1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.6, 1.8, 1.13-1.14, 1.23, 1.25-1.27, 1.29-1.42, 1.44-1.46, 1.48-1.54, 1.57-1.58, 1.63, 1.65-1.71, 3.20-3.21, 5.2, 5.7, 5.16-5.21, 5.24-5.69, 5.71, 5.73-5.76 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 1.6. Quid? quod BEN 2 si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque eisque eisdem N his (hys) BE nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca antepot iis, quae et splendide dicta sint dicta sint dett. dicta sunt neque sint conversa de Graecis? nam si dicent ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos ipsos NV ipso quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant, quam legendi sunt. quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? legimus tamen Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. quid? Theophrastus Theophrastus A. Man. theophrastum RNV theophastrum A theoprastum BE mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos? quid? Epicurei epicuri BE num num BE non RV non ( superscr. ab alt. m. uel num) A non ( superscr. ab alt. m. nun) N desistunt de isdem, de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere? quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis isdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est, cur nostri a nostris non legantur? 1.8. ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire, usui uenire superscr. ab alt. m. illud e; ut sit illud euenire, A; uenire usu R ut abhorreant a Latinis, quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius. quibus ego assentior, dum modo de isdem rebus ne Graecos quidem legendos putent. res vero bonas verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas dictas V dictatas quis non legat? nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a Scaevola est praetore praetore P. Man. praetor salutatus Athenis Albucius. 1.13. Ut autem a facillimis ordiamur, prima veniat in medium Epicuri ratio, quae plerisque notissima est. quam a nobis sic intelleges intelleges A intelliges expositam, ut ab ipsis, qui eam disciplinam probant, non soleat accuratius explicari; verum enim invenire volumus, non tamquam adversarium aliquem convincere. accurate autem quondam a L. Torquato, homine omni doctrina erudito, defensa est Epicuri sententia de voluptate, a meque ei responsum, cum C. Triarius, in primis gravis et doctus adolescens, ei disputationi interesset. 1.14. nam cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi causa uterque venisset, pauca primo inter nos inter nos primo BE de litteris, quarum summum erat in utroque studium, deinde Torquatus: Quoniam nacti te, nacti te VN 2 hac tite A 1 BER, N 1 (ut videtur); hac die A 2 inquit, sumus aliquando otiosum, certe audiam, quid sit, quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt, qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes, eum quem ego arbitror unum vidisse verum maximisque erroribus animos hominum liberavisse et omnia tradidisse, quae pertinerent pertinent R ad bene beateque vivendum. sed existimo te, sicut nostrum Triarium, minus ab eo delectari, quod ista Platonis, Aristoteli, aristoteli A 1 aristotili E aristotilis Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. nam illud illuc NV ad illud A 2 quidem adduci vix possum, ut ea, quae senserit ille, tibi non vera videantur. 1.23. Confirmat autem illud vel maxime, quod ipsa natura, ut ait ille, sciscat et probet, id est voluptatem et dolorem. ad haec et quae sequamur et quae fugiamus refert omnia. quod quamquam Aristippi est a Cyrenaicisque melius liberiusque defenditur, tamen eius modi esse iudico, ut nihil homine videatur indignius. ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et conformavit, ut mihi quidem videtur. ac fieri potest, ut errem, sed ita prorsus existimo, neque eum Torquatum, qui hoc primus cognomen invenerit, invenit BE aut torquem illum hosti detraxisse, ut aliquam ex eo perciperet corpore voluptatem, aut cum Latinis tertio consulatu conflixisse apud Veserim propter voluptatem; quod vero securi percussit percussit Mdv. percusserit filium, privavisse privasse BER se etiam videtur multis voluptatibus, cum ipsi naturae patrioque amori praetulerit ius maiestatis atque imperii. 1.25. nec mihi illud dixeris: Haec enim ipsa mihi sunt voluptati, et erant illa Torquatis. Torquatis edd. torquati ABER torquato NV Numquam hoc ita defendit Epicurus neque Metrodorus Metrodorus P. Man. vero tu aut quisquam eorum, qui aut saperet aliquid aut ista fortasse legendum qui et saperet aliquid et ista didicisset. et quod quaeritur saepe, cur tam multi sint Epicurei, epicuri BE, R (Ep.), N sunt aliae quoque causae, sed multitudinem haec maxime allicit, quod ita putant dici ab illo, recta et honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam, id est voluptatem. homines optimi non intellegunt totam rationem everti, si ita res se habeat. nam si concederetur, etiamsi ad corpus nihil referatur, ista sua sponte et per se esse iucunda, per se esset et virtus et cognitio rerum, quod minime ille vult, expetenda. 1.26. Haec igitur Epicuri non probo, inquam. De cetero vellem equidem aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instructior— est enim, quod tibi ita videri necesse est, non satis politus iis artibus, quas qui tenent, eruditi appellantur —aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. quamquam te quidem video minime esse deterritum. Quae cum dixissem, magis ut illum provocarem quam ut ipse loquerer, tum Triarius leniter leniter dett. leuiter arridens: Tu quidem, inquit, totum Tu quidem inquit totum tum quid totum inquit (inquid B) BE Epicurum paene e philosophorum choro sustulisti. quid ei reliquisti, nisi te, quoquo modo quoque modo A 1 quoque ut modo RN 1 V quoque ut id modo N 2 loqueretur, intellegere, quid diceret? aliena dixit in physicis nec ea ipsa, quae tibi probarentur; si qua in iis corrigere voluit, deteriora fecit. disserendi artem nullam habuit. voluptatem cum summum bonum diceret, primum in eo ipso parum vidit, deinde hoc quoque alienum; nam ante Aristippus, et ille melius. post melius add. in V Etenim quoniam detractis de ho- mine sensibus; idem in N (et enim cet ) ab alt. m. in marg. adscr. posito post melius signo eodemque in marg.; melius Etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nichil est necesse est quid ad naturam aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. Et expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse. addidisti R (cf. p. 13, 32 sqq. et p. 14, 8 sq.) addidisti ad extremum etiam indoctum fuisse. 1.27. Fieri, inquam, Triari, nullo pacto potest, ut non dicas, quid non probes eius, a quo dissentias. quid enim me prohiberet Epicureum esse, si probarem, quae ille diceret? cum praesertim illa perdiscere ludus esset. quam ob rem dissentientium inter se reprehensiones reprehensiones dissenciencium inter se BE non sunt vituperandae, maledicta, contumeliae, tum iracundiae, contentiones concertationesque in disputando pertinaces indignae philosophia mihi videri solent. 1.29. Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic: 1.30. omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec haec ħ BE hoc NV putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel. dulce esse mel R mel dulce A quorum nihil oportere oportere V oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum tantum om. BE satis esse esse satis A admonere. interesse enim inter inter om. BE argumentum argumentumque BE argumentatum R augmentatum A conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta promta AR et aperta iudicari. indicari NV etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut ad naturam AR ad naturam ( om. aut) BE aut naturam ( om. ad) N 1 aut secundum naturam N 2 aut verum (compend scr) V aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. post iudicari add. in V voluptatem etiam per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum; idem in N ab alt. m. in marg. adscr. posito post iudicari signo eo- demque in marg. ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et et aut NV dolorem? 1.31. Sunt autem quidam e nostris, qui haec subtilius velint tradere et negent satis esse quid bonum sit aut quid malum sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse et voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. esse. Et fugiendum itaque aiunt (om. expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse cf. ad p. 12, 5) R itaque aiunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem, ut alterum esse appetendum, alterum asperdum sentiamus. Alii autem, quibus ego assentior, cum a philosophis compluribus permulta dicantur, cur nec voluptas in bonis sit numeranda nec in malis dolor, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant. 1.32. Sed ut perspiciatis, unde omnis iste natus error sit natus sit error BE error natus sit V voluptatem accusantium doloremque laudantium, totam rem aperiam eaque ipsa, quae ab illo inventore veritatis et quasi architecto beatae vitae dicta sunt, explicabo. nemo enim ipsam voluptatem, quia voluptas sit, sit si BE aspernatur aut odit aut fugit, sed quia consequuntur consecuntur A magni dolores eos, qui ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt, neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quia non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore dolore et labore BE magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem. Ut enim ad minima veniam, quis nostrum exercitationem ullam corporis suscipit suscepit BER laboriosam, nisi ut aliquid ex ea commodi consequatur? quis autem vel eum iure reprehenderit, qui in ea voluptate velit esse, quam nihil molestiae consequatur, vel illum, qui dolorem eum fugiat, quo voluptas nulla pariatur? 1.33. At vero eos et accusamus et iusto odio dignissimos ducimus, qui blanditiis praesentium voluptatum deleniti deliniti BEV atque corrupti, quos dolores et quas molestias excepturi sint, obcaecati obcecati AENV occec cupiditate non provident, similique sunt in culpa, qui officia deserunt mollitia animi, id est laborum et dolorum fuga. et harum quidem rerum facilis est et expedita distinctio. nam libero tempore, cum soluta nobis est eligendi optio, cumque nihil impedit, quo minus id, quod maxime placeat, placeat maxime BE facere possimus, omnis voluptas assumenda est, omnis dolor repellendus. repellendus BE depellendus temporibus autem quibusdam et aut officiis debitis aut rerum necessitatibus saepe eveniet, ut et voluptates repudiandae sint et molestiae non recusandae. itaque earum rerum hic tenetur a sapiente delectus, ut aut reiciendis voluptatibus maiores maioris ABERN 1 alias consequatur aut perferendis doloribus asperiores asperioris ABE asperioribus R repellat. Hanc ego cum teneam sententiam, quid est cur verear, ne ad eam non possim accommodare Torquatos nostros? 1.34. quos tu paulo ante cum memoriter, tum etiam erga nos amice et benivole collegisti, nec me tamen laudandis maioribus meis corrupisti corrupisti cod. Leidens. Madvigii; corripuisti nec segniorem ad respondendum reddidisti. quorum facta quem ad modum, quaeso, interpretaris? sicine siccine RN 2 V sic cine N 1 eos censes aut in armatum hostem impetum fecisse aut in liberos atque atque aut R in sanguinem suum tam crudelis fuisse, nihil ut de utilitatibus, nihil ut de commodis suis cogitarent? at at ad A 1 RV id ne ferae quidem faciunt, ut ita ruant itaque turbent, ut earum motus et impetus quo pertineant non intellegamus, intelligantur R tu tam egregios viros censes tantas res gessisse sine causa? 1.35. quae fuerit causa, mox videro; video RV interea hoc tenebo, si ob aliquam causam ista, quae sine dubio praeclara sunt, fecerint, virtutem iis iis si BE per se ipsam causam non fuisse.—Torquem detraxit hosti.—Et quidem se texit, ne interiret.