsis G 1 inter se dissentientibus dissentientibus dissidentibus H atque distractis quem vacuum solutum liberum videris, hunc dubitabis beatum dicere? atqui sapiens semper ita adfectus est; semper igitur sapiens beatus est. Atque atque sqq. St.fr.3,37 ( cf. fin. 3, 27 ) etiam omne bonum laetabile est; quod autem laetabile, id praedicandum et prae se ferendum; et praeferendum H s quod tale autem, id etiam gloriosum; si vero gloriosum, certe laudabile; quod laudabile autem, profecto etiam honestum; 5.44. quod bonum igitur, id honestum. qui...424,9 honestum ( sine 11 an...15 universa et 21 haec...22 explicata) H at quae isti atque isti X bona numerant, ne ipsi quidem honesta dicunt; solum igitur bonum, quod honestum; ex quo efficitur honestate una unam GH ( alt. loco ) vitam contineri continere X corr. V rec s beatam. Non sunt igitur ea bona dicenda nec habenda, quibus abundantem habundantem GKH licet esse miserrimum. solum...14 miserrimum (...12 beatam bis ) 5.48. Etenim, pro deorum atque hominum fidem! fidem s fide X parumne cognitum est superioribus nostris disputationibus, an delectationis delectacionis K dilectationis GR dilectationibus V et otii consumendi causa locuti sumus, sapientem ab omni concitatione animi, quam perturbationem voco, semper vacare, semper in animo eius esse placidissimam pacem? vir igitur temperatus, constans, sine metu, sine aegritudine, sine alacritate futtili, futili Bentl. ( cf. 379, 18 ) ulla W et Non. 457, 4 : Alacritatem in malis habendam Cicero Tusculanarum lib.V ostendit: vir igitur... sine alacritate ulla, lubidine non vexatus sine libidine nonne beatus? at a t V aut GKR semper sapiens talis; semper igitur beatus. Iam St. fr. 3,59 vero qui potest vir bonus non ad id, quod laudabile sit, omnia referre, quae agit quaeque sentit? refert autem omnia ad beate vivendum; beata igitur vita laudabilis; nec quicquam nequicquam GV sine virtute laudabile: beata igitur vita virtute conficitur. 5.50. quod si est, add. Lb. beata vita glorianda et praedicanda et prae se ferenda est; nihil est enim aliud quod praedicandum et prae se ferendum praeferendum V ( cf. ad 426, 20 ) sit. quibus positis intellegis quid sequatur. Et quidem, nisi ea vita beata est, quae est eadem honesta, sit aliud necesse est melius vita beata; quod erit enim enim add. G 2 honestum, certe fatebuntur esse melius. ita erit beata vita melius aliquid; quo quid potest dici perversius? dicimus itaque sapientem...9 pacem et 14 beata... 427,7 perversius H Quid? cum fatentur satis magnam vim esse in vitiis ad invitusad V miseram vitam, nonne fatendum est eandem vim in virtute virtute B 1 virtutem X virtutum s esse ad beatam vitam? contrariorum enim contraria sunt consequentia. 5.54. Etenim ut stultitia, etsi adepta est quod concupivit, numquam se tamen satis consecutam putat, consecuta GRV 1 putet V 1 sic sapientia semper eo contenta contenda K 1 conta G contempta H est quod adest, neque eam umquam sui paenitet. at nos autem...14 penitet H Similemne similene X similemen s putas C. Laelii unum consulatum consolat.GR ( in 24 corr. c ) V fuisse, fuisse s V rec fuisset X et eum quidem cum repulsa (si, si sic V rec cum sapiens et bonus vir, qualis ille fuit, suffragiis praeteritur, non populus a bono consule potius quam ille a bono populo del.Mue. a vano populo s a populo ( sine bono) Mdv del.Mue. a vano populo s a populo ( sine bono) Mdv repulsam fert post fert iterat suffragiis praeteritur X )—sed tamen utrum malles te, ma este G ( ss. 2 ) si potestas esset, semel ut Laelium consulem an ut Cinnam quater? 