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2293
Cicero, On The Ends Of Good And Evil, 3.1


nan My dear Brutus. — Were Pleasure to speak for herself, in default of such redoubtable advocates as she now has to defend her, my belief is that she would own defeat. Vanquished by the arguments of our preceding Book, she would yield the victory to true Worth. Indeed she would be lost to shame if she persisted any longer in the battle against Virtue, and rated what is pleasant above what is morally good, or maintained that bodily enjoyment or the mental gratification which springs from it is of higher value than firmness and dignity of character. Let us then give Pleasure her dismissal, and bid her keep within her own domains, lest her charms and blandishments put snares in the way of strict philosophical debate. <


Voluptatem quidem, Brute, si ipsa pro se loquatur nec tam pertinaces habeat patronos, concessuram arbitror convictam superiore libro dignitati. etenim sit inpudens, si virtuti diutius repugnet, aut si honestis honestis honestati NV iucunda anteponat aut pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis ex eave natam laetitiam quam gravitatem animi atque constantiam. quare illam quidem dimittamus et suis se finibus tenere tenere (ten ab alt. m. in ras. ) N petere iubeamus, ne blanditiis eius inlecebrisque impediatur disputandi severitas. My dear Brutus. — Were Pleasure to speak for herself, in default of such redoubtable advocates as she now has to defend her, my belief is that she would own defeat. Vanquished by the arguments of our preceding Book, she would yield the victory to true Worth. Indeed she would be lost to shame if she persisted any longer in the battle against Virtue, and rated what is pleasant above what is morally good, or maintained that bodily enjoyment or the mental gratification which springs from it is of higher value than firmness and dignity of character. Let us then give Pleasure her dismissal, and bid her keep within her own domains, lest her charms and blandishments put snares in the way of strict philosophical debate. <