—At at N 2 (t in ras. ), ad ABERV magnum periculum adiit.—In oculis quidem exercitus.—Quid ex eo est consecutus?—Laudem et caritatem, quae sunt vitae sine metu degendae praesidia firmissima.—Filium morte multavit.—Si sine causa, nollem me ab eo ortum, tam inportuno tamque crudeli; sin, ut dolore suo sanciret militaris imperii disciplinam exercitumque in gravissimo bello animadversionis animum adversionis R metu contineret, saluti prospexit civium, qua intellegebat contineri suam. 1.36. atque haec ratio late patet. in quo enim maxime consuevit iactare vestra nostra (compend. scr.) BERV se oratio, tua praesertim, qui studiose antiqua persequeris, claris et fortibus viris commemorandis eorumque factis non emolumento emolimento BE aliquo, sed ipsius honestatis decore laudandis, id totum evertitur eo delectu delectu N deflectu A deffectu R defectu V defluxu BE rerum, quem modo dixi, constituto, ut aut voluptates omittantur maiorum voluptatum adipiscendarum causa aut dolores suscipiantur maiorum dolorum effugiendorum gratia. 1.37. Sed de clarorum hominum factis illustribus et gloriosis satis hoc loco dictum sit. erit enim iam de omnium virtutum cursu ad voluptatem proprius disserendi locus. nunc autem explicabo, voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit, ut tollatur error omnis imperitorum inp. R intellegaturque ea, quae voluptaria, delicata, mollis habeatur disciplina, disciplinata ABER quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit. Non enim hanc solam sequimur, quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus, quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. nam quoniam, cum privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est, ut omne, quo offendimur, dolor, doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. ut enim, cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis, sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem efficit voluptatis. 1.38. itaque non placuit Epicuro medium esse quiddam quiddam A quoddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum, quod quibusdam medium videretur, videretur N (?), Rath.; videtur cum om. R cum omni dolore careret, non modo voluptatem esse, verum etiam summam voluptatem. quisquis enim sentit, quem ad modum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore. omnis omnis Morel. omni autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit. 1.39. At etiam Athenis, ut e patre epatre AN audiebam facete et urbane Stoicos irridente, irridente R arridente statua est in Ceramico Chrysippi sedentis porrecta manu, quae manus significet illum in hac esse rogatiuncula delectatum: 'Numquidnam manus tua sic affecta, quem ad modum affecta nunc est, desiderat?'—Nihil sane.—'At, si voluptas esset bonum, desideraret.'—Ita credo.— Non est igitur voluptas bonum. credo ita B (desideraret — voluptas bonum om. E) Hoc ne statuam quidem dicturam pater aiebat, si loqui posset. conclusum est enim contra Cyrenaicos satis acute, nihil ad Epicurum. nam si ea sola voluptas esset, quae quasi titillaret sensus, ut ita dicam, et ad eos cum suavitate afflueret et illaberetur, nec nec ulla par A ut ulla pars BE ulla ( om. nec et pars) RN illa ( om. nec et pars) V manus esse contenta posset nec ulla pars vacuitate doloris sine iucundo motu voluptatis. sin autem summa voluptas est, ut Epicuro placet, nihil dolere, primum tibi recte, Chrysippe, concessum est nihil desiderare manum, cum ita esset affecta, secundum non recte, si voluptas esset bonum, fuisse desideraturam. idcirco enim non desideraret, quia, quod dolore caret, id in voluptate est. 1.40. Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus nullo dolore nec impediente nec inpendente, quem tandem hoc statu praestabiliorem aut magis expetendum possimus possumus BE dicere? inesse enim necesse est in eo, qui ita sit affectus, et firmitatem animi nec mortem nec dolorem timentis, quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis, lenis ARN in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio consoletur. 1.41. ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est, quod huc possit, quod melius sit, accedere? Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus, quanti in hominem maximi maximi dett. maxime cadere possunt, nulla spe proposita fore levius aliquando, aliquando dett. aliquanto nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec expectata voluptate, quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest? quodsi vita doloribus referta maxime fugienda est, summum profecto malum est vivere cum dolore, cui sententiae consentaneum est ultimum esse bonorum cum voluptate vivere. nec enim habet nostra habet praeter voluptatem nostra V fortasse recte mens quicquam, ubi consistat tamquam in extremo, omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla, quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere. aut angere Vict. aut tangere 1.42. Praeterea et appetendi et refugiendi et omnino rerum gerendarum initia proficiscuntur aut a voluptate aut a dolore. quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est omnis rectas res atque laudabilis eo referri, ut cum voluptate vivatur. quoniam autem id est vel summum bonorum bonorum om. R vel ultimum vel extremum summum vel ultimum vel extremum bono- rum BE ( non A) —quod Graeci te/los nomit—, quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur res referuntur (re post res ab alt. m. superscr. ) N res ferunt A 1 res feruntur A 2 R feruntur ( om. res) V res ferentur BE omnes, fatendum est summum esse bonum iucunde vivere. Id qui in una virtute ponunt et splendore nominis capti quid natura postulet non intellegunt, errore maximo, si Epicurum audire voluerint, liberabuntur. istae enim vestrae eximiae pulchraeque virtutes nisi voluptatem voluptates BE efficerent, quis eas aut laudabilis aut expetendas arbitraretur? ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius artis, sed bonae valetudinis causa probamus, et gubernatoris ars, quia bene navigandi rationem habet, utilitate, non arte laudatur, sic sapientia, quae ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur, si nihil efficeret; nunc expetitur, quod est tamquam artifex conquirendae et 1.44. ex cupiditatibus odia, discidia, discordiae, seditiones, bella nascuntur, nec eae se eae se A eas se BER he se se (he se ab alt. m. in ras ) N hee se V foris solum iactant nec tantum in alios caeco impetu incurrunt, sed intus etiam in animis inclusae inter se dissident atque discordant, ex quo vitam amarissimam necesse est effici, ut sapiens solum amputata circumcisaque iitate omni et errore naturae finibus contentus sine aegritudine possit et sine metu vivere. 1.45. quae est enim aut utilior aut ad bene vivendum aptior partitio quam illa, qua est usus Epicurus? qui unum genus posuit earum cupiditatum, quae essent et naturales et ante naturales om. BE et necessariae, alterum, quae naturales essent nec nec non BE tamen necessariae, tertium, quae nec naturales nec necessariae. quarum ea ratio est, ut necessariae nec opera multa nec impensa inp. R expleantur; ne naturales quidem multa desiderant, propterea quod ipsa natura divitias, quibus contenta sit, et parabilis parabilis A 1 R parabiles (in N e ex corr. alt. m.) et terminatas habet; iium autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec finis inveniri potest. 1.46. quodsi Quid si A 1 vitam omnem perturbari videmus errore et inscientia, sapientiamque esse solam, quae nos a libidinum impetu et a formidinum terrore vindicet et ipsius fortunae modice ferre doceat iniurias et omnis monstret vias, quae ad quietem et ad tranquillitatem et ad tranquillitatem AR et tranquillitatem ferant, quid est cur dubitemus dicere et sapientiam propter voluptates expetendam et insipientiam propter molestias esse fugiendam? 1.48. Qui autem ita frui volunt voluptatibus, ut nulli propter eas consequantur dolores, et qui suum iudicium retinent, ne voluptate victi faciant id, quod sentiant non esse faciendum, ii ii A 1 V in BE hi A 2 hii RN voluptatem maximam adipiscuntur praetermittenda voluptate. idem etiam dolorem saepe perpetiuntur, ne, si id non faciant, incidant in maiorem. ex quo intellegitur nec intemperantiam propter se esse fugiendam temperantiamque expetendam, non quia voluptates fugiat, sed quia maiores consequatur. 1.49. Eadem fortitudinis ratio reperietur. nam neque laborum perfunctio neque perpessio dolorum per se ipsa allicit nec patientia nec assiduitas assiduitates ANV nec vigiliae nec ea ea om. BE ipsa, quae laudatur, industria, ne fortitudo quidem, sed ista sequimur, ut sine cura metuque vivamus animumque et corpus, quantum efficere possimus, possimus AEN possumus molestia liberemus. ut enim mortis metu omnis quietae vitae status perturbatur, et ut succumbere doloribus eosque humili animo inbecilloque ferre miserum est, ob eamque debilitatem animi multi parentes, parentis R multi amicos, non nulli patriam, plerique autem se ipsos penitus perdiderunt, sic robustus animus et excelsus omni est liber cura et angore, cum et mortem contemnit, qua qui qui quia A 1 BE affecti sunt in eadem causa sunt, qua ante quam nati, et ad dolores ita paratus est, ut meminerit maximos morte finiri, parvos multa habere intervalla requietis, mediocrium nos esse dominos, ut, si tolerabiles sint, feramus, si minus, animo aequo e vita, cum ea non placeat, tamquam e theatro exeamus. quibus rebus intellegitur nec timiditatem ignaviamque vituperari nec fortitudinem patientiamque laudari suo nomine, sed illas reici, quia dolorem pariant, has optari, quia voluptatem. 1.50. Iustitia restat, ut de omni virtute sit dictum. sed similia fere dici possunt. ut enim sapientiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem copulatas esse docui cum voluptate, ut ab ea nullo modo nec divelli nec distrahi possint, sic de iustitia iudicandum est, quae non modo numquam nocet cuiquam, sed contra semper afficit afficit ( cf. Tusc. 3,11 qui contra affecti sint) Se. aliquid ( in N ante aliquid ab alt. m. superscr. est alit) cum vi sua vi sua V, N (vi ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ); in sua BER sua vi A atque natura, quod tranquillat tranquillat Se. tranquillet animos, tum spe nihil earum rerum defuturum, quas natura non non om. RNV depravata desiderat. desiderat R 1 V desideret Et add. Lamb. quem ad modum temeritas et libido et ignavia semper animum excruciant et semper sollicitant turbulentaeque sunt, sic inprobitas si add. Mdv. cuius in mente consedit, hoc ipso, quod adest, turbulenta est est: si Grut. et si ABE turbulenta non potest fieri Et si RN turbulenta non potest fieri Si V ; si vero molita quippiam est, quamvis occulte fecerit, numquam tamen id confidet fore semper occultum. plerumque improborum facta primo suspicio insequitur, dein deinde NV sermo atque fama, tum accusator, tum iudex; index A multi etiam, ut te consule, ipsi se indicaverunt. indicaverunt A 2 RN indicaverat A 1 iudicaverunt BEV 1.51. quodsi qui satis sibi contra hominum sibi contra hominum ibi contra hominum V hominum sibi contra R conscientiam conscientiam t n scientiam R cumscientiam A 1 saepti esse et et om. E muniti et muniti om. R videntur, deorum tamen horrent easque ipsas sollicitudines, quibus eorum animi noctesque diesque noctes diesque R diesque noctesque B exeduntur, a diis inmortalibus supplicii causa importari inport. N putant. quae autem tanta ex improbis factis ad minuendas vitae molestias accessio potest fieri, quanta ad augendas, cum conscientia factorum, tum poena legum odioque civium? et tamen in quibusdam neque pecuniae modus est neque honoris neque imperii nec libidinum nec epularum nec reliquarum cupiditatum, quas nulla praeda umquam improbe parta minuit, minuit imminit BE sed add. dett. (sed auget potius atque inflammat) potius inflammat, ut coe+rcendi magis quam dedocendi esse videantur. 