5.55. non dubito, tu quid responsurus sis; itaque video, cui committam. non quemvis hoc idem interrogarem; responderet enim alius fortasse se non modo quattuor consulatus consolat.GR ( in 24 corr. c ) V uni anteponere, sed unum diem Cinnae multorum et clarorum virorum totis aetatibus. Laelius si digito quem attigisset, poenas dedisset; at Cinna collegae sui consulis Cn. Octavii GN.X praecidi caput praeciditapud K iussit, iussit, iussit Sey. lussit G hic et saepius P. Crassi L. Caesaris, nobilissimorum hominum, quorum virtus fuerat domi militiaeque cognita, M. Antonii, omnium eloquentissimi quos ego audierim, C. Caesaris, G. X in quo mihi videtur specimen fuisse humanitatis salis suavitatis leporis. beatusne igitur, qui hos qui hos s V 3 quos X interfecit? interficit V 1 mihi contra non solum eo videtur miser, miser eqs. cf. Aug. civ. 5, 26 quod ea fecit, sed etiam quod ita se gessit, ut ea facere ea se f. G ( exp. 2 ) ei liceret (etsi peccare peccaret X corr. V 1 nemini licet; sed sermonis errore labimur; errore labimur add. V c labimus K id enim licere lic&re V 1 dicimus 5.56. quod cuique conceditur). utrum tandem beatior C. Marius tum, cum Cimbricae victoriae gloriam cum collega Catulo communicavit, paene altero Laelio—nam hunc illi huic X ( unde ilium pro illi V 3 ) hunc s duco simillimum—, an cum an cum annum G 1 civili bello victor iratus necessariis Catuli deprecantibus non semel respondit, sed saepe: moriatur ? in quo beatior ille, qui huic nefariae voci paruit, par uit V quam is, qui tam scelerate imperavit. nam cum accipere quam facere praestat iniuriam, tum morti iam ipsi ipsa K adventanti paulum procedere ob viam, quod fecit Catulus, quam quod Marius, quod quam M. V 1 talis viri interitu sex interitus ex X suos obruere consulatus et contaminare extremum tempus aetatis. 5.57. Duodequadraginta Totum cap. 20 libere excerpsit Val. Max. 9, 13 ext. 4 annos tyrannus Syracusanorum fuit Dionysius, dionisius KV dyonisius GR cum quinque et viginti natus annos dominatum occupavisset. qua pulchritudine urbem, quibus autem opibus praeditam servitute oppressam tenuit civitatem! atqui de hoc homine a bonis auctoribus sic scriptum accepimus, summam fuisse eius in victu temperantiam in rebusque gerundis virum acrem et industrium, et industrium om. R 1 eundem tamen maleficum natura in rebus gerundis... 29 maleficum natura Non. 241,8 et iniustum; ex quo omnibus bene veritatem intuentibus inuentibus X corr. V 1 videri necesse est miserrimum. ea ea ecce K enim ipsa, quae concupierat, ne tum quidem, cum omnia omni G 1 se posse censebat, consequebatur. 5.58. qui cum esset bonis parentibus atque honesto loco natus—etsi id quidem alius alio modo tradidit—abundaretque et B s ei X aequalium familiaritatibus et consuetudine propinquorum, haberet etiam more Graeciae graciae gratiae V 1 quosdam adulescentis amore more amore G 1 coniunctos, credebat eorum nemini, sed is quos quos s V 3 quod X ex familiis locupletium servos delegerat, quibus nomen servitutis ipse detraxerat, traxerat G 1 et quibusdam convenis convenis et B s convenisset X et feris barbaris corporis custodiam committebat. ita propter iniustam dominatus cupiditatem dominatus domi cup. G 1 in carcerem quodam modo ipse se incluserat. quin etiam ne tonsori collum committeret, tondere filias suas docuit. ita ista K 1 sordido ancillarique sordidoque ancillari X corr. V 3 B 1 ( cf. simile mendum in G 415,5 ) sordido atque ancillari alii s artificio regiae virgines ut tonstriculae tondebant barbam et capillum patris. regiae ...17 patris Prisc.GL.2, 371, 11 et tamen ab is ipsis, cum iam essent adultae, ferrum removit instituitque, ut candentibus cadentibus Non. iuglandium putaminibus barbam sibi et capillum adurerent. instituitque...20 adurerent Non. 122, 30 5.59. cumque duas uxores haberet, haberet uxores V 1 Aristomachen aristomachem X (aristhom.G) civem suam, Doridem autem Locrensem, sic noctu ad eas n otu V 1 notua deas K 1 ( corr. c ) ventitabat, ut omnia specularetur et perscrutaretur ante. et cum fossam latam cubiculari fossa lata cubicularis X corr. s lecto circumdedisset eiusque fossae transitum ponticulo ligneo coniunxisset, eum ipsum, ipsum ipse Scheibe (cum forem cubiculi extrinsecus a custodibus opertum interiore claustro ipse diligenter obserasset Val. Max. ) cum forem cubiculi clauserat, detorquebat. idemque cum in communibus suggestis consistere non auderet, contionari ex turri alta solebat. 