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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2293
Cicero, On The Ends Of Good And Evil, 5.10


persecutus est est N 2 om. BERN 1 V Non. p. 232 Aristoteles animantium omnium ortus, victus, figuras, Theophrastus autem stirpium naturas omniumque fere rerum, quae e terra gignerentur, causas atque rationes; qua ex cognitione facilior facta est investigatio rerum occultissimarum. Disserendique ab isdem non dialectice solum, sed etiam oratorie praecepta sunt tradita, ab Aristoteleque principe de singulis rebus in utramque partem dicendi exercitatio est instituta, ut non contra omnia semper, sicut Arcesilas, diceret, et tamen ut in omnibus rebus, quicquid ex utraque parte dici posset, expromeret. exprimeret R Aristotle gave a complete account of the birth, nutrition and structure of all living creatures, Theophrastus of the natural history of plants and the causes and constitution of vegetable organisms in general; and the knowledge thus attained facilitated the investigation of the most obscure questions. In Logic their teachings include the rules of rhetoric as well as of dialectic; and Aristotle their founder started the practice of arguing both pro and contra upon every topic, not like Arcesilas, always controverting every proposition, but setting out all the possible arguments on either side in every subject. <


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

11 results
1. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 2.9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.7, 3.9-3.10, 5.9, 5.11-5.12, 5.33, 5.39 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.7. nam in Tusculano cum essem vellemque e bibliotheca pueri Luculli quibusdam libris uti, veni in eius villam, ut eos ipse, ut solebam, depromerem. quo cum venissem, M. Catonem, quem ibi esse nescieram, vidi in bibliotheca sedentem multis circumfusum Stoicorum libris. erat enim, ut scis, in eo aviditas legendi, nec satiari poterat, quippe qui ne reprehensionem ne re pn sionē R ne pren- sionem ABE rep hensionem N nec reprensionem V quidem vulgi iem reformidans iem non ut credo reformidans (punct. ab alt. m. pos.) N in ipsa curia soleret legere saepe, dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operae rei publicae detrahens. quo magis tum in summo otio maximaque copia quasi helluari libris, si hoc verbo in tam clara re utendum est, videbatur. 3.9. Praeclare, inquit, facis, cum cum quod Wes. apud Mdv. et eorum memoriam tenes, quorum uterque tibi testamento liberos suos testamento libros suos tibi BE commendavit, et puerum diligis. quod autem meum munus dicis non equidem recuso, sed te adiungo socium. addo etiam illud, multa iam mihi dare signa puerum et pudoris et ingenii, sed aetatem vides. Video equidem, inquam, sed tamen iam infici debet iis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, conbiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior. veniet paratior sit et quidem A venerit (in E incert.) paratior sit et quidem BE veniet paratior sit. Equidem R cu ul si venerit paratior sit Et quidem N 1 veniet paratior sit quidem N 2 veniet paratior sic equidem V Sic, et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos agemusque communiter. sed residamus, inquit, si placet. Itaque fecimus. 3.10. Tum ille: Tu autem cum ipse tantum librorum habeas, quos quos om. BE hic hic hic ul hic N his AR hys BE om. V tandem requiris? Commentarios quosdam, inquam, Aristotelios, aristotelios A aristotilis BE aristoteles R aristotili hos N 1 aristotelicos N 2 aristotilicos V quos hic sciebam esse, veni ut auferrem, quos legerem, dum essem otiosus; quod quidem nobis non saepe contingit. Quam vellem, inquit, te ad Stoicos inclinavisses! erat enim, si cuiusquam, certe tuum nihil praeter virtutem in bonis ducere. Vide, ne magis, inquam, tuum fuerit, cum re idem tibi, quod mihi, videretur, non nova te te om. NV rebus nomina inponere. ratio enim nostra consentit, pugnat oratio. Minime vero, inquit ille, consentit. quicquid quidquid BV quitquid E Quid quod R enim praeter id, quod honestum sit, expetendum esse dixeris in bonisque numeraveris, et honestum ipsum quasi virtutis lumen extinxeris et virtutem penitus everteris. Dicuntur ista, Cato, magnifice, inquam, sed videsne verborum gloriam tibi cum Pyrrhone et cum Aristone, qui omnia exaequant, esse exequant esse V, N (post t ras., es ab alt. m.); exequantes se ABE ex sequentes se R communem? 