1.52. Invitat igitur vera ratio bene sanos ad iustitiam, aequitatem, fidem, neque homini infanti aut inpotenti iniuste facta conducunt, qui nec facile efficere possit, quod conetur, nec optinere, si effecerit, et opes vel fortunae fortuna E vel ingenii ingenii edd. ingenia liberalitati magis conveniunt, qua qui utuntur, utantur ARNV benivolentiam sibi conciliant et, quod aptissimum est ad quiete vivendum, caritatem, praesertim cum omnino nulla sit causa peccandi. 1.53. quae enim cupiditates a natura proficiscuntur, facile explentur sine ulla iniuria, iniuria ulla BE quae autem ies sunt, iis parendum non est. nihil enim desiderabile concupiscunt, plusque in ipsa iniuria detrimenti est quam in iis rebus emolumenti, quae pariuntur iniuria. Itaque ne iustitiam quidem recte quis dixerit per se ipsam optabilem, sed quia iucunditatis vel plurimum afferat. nam diligi et carum esse iucundum est propterea, quia tutiorem vitam et voluptatem pleniorem pleniorem voluptatem BE efficit. itaque non ob ea solum incommoda, quae eveniunt eveniunt et veniunt ARN inprobis, fugiendam inprobitatem putamus, sed multo etiam magis, quod, cuius in animo versatur, numquam sinit eum respirare, numquam adquiescere. 1.54. Quodsi ne ipsarum quidem virtutum laus, in qua maxime ceterorum philosophorum exultat oratio, reperire exitum potest, nisi derigatur ad voluptatem, voluptas autem est sola, quae nos vocet ad se et alliciat suapte natura, non potest esse dubium, quin id sit summum atque extremum bonorum omnium, beateque vivere nihil aliud sit nisi cum voluptate vivere. 1.57. Sed ut iis bonis erigimur, quae expectamus, sic laetamur iis, quae recordamur. stulti autem malorum memoria torquentur, sapientes sapientis R bona praeterita grata recordatione renovata delectant. est autem situm in nobis ut et adversa quasi perpetua oblivione obruamus et secunda iucunde ac suaviter meminerimus. sed cum ea, quae praeterierunt, acri animo et attento intento BE intuemur, tum fit ut aegritudo sequatur, si illa mala sint, laetitia, si bona. si bona laetitia BE O praeclaram beate vivendi et apertam et simplicem et directam viam! cum enim certe nihil homini possit melius esse quam vacare omni dolore et molestia perfruique maximis et animi et corporis voluptatibus, videtisne quam nihil praetermittatur quod vitam adiuvet, quo facilius id, quod propositum est, summum bonum consequamur? clamat Epicurus, is quem vos nimis voluptatibus esse deditum dicitis, non posse iucunde vivi, nisi sapienter, honeste iusteque vivatur, nec sapienter, honeste, iuste, nisi iucunde. 1.58. neque enim civitas in seditione beata esse potest nec in discordia dominorum domus; quo minus animus a se ipse ipso BE dissidens secumque discordans gustare partem ullam liquidae voluptatis et liberae potest. atqui pugtibus et contrariis studiis consiliisque semper utens nihil quieti videre, nihil tranquilli potest. 1.63. optime vero Epicurus, quod exiguam dixit fortunam intervenire sapienti maximasque ab eo et ab eo et om. R et ( ante gravissimas) om. V gravissimas res consilio ipsius et ratione administrari neque maiorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi posse, quam ex hoc percipiatur, quod videamus esse finitum. In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam. viam om. R In physicis plurimum posuit. ea scientia et verborum vis et natura orationis et consequentium repugtiumve ratio potest perspici. percipi R omnium autem rerum natura cognita levamur superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione rerum, e qua ipsa horribiles existunt saepe formidines. denique etiam morati melius erimus, cum didicerimus quid natura desideret. tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa, quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium, regula, ad quam omnia iudicia rerum omnium rerum regula R 1 dirigentur, numquam ullius oratione victi sententia desistemus. 1.65. Restat locus huic disputationi vel maxime necessarius de amicitia, quam, si voluptas summum sit bonum, affirmatis nullam omnino fore. de qua Epicurus quidem ita dicit, omnium rerum, quas ad beate vivendum sapientia comparaverit, nihil esse maius amicitia, nihil uberius, nihil iucundius. nec vero hoc hoc hos A 1 BER oratione solum, sed multo magis vita et factis et moribus comprobavit. quod quam magnum sit fictae veterum fabulae declarant, in quibus tam multis tamque variis ab ultima antiquitate repetitis tria vix amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem pervenias profectus a Theseo. at vero Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientis tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis. sed ad rem redeamus; de hominibus dici non necesse est. 1.66. Tribus igitur igitur ergo BE modis video esse a nostris a nostris esse BE de amicitia disputatum. alii cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur confirmetur ABE animus et a spe et a spe ad spem et ABE pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. 1.67. atque ut odia, odiā BE invidiae, invidiae A 2 invidie (e ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ) N invidiā B invidia A 1 EV, R ( sequente una litt. erasa, quae vi-detur fuisse e) despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus possumus etiam B neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi nisi ipsi ARV aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia et amicitia om. R, A 1 (ab alt. m. in mg. exteriore sinistro ita add. amicitia, ut a ligatore et desectum esse possit) cōnect. BE cum voluptate conectitur. nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque ut RNV atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. 1.68. quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, susciperet susceperit R (suam susceperit voluptatem), NV eosdem suscipiet suscipiet susciperet BE propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae eae A hc B hec E hee RV ea N semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: 'Eadem', his paene verbis eadem eadem hys pene verbis BE hiis pene eadem verbis V inquit, scientia scientia sententia BE confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum. 1.69. Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, nostra convitia V convicia nostra BE sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; voluntates A voluptates R voluptatum NV om. BE voluptatem voluptates R cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra si ludicras A 2 si ludicrica R exercendi aut vedi consuetudine consuetudines A consuetudinēs R adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit poterit edd. potuerit et iustius? 1.70. Sunt autem, qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, sapientum V sap ia (= sapientia, pro sap iu = sapientiū) R ut ne minus amicos quam minus amicos quam P. Man. minus quidem amicos quam ARNV minus quam amicos BE se ipsos diligant. quod et posse fieri fieri posse BE intellegimus et saepe etiam etiam Dav. enim videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri. et 26 repp. A 1.71. Quapropter si ea, quae dixi, sole ipso illustriora et clariora sunt, si omnia dixi hausta omnia dixi hausta = nihil dixi nisi quod haustum esset e fonte naturae, si tota oratio nostra omnem sibi fidem sensibus confirmat, id est incorruptis atque integris testibus, si infantes pueri, mutae etiam bestiae paene loquuntur magistra ac duce natura nihil esse prosperum nisi voluptatem, nihil asperum nisi dolorem, de quibus neque depravate iudicant neque corrupte, depravatae ... corruptae A nonne ei maximam gratiam habere debemus, qui hac exaudita quasi voce naturae sic eam firme graviterque comprehenderit, ut omnes bene sanos in viam placatae, tranquillae, quietae, beatae vitae deduceret? Qui quod tibi parum videtur eruditus, ea causa est, quod nullam eruditionem esse duxit, nisi quae beatae vitae disciplinam iuvaret. 3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. 3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 5.2. tum Piso: Naturane nobis hoc, inquit, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod aliquid R legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui propinqui hortuli BE non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo, cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram—Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor mihi esse esse mihi B videtur, posteaquam est maior—solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina. 5.7. Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit poterit 'emendavisse videtur Aldus' Mdv. poteris sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam illam veterem BE vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii ii edd. hi R hij BENV soli solum R numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps principes R Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, converte te NV convertere R convertere te BE quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum artificiū R officina profecti sunt. Atque ego: At ego R Et ego V 5.16. ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea carneadia BENV nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. 5.17. constitit autem fere inter omnes id, in quo prudentia versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem o(rmh o(rmh/n ] bonū R Graeci vocant. quid autem sit, quod ita moveat itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, deque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum exquiritur, omnis dissensio. totius enim quaestionis eius, quae habetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur, in his quid sit extremum et ultimum, et quid ultimum BE fons reperiendus est, in quo sint prima invitamenta naturae; quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur. Voluptatis alii primum appetitum putant et primam depulsionem doloris. vacuitatem doloris alii censent primum ascitam ascitam cod. Glogav., Mdv. ; ascitum RV as|scitum N assertum BE et primum declinatum dolorem. 5.18. ab iis iis Lamb. 2, Mdv. ; his alii, quae prima secundum naturam nomit, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, valitudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, viris, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima prima om. R in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid aliquid Wes. aliquod sit, quo primum primum dett. prima BE primo RNV natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad ad ( prius ) om. BERN repellendum, nec quicquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid aliquod BE referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in earum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium. 5.19. ex eo autem, quod statuerit esse, quo primum natura moveatur, existet recti etiam ratio atque honesti, quae cum uno aliquo aliquo uno BE ex tribus illis congruere possit, possit. u aut non dolendi ita sit ut quanta ( v. 19 ) R rell. om. ut aut id honestum sit, facere omnia aut voluptatis causa, etiam si eam secl. Mdv. non consequare, aut non dolendi, etiam etiam N 2 in ras., aut BEV si id assequi nequeas, aut eorum, quae secundum naturam sunt, adipiscendi, etiam si nihil consequare. ita ita N 2 aut non dolendi ita R ( cf. ad v. 14 ), N 1 V; aut nichil dolendi ita BE fit ut, quanta differentia est in principiis naturalibus, tanta sit in finibus bonorum malorumque dissimilitudo. alii rursum isdem a principiis omne officium referent aut ad voluptatem aut ad non dolendum aut ad prima illa secundum naturam optinenda. 