5.60. atque is cum pila ludere vellet —studiose enim id factitabat—tunicamque poneret, adulescentulo, quem amabat, tradidisse gladium dicitur. hic cum quidam familiaris iocans dixisset: huic quidem quidam V 1 certe vitam tuam committis adrisissetque adrisisetque KR adrisissetque V 1 adulescens, utrumque iussit interfici, alterum, quia viam demonstravisset interimendi sui, alterum, quia dictum id risu adprobavisset. atque eo facto factu V 1 sic doluit, nihil ut tulerit gravius in vita; quem enim vehementer amarat, occiderat. sic distrahuntur in contrarias partis impotentium cupiditates. cum huic obsecutus sis, illi est repugdum. 5.61. Quamquam hic quidem tyrannus ipse iudicavit, quam esset beatus. nam cum cum add. G 2 quidam ex eius adsentatoribus, Damocles, commemoraret in sermone sermonem K copias eius, opes, maiestatem dominatus, rerum abundantiam, magnificentiam aedium regiarum negaretque umquam beatiorem quemquam fuisse, visne igitur inquit, inquid G 1 V inquit add. R 1 o Damocle, quoniam te haec vita delectat, ipse eam eam Ern. eadem ( de tota vita agitur cf. p.433, 4 ) degustare et fortunam experiri meam? cum se ille cupere dixisset, conlocari coll. KR iussit hominem in aureo lecto strato stato K 1 pulcherrimo textili stragulo, magnificis operibus picto, abacosque compluris ornavit argento auroque caelato. tum ad mensam eximia forma pueros delectos iussit consistere eosque que om. G 1 nutum illius intuentis diligenter ministrare. 5.62. aderant unguenta ungenta V coronae, incendebantur odores, mensae conquisitissimis conquisitissimis -nquisiti— V c in r. epulis aepulis GRV extruebantur. fortunatus sibi Damocles videbatur. in hoc medio apparatu fulgentem gladium e lacunari saeta equina lacunariaetaequina G 1 equi Non. aptum demitti dimitti KR Non. iussit, fulgentem... 432, 1 iussit Non.235,19 ut impenderet illius beati cervicibus. itaque nec pulchros illos ministratores aspiciebat nec plenum artis argentum nec manum porrigebat in mensam; iam ipsae ipse GKV defluebant coronae; denique exoravit tyrannum, ut abire liceret, quod iam beatus nollet esse. satisne videtur declarasse Dionysius dyonis.X ( in 6 ex dion. K 1 ) nihil esse ei beatum, cui semper cui miser semper K aliqui terror aliqui terror B s aliquid error X (aliquis error V rec ) impendeat? impend at V 1 atque ei ei add. V 1 ne integrum quidem erat, ut ad iustitiam remigraret, remigaret V 1 civibus libertatem et iura redderet; is enim se adulescens inprovida aetate inretierat erratis eaque commiserat, comiserat G 1 R ut salvus esse non posset, si sanus esse coepisset. coepisset ex coepit R 1 5.63. Quantopere vero amicitias desideraret, quarum infidelitatem extimescebat, declaravit in Pythagoriis pythagoris V duobus illis, quorum cum alterum vadem mortis vademortis X corr. G 2 V 3 accepisset, alter, alter ut s alterum X ut vadem suum liberaret, praesto fuisset ad horam oram V mortis destinatam, utinam ego inquit tertius vobis amicus adscriberer! quam huic erat miserum carere consuetudine amicorum, societate victus, sermone omnino familiari, homini praesertim docto docto dato V a puero et artibus ingenuis ingeniis K erudito, musicorum misicorum X (musicum B) vero perstudioso; perstudiosum ( propter poetam) W corr.Dav. ( qui etiam poetae...tragico...bono) poëtam etiam tragicum post tragicum add. accepimus ( ex 429,27) s non male —quam bonum, nihil ad rem; in hoc cf. Att.14, 20, 3 Atil. fr.1 enim genere nescio quo pacto magis quam in aliis suum cuique pulchrum pulcrum G est; adhuc neminem cognovi poëtam (et et om. K 1 mihi fuit cum Aquinio amicitia), qui sibi non optumus videretur; sic se res habet: te tua, me delectant mea mea ea K —sed ut ad Dionysium dyonis.X ( in 6 ex dion. K 1 ) redeamus: omni cultu et victu humano carebat; vivebat cum fugitivis, cum facinerosis, cum barbaris; neminem, qui aut libertate libertatem K dignus esset aut vellet omnino liber esse, sibi amicum arbitrabatur. arbitrabantur G 1 Non ego iam cum huius vita, qua taetrius miserius detestabilius excogitare nihil possum, Platonis aut Archytae architae vitam vitae vitam X (vitae del. s V 3 ) comparabo, doctorum hominum et plane sapientium: 5.64. ex eadem urbe humilem homunculum a pulvere et radio excitabo, qui multis annis post fuit, Archimedem. cuius ego quaestor ignoratum ab Syracusanis, cum esse omnino negarent, saeptum septum X undique et vestitum vestitutum V 1 vepribus et dumetis indagavi sepulcrum. tenebam enim quosdam senariolos, quos in eius monumento esse inscriptos acceperam, qui declarabant in summo sepulcro sphaeram spheram X (18 spherae RV sphaere GK) esse positam cum cylindro. 