5.9. Sic est igitur locutus: Quantus ornatus in Peripateticorum disciplina sit satis est a me, ut brevissime potuit, paulo ante dictum. sed est forma eius disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, triplex: una pars est naturae, naturae edd. natura ( etiam B) disserendi altera, vivendi tertia. Natura sic ab iis investigata est, ut nulla pars caelo, mari, terra, ut poe+tice loquar, praetermissa sit; quin etiam, cum de rerum initiis omnique mundo locuti essent, ut multa non modo probabili argumentatione, sed etiam necessaria mathematicorum ratione concluderent, maximam materiam ex rebus per se investigatis ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attulerunt. 5.11. Cum autem tertia pars bene vivendi praecepta quaereret, ea quoque est ab isdem non solum ad privatae vitae rationem, sed etiam ad rerum publicarum rectionem relata. omnium fere civitatum non Graeciae solum, sed etiam barbariae ab Aristotele mores, instituta, disciplinas, a Theophrasto leges etiam cognovimus. cumque uterque eorum docuisset qualem in re publica principem esse conveniret, add. Ascens. 1511 pluribus praeterea conscripsisset cum scripsisset NV qui esset optimus rei publicae status, hoc amplius Theophrastus: quae essent in re publica status ... in re publica om. BER rerum inclinationes et momenta temporum, quibus esset moderandum, utcumque res postularet. vitae autem degendae elegendae E eligendae B ratio maxime quidem illis illis quidem BE placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae vite erat BE simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima. atque his de rebus et splendida est eorum et illustris oratio. 5.12. De summo autem bono, quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod e)cwteriko/n appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio. sed cum beata vita quaeratur idque sit unum, quod philosophia philosophia dett. philosophiam spectare et sequi debeat, sitne ea tota sita in potestate sapientis an possit aut labefactari aut eripi rebus adversis, in eo non numquam variari inter eos inter eos variari R et dubitari videtur. quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur. quod si ita se habeat, non possit beatam praestare vitam vitam praestare BE sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, delicatior videtur NV ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Theophrastum tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, dum modo plus in virtute teneamus, quam ille tenuit, firmitatis et roboris. Simus igitur contenti his. 5.33. De hominum genere aut omnino de animalium loquor, cum arborum et stirpium eadem paene natura sit? sive enim, ut doctissimis viris visum est, maior aliqua causa atque divinior hanc vim ingenuit, sive hoc ita fit fortuito, fortuitu BER videmus N 2 videamus videmus ea, quae terra gignit, corticibus et radicibus valida servari, quod contingit animalibus sensuum distributione et quadam compactione membrorum. Qua quidem de re quamquam assentior iis, qui haec omnia regi natura putant, quae si natura neglegat, ipsa esse non possit, tamen concedo, ut, qui de hoc dissentiunt, existiment, quod velint, ac vel hoc intellegant, si quando quando dett. quid BE quā R q ua NV naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt. nam prius a se poterit quisque discedere quam appetitum earum rerum, quae sibi conducant, amittere. iure igitur gravissimi philosophi initium summi boni a natura petiverunt et illum appetitum rerum ad naturam accommodatarum ingeneratum putaverunt omnibus, quia quia Dav. qui continentur ea commendatione naturae, qua se ipsi diligunt. 5.39. Earum etiam rerum, quas terra gignit, educatio quaedam et perfectio est non dissimilis animantium. itaque et vivere vitem et mori dicimus arboremque et novellam et vetulam vetulam dicimus BE et vigere et 'senescere'. ex quo non est alienum, ut animantibus, animalibus BE sic illis et apta quaedam ad naturam putare et putare et BE aptare et R amputare et NV aliena earumque augendarum et alendarum quandam cultricem esse, quae sit scientia atque ars agricolarum, quae circumcidat, circumcidat dett. circumcidet R circumdat BEN 1 circumdet N 2 V amputet, erigat, extollat, adminiculet, ut, quo natura ferat, eo possint possint Dav. possit ire, ut ipsae vites, si loqui possint, possint A. Man. possent ita se tractandas tuendasque esse fateantur. et nunc quidem quod eam tuetur, ut de vite potissimum loquar, est id id om. BE extrinsecus; in ipsa enim parum magna vis inest, ut quam optime se habere possit, si nulla cultura adhibeatur. 3.7.  