5.20. expositis iam igitur sex de summo bono sententiis trium proximarum hi principes: voluptatis Aristippus, non dolendi Hieronymus, fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor, sed defensor disserendi causa fuit. superiores tres erant, quae esse possent, quarum est una sola defensa, eaque vehementer. nam voluptatis causa facere omnia, cum, etiamsi nihil consequamur, tamen ipsum illud consilium ita faciendi per se expetendum et honestum et solum bonum sit, nemo dixit. ne vitationem quidem doloris ipsam per se quisquam in rebus expetendis putavit, nisi nisi Urs. ne si etiam evitare posset. at vero facere omnia, ut adipiscamur, quae secundum naturam sint, sunt BE etiam si ea non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per se expetendum et solum bonum Stoici dicunt. 5.21. Sex igitur hae hee E, h (= haec) R summo BERNV summa dett. sunt simplices de summo bonorum malorumque sententiae, duae sine patrono, quattuor defensae. quatuor defense quatuor BE iunctae autem et duplices expositiones summi boni tres omnino fuerunt, nec vero plures, si penitus rerum naturam videas, esse potuerunt. nam aut voluptas adiungi potest ad honestatem, ut Calliphonti Dinomachoque placuit, aut doloris vacuitas, ut Diodoro, aut prima naturae, ut antiquis, quos eosdem Academicos et Peripateticos nominavimus. nominavimus BER ( cf. p. 158, 30 sqq. ) nominamus NV sed quoniam quoniam q uo R non possunt omnia simul dici, haec in praesentia nota esse debebunt, voluptatem semovendam esse, quando ad maiora quaedam, ut iam apparebit, nati sumus. de vacuitate doloris eadem fere dici solent, quae de voluptate. Quando igitur et de voluptate secl. Nissenius ( sec. Gz. ); cf. Muret. var. lect. 14, 20 cum Torquato et de honestate, in qua una omne bonum poneretur, cum Catone est disputatum, primum, quae contra voluptatem dicta sunt, eadem fere cadunt contra vacuitatem doloris. 5.24. Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul et ortum est, id agit, se ut ut se BE conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum modo se tueatur, qualecumque sit, sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quicquid se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere quam ob ob N 2 ad causam habeat habeat Lamb. habet eum, quem diximus, animi appetitum coeptatque et ea, quae naturae sentit apta, appetere et propulsare contraria. ergo omni animali illud, quod appetit, positum est in eo, quod naturae nature V natura ( etiam B) est accommodatum. ita finis bonorum existit secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque que ER et NV om. B accommodatissime. 5.25. Quoniam Quoniam Q uo R autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur—nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis—, sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint sunt RNV et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret. desiderat RNV 5.26. quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente. 5.27. haec igitur nobis explicanda sunt, sed si enodatius, vos ignoscetis. huius enim aetati haec igitur ... aetati Non. p. 15 ignoscetis cuius aetatis Non. et huic nunc haec primum haec primum R primum hoc ( ante primum ras., in qua cognosc. h) N 2 hic primum BE hoc primum V fortasse secl. Mdv. audientis audientis Mdv. audienti (audiendi E) servire debemus. Ita prorsus, inquam; etsi ea quidem, quae adhuc dixisti, quamvis ad aetatem recte isto modo dicerentur. Exposita igitur, inquit, inquit om. BE terminatione rerum expetendarum cur ista se res ita habeat, ut dixi, deinceps demonstrandum est. quam ob rem ordiamur ab eo, quod primum posui, quod idem reapse reapse re ab se primum est, ut intellegamus omne animal se ipsum diligere. diligere N 2 V diligi BERN 1 quod quamquam dubitationem non habet—est enim infixum in ipsa natura comprehenditur que suis add. Crat. natura ac comprehenditur suis Alanus cuiusque sensibus sic, ut, contra si quis dicere velit, non audiatur—, tamen, ne quid praetermittamus, rationes quoque, cur hoc ita sit, afferendas puto. 5.28. etsi qui qui edd. quid potest intellegi aut cogitari esse aliquod animal, quod se oderit? res enim concurrent occurrent R contrariae. nam cum appetitus ille animi aliquid ad se trahere coeperit consulto, quod sibi obsit, quia sit sibi inimicus, cum id sua causa faciet, et oderit se et simul diliget, quod fieri non potest. necesseque est, necesseque est BE necesse ēq; (= estque) R necesse est eque N 1 V necesse est quidem N 2 si quis sibi ipsi ipsi sibi BE inimicus est, eum quae bona sunt mala putare, bona contra quae mala, et quae appetenda fugere, fugere et que BEV quae fugienda appetere, appetere dett. petere quae sine dubio vitae est est Mdv. sunt eversio. neque enim, si non nulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos aut alia exitia quaerant aut ut aut ut Mdv. ille apud Terentium, Terentium Heautontim. I 1, 95 ( 147 ): Decrevi tantisper me minus iniuriae, Chremes, meo gnato facere, dum fiam miser. qui 'decrevit tantisper tantisper dett. tantum per (tantum s per N 2 ) se minus est usus BE iniuriae suo nato facere', ut ait ipse, 'dum fiat miser', inimicus ipse sibi putandus est. 5.29. sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate, iracundia etiam multi efferuntur et, cum in mala scientes inruunt, tum se optime sibi consulere arbitrantur. itaque dicunt nec dubitant: 'mihi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac'. et qui Et qui RV Equi BE et qui (et ab alt. m. in ras. add. ) N ipsi sibi bellum indixissent, cruciari dies, noctes torqueri vellent, nec vero sese ipsi accusarent ob eam causam, quod se male suis rebus consuluisse dicerent. eorum enim est haec querela, qui sibi cari sunt seseque diligunt. quare, quotienscumque dicetur male quis de se mereri sibique esse inimicus inimicus esse BE atque hostis, vitam denique fugere, intellegatur aliquam subesse eius modi causam, ut ex eo ipso intellegi possit sibi quemque esse carum. 5.30. Nec vero id satis est, est om. BE neminem esse, qui ipse se oderit, sed illud quoque intellegendum est, neminem esse, qui, quo modo se habeat, nihil sua censeat interesse. tolletur enim appetitus animi, si, ut in iis rebus, inter quas nihil interest, neutram in partem propensiores sumus, sumus Lamb. simus item in nobismet ipsis quem ad modum affecti simus simus B sumus nihil nostra arbitrabimur arbitramur RNV interesse. Atque etiam illud si qui qui Bai. quid BERN 1 quis N 2 V dicere velit, perabsurdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque, ut ea vis diligendi ad aliam rem quampiam referatur, non ad eum ipsum, ipsum V ipse qui sese diligat. hoc cum in amicitiis, cum in officiis, cum in virtutibus dicitur, quomodocumque quoquomodocumque BE dicitur, intellegi tamen quid dicatur potest, in nobismet autem ipsis ipsis autem BE ipsis autem ipsis R ne ne et ut add. A. Man. (intelligi ne quidem ut N 2 ) intellegi quidem, ut propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratia propter voluptatem, nos amemus; propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmet ipsos diligimus. 5.31. Quamquam quid est, quod magis perspicuum sit, quam non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam add. cod. Glogav., P. Man. vehementer carum esse? quis est enim aut quotus quisque, cui, quisque est cui Non. mors cum adpropinquet, adpr. Non. appr. non 'refugiat fugiat Non. ti/mido sanguen timido sanguen Non. timidos anguis BERN 1 timido sanguis N 2 V a/tque exalbesca/t metu'? quis est ... metu Non. p. 224 etsi hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturae tam valde perhorrescere—quod item est reprehendendum in dolore—, sed quia fere sic afficiuntur omnes, satis argumenti est ab interitu naturam abhorrere; idque quo magis quidam ita faciunt, ut iure etiam reprehendantur, hoc magis intellegendum est haec ipsa nimia in quibusdam futura non fuisse, nisi quaedam essent modica natura. modica natura essent BE nec vero dico eorum metum mortis, qui, quia privari se vitae bonis arbitrentur, aut quia quasdam post mortem formidines extimescant, aut si metuant, ne cum dolore moriantur, idcirco mortem fugiant; in parvis enim saepe, qui nihil eorum cogitant, si quando iis ludentes minamur praecipitaturos alicunde, alicunde edd. aliunde extimescunt. quin etiam 'ferae', inquit Pacuvius, 'qui/bus abest ad prae/cavendum inte/llegendi astu/tia', astutia N 2 V astutias iniecto terrore mortis 'horrescunt'. quis autem de ipso sapiente aliter existimat, quin, etiam cum decreverit esse moriendum, tamen discessu a suis atque ipsa relinquenda luce moveatur? 5.32. maxime autem in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturae, cum et mendicitatem multi perpetiantur, ut vivant, et angantur adpropinquatione mortis confecti homines senectute et ea perferant, quae Philoctetam videmus in fabulis. qui cum cruciaretur non ferendis doloribus, propagabat tamen vitam aucupio, 'sagittarum sagittarum om. BE ictu ictu add. Se. configebat tardus celeres, stans volantis', ut apud Accium accium R actium est, pennarumque contextu corpori tegumenta faciebat. 5.33. De hominum genere aut omnino de animalium loquor, cum arborum et stirpium eadem paene natura sit? sive enim, ut doctissimis viris visum est, maior aliqua causa atque divinior hanc vim ingenuit, sive hoc ita fit fortuito, fortuitu BER videmus N 2 videamus videmus ea, quae terra gignit, corticibus et radicibus valida servari, quod contingit animalibus sensuum distributione et quadam compactione membrorum. Qua quidem de re quamquam assentior iis, qui haec omnia regi natura putant, quae si natura neglegat, ipsa esse non possit, tamen concedo, ut, qui de hoc dissentiunt, existiment, quod velint, ac vel hoc intellegant, si quando quando dett. quid BE quā R q ua NV naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt. nam prius a se poterit quisque discedere quam appetitum earum rerum, quae sibi conducant, amittere. iure igitur gravissimi philosophi initium summi boni a natura petiverunt et illum appetitum rerum ad naturam accommodatarum ingeneratum putaverunt omnibus, quia quia Dav. qui continentur ea commendatione naturae, qua se ipsi diligunt. 5.34. Deinceps videndum est, quoniam satis apertum est sibi quemque natura esse carum, quae sit hominis natura. id est enim, de quo quaerimus. atqui perspicuum est hominem e corpore animoque constare, cum primae sint animi partes, secundae corporis. deinde id quoque videmus, et ita figuratum corpus, ut excellat aliis, animumque que om. B ita constitutum, aliis ... constitutum om. E ut et sensibus instructus sit et habeat praestantiam mentis, cui tota hominis natura pareat, in qua sit mirabilis quaedam vis rationis et cognitionis et scientiae virtutumque omnium. iam iam (' aptius scriberetur : iam quae cet. ') Mdv. nam quae corporis sunt, ea nec auctoritatem cum animi partibus comparandam et cognitionem habent faciliorem. itaque ab his ordiamur. 5.35. Corporis igitur nostri partes totaque figura et forma et statura quam apta ad naturam sit, apparet, neque est dubium, quin frons, oculi, aures et reliquae partes quales propriae sint sint Lamb. ( in curis secundis ); sunt hominis intellegatur. sed certe opus est ea valere et vigere et naturales motus ususque habere, ut nec absit quid eorum nec aegrum debilitatumve sit; id enim natura desiderat. est autem etiam actio quaedam corporis, quae motus et status naturae congruentis tenet; in quibus si peccetur distortione et depravatione quadam aut aut ac BE motu statuve deformi, ut si aut manibus ingrediatur quis aut non ante, sed retro, fugere plane se ipse et hominem ex homine exuens ex homine exuens RN 2 V exuens ( om. ex homine) N 1 exuens ex homine BE naturam odisse videatur. quam ob rem etiam sessiones quaedam et flexi fractique motus, quales protervorum hominum aut mollium esse solent, contra naturam sunt, ut, etiamsi animi vitio id eveniat, tamen in corpore immutari mutari BE hominis natura videatur. 