5.65. ego autem cum omnia conlustrarem oculis—est enim ad ad a GRV 1 ( corr. V 3 ) portas Agragantinas ego ducem cum...16 portas gaianas Non.335,24 agragantinas Came rarius agragianas X gaianas (gafanas L 1 ) Non. agragentinas Sey. ( cf. Th.l.l.l.1428 ) magna frequentia sepulcrorum—, animum adverti columellam non multum e dumis eminentem, in qua inerat sphaerae figura et cylindri. atque ego statim Syracusanis— erant autem principes mecum—dixi me illud ipsum arbitrari esse, quod quaererem. inmissi cum inmissi cum s V 3 inmusicum X (inmuscum K) falcibus multi multi famuli Lattmann milites olim Sey. purgarunt et aperuerunt locum. 5.66. quo cum patefactus patefactum X esset aditus, ad adversam a ddit' adadv. G basim bassim X ( corr. G 1 ) accessimus. accessimus R sed -ss- e corr. ( fuit fort. accedimus) acces imus V apparebat epigramma epygramma KRV exesis posterioribus partibus versiculorum dimidiatum dimidiatis X (di prius in r. R 1 ) corr. Bentl. (dimidiatus de versiculis vel de epigrammate dici poterat, de partibus non poterat cf. Gell. 3, 14 ) fere. ita nobilissima Graeciae civitas, quondam vero etiam doctissima, sui civis unius acutissimi monumentum ignorasset, nisi ab homine Arpinate Arpinati We.cl.leg.1, 4 al. didicisset. sed redeat, reddeat X ( corr. G 1 ) unde aberravit oratio: quis est omnium, qui qui quo V 1 modo cum Musis, id est cum humanitate humilitate K 1 ut v. et cum doctrina, habeat aliquod commercium, qui se non hunc mathematicum malit quam illum tyrannum? si vitae modum actionemque quaerimus, alterius mens rationibus agitandis exquirendisque alebatur cum oblectatione sollertiae, qui est unus suavissimus pastus patus K 1 ( r ss. c ) animorum, alterius in caede et iniuriis cum et diurno et nocturno metu. age confer Democritum Pythagoram, Anaxagoram: quae regna, quas opes studiis eorum et delectationibus antepones? 5.68. Sed ne verbis solum attingamus ea quae eaque v. KRV 1 volumus ostendere, proponenda quaedam quasi moventia sunt, quae nos magis ad cognitionem intellegentiamque convertant. sumatur enim nobis quidam praestans vir optumis optumus V artibus, isque animo parumper et cogitatione cognitione K fingatur. primum ingenio eximio sit necesse est; tardis enim mentibus virtus non facile comitatur; deinde deinde denique K ad investigandam vestigandam K veritatem studio incitato. ex quo triplex ille animi fetus fetus KR (ę) factus GV existet, unus I II III ad-scribunt G 1 V 1 in cognitione rerum positus et in explicatione naturae, alter aliter K in discriptione expetendarum fugiendarumque rerum fugiendarumque vererumne vivendi GKV (ve exp. et be supra ne scr. V 3 ) R 1 ut v. (fugiendarumque rerum . post vivendi quod in ras. certo dispicitur alia manus adscripscrat ue) H 1 (fugiendar verer nevivendi. Verba cū ratio ss.non H 1 sed alia manus eiusdem aetatis sec. Stroux ) et in ratio ne We.bene quod fin. 5,15 certa de causa deest add. Po. cl. ac.1, 19 fin. 5, 11. 16 et in ratione be ne vivendi, tertius in iudicando, in ante iud. om. K iudicando nequid KRH quid cuique rei sit consequens quid repugs, in quo inest omnis inest omnis est H cum subtilitas disserendi, tum veritas iudicandi. 5.69. quo tandem igitur gaudio adfici necesse est est V esset GK C RH est et K 1 sapientis animum cum his habitantem pernoctantemque curis! ut, cum totius mundi motus conversionesque perspexerit ut, quod del.Bentl.,pendet a verbis cum — curis (= so da b ). Ciceronem pergere voluisse ut, cum... perspexerit,... ipse se adgnoscat coniunctumque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio compleatur cum similitudo verborum v. 9—10 et 436,5—9 tum locus gemellus leg. 1,61 declarant. sideraque viderit innumerabilia caelo inhaerentia cum eius ipsius motu congruere certis infixa sedibus, septem alia suos quaeque tenere cursus multum inter se aut altitudine aut humilitate distantia, quorum vagi motus rata tamen et certa sui cursus spatia definiant—horum nimirum aspectus impulit