I was down at my place at Tusculum, and wanted to consult some books from the library of the young Lucullus; so I went to his country-house, as I was in the habit of doing, to help myself to the volumes I needed. On my arrival, seated in the library I found Marcus Cato; I had not known he was there. He was surrounded by piles of books on Stoicism; for he possessed, as you are aware, a voracious appetite for reading, and could never have enough of it; indeed it was often his practice actually to brave the idle censure of the mob by reading in the senate-house itself, while waiting for the senate to assemble, — he did not steal any attention from public business. So it may well be believed that when I found him taking a complete holiday, with a vast supply of books at his command, he had the air of indulging in a literary debauch, if the term may be applied to so honourable an occupation. 3.9.  "I commend you," rejoined Cato, "for your loyalty to the memory of men who both bequeathed their children to your care, as well as for your affectionate interest in the lad. My own responsibility, as you call it, I by no means disown, but I enlist you to share it with me. Moreover I may say that the youth already seems to me to show many signs both of modesty and talent; but you know how young he is." "I do," said I, "but all the same it is time for him to receive a tincture of studies which, if allowed to soak in at this impressionable age, will render him better equipped when he comes to the business of life." "True, and we will discuss this matter again several times more fully and take common action. But let us sit down," he said, "shall we?" So we sat down. 3.10.  Cato then resumed: "But what pray are the books that you must come here for, when you have so large a library of your own?" "I have come to fetch some Note-books of Aristotle," I replied, "which I knew were here. I wanted to read them during my holiday; I do not often get any leisure." "How I wish," said he, "that you had thrown in your lot with the Stoics! You of all men might have been expected to reckon virtue as the only good." "Perhaps you might rather have been expected," I answered, "to refrain from adopting a new terminology, when in substance you think as I do. Our principles agree; it is our language that is at variance." "Indeed," he rejoined, "they do not agree in the least. Once pronounce anything to be desirable, once reckon anything as a good, other than Moral Worth, and you have extinguished the very light of virtue, Moral Worth itself, and overthrown virtue entirely. 5.9.  Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the elements of being and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation. 5.11.  The third division of philosophy investigates the rules of human well-being; this too was treated by the Peripatetics, so as to comprise not only the principles of individual conduct but also of the government of states. From Aristotle we learn the manners, customs and institutions, and from Theophrastus the laws also, of nearly all the states not only of Greece but of the barbarians as well. Both described the proper qualifications of a statesman, both moreover wrote lengthy treatises on the best form of constitution; Theophrastus treated the subject more fully, discussing the forces and occasions of political change, and their control as circumstances demand. Among the alternative ideals of conduct they gave the highest place to the life of retirement, devoted to contemplation and to study. This was pronounced to be most worthy of the Wise Man, as most nearly resembling the life of the gods. And these topics they handle in a style as brilliant as it is illuminating. 5.12.  "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.33.  But do I speak of the human race or of animals generally, when the nature of trees and plants is almost the same? For whether it be, as very learned men have thought, that this capacity has been engendered in them by some higher and diviner power, or whether it is the result of chance, we see that the vegetable species secure by means of their bark and roots that support and protection which animals derive from the distribution of the sensory organs and from the well-knit framework of the limbs. On this matter I agree, it is true, with those who hold that all these things are regulated by nature, because if nature were to neglect them her own existence would be impossible; yet I allow those who think otherwise on this point to hold whatever view they please: whenever I mention 'the nature of man,' let them, if they like, understand me to mean 'man,' as it makes no difference. For the individual can no more lose the instinct to seek the things that are good for him than he can divest himself of his own personality. The wisest authorities have therefore been right in finding the basis of the Chief Good in nature, and in holding that this instinctive desire for things suited to our nature is innate in all men, because it is founded on that natural attraction which makes them love themselves. 