5.36. itaque e contrario moderati aequabilesque habitus, affectiones ususque corporis apti esse ad naturam videntur. Iam vero animus non esse solum, sed etiam cuiusdam modi cuiusdam modi cuiusmodi BE debet esse, ut et omnis partis suas habeat incolumis et de virtutibus nulla desit. atque atque BE atqui NV at qui R in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus, ut ne quid impediat quo minus suo sensus quisque munere fungatur in iis rebus celeriter expediteque percipiendis, quae subiectae sunt sensibus. animi autem et eius animi partis, quae princeps est, quaeque mens nominatur, plures sunt virtutes, sed duo prima genera, unum earum, quae ingenerantur suapte natura appellanturque non voluntariae, alterum autem earum, quae in voluntate positae magis proprio proprio proprie eo Dav. nomine appellari solent, quarum est excellens in animorum laude praestantia. prioris generis est docilitas, memoria; quae fere omnia appellantur uno ingenii nomine, easque virtutes qui habent, ingeniosi vocantur. alterum autem genus est magnarum verarumque virtutum, quas appellamus voluntarias, ut ut N 2 et prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam et reliquas eiusdem generis. generis eiusdem BE Et summatim quidem haec erant de corpore animoque dicenda, quibus quasi informatum est quid quid NV quod hominis natura postulet. 5.37. ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo et in corpore et in animo et in corpore NV et animo et corpore (in bis om. ) BE in animo et corpore ( priore et et poster. in om. ) R perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. quo cognito dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate sua caritate V sua e caritate R sua ecaritate BEN colantur et per se ipsae appetantur. 5.38. Quibus expositis facilis est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris, quae plurimum habent habent habeant Ern. dignitatis, ut optimae cuiusque partis, quae per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maxime. ita fiet, ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie virtutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius. etenim omnium rerum, quas et creat natura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt sunt Ern. sint aut sine animo sunt aut om. R non non add. A. Man. multo secus, earum earum edd. eorum summum bonum in corpore est, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. non inscite ... putisceret Non. p. 161 putisceret Non. putresceret sunt autem bestiae quaedam, in quibus inest aliquid aliquod BER simile virtutis, ut in leonibus, ut in canibus, in equis, leonibus ut in canibus in equis BEN 1 leonibus in canibus in equis RV leonibus ut in canibus ut in equis N 2 in quibus non corporum solum, ut in suibus, sed etiam animorum aliqua ex parte motus quosdam videmus. in homine autem summa omnis animi est et in animo rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio definitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam putant. 5.39. Earum etiam rerum, quas terra gignit, educatio quaedam et perfectio est non dissimilis animantium. itaque et vivere vitem et mori dicimus arboremque et novellam et vetulam vetulam dicimus BE et vigere et 'senescere'. ex quo non est alienum, ut animantibus, animalibus BE sic illis et apta quaedam ad naturam putare et putare et BE aptare et R amputare et NV aliena earumque augendarum et alendarum quandam cultricem esse, quae sit scientia atque ars agricolarum, quae circumcidat, circumcidat dett. circumcidet R circumdat BEN 1 circumdet N 2 V amputet, erigat, extollat, adminiculet, ut, quo natura ferat, eo possint possint Dav. possit ire, ut ipsae vites, si loqui possint, possint A. Man. possent ita se tractandas tuendasque esse fateantur. et nunc quidem quod eam tuetur, ut de vite potissimum loquar, est id id om. BE extrinsecus; in ipsa enim parum magna vis inest, ut quam optime se habere possit, si nulla cultura adhibeatur. 5.40. at vero si ad vitem sensus accesserit, ut appetitum quendam habeat et per se ipsa ipsa Crat. ipsam moveatur, quid facturam putas? an ea, quae per vinitorem antea ante BE consequebatur, per se ipsa ipsa Crat. ipsam curabit? sed videsne accessuram ei curam, ut sensus quoque suos eorumque omnem appetitum et si qua sint adiuncta ei membra tueatur? sic ad illa, quae semper habuit, iunget ea, quae postea accesserint, nec eundem finem habebit, quem cultor eius habebat, sed volet secundum eam naturam, quae postea ei adiuncta erit, erit ( priore loco ) C.F. W. Mue. sit vivere. ita similis erit ei ei Bentl., Gz. ; et finis boni, atque antea fuerat, neque idem tamen; non enim iam stirpis bonum quaeret, sed animalis. quid, si quod si R (Quod), NV non sensus modo ei modo sensus non ei BE non sensus ei modo R sit datus, datus sit BE verum etiam animus hominis? eciam animus hominis N 2 V etiam animus (animus R) est animus hominis RN 1 animus est etiam animus hominis BE etiam animus, et animus hominis Vict. non necesse est et illa pristina manere, ut Inter RN 1 ad tuendas inter BE ut tuenda Inter N 2 V tuenda sint, et ut tuenda sint, et Or. ut tuendas. haec multo esse cariora, quae accesserint, animique optimam quamque partem carissimam, in eaque expletione expletione explanatione R naturae summi boni finem consistere, cum longe multumque praestet mens atque ratio? sic, quod est sic, quod est Se. sitque BERN 1 V sicque N 2 Sic extitit Mdv. Librarius archetypi pro ē legit que extremum omnium appetendorum atque ductum ductum (uc ab alt. m. in ras. ) N doctum commendatione Lamb. commutatione BE commutate V comunitate R c oi tate N a prima commendatione naturae, multis gradibus adscendit, ut ad summum perveniret, quod cumulatur ex integritate corporis et ex mentis ratione perfecta. 5.41. Cum igitur ea sit, quam exposui, forma naturae, si, ut initio dixi, simul atque ortus esset, se quisque cognosceret iudicareque posset quae vis et totius esset naturae et partium singularum, continuo videret quid esset hoc, quod quaerimus, omnium rerum, quas expetimus, summum et ultimum nec ulla in re peccare posset. nunc vero a primo quidem mirabiliter occulta natura est nec perspici nec cognosci potest. progredientibus autem aetatibus sensim tardeve potius quasi nosmet ipsos cognoscimus. itaque prima illa commendatio, quae a natura nostri facta est nobis, incerta et obscura est, primusque appetitus ille animi tantum agit, ut salvi atque integri esse possimus. cum autem dispicere dispicere NV despicere BER coepimus cepimus RNV ceperimus BE et sentire quid simus et quid ab add. ed. Veneta 1494 animantibus ceteris differamus, tum ea sequi incipimus, ad quae nati sumus. 5.42. quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, quae primo, in quo loco natae sunt, ex eo se non commovent, deinde suo quaeque appetitu movetur. movetur moventur NV serpere anguiculos, nare nare natare Non. anaticulas, anaticulas V aneticulas BERN anaticulos Non. volare Non. evolare merulas, cornibus uti videmus boves, videamus boves Non. boves videmus BE nepas nepas RN 1 Non. nespas vel vespas V vespas BEN 2 aculeis, suam denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. serpere ... ducem Non. p. 145 quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparet. parvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint. cum autem paulum firmitatis accessit, et animo utuntur et sensibus conitunturque, ut sese sese ut BE utuntur ed. Iuntina utantur erigant, et manibus utuntur et eos agnoscunt, a quibus educantur. deinde aequalibus delectantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur deque eo, quod ipsis superat, aliis gratificari volunt animadvertuntque ea, quae domi fiunt, curiosius incipiuntque commentari aliquid et discere et discere facere R et eorum, quos vident, volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque rebus cum aequalibus decertant, si vicerunt, vicerunt Mdv.. vicerint BENV dicerint R efferunt se laetitia, victi debilitantur animosque que om. BEN demittunt. quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum est. 5.43. est enim natura sic generata vis hominis, ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim prima elementa naturae, quibus auctis auctis actis R virtutis quasi germen germen I. F. Gronov. carmen efficitur. nam cum ita nati factique simus, ut et agendi aliquid et diligendi aliquos et liberalitatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contineremus atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, non sine causa eas, quas dixi, in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet, ut eam quasi deum ducem subsequens ad naturae perveniat extremum. nam, ut saepe iam dixi, in infirma aetate inbecillaque mente vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur; cum autem progrediens confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem ille quidem Mdv. quid ille BE quidem ille RNV naturae vim, sed ita, ut progredi possit longius, per se sit tantum tantum Mdv. tamen inchoata. 5.44. Intrandum est igitur igitur est BE in rerum naturam et penitus quid ea postulet pervidendum; aliter enim nosmet ipsos nosse non possumus. quod praeceptum quia maius erat, quam ut ab homine videretur, idcirco assignatum est deo. iubet igitur nos Pythius Apollo noscere nosmet ipsos. cognitio autem haec est una nostri, ut vim corporis nostri, ut vim corporis Mdv. nostri ut corporis BER vim ut nostri corporis (vim in ras., nostri ab alt. m. superscr. ) N ut vim nostri corporis V animique norimus sequamurque eam vitam, quae rebus iis rebus iis (hys) BE rebus ( pro reb; us = rebus is) RNV ipsis ipsis om. BE ( vi corporis animique opponuntur res eae ipsae cf. p. 179, 7 sq ) perfruatur. quoniam autem is animi appetitus a principio fuit, ut ea, quae dixi, quam perfectissima natura haberemus, confitendum est, cum id adepti simus, quod appetitum sit, in eo quasi in in ( post quasi) om. NV ultimo consistere naturam, atque id esse summum bonum; quod certe universum sua sponte ipsum expeti et propter se necesse est, quoniam ante demonstratum est etiam singulas eius partes esse per se expetendas. 5.45. In enumerandis autem corporis commodis si quis praetermissam a nobis voluptatem putabit, in aliud tempus ea quaestio differatur. utrum enim sit voluptas in iis rebus, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, necne sit ad id, quod agimus, nihil interest. si enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, non explet bona naturae voluptas, iure praetermissa est; sin autem autem om. RNV est in ea, quod quidam quidem BER volunt, nihil impedit hanc nostram comprehensionem summi boni. quae enim constituta sunt prima naturae, ad ea si voluptas accesserit, unum aliquod accesserit commodum corporis neque eam constitutionem summi boni, quae est proposita, mutaverit. 5.46. Et adhuc quidem ita nobis progressa ratio est, ut ea duceretur omnis a prima commendatione naturae. nunc autem aliud iam argumentandi sequamur genus, ut non solum quia nos diligamus, sed quia cuiusque partis naturae et in corpore et in animo sua quaeque vis sit, idcirco in his rebus summe summe M. Brutus apud Dav. ; summa nostra sponte moveamur. atque ut a corpore ordiar, videsne ut, si ut si dett. si quae in membris prava aut debilitata aut inminuta sint, occultent homines? ut etiam contendant et elaborent, si efficere possint, ut aut non appareat corporis vitium aut quam minimum appareat? multosque etiam dolores curationis causa perferant, ut, si ipse usus membrorum non modo non maior, verum etiam minor futurus sit, eorum tamen species ad naturam revertatur? etenim, cum omnes omnis BERN natura totos se expetendos putent, nec id ob aliam rem, sed propter ipsos, necesse est eius etiam partis propter se expeti, quod universum propter se expetatur. 