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

10 results
1. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 76, 75 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, Academica, 1.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.13. Tum ille: 'Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. sed de te ipso quid est' inquit quod audio? Quanam inquam de re? VA. Relictam a te veterem Academiam Academiam Bentl. iam *g*d inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid ergo inquam Antiocho id magis licuerit nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova, quam nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime. quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, pholo *g magnus vir ut tu existimas estimas vel ex(s)t- *g ipse, †negaret negat Dav. negare solet Pl. in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse, erroremque eorum qui ita putarent coarguit. VA. Est inquit ut dicis; sed ignorare te non arbitror quae contra Philonis Antiochus scripserit. scripsit gf
3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.15, 3.3-3.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.15. Satisne igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine docendus? et tamen vide, ne, si ego non intellegam quid Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece, ut videor, luculenter sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius, qui ita loquatur, ut non intellegatur. quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, 'cognomento qui skoteino/s perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit', aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis. Epicurus autem, ut opinor, nec non vult, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facili et iam et iam P. Man. etiam (eciam V) in vulgus pervagata loquitur. loquitur (i in ras. ) N loquatur ( etiam A) Quamquam non negatis nos intellegere quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat. e quo efficitur, non ut nos non intellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat. 3.3. ipse etiam dicit dicit cf. p. 13, 24—29 Epicurus ne ne nec RNV argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. nec enim in Torquati sermone quicquam sermone quicquam VN 2 sermone nec quicquam (quitquam ABE) implicatum inpl. R aut tortuosum fuit, nostraque, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis tum magis nobis, quibus etiam verba parienda sunt inponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur cogitans in omni arte, cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit, multam novitatem nominum esse, cum constituantur earum rerum vocabula, quae in quaque arte versentur. 3.4. itaque et dialectici et physici verbis utuntur iis, quae ipsi Graeciae nota non non BENV om. AR sint, sint Mdv. sunt geometrae vero et musici, grammatici etiam more quodam loquuntur suo. ipsae rhetorum artes, quae sunt totae forenses atque populares, verbis tamen in docendo quasi privatis utuntur ac suis. atque ut omittam has artis elegantes et ingenuas, ne opifices opifices N opificis AER opositis B opifex V quidem tueri sua artificia possent, nisi vocabulis uterentur nobis incognitis, usitatis sibi. quin etiam agri cultura, quae abhorret ab omni politiore elegantia, tamen eas eas V ea res, in quibus versatur, nominibus notavit novis. quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est. ars est enim philosophia vitae, de qua disserens arripere verba de foro non potest. 2.15.  "Well, do you think I have properly grasped the meaning of the terms, or do I still require lessons in the use of either Greek or Latin? And even supposing that I do not understand what Epicurus says, still I believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek, so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such unintelligible language. Obscurity is excusable on two grounds: it may be deliberately adopted, as in the case of Heraclitus, The surname of the Obscure who bore, So dark his philosophic lore; or the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of the subject and not of the style — an instance of this is Plato's Timaeus. But Epicurus, in my opinion, has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly if he can, nor is he discussing a recondite subject like natural philosophy, nor a technical subject such as mathematics, but a lucid and easy topic, and one that is generally familiar already. And yet you Epicureans do not deny that we understand what pleasure is, but what he means by it; which proves not that we do not understand the real meaning of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology. 3.3.  In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. 3.4.  Thus Logic and Natural Philosophy alike make use of terms unfamiliar even to Greece; Geometry, Music, Grammar also, have an idiom of their own. Even the manuals of Rhetoric, which belong entirely to the practical sphere and to the life of the world, nevertheless employ for purposes of instruction a sort of private and peculiar phraseology. And to leave out of account these liberal arts and accomplishments, even artisans would be unable to preserve the tradition of their crafts if they did not make use of words unknown to us though familiar to themselves. Nay, agriculture itself, a subject entirely unsusceptible of literary refinement, has yet had to coin technical terms to denote the things with which it is occupied. All the more is the philosopher compelled to do likewise; for philosophy is the Science of Life, and cannot treat its subject in language taken from the street.
4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.32 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.32. For let us hear Plato, that divine philosopher, for so almost he is to be deemed. He holds that motion is of two sorts, one spontaneous, the other derived from without; and that that which moves of itself spontaneously is more divine than that which has motion imparted to it by some force not its own. The former kind of motion he deems to reside only in the soul, which he considers to be the only source and origin of motion. Hence, since all motion springs from the world-heat, and since that heat moves spontaneously and not by any impulse from something else, it follows that that heat is soul; which proves that the world is an animate being. "Another proof that the world possesses intelligence is supplied by the fact that the world is unquestionably better than any of its elements; for even as there is no part of our body that is not of less value than we are ourselves, so the whole universe must needs be of higher worth than any portion of the universe; and if this be so, it follows that the world must be endowed with wisdom, for, if it were not, man, although a part of the world, being possessed of reason would necessarily be of higher worth than the world as a whole.