illos veteres et admonuit, ut plura quaererent; inde est est enim G 1 indagatio nata initiorum et tamquam seminum, unde essent omnia orta generata concreta, quaeque cuiusque generis vel iimi iimi animi H vel animantis animantis iimantis K vel muti vel loquentis loquentes GR 1 V 1 origo, quae vita, qui interitus quae int. GR 1 V 1 quaeque ex alio in aliud vicissitudo atque mutatio, unde terra et quibus librata ponderibus, quibus cavernis maria sustineantur, qua sustineantur, qua Dav sustineant. In qua X (sustineantur vel sustineat s ) omnia delata gravitate medium mundi locum semper expetant, expectant qui est idem infimus in rutundo. rotundo KV c? H 5.70. haec tractanti tractanti s V 3 tractandi X (-i ex -o K 1 ) animo et noctes et dies cogitanti cogitandi KV 1 cogitanti G existit illa a a s om. X deo deo H Delphis praecepta cognitio, ut ipsa se mens agnoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio compleatur. completur Bentl. ipsa enim cogitatio de vi et natura deorum studium incendit incedit GRV 1 illius aeternitatem aeternitatem Sey. aeternitatis (aeterni status Mdv. ad fin.1, 60 ) imitandi, neque se in brevitate vitae conlocatam conlocata GRV 1 collocatam H ( bis ) conlocatum s We. putat, cum rerum causas alias ex aliis aptas et necessitate nexas videt, quibus ab aeterno tempore fluentibus in aeternum ratio tamen mensque moderatur. 5.71. Haec ille intuens atque suspiciens suspiciens V sed pic in r. 1 suscipiens K 1 vel potius omnis partis orasque circumspiciens quanta rursus animi tranquillitate tranquillitati K humana et citeriora considerat! hinc illa cognitio virtutis existit, efflorescunt genera partesque virtutum, invenitur, quid sit quod natura spectet expectet G 1 expectetur Gr extremum in bonis, quid in malis ultumum, sumatur...436, 20 ultimum H ( extrema bis ) quo referenda sint officia, quae degendae degente G 1 aetatis ratio deligenda. diligenda X corr. s quibus et et add. K c talibus rebus exquisitis hoc vel maxime efficitur, quod hac hac ac G 1 hic V 1 disputatione agimus, ut virtus ad beate vivendum sit se ipsa contenta. 5.72. Sequitur tertia, quae per omnis partis sapientiae manat et funditur, quae rem definit, definivit X (dif. K) corr. s V 3 genera dispertit, sequentia adiungit, perfecta concludit, vera et falsa diiudicat, disserendi ratio et scientia. ex qua cum summa utilitas existit extitit K ( in 18 corr K c ) ad res ponderandas, tum maxume maxime GKH ingenua delectatio et digna sapientia. Sed haec otii. sed haec otii om. H transeat idem iste sapiens ad rem publicam tuendam. quid eo possit esse praestantius, cum †contineri contineri del.Lb. cum temperantia suas adpetitiones contineat ( vel queat continere), prudentia fere desiderat Po.cl.p.371, 22 off.3,96.116; 2,77.rep.6,1 (rei publicae rector...sapiens sit et iustus et temperans eqs.) prudentia utilitatem civium cernat, iustitia sequitur...437, 8 iustitia H nihil in suam domum inde derivet, derivet -iv- scr. G 2 reliquis utatur tot tam variisque virtutibus? adiunge fructum amicitiarum, in quo doctis positum est cum consilium omnis vitae consentiens et paene conspirans, tum summa iucunditas e e et V 1 (ex V rec ) cotidiano cultu atque victu. victu s V 3 victurus GRV 1 victus K cf.Th.l.l.IV,1333 Quid haec tandem vita desiderat, quo quo quod GK sit beatior? cui refertae tot cui rei refertae etot G cui rei referta etot R cui rei referta et tot V cui rei refertae et tot K corr. Man. tantisque gaudiis Fortuna ipsa cedat necesse est. quodsi gaudere talibus bonis animi, id est virtutibus, beatum est omnesque sapientes is gaudiis perfruuntur, omnis eos beatos esse confiteri necesse est. Etiamne etiamne -ne eras.in R in cruciatu atque tormentis? 