5.47. Quid? in quid in RNV quod in BE motu et et etiam BE in statu corporis nihil inest, quod animadvertendum esse ipsa natura iudicet? quem ad modum quis ambulet, sedeat, qui ductus oris, qui vultus in quoque sit? nihilne est in his rebus, quod dignum libero aut indignum esse ducamus? nonne odio multos dignos putamus, qui quodam motu aut statu videntur naturae legem et modum contempsisse? et quoniam haec deducuntur ducuntur NV de corpore, quid est cur non recte pulchritudo etiam ipsa propter se expetenda ducatur? nam si pravitatem inminutionemque corporis propter se fugiendam fugienda BER putamus, cur non etiam, ac etiam ac N 2 iam et hanc BE etiam (eciam V) hac RV etiam hanc N 1 fortasse magis, propter se formae dignitatem sequamur? et si turpitudinem fugimus fugimus P. Man. fugiamus in statu et motu corporis, quid est cur pulchritudinem non sequamur? atque etiam valitudinem, vires, vacuitatem doloris non propter utilitatem solum, sed etiam ipsas propter se expetemus. quoniam enim natura suis omnibus expleri partibus vult, hunc statum corporis per se ipsum expetit, qui est maxime e natura, quae tota perturbatur, si aut aegrum corpus corpus V opus est aut dolet aut caret viribus. 5.48. Videamus animi partes, quarum est conspectus illustrior; quae quo sunt excelsiores, eo dant clariora indicia naturae. inditia nature N iudicia natura BE iudicia nature RV tantus est igitur innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiae, ut nemo dubitare possit quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur. videmusne ut pueri ne verberibus quidem a contemplandis rebus perquirendisque deterreantur? ut pulsi ut pulsi P. Man. aut pulsi ( etiam B) recurrant? ut aliquid recurrant ut aliquid cod. Morel. recurrentur aliquid R recurrant aliquid BEV recurrerentur aliquid ( ut vid. ) N 1 recurrerent et aliquid N 2 scire se scire se etiam R gaudeant? ut id aliis narrare gestiant? ut pompa, ludis atque eius modi spectaculis teneantur ob eamque rem vel famem et sitim perferant? quid vero? qui ingenuis ingeniis BER studiis atque artibus delectantur, nonne videmus eos nec valitudinis nec rei familiaris habere rationem omniaque perpeti ipsa cognitione et scientia captos et cum maximis curis et laboribus compensare eam, quam ex discendo capiant, voluptatem? 5.49. ut add. Se. mihi quidem Homerus huius modi quiddam vidisse videatur videatur BER videtur N om. V in iis, quae de Sirenum cantibus finxerit. finxerit RN 1 V finxerint BE finxerat N 2 neque enim vocum suavitate videntur aut novitate quadam et varietate cantandi revocare eos solitae, qui praetervehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur, ut homines ad earum saxa discendi cupiditate adhaerescerent. ita enim invitant Ulixem—nam verti, ut quaedam Homeri, sic istum ipsum locum—: O decus Argolicum, quin quin N 2 qui puppim flectis, Ulixes, Auribus ut nostros possis agnoscere cantus! Nam nemo haec umquam est transvectus caerula cursu, Quin prius adstiterit vocum dulcedine captus, Post variis avido satiatus pectore musis Doctior ad patrias lapsus pervenerit oras. Nos grave certamen belli clademque tenemus, Graecia quam Troiae divino numine vexit, Omniaque e latis rerum rerum Marsus regum vestigia terris. Vidit Homerus probari fabulam non posse, si cantiunculis tantus irretitus vir teneretur; scientiam pollicentur, quam non erat mirum sapientiae cupido patria esse patria esse (pat a ee, 1 et in ras. a ee ab alt. m. ) N patrie V patria BER cariorem. Atque omnia quidem scire, cuiuscumque modi sint, cupere curiosorum, duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum. 5.50. quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede, qui dum in pulvere quaedam describit attentius, ne patriam quidem captam esse add. ed. princ. Roman. ( sec. Mdv. sil. ) senserit? quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis? quo studio Aristophanem putamus aetatem in litteris duxisse? quid de Pythagora? quid de Platone aut de Democrito aut democrito (de mocrito V) RNV loquar? a quibus propter discendi cupiditatem videmus ultimas terras esse peragratas. quae qui non vident, nihil umquam magnum magnum ac Brem. magna ac cognitione dignum amaverunt. Atque hoc loco, qui propter animi voluptates coli dicunt ea studia, quae dixi, non intellegunt idcirco esse ea propter se expetenda, quod nulla utilitate obiecta delectentur animi atque ipsa scientia, etiamsi incommodatura sit, gaudeant. 5.51. Sed quid attinet de rebus tam apertis plura requirere? ipsi enim quaeramus a a e RNV nobis stellarum motus contemplationesque rerum caelestium eorumque omnium, quae naturae obscuritate occultantur, cognitiones quem ad modum cognitiones quem ad modum N 2 cogni- tionesque admodum nos moveant, et quid historia delectet, quam solemus persequi usque ad extremum, cum praetermissa repetimus, add. Se. inchoata persequimur. nec vero sum nescius esse utilitatem in historia, non modo voluptatem. 5.52. quid, cum fictas fabulas, e quibus utilitas nulla elici elici dett. dici BERN duci V potest, cum voluptate legimus? quid, cum volumus nomina eorum, qui quid gesserint, gesserunt R nota nobis esse, parentes, patriam, multa praeterea minime necessaria? quid, quod homines infima infirma BE fortuna, nulla spe rerum gerendarum, opifices denique delectantur delectentur RNV historia? maximeque que om. R eos videre possumus res gestas audire et legere velle, qui a spe gerendi absunt confecti senectute. quocirca intellegi necesse est in ipsis rebus, quae discuntur et cognoscuntur, invitamenta invita—menta ( lineola et ta poste- rius ab alt. m. scr., ta in ras. ) N invita mente BE invita|et mente R in vita mentem V inesse, quibus ad discendum cognoscendumque moveamur. 5.53. Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura futura Clericus ( ad Aeschinis Axioch. 17 ); natura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae cultum aut paratum aut apparatum Lamb. requirentis, nihil aliud esse esse om. BE acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo in qendo E in querendo RV inquerendo N ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant. Nos autem non solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem videmus, sed etiam levamentum miseriarum. itaque multi, cum in in om. BER potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt. levarunt BE 5.54. princeps huius civitatis Phalereus phalereus R phalerius BEN phalerus V Demetrius cum patria pulsus esset iniuria, ad Ptolomaeum se regem Alexandream alexandriam RNV contulit. qui cum in hac ipsa ipsa om. BE philosophia, ad quam te hortamur, excelleret Theophrastique esset auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit scripsit ed. Veneta 1494 ; scribit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus. equidem e Cn. Aufidio, praetorio, erudito homine, oculis capto, saepe audiebam, cum se lucis magis quam utilitatis desiderio moveri diceret. somnum denique nobis, nisi requietem corporibus et medicinam quandam laboris afferret, contra naturam putaremus datum; aufert enim sensus actionemque tollit omnem. itaque si aut requietem natura non quaereret aut eam posset alia quadam ratione consequi, facile pateremur, qui qui N 2 quin etiam nunc agendi aliquid discendique causa prope contra naturam vigilias suscipere soleamus. soleamus valeamus R 5.55. Sunt autem etiam clariora vel plane perspicua minimeque dubitanda indicia inditia N iudicia naturae, maxime scilicet in homine, sed in omni animali, ut appetat animus aliquid agere semper agere semper aliquod BE neque ulla condicione quietem sempiternam possit pati. facile est hoc cernere in primis puerorum aetatulis. quamquam enim vereor, ne nimius in hoc genere videar, tamen omnes veteres philosophi, maxime nostri, ad incunabula accedunt, quod quod RNV qui BE in pueritia facillime se arbitrantur arbitrantur RNV arbitrentur BE naturae voluntatem voluntatem Lamb. voluptatem posse cognoscere. videmus igitur ut conquiescere ne infantes quidem possint. cum vero paulum processerunt, processerunt Non. processerint lusionibus vel laboriosis laboriosius Non. delectantur, cum ... delectantur Non. p. 211 cum hi vero Non. ut ne verberibus quidem deterreri possint, eaque cupiditas agendi aliquid adolescit una cum aetatibus. itaque, ne si ne si edd. nisi iucundissimis quidem nos somniis usuros putemus, Endymionis somnum nobis velimus dari, idque si accidat, mortis instar putemus. 5.56. quin etiam inertissimos homines nescio qua qua qui BE singulari segnitia segnitia etiam E praeditos videmus tamen et corpore et animo moveri semper et, cum re nulla impediantur necessaria, aut alveolum poscere aut quaerere quempiam ludum aut sermonem aliquem requirere, cumque non habeant ingenuas ex doctrina oblectationes, circulos aliquos et sessiunculas consectari. quin ne bestiae quidem, quas delectationis causa concludimus, cum copiosius alantur, quam si essent liberae, facile patiuntur sese contineri motusque solutos et vagos a natura sibi tributos requirunt. 5.57. itaque ut quisque optime natus institutusque est, esse omnino nolit in vita, si gerendis gerendis gerundis Non. negotiis orbatus possit possit orbatus Non. paratissimis vesci voluptatibus. si gerendis ... voluptatibus Non. p. 416 nam aut privatim aliquid gerere malunt aut, qui altiore animo sunt, capessunt rem publicam honoribus imperiisque adipiscendis aut totos se ad studia doctrinae conferunt. qua in vita tantum abest ut voluptates consectentur, etiam curas, sollicitudines, vigilias perferunt optimaque parte hominis, quae in nobis divina ducenda est, ingenii et mentis acie fruuntur nec voluptatem requirentes nec fugientes laborem. nec vero intermittunt aut admirationem earum rerum, quae sunt ab antiquis repertae, aut investigationem novarum. quo studio cum satiari non possint, possint Ern. possunt omnium ceterarum rerum obliti nihil abiectum, nihil humile cogitant; tantaque est vis talibus in studiis, ut eos etiam, qui sibi alios proposuerunt fines bonorum, quos utilitate aut voluptate dirigunt, tamen in rebus quaerendis explicandisque naturis aetates conterere videamus. 5.58. Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam minora maioribus, minora maioribus maioribus minoribus BE maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis, quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque cognitioque N cognitione rerum caelestium et earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes latentes iacentes R indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum scientia, tum sciendi que (ēdi que ab alt. m. in ras. ) N prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta fortis, iusta Mdv. forti si iusta B E fortis. Si iusta R fortis et iusta (& in N ab alt. m. in ras. ) NV ratio reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeeunte deducimur. omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas teneritas NV Non. temeritas BER ac mollitia mollitia BE Non. mollities RN mollicies V quaedam, in primo ... moll. quaedam Non. p. 495 ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint intellegantur. praeclare enim Plato: Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit! Quare, quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus. 5.59. Natura igitur corpus quidem hominis sic et genuit et formavit, ut alia in primo ortu perficeret, alia progrediente aetate fingeret neque sane multum adiumentis externis et adventiciis uteretur. animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, ut corpus; sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nihil aut non multum adiumento ullo ad suam confirmationem indigerent; indigerent Brem. indigeret quod autem in homine praestantissimum atque optimum est, id deseruit. etsi dedit talem mentem, quae omnem virtutem accipere posset, ingenuitque sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum et quasi instituit docere et induxit in ea, quae inerant, tamquam elementa virtutis. sed virtutem ipsam inchoavit, nihil amplius. 