5.39.  "Plants also have a development and progress to maturity that is not unlike that of animals; hence we speak of a vine living and dying, or of a tree as young or old, in the prime of life or decrepit; consequently it is appropriate to suppose that with them as with animals certain things are suited and certain other things foreign to their nature; and that their growth and nurture is tended by a foster-mother, the science and art of husbandry, which trims and prunes, straightens, raises and props, enabling them to advance to the goal that nature prescribes, till the vines themselves, could they speak, would acknowledge this to be their proper mode of treatment and of tendance. In reality, of course, the power that tends the vine, to take that particular instance, is something outside of it; for the vine does not possess force enough in itself to be able to attain its highest possible development without the aid of cultivation.
3. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.35, 2.168 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.35. Again, it is undeniable that every organic whole must have an ultimate ideal of perfection. As in vines or cattle we see that, unless obstructed by some force, nature progresses on a certain path of her own to her goal of full development, and as in painting, architecture and the other arts and crafts there is an ideal of perfect workmanship, even so and far more in the world of nature as a whole there must be a process towards completeness and perfection. The various limited modes of being may encounter many external obstacles to hinder their perfect realization, but there can be nothing that can frustrate nature as a whole, since she embraces and contains within herself all modes of being. Hence it follows that there must exist this fourth and highest grade, unassailable by any external force. 2.168. These are more or less the things that occurred to me which I thought proper to be said upon the subject of the nature of the gods. And for your part, Cotta, would you but listen to me, you would plead the same cause, and reflect that you are a leading citizen and a pontife, and you would take advantage of the liberty enjoyed by your school of arguing both pro and contra to choose to espouse my side, and preferably to devote to this purpose those powers of eloquence which your rhetorical exercises have bestowed upon you and which the Academy has fostered. For the habit of arguing in support of atheism, whether it be done from conviction or in pretence, is a wicked and impious practice.
4. Cicero, On Duties, 3.89 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.89. Plenusestsextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium quaestionum: sitne boni viri in maxima caritate annonae familiam non alere. In utramque partem disputat, sed tamen ad extremum utilitate, ut putat, officium dirigit magis quam humanitate. Quaerit, si in mari iactura facienda sit, equine pretiosi potius iacturam faciat an servoli vilis. Hic alio res familiaris, alio ducit humanitas. Si tabulam de naufragio stultus arripuerit, extorquebitne eam sapiens, si potuerit? Negat, quia sit iniurium. Quid? dominus navis eripietne suum? Minime, non plus quam navigantem in alto eicere de navi velit, quia sua sit. Quoad enim perventum est eo, quo sumpta navis est, non domini est navis, sed navigantium. 3.89.  The sixth book of Hecaton's "Moral Duties" is full of questions like the following: "Is it consistent with a good man's duty to let his slaves go hungry when provisions are at famine price?" Hecaton gives the argument on both sides of the question; but still in the end it is by the standard of expediency, as he conceives it, rather than by one of human feeling, that he decides the question of duty. Then he raises this question: supposing a man had to throw part of his cargo overboard in a storm, should he prefer to sacrifice a high-priced horse or a cheap and worthless slave? In this case regard for his property interest inclines him one way, human feeling the other."Suppose that a foolish man has seized hold of a plank from a sinking ship, shall a wise man wrest it away from him if he can?" "No," says Hecaton; "for that would be unjust." "But how about the owner of the ship? Shall he take the plank away because it belongs to him?""Not at all; no more than he would be willing when far out at sea to throw a passenger overboard on the ground that the ship was his. For until they reach the place for which the ship is chartered, she belongs to the passengers, not to the owner.