5.73. An Epic.fr.604 tu me in viola putabas aut in rosa dicere? an Epicuro, qui qui G 1 quia G 2 KRV cf.438,19 tantum modo induit personam philosophi et sibi ipse hoc nomen inscripsit, dicere licebit, licebit alt. i in r. V quod quidem, ut habet se res, me tamen plaudente dicit, nullum sapienti esse tempus, etiamsi uratur torqueatur secetur, quin possit exclamare: quam pro nihilo puto! cum praesertim omne malum dolore definiat defirmat ( vel defirniat) V 1 bonum voluptate, haec nostra honesta turpia inrideat dicatque nos in vocibus Epic.fr.511 occupatos iis sonos fundere, neque quicquam ad nos pertinere nisi quod aut leve aut asperum in corpore sentiatur: huic ergo, ut dixi, non multum differenti a iudicio ferarum oblivisci licebit sui et tum fortunam contemnere, cum sit omne et bonum eius et malum in potestate fortunae, tum dicere se se add. G 2 beatum in summo cruciatu atque tormentis, cum constituerit non modo summum malum esse dolorem, sed etiam solum? 5.74. nec vero illa sibi remedia comparavit ad tolerandum tollerandum X (toll endum G 1 ) dolorem, firmitatem animi, turpitudinis verecundiam, exercitationem consuetudinemque patiendi, praecepta fortitudinis, praecepta fortitudinis del.Sey.sed Cic.l.2,34—41 exercitationem consuetudinemque,postea (cf. maxime 51. 53) praecepta fortitudinis animo proposita (p.313,15sqq.) valere ad tolerandum dolorem exponit (cf.p.285.6 295, 24sqq.fin.2,94.95; 4, 31). cf.etiam Plasberg, Festschrift f. Vahlen p.234 (obloq. Se.,Jb.d.ph.V.29 p.97) duritiam virilem, sed una se dicit recordatione adquiescere praeteritarum voluptatium, voluptatum Bai.cf.Neue 1, 410 ut si quis aestuans, cum vim caloris non non postea add. R 1 facile patiatur, patiatur putatur V 1 recordari velit sese sese s esse X (se V 3 ) aliquando in Arpinati nostro gelidis fluminibus circumfusum fuisse. non enim video, quo modo sedare possint 5.75. mala praesentia praeteritae voluptates—sed cum is is his G 1 KV 1 dicat semper beatum esse sapientem, cui dicere hoc, si si add. G 2 sibi constare vellet, non liceret, quidnam faciendum est is qui nihil expetendum, nihil in bonis ducendum, quod honestate careat, existumant? existumant -a- e corr. R 1 Me quidem auctore auctore ex auctoritate R c etiam Peripatetici veteresque Academici balbuttire balbuttire GR Non. balbut ire V 1 balbutire K aliquando desit me...24 desit Non. 80, 13 aperteque et clara voce audeant dicere beatam vitam in Phalaridis taurum descensuram. decen suram X ( corr. V 3 ) 5.76. sint enim tria genera bonorum, ut ut aut V iam a laqueis Stoicorum, quibus usum me pluribus quam soleo intellego, recedamus, sint sane illa genera bonorum, dum corporis et et s om. X externa iaceant humi et tantum modo, quia sumenda sint, appellentur bona, animi animi Jeep (cf.427,14 443,3 458,6;divini ani- mi bona divina sunt caelumque contingunt) autem illa alii K alia GRV illa add. G 2 divina longe lateque se pandant caelumque contingant; ut, ut del.Lb.sed cf.p.242,25 ea qui adeptus sit, cur eum beatum modo et non beatissimum etiam dixerim? Dolorem vero sapiens extimescet? is enim huic maxime maxime huic G 1 sententiae repugnat. nam nam non V contra mortem nostram atque nostrorum contraque aegritudinem et reliquas animi perturbationes satis esse videmur videmus K superiorum dierum disputationibus armati et parati; dolor esse videtur acerrumus virtutis virtutis We. virtuti istis ard. G adversarius; is ardentis faces intentat, is fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam se debilitaturum minatur. 5.77. huic igitur succumbet virtus, huic beata sapientis et constantis viri vita cedet? caedet RV quam turpe, o dii boni! pueri Spartiatae non ingemescunt ingemiscunt K 1 R c B verberum verberum ex verborum V 1 G 2 dolore laniati. adulescentium greges reges V 1 Lacedaemone vidimus ipsi incredibili contentione contione X (conditione G 1 ) corr. B 1 s certantis pugnis calcibus unguibus morsu denique, cum exanimarentur prius quam victos se faterentur. quae barbaria India vastior aut agrestior? quae...agrestior? Non.415,11 in ea tamen aut... tamen add. V c gente primum sqq. cf.Val.Max.3,3,6 ext.2,6,14 ei, qui sapientes habentur, nudi aetatem agunt et Caucasi nives hiemalemque vim perferunt sine sqq. cf.Val.Max.3,3,6 ext.2,6,14 dolore, cumque ad flammam se adplicaverunt, applicaverunt KRV sine gemitu aduruntur. 