5.60. itaque amplius itaque BE itaque amplius RNV nostrum est—quod nostrum dico, artis est—ad ea principia, quae accepimus, consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id, quod volumus, effectum. quod quidem pluris est est Thurot. ( Revue critique 1870,1. semestrep.21 ); sunt R sit NV om. BE haud paulo magisque ipsum propter se expetendum quam aut sensus aut corporis ea, quae diximus, quibus tantum praestat mentis excellens perfectio, ut vix cogitari possit quid intersit. itaque omnis honos, omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad eas actiones, quae virtuti sunt consentaneae, consentanee sunt BE refertur, eaque omnia, quae aut ita in animis sunt aut ita geruntur, uno nomine honesta dicuntur. quorum omnium quae quae Matthiae ( Vermischte Schriften 1833 p. 31 sq. ); queque sint notitiae, quae quidem quae quidem Se. quaeque (queque) BENV que R significentur significent BE rerum vocabulis, quaeque cuiusque vis cuiusque vis NV cuiusvis BE cuius vis R et natura sit mox mox p. 189, 20 sqq. videbimus. 5.61. Hoc autem loco tantum explicemus haec honesta, quae dico, praeterquam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus, praeterea suapte natura per se esse expetenda. indicant iudicant BER pueri, in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur. quanta studia decertantium sunt! sunt R sint quanta ipsa certamina! ut illi efferuntur laetitia, cum vicerunt! vicerunt Mdv. vicerint ut pudet victos! ut se accusari nolunt! quam cupiunt laudari! quos illi labores non perferunt, ut aequalium principes sint! quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas! atque ea in optima quaque indole indole quaque BE maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta, quae intellegimus, a natura tamquam adumbrantur. 5.62. Sed haec in pueris; expressa in pueris expressa. In iis (his) vero RNV vero in iis aetatibus, quae iam confirmatae sunt. quis est tam dissimilis homini, qui non moveatur et offensione turpitudinis et comprobatione honestatis? quis est, qui non oderit libidinosam, protervam adolescentiam? quis contra in illa aetate pudorem, constantiam, etiamsi sua nihil intersit, non tamen diligat? quis Pullum Numitorium Fregellanum, proditorem, quamquam rei publicae nostrae profuit, non odit? quis suae urbis quis suae urbis RKl. quis huius urbis Mdv. conservatorem Codrum, quis Erechthei filias non maxime laudat? cui Tubuli nomen odio non est? quis Aristidem non mortuum diligit? an obliviscimur, quantopere in audiendo in legendoque moveamur, cum pie, cum amice, cum magno animo aliquid factum cognoscimus? 5.63. Quid loquor loquor V loquar de nobis, qui ad laudem et ad et ad qui ad BE decus nati, suscepti, instituti sumus? qui clamores vulgi atque imperitorum excitantur in theatris, cum illa dicuntur: 'Ego sum Orestes', contraque ab altero: Immo enimvero ego sum, inquam, Orestes! cum autem etiam exitus ab utroque datur conturbato errantique regi, ambo ergo se una necari cum precantur, se una necari cum precantur Se. sueganum precamur BE suegamū precamur R una uivere precamur ( ab alt. m. in ras., sub a u inferior pars g erasae cognosci potest ) N negancium una vivere precamur V quotiens hoc agitur, ecquandone ecquandone Dav. et quando ne BER et quando|ve N 2 est quando ne V et, ut vid., N 1 nisi admirationibus maximis? nemo est igitur, quin hanc affectionem animi probet atque laudet, qua non modo utilitas nulla quaeritur, sed contra utilitatem etiam conservatur fides. 5.64. Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae, verum verum sed Non. etiam historiae refertae talibus exp. ... refertae Non. p. 309 sunt, et quidem maxime nostrae. nos enim ad sacra Idaea accipienda optimum virum delegimus, nos tutores misimus regibus, regibus misimus BE (misimus regem municissimum menibus, rell. om., R) nostri imperatores pro salute patriae sua capita voverunt, nostri consules regem inimicissimum moenibus iam adpropinquantem monuerunt, a veneno ut caveret, nostra in re publica Lucretia et quae per del. Vict. vim oblatum stuprum voluntaria morte lueret inventa est et qui interficeret filiam, filiam interficeret BE ne stupraretur. quae quidem omnia et innumerabilia praeterea quis est quin quin NV qui BER intellegat et eos qui fecerint dignitatis splendore ductos inmemores fuisse utilitatum suarum nosque, cum ea laudemus, nulla alia re nisi honestate duci? Quibus rebus expositis breviter breviter expositis BE —nec enim sum copiam, quam potui, quia dubitatio in re nulla erat, persecutus—sed his rebus concluditur profecto et virtutes omnes et honestum illud, quod ex iis oritur ex hijs virtutibus oritur N et in iis iis Mdv. his R hijs NV illis BE haeret, per se esse expetendum. 5.65. in omni autem autem enim BE honesto, de quo loquimur, nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam coniunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani. quae nata a primo satu, quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur et tota domus coniugio et stirpe coniungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus et iis, qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae. quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens atque hanc, quam dico, societatem coniunctionis humanae munifice et aeque tuens iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunctae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem. atque haec ita iustitiae propria sunt, ut sint virtutum reliquarum communia. 5.66. nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam quoddam BE ingenitum ingenitum B E innatum RN in natum V quasi civile atque populare, quod Graeci politiko/n vocant, quicquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea, quam quam que RN exposui, caritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit, vicissimque iustitia, ut ipsa se fundet fundet se BE in in N post fundet ab alt. m. superscr. est (= scilicet) usu ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet. servari enim iustitia nisi a forti forte RNV viro, nisi a sapiente non potest. qualis est igitur omnis haec, quam dico, conspiratio consensusque virtutum, tale est illud ipsum honestum, quandoquidem honestum aut ipsa virtus est aut res gesta virtute; quibus rebus in rebus R et (ī ab alt. m. superscr. ) N 2 vita consentiens virtutibusque respondens recta et honesta et constans et naturae congruens existimari potest. 5.67. atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. nam cum ita copulatae conexaeque sint, sint ( ante ut) BE sunt ut omnes omnium participes sint nec alia ab alia possit separari, tamen proprium suum cuiusque munus est, ut fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur, temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus, prudentia in dilectu bonorum et malorum, iustitia in suo cuique tribuendo. quando igitur inest in omni virtute cura quaedam quasi foras spectans aliosque appetens atque complectens, existit illud, ut amici, ut fratres, ut propinqui, ut affines, ut cives, ut omnes denique—quoniam unam societatem hominum esse volumus—propter se expetendi sint. atqui eorum nihil est eius generis, ut sit in fine atque extremo bonorum. 5.68. ita fit, ut duo genera propter se expetendorum reperiantur, unum, quod est in iis, in quibus completur illud extremum, quae sunt aut animi aut corporis; haec autem, quae sunt extrinsecus, id est quae neque in animo nec in animo BE insunt neque in corpore, ut amici, ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propinqui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere, quo illa, non sunt. nec vero umquam umquam N unquam V inquam BER summum bonum assequi quisquam posset, si omnia illa, ilia om. BE quae sunt extra, quamquam expetenda, summo bono continerentur. 5.69. Quo modo igitur, inquies, verum esse poterit omnia referri ad summum bonum, si amicitiae, si propinquitates, si reliqua externa summo bono non continentur? Hac videlicet ratione, quod ea, quae externa sunt, iis tuemur officiis, quae oriuntur a suo cuiusque genere virtutis. nam et amici cultus et parentis ei, ei Or. et qui officio fungitur, in eo ipso prodest, quod ita fungi officio in recte factis est, quae sunt orta a virtutibus. quae add. Lamb. quidem sapientes sequuntur duce natura tanquam videntes; sapientes sequuntur duce natura tanquam videntes Se. sa- pientes utentes sequuntur duce natura tanquam BERV sapientes vírt tes ('rt ab alt. m. in ras. ) sequuntur duce natura tamquam N. ' Latet aliquid huiusmodi : quae quidem sapientes videntes sequuntur duce natura eam viam' Mdv. non perfecti autem homines et tamen ingeniis excellentibus praediti excitantur saepe gloria, quae habet speciem honestatis et similitudinem. quodsi ipsam honestatem undique perfectam atque absolutam. rem unam praeclarissimam omnium maximeque laudandam, penitus viderent, quonam gaudio complerentur, cum tantopere eius adumbrata opinione laetentur? 5.71. iam non dubitabis, quin earum compotes homines magno animo erectoque viventes semper sint beati, qui omnis motus fortunae mutationesque rerum et temporum levis et inbecillos fore intellegant, si in virtutis certamen venerint. illa enim, quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata, complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita, ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. consistere R ita enim parvae et exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum, ut, quem ad modum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum splendore ne certur quidem. Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est nulla esse dicere; 5.73. saepe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia; hoc uno captus Erillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit nec rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. multa sunt dicta dicta sunt BE ab antiquis de contemnendis ac despiciendis rebus humanis; hoc unum Aristo tenuit: praeter vitia atque virtutes negavit rem esse ullam aut fugiendam aut expetendam. expetendam dett. petendam positum est a nostris in iis esse rebus, quae secundum naturam essent, non dolere; hoc Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit. at vero Callipho et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem adamavisset, adamasset BE alter vacuitatem doloris, neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a nostris laudata maxime. 5.74. quin etiam ipsi voluptarii deverticula diverticula BENV quaerunt et virtutes habent in ore totos dies voluptatemque primo dumtaxat primo dumtaxat NV prima dum taxat R dumtaxat primo BE expeti dicunt, quaerunt ... habent ... dicunt Lamb. quaerant ... habeant (habent V) ... dicant (' sententiae satisfaceret : quidni, quum etiam ... quaerant ... habeant ... dicant? ut minus hoc in Calliphonte et Diodoro mirum esse significaretur ' Mdv. ) deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici, qua inpulsi multa faciant faciant Bentl., Ernest. ; faciunt nullam quaerentes voluptatem. Stoici restant. ei quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram rem a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam add. Bentl., Davis. transtulerunt; atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. ita relinquitur sola haec disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus. Quae cum dixisset paulumque parumque BE institisset, Quid est? 5.75. inquit; satisne vobis videor pro meo iure in vestris auribus commentatus? comentatus R commentatus ( prior t in ras. paulo capaciore ) N commendatus (conm. E) BE comendatus V Et ego: Tu vero, inquam, Piso, ut saepe alias, alias N 2 alia sic hodie ita nosse ista visus es, ut, si tui nobis potestas saepius fieret, non multum Graecis supplicandum putarem. quod quidem eo probavi magis, quia memini Staseam Neapolitanum, doctorem illum tuum, nobilem sane Peripateticum, aliquanto aliquando BE ista secus dicere solitum, assentientem iis, qui multum in fortuna secunda aut adversa, multum in bonis aut malis corporis ponerent. Est, ut dicis, inquit; sed haec ab Antiocho, familiari nostro, dicuntur multo melius et fortius, quam a Stasea dicebantur. quamquam ego non quaero, quid tibi a me probatum sit, sed huic Ciceroni nostro, quem discipulum cupio a te abducere. 