5. Cicero, De Oratore, 3.80, 3.107 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.80. sin aliquis exstiterit aliquando, qui Aristotelio more de omnibus rebus in utramque partem possit dicere et in omni causa duas contrarias orationes, praeceptis illius cognitis, explicare aut hoc Arcesilae modo et Carneadi contra omne, quod propositum sit, disserat, quique ad eam rationem adiungat hunc rhetoricum usum moremque exercitationemque dicendi, is sit verus, is perfectus, is solus orator. Nam neque sine forensibus nervis satis vehemens et gravis nec sine varietate doctrinae satis politus et sapiens esse orator potest. 3.107. alii autem habent deprecationem aut miserationem; alii vero ancipitis disputationes, in quibus de universo genere in utramque partem disseri copiose licet. Quae exercitatio nunc propria duarum philosophiarum, de quibus ante dixi, putatur, apud antiquos erat eorum, a quibus omnis de rebus forensibus dicendi ratio et copia petebatur; de virtute enim, de officio, de aequo et bono, de dignitate, utilitate, honore, ignominia, praemio, poena similibusque de rebus in utramque partem dicendi etiam nos et vim et artem habere debemus.
6. Cicero, Lucullus, 104 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Cicero, Orator, 46 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

8. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.8, 5.37 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.8. itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. fiebat autem ita ut, cum is his G 1 V 1 H qui audire audiri X ( corr. V 2 l e ss. K 2 ) vellet dixisset, quid quod K 1 V 2 sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et et om. V 1 add. 2 Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Philosophia ... 221, 7 narretur H (27 fieri 220, 5 litteris et 220,13 adulescentes 220, 18 dicere bis ) ergo ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c ita nascetur exordium: Malum ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c mihi videtur esse mors. 5.37. quae, quicquid genuit, non modo animal, sed etiam quod ita ortum esset e terra, ut stirpibus suis niteretur, in suo quidque genere perfectum esse voluit. itaque et arbores et vites et ea, quae sunt humiliora neque se tollere a terra altius possunt, alia semper virent, alia hieme nudata verno tempore tepefacta frondescunt, neque est ullum quod non ita vigeat vigeant X interiore quodam motu et suis in quoque seminibus inclusis, ut aut flores aut fruges fundat aut bacas, ut... bacas Non.312,41 (fundant) omniaque in omnibus, quantum in ipsis sit, nulla vi vi K vim GRV impediente perfecta sint.
9. Strabo, Geography, 13.1.54, 13.54 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

13.1.54. From Scepsis came the Socratic philosophers Erastus and Coriscus and Neleus the son of Coriscus, this last a man who not only was a pupil of Aristotle and Theophrastus, but also inherited the library of Theophrastus, which included that of Aristotle. At any rate, Aristotle bequeathed his own library to Theophrastus, to whom he also left his school; and he is the first man, so far as I know, to have collected books and to have taught the kings in Egypt how to arrange a library. Theophrastus bequeathed it to Neleus; and Neleus took it to Scepsis and bequeathed it to his heirs, ordinary people, who kept the books locked up and not even carefully stored. But when they heard bow zealously the Attalic kings to whom the city was subject were searching for books to build up the library in Pergamum, they hid their books underground in a kind of trench. But much later, when the books had been damaged by moisture and moths, their descendants sold them to Apellicon of Teos for a large sum of money, both the books of Aristotle and those of Theophrastus. But Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher; and therefore, seeking a restoration of the parts that had been eaten through, he made new copies of the text, filling up the gaps incorrectly, and published the books full of errors. The result was that the earlier school of Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus had no books at all, with the exception of only a few, mostly exoteric works, and were therefore able to philosophize about nothing in a practical way, but only to talk bombast about commonplace propositions, whereas the later school, from the time the books in question appeared, though better able to philosophise and Aristotelise, were forced to call most of their statements probabilities, because of the large number of errors. Rome also contributed much to this; for, immediately after the death of Apellicon, Sulla, who had captured Athens, carried off Apellicon's library to Rome, where Tyrannion the grammarian, who was fond of Aristotle, got it in his hands by paying court to the librarian, as did also certain booksellers who used bad copyists and would not collate the texts — a thing that also takes place in the case of the other books that are copied for selling, both here and at Alexandria. However, this is enough about these men.