5.78. mulieres vero in India, cum est cuius cuiuis V 3 communis Geel ( sed tum plures...nuptae post mortuus legeretur; cf.etiam Se., Jb.d.ph.V.26 p.301 ) earum vir mortuus, in certamen iudiciumque veniunt, quam plurumum ille dilexerit— plures enim singulis solent esse nuptae—; quae est victrix, ea laeta prosequentibus suis una unam V 1 cum viro in rogum imponitur, ponitur G 1 illa ilia cf.Quint.inst.1,3,2 victa quae Se. non male,cf.Claud.de nupt.Hon.64 (superatae cum...maerore in vita remanent Val.M. ) maesta discedit. numquam naturam mos vinceret; vinceret vincit H est enim ea semper invicta; sed nos umbris deliciis delitiis X (deliciis V, sed ci in r scr.,alt. i ss. V 2 ) otio languore langore G desidia animum infecimus, opinionibus maloque more delenitum delinitum V 1 H mollivimus. mollium KR 1 ( corr. 1 aut c )H Aegyptiorum morem quis ignorat? ignoret K quorum inbutae mentes pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificinam carnifici. nam X prius subierint quam ibim aut aspidem aut faelem felem GV cf.nat.deor.1, 82 aut canem aut corcodillum corcodillum GRV corcodrillum KH cf.Th.l.l. violent, volent V 1 quorum etiamsi inprudentes quippiam fecerint, poenam nullam recusent. 5.79. de hominibus loquor; quid? bestiae non frigus, non famem, non montivagos atque silvestris cursus lustrationesque patiuntur? non pro suo sua G 1 partu ita propugt, ut ut K vulnera excipiant, nullos impetus nullos ictus reformident? omitto, quae omittoque p.G 1 V 1 perferant quaeque patiantur ambitiosi honoris causa, laudis studiosi gloriae gratia, amore incensi cupiditatis. plena plana GRV 1 ( corr. 3 ) vita exemplorum exemplum G 1 est. 5.80. Sed adhibeat oratio modum et redeat illuc, unde deflexit. dabit, inquam, dabit, dabit, inquam edd. vett. se in tormenta vita beata nec iustitiam temperantiam in primisque fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam patientia GRVH prosecuta, cum tortoris os viderit, consistet virtutibusque omnibus sine ullo animi terrore ad cruciatum profectis resistet extra extra ( fuit et) R fores, ut ante ante cf.p. 410,8 dixi, limenque lumenque G 1 carceris. quid enim ea foedius, quid deformius sola relicta, a add. Lb. comitatu pulcherrimo pulcherrumo KR segregata? quod tamen fieri nullo pacto potest; nec enim virtutes sine beata vita cohaerere possunt nec illa sine virtutibus.
9. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 9.67 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9.67. They say that, when septic salves and surgical and caustic remedies were applied to a wound he had sustained, he did not so much as frown. Timon also portrays his disposition in the full account which he gives of him to Pytho. Philo of Athens, a friend of his, used to say that he was most fond of Democritus, and then of Homer, admiring him and continually repeating the lineAs leaves on trees, such is the life of man.He also admired Homer because he likened men to wasps, flies, and birds, and would quote these verses as well:Ay, friend, die thou; why thus thy fate deplore?Patroclus too, thy better, is no more,and all the passages which dwell on the unstable purpose, vain pursuits, and childish folly of man.
11. Olympiodorus The Younger of Alexandria, In Platonis Gorgiam Commentaria, 41.9 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academics Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
academy, early Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 110
academy, old (i.e., antiochus) Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
academy, sceptical Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
academy Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100, 110
antiochus of ascalon Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100, 110; Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 31
aristotle Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 110; Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
aristoxenus Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
ataraxia Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 235
athambei Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 235
athaumastia Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 235
atomism Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
atticus Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
chrysippus Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 31