5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.4, 1.22, 1.41, 1.65, 1.94 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.4. non satis Graecorum gloriae responderunt. an censemus, cessemus KRH si Fabio, GFabio V 1 nobilissimo homini, laudi datum esset, quod pingeret, non multos etiam apud nos futuros Polyclitos et Parrhasios fuisse? honos alit artes, omnesque incenduntur acceduntur ( vel ac- cenduntur) Aug. incenduntur ex acc. H 1 ecl. 212 gloriae H ibid. cum Aug. plerisque codd. (gloriae L) Lup. ad studia gloria, iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque improbantur. honos ... 219,2 improbantur Aug. civ. 5,13 (H ecl. 212 ) et ex eo Serv. Lupus ep. 1 summam eruditionem Graeci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus; igitur et Epaminondas, princeps meo iudicio Graeciae, graecis X -ę pro -s V 1 aut c fidibus praeclare cecinisse dicitur, Themistoclesque aliquot ante annos annis edd. vett. cum in epulis recusaret recusasset V 2 s lyram, liram X est habitus indoctior. est... indoctior Quint. inst. 1,10,19 ergo in Graecia musici floruerunt, discebantque id omnes, nec qui nesciebat nesciebant V 1 satis excultus doctrina putabatur. 1.22. Aristoteles, longe omnibus—Platonem semper excipio—praestans et ingenio et diligentia, cum quattuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orerentur, orirentur H s quintam quandam naturam censet esse, esse esset GR 1 e corr. e qua equa G 1 ( in mg. de) K 1 (equae K 2 ut v. ) R esse qua V (quae V 2 ) sit mens; cogitare enim et providere et discere et docere et invenire aliquid et tam multa alia alia X exp. V vet , cf. 247,14 meminisse, amare odisse, cupere timere, angi laetari, haec et et om. H similia eorum in horum quattuor generum inesse nullo nullo numero H putat; quintum genus genus om. H adhibet vacans nomine et sic sic exp. V vet ipsum animum e)ndele/xeian endelecheian GKVH, sed in R inter e et a graecum com- pendium diphthongi ei ( ) scriptum est appellat appellant G 1 V 1 novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem. Nisi quae me forte fugiunt, fugiunt (exp. m. vet.) V haec hae V rec s sunt fere omnium post fere add. V 2 de animo sententiae. Aristoteles cum quattuor ... 229, 3 de animo sentiae H Democritum enim, magnum illum quidem virum, sed levibus et rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum anim um V ( ss. c ) concursu quodam fortuito, omittamus; nihil est enim apud istos, quod non atomorum turba conficiat. nihil... eorum t. conficiat Non. 269,12 1.41. si vero aut numerus quidam sit sit est Mdv. sed cf. comm. animus, quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide dicitur, aut cf. Aug. gen. ad litt. 7, 21 quinta illa non nominata magis quam non intellecta natura, multo etiam integriora ac puriora sunt, ut a terra longissime se se om. H ecferant. si vero ... 5 ecferant ecf. X (eff. corr. V 1 ecf. K c ) Horum igitur aliquid animus, putetur vel cogitetur fere potius supplendum quam sit (We.). est ante animus add. B s ne nec K tam vegeta vegeta V 1 (veg in r. ) K 2 veta GK 1 R mens aut in corde cerebrove aut in Empedocleo sanguine demersa iaceat. Dicaearchum vero cum Aristoxeno aequali et condiscipulo suo, doctos sane homines, omittamus; quorum alter ne nae R nę K ne, sed e in r. V 1 condoluisse quidem umquam videtur, qui animum quia nimium K 1 se habere non sentiat, alter ita delectatur suis cantibus, ut eos etiam ad haec transferre conetur. harmonian arm. ter H ( in 13 V 1 e corr., in 14 K) harmoniă K autem ex intervallis sonorum nosse possumus, quorum varia compositio etiam harmonias arm. ter H ( in 13 V 1 e corr., in 14 K) efficit pluris; membrorum vero situs vero situs om. K 1 add. c et figura corporis vacans animo quam possit harmoniam arm. ter H ( in 13 V 1 e corr., in 14 K) efficere, non video. armonian ... 17 video sed hic quidem, quamvis eruditus sit, sicut est, haec magistro concedat Aristoteli, canere ipse doceat; bene enim illo Graecorum proverbio praecipitur: quam quisque norit artem, in hac se exerceat. cf. Arist. Ve. 1431 Cic. Att. 5, 10,3 1.65. prorsus haec divina mihi videtur vis, quae tot res efficiat et tantas. quid est enim enim s. v. add. G 1 memoria rerum et verborum? quid porro inventio? profecto id, quo ne in deo quidem quidem V 2 s om. X quicquam maius magis V 1 (corr. rec ) intellegi potest. potest R 1 potes G non enim ambrosia deos aut nectare aut Iuventate iuventute V rec pocula ministrante laetari laetare GR 1 (corr. 1 ) V 1 (corr. 2 ) Hom. Y 232 arbitror, nec Homerum audio, qui Ganymeden ganimeden V 1 (corr. 1 ) H ab dis dis ex his R raptum ait ait ex aut K c propter formam, ut ut V Iovi bibere ministraret; ut... ministraret Arus. GL. VII458, 16 non iusta causa, cur Laomedonti tanta tanta add. K c ex tanti V 2 fieret fieret V 2 s fierit X iniuria. fingebat haec Homerus et et add. V 2 humana ad deos transferebat: -ebat in r. V c transferret ad nos ss. K 2 divina mallem ad nos. fingebat... 2 nos Aug. civ. 4, 26 conf. 1,16 quae autem divina? vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse. quid igitur... 15 videtur et quis igitur ( pro aut qui) pri- mus 250, 3 meminisse H ergo animus animusq : K ( ui ss. 2 ) lac. ind. Po. ( suppl. fere sec. § 66 et rep. 6,26 : viget invenit meminit) qui ..., qui del. Lb. quidem Sey. ut ego Eurip. fr. 1018 dico, divinus est, ut Euripides dicere audet, deus. Et quidem, et quidem ex equi- dem V 1 si si add. K c deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. nam ut illa natura caelestis et terra vacat et umore, humore X sic utriusque utrisque V 1 harum rerum humanus animus est expers; sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele inducta primum, haec et deorum est et animorum. Hanc nos sententiam secuti sicuti K his ipsis verbis in Consolatione hoc hoc del. s, sed hoc ut p. 253, 27 de hoc ipso usurpatum est. Cic. distinguit inter hoc argumentum quod suis verbis exprimit et universam Aristotelis sententiam e qua illud ductum est. expressimus: 1.94. cur? nam, reor, nullis, si vita longior daretur, posset esse iucundior; nihil enim est profecto homini hominis X prudentia dulcius, cf. Med. fr. 676 quam, ut quam ut quia utem K 1 cetera auferat, adfert certe senectus. Quae vero aetas longa est, aut quid omnino est post omnino add. V vet homini longum? nonne Mo/do pueros, pueri (i in r. V 1 ) V modo a/dulescentes i/n cursu a tergo i/nsequens Com. pall. inc. 43 actergo V 1 Ne/c opitis a/dsecuta est senectus? sed quia ultra nihil habemus, hoc longum dicimus. ducimus K Omnia ista, perinde ut cuique data sunt pro rata parte, ita aut longa aut parte avita longa GKR parte aucta l. in parte aut l. corr. V parte, ita aut Man. brevia dicuntur. apud Hypanim fluvium, qui ab Europae parte in Pontum influit, Aristoteles Arist. hist. an. 552b 18 ait bestiolas quasdam nasci, quae unum diem vivant. ex his igitur hora VIII quae mortua est, provecta aetate mortua est; quae vero occidente sole, decrepita, eo magis, si etiam solstitiali die. confer confert X ( corr. KV 1 ) nostram longissimam aetatem cum aeternitate: in eadem propemodum brevitate qua illae bestiolae reperiemur. reperiemus V 1
6. Philodemus, De Oeconomia, 23.15-23.16, 23.24-23.25 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Horace, Letters, 1.7.35-1.7.48 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