10. Plutarch, Sulla, 26 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 5.22-5.27 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

5.22. of Justice, four books.On Poets, three books.On Philosophy, three books.of the Statesman, two books.On Rhetoric, or Grylus, one book.Nerinthus, one book.The Sophist, one book.Menexenus, one book.Concerning Love, one book.Symposium, one book.of Wealth, one book.Exhortation to Philosophy, one book.of the Soul, one book.of Prayer, one book.On Noble Birth, one book.On Pleasure, one book.Alexander, or a Plea for Colonies, one book.On Kingship, one book.On Education, one book.of the Good, three books.Extracts from Plato's Laws, three books.Extracts from the Republic, two books.of Household Management, one book.of Friendship, one book.On being or having been affected, one book.of Sciences, one book.On Controversial Questions, two books.Solutions of Controversial Questions, four books.Sophistical Divisions, four books.On Contraries, one book.On Genera and Species, one book.On Essential Attributes, one book. 5.23. Three note-books on Arguments for Purposes of Refutation.Propositions concerning Virtue, two books.Objections, one book.On the Various Meanings of Terms or Expressions where a Determit is added, one book.of Passions or of Anger, one book.Five books of Ethics.On Elements, three books.of Science, one book.of Logical Principle, one book.Logical Divisions, seventeen books.Concerning Division, one book.On Dialectical Questioning and Answering, two books.of Motion, one book.Propositions, one book.Controversial Propositions, one book.Syllogisms, one book.Eight books of Prior Analytics.Two books of Greater Posterior Analytics.of Problems, one book.Eight books of Methodics.of the Greater Good, one book.On the Idea, one book.Definitions prefixed to the Topics, seven books.Two books of Syllogisms. 5.24. Concerning Syllogism with Definitions, one book.of the Desirable and the Contingent, one book.Preface to Commonplaces, one book.Two books of Topics criticizing the Definitions.Affections or Qualities, one book.Concerning Logical Division, one book.Concerning Mathematics, one book.Definitions, thirteen books.Two books of Refutations.of Pleasure, one book.Propositions, one book.On the Voluntary, one book.On the Beautiful, one book.Theses for Refutation, twenty-five books.Theses concerning Love, four books.Theses concerning Friendship, two books.Theses concerning the Soul, one book.Politics, two books.Eight books of a course of lectures on Politics like that of Theophrastus.of Just Actions, two books.A Collection of Arts [that is, Handbooks], two books.Two books of the Art of Rhetoric.Art, a Handbook, one book.Another Collection of Handbooks, two books.Concerning Method, one book.Compendium of the Art of Theodectes, one book.A Treatise on the Art of Poetry, two books.Rhetorical Enthymemes, one book.of Degree, one book.Divisions of Enthymemes, one book.On Diction, two books.of Taking Counsel, one book. 5.25. A Collection or Compendium, two books.On Nature, three books.Concerning Nature, one book.On the Philosophy of Archytas, three books.On the Philosophy of Speusippus and Xenocrates, one book.Extracts from the Timaeus and from the Works of Archytas, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Melissus, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Alcmaeon, one book.A Reply to the Pythagoreans, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Gorgias, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Xenophanes, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Zeno, one book.On the Pythagoreans, one book.On Animals, nine books.Eight books of Dissections.A selection of Dissections, one book.On Composite Animals, one book.On the Animals of Fable, one book.On Sterility, one book.On Plants, two books.Concerning Physiognomy, one book.Two books concerning Medicine.On the Unit, one book. 5.26. Prognostics of Storms, one book.Concerning Astronomy, one book.Concerning Optics, one book.On Motion, one book.On Music, one book.Concerning Memory, one book.Six books of Homeric Problems.Poetics, one book.Thirty-eight books of Physics according to the lettering.Two books of Problems which have been examined.Two books of Routine Instruction.Mechanics, one book.Problems taken from the works of Democritus, two books.On the Magnet, one book.Analogies, one book.Miscellaneous Notes, twelve books.Descriptions of Genera, fourteen books.Claims advanced, one book.Victors at Olympia, one book.Victors at the Pythian Games, one book.On Music, one book.Concerning Delphi, one book.Criticism of the List of Pythian Victors, one book.Dramatic Victories at the Dionysia, one book.of Tragedies, one book.Dramatic Records, one book.Proverbs, one book.Laws of the Mess-table, one book.Four books of Laws.Categories, one book.De Interpretatione, one book. 5.27. Constitutions of 158 Cities, in general and in particular, democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic, tyrannical.Letters to Philip.Letters of Selymbrians.Letters to Alexander, four books.Letters to Antipater, nine books.To Mentor, one book.To Ariston, one book.To Olympias, one book.To Hephaestion, one book.To Themistagoras, one book.To Philoxenus, one book.In reply to Democritus, one book.Verses beginning Ἁγνὲ θεῶν πρέσβισθ᾽ ἑκατηβόλε (Holy One and Chiefest of Gods, far-darting).Elegiac verses beginning Καλλιτέκνου μητρὸς θύγατερ (Daughter of a Mother blessed with fair offspring).In all 445,270 lines.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academic philosophy, attitude towards auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267