cicero, as source for democritus Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213, 216, 235
cicero, marcus tullius, academic books Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 42
cicero Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100, 110; Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
clement of alexandria Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
democritus, concept of euthumiē Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213, 235
democritus, evidence and sources Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 216
democritus, importance and reputation Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
democritus Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213, 216, 235
epicurean garden Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
epicureans Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
epicurus Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
eudaimonia/-ē, in democritus Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 235
eudorus Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 110
eusebius Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
euthumia/-ē Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213, 235
founder Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
happiness (lat. beatitudo = gr. eudaimonia) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 42
heraclitus, evidence of works Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 216
kant, immanuel Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
kathēgemōn Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
late antiquity/later antiquity Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
maxims (gnōmai) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
numenius Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
olympiodorus Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
origen Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
orthodoxy Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
peripatetics Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
philo of larissa Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
philodemus of gadara Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 31
philosophical works, apology Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 42
piso (ciceros character) Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
plato Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184; Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 42
plutarch, and democritus Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
posidonius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 31
pseudo-pythagorean corpus Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 110
pyrrho Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
pythagoras Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 110
pythagoreanism Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 110
pythagoreans Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 110
socrates Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100, 110; Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 42
socratic problem Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 216
soul (lat. animus = gr. psychē) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 42
speusippus Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
stoic/stoics Fowler, Plato in the Third Sophistic (2014) 184
system Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100, 110
theophrastus Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
thrasyllus of alexandria Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
tranquillity Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 213
varro (ciceros character) Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
varro (historical figure) Erler et al., Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition (2021) 100
virtue, psychic or of the soul Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 42
virtue Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 42
zeno of sidon' Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 31