8. Horace, Sermones, 1.3.20, 1.4.53, 1.10.26, 1.10.31-1.10.35, 2.2.112-2.2.115, 2.6.71 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

9. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.136-1.145, 5.1028-5.1029, 5.1041-5.1055, 5.1081-5.1086 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

10. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 10.13 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

10.13. Apollodorus in his Chronology tells us that our philosopher was a pupil of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes; but in his letter to Eurylochus, Epicurus himself denies it and says that he was self-taught. Both Epicurus and Hermarchus deny the very existence of Leucippus the philosopher, though by some and by Apollodorus the Epicurean he is said to have been the teacher of Democritus. Demetrius the Magnesian affirms that Epicurus also attended the lectures of Xenocrates.The terms he used for things were the ordinary terms, and Aristophanes the grammarian credits him with a very characteristic style. He was so lucid a writer that in the work On Rhetoric he makes clearness the sole requisite.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academics, the academy Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 290
ambition, condemned Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 175
aristotle, cicero on Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 290
armstrong, david Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128, 147
bailey, cyril Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
bion of borysthenes, on apathy Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128, 147
boyancé, pierre Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 175
cicero, commentary on epicureanism Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128, 175
cicero, on philosophy Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 290
cicero, on plato and aristotle Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 290
cicero, verbal coinages Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
cicero Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 290
determinism, dialectic Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 290
ferguson, john Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128, 175
frankness Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128
indelli, giovanni Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128, 147
maecenas, personal qualities of (according to horace) Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 175
maecenas, rejection of political ambition Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 175
maecenas, relationship with horace Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 175
mcosker, michael Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128, 147
metrodorus of lampsacus Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128
oltramare, andré Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
patronage Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 175
peripatetics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 290
persona of horace, moral worth Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128
philippson, robert Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128
plato, cicero on Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 290
quirinus Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
rhetoric Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 290
satires (horace), treatment of political ambition Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 175
satires (horace), treatment of relationship with maecenas Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 175
scepticism, academic' Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 290
stoics/stoicism, condemned by horace Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128, 147
tsakiropoulou-summers, anastasia Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 175
tsouna(-mckirahan), voula Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128, 147
wilke, karl Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 128