academic scepticism/sceptics, new academy/new academic Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 55
ancients Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 46
antiochus Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267
antonius m. Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 12
argument Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 12
aristotle, corpus Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 55
aristotle, history of animals Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 103
aristotle, nicomachean ethics Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 55
aristotle, on the generation of animals Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 54
aristotle, on the parts of animals Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 54
aristotle, on the soul Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 192
aristotle, politics Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 103
aristotle, topics Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 55
aristotle Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 46, 55
auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267
authority, argument from, of plato Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 46
authority (lat. auctoritas) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 46
body Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 193
cicero, marcus tullius, academic books Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 53
cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 23, 53, 54, 55, 193, 195
cicero Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267
commentarii (of aristotle and theophrastus) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 53
dialectic Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267
elements (lat. elementa or principia= gr. stoicheia) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 54
eloquence / eloquentia Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 12
epicurus Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 46
expertise (lat. ars = gr. technē), imitates nature Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 195
expertise (lat. ars = gr. technē) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 192, 195
impulse (lat. appetitus = gr. hormē) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 192
knowledge Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 55
law Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 12
licinius crassus l. Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 12
lucullus, lucius licinius, his library Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 23
lucullus, lucius licinius Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 23
lucullus Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267
nature Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 103, 192, 193, 195
oikeiōsis = lat. commendatio or conciliatio, antiochean/peripatetic argument from Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 103
oikeiōsis = lat. commendatio or conciliatio, of plants Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 192, 193
peripatos, school treatises Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 53
peripatos Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 23, 53, 55, 192
piso Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 23, 53, 54, 55, 195
plato, his authority Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 46
plato Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 46
plutarch Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267
power (lat. vis = gr. dynamis) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 103, 193, 195
socrates Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 12
soul (lat. animus = gr. psychē) Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 192, 193
speusippus Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 46
strabo Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267
sulla Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 23, 53
sulla p. cornelius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 12
telos Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 103, 195
theophrastus, on the causes of plants Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 54, 193, 195
theophrastus Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 46, 103, 193, 195; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267
tradition' Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 12
varro Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 53
zeno of citium Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 267