5.76. Tum Lucius: Mihi vero ista valde probata sunt, quod item fratri puto. Tum mihi Piso: Quid ergo? inquit, dasne adolescenti veniam? an eum discere ea mavis, quae cum plane cum plane BE cum p clare NV comp clare R perdidicerit, perdidicerit NV didicerit R perdiderit BE nihil sciat? Ego vero isti, inquam, permitto. sed nonne meministi licere mihi ista probare, quae sunt a te dicta? quis enim potest ea, quae probabilia videantur ei, non probare? An vero, inquit, quisquam potest probare, quod perceptum, quod comprehensum, quod cognitum non habet? Non est ista, inquam, Piso, magna dissensio. nihil enim est est enim BE aliud, quam ob rem mihi percipi nihil posse videatur, nisi quod percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quicquam posse percipi nisi tale verum, quale falsum esse non possit. itaque haec haec hic BE cum illis est dissensio, cum Peripateticis nulla sane. sed haec haec etiam B omittamus; habent enim et bene longam et satis litigiosam disputationem. | 3.20. "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â axia as the Stoics call it â this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathÄkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.21. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â in Stoic phraseology ennoia â and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 5.2. Thereupon Piso remarked: "Whether it is a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I can't say; but one's emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the present moment are a case in point. I am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed the garden close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates' pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the very seat we see over there. For my own part even the sight of our senate-house at home (I mean the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, which looks to my eyes smaller since its enlargement) used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and chief of all, my grandfather; such powers of suggestion do places possess. No wonder the scientific training of the memory is based upon locality. 5.7. "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians. 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.17. Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormÄ. But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire â as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.19. "Now, from whichever Prudence decides to be the object of the primary natural impulses, will arise a theory of right and of Moral Worth which may correspond with one or other of the three objects aforesaid. Thus Morality will consist either in aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one may not succeed in attaining it; or at absence of pain, even though one is unable to secure it; or at getting the things in accordance with nature, even though one does not attain any of them. Hence there is a divergence between the different conceptions of the Ends of Goods and Evils, precisely equivalent to the difference of opinion as to the primary natural objects. â Others again starting from the same primary objects will make the sole standard of right action the actual attainment of pleasure, freedom from pain, or the primary things in accordance with nature, respectively. 5.20. "Thus we have now set forth six views as to the Chief Good. The leading upholders of the latter three are: of pleasure, Aristippus; of freedom from pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of what we have called the primary things in accordance with nature, Carneades, â that is, he did not originate this view but he upheld it for purposes of argument. The three former were possible views, but only one of them has been actually maintained, though that with great vigour. No one has asserted pleasure to be the sole aim of action in the sense that the mere intention of attaining pleasure, although unsuccessful, is in itself desirable and moral and the only good. Nor yet has anyone held that the effort to avoid pain is in itself a thing desirable, without one's being able actually to avoid it. On the other hand, that morality consists in using every endeavour to obtain the things in accordance with nature, and that this endeavour even though unsuccessful is itself the sole thing desirable and the sole good, is actually maintained by the Stoics. 5.21. "These then are the six simple views about the End of Goods and Evils; two of them without a champion, and four actually upheld. of composite or dualistic definitions of the Supreme Good there have been three in all; nor were more than three possible, if you examine the nature of the case closely. There is the combination of Morality with pleasure, adopted by Callipho and Dinomachus; with freedom from pain, by Diodorus; or with the primary objects of nature, the view of the ancients, as we entitle both the Academics and the Peripatetics."But it is impossible to set forth the whole of our position at once; so for the present we need only notice that pleasure must be discarded, on the ground that, as will be shown later, we are intended by nature for greater things. Freedom from pain is open to practically the same objections as pleasure. 5.24. "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. 5.25. At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. 5.26. Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.27. This, then, is the theory that we have to expound; but if it requires a good deal of explanation, you will receive it with forbearance. For this is perhaps the first time that Lucius has heard the subject debated, and we must make allowance for his youth." "Very true," said I; "albeit the style of your discourse so far has been suited to hearers of any age.""Well then," he resumed, "having explained what the principle is which determines what things are desirable, I have next to show why the matter is as I have stated. Let us therefore begin from the position which I laid down first and which is also first in the order of reality: let us understand that every living creature loves itself. The fact that this is so admits of no doubt, for indeed it is a fundamental fact of nature, and one that everybody can grasp for himself by the evidence of his senses, so much so that did anyone choose to deny it, he would not get a hearing; nevertheless, so that no step may be omitted, I suppose I ought also to give reasons why it is so. 5.28. Yet how can you form any intelligible conception of an animal that should hate itself? The thing is a contradiction in terms. For the creature being its own enemy, the instinctive appetition we spoke of will deliberately set about drawing to itself something harmful to itself; yet it will be doing this for its own sake; therefore the animal will both hate and love itself at the same time, which is impossible. Also, if a man is his own enemy, it follows that he will think good evil and evil good; that he will avoid things that are desirable and seek things that ought to be avoided; but this undeniably would mean to turn the whole of life upside down. A few people may be found who attempt to end their lives with a halter or by other means; but these, or the character of Terence who (in his own words) 'resolved that if he made himself to suffer, he so made less the wrong he did his son,' are not to be put down as haters of themselves. 5.29. The motive with some is grief, with others passion; many are rendered insane by anger, and plunge into ruin with their eyes open, fancying all the time that what they do is for their own best interests. Hence they say, and say in all sincerity: 'It is my way; do you do as it suits you.' Men who had really declared war against themselves would desire to have days of torment and nights of anguish, and they would not reproach themselves and say that they had been misguided and imprudent: such lamentations show that they love and care for themselves. It follows that whenever it is said of a man that he has ruined himself and is his own worst enemy, and that he is tired of life, you may be sure that there is really an explanation which would justify the inference, even from such a case as this, that every man loves himself. 5.30. Nor is it enough to say that nobody exists who hates himself; we must also realize that nobody exists who thinks it makes no difference to him what his own condition is. For it will be destructive of the very faculty of desire if we come to think of our own circumstances as a matter of indifference to us, and feel in our own case the absolute neutrality which is our attitude towards the things that are really indifferent."It would also be utterly absurd if anyone desired to maintain that, though the fact of self-love is admitted, this instinct of affection is really directed toward some other object and not towards the person himself who feels it. When this is said of friendship, of right action or of virtue, whether correct or not, it has some intelligible meaning; but in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to say that we love ourselves for the sake of something else, for example, for the sake of pleasure. Clearly we do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of ourselves. 5.31. Yet what fact is more self-evident than that every man not merely loves himself, but loves himself very much indeed? For who is there, what percentage of mankind, whose 'Blood does not ebb with horror, and face turn pale with fear,' at the approach of death? No doubt it is a fault to recoil so violently from the dissolution of our being (and the same timidity in regard to pain is blameworthy); but the fact that practically everybody has this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more some people act thus â as indeed they do to a blameworthy degree â the more it is to be inferred that this very excess would not have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a certain moderate degree of such timidity natural. I am not referring to the fear of death felt by those who shun death because they believe it means the loss of the good things of life, or because they are afraid of certain horrors after death, or if they dread lest death may be painful: for very often young children, who do not think of any of these things, are terribly frightened if in fun we threaten to let them fall from a height. Even 'wild creatures,' says Pacuvius, 'Lacking discourse of reason To look before,' when seized with fear of death, 'bristle with horror.' 5.32. Who does not suppose that the Wise Man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be ')" onMouseOut="nd();"affected by parting from his friends and merely by leaving the light of day? The strength of natural impulse, in this manifestation of it, is extremely obvious, since many men endure to beg their bread in order that they may live, and men broken with age suffer anguish at the approach of death, and endure torments like those of Philoctetes in the play; who though racked with intolerable pains, nevertheless prolonged life by fowling; 'Slow he pierced the swift with arrows, standing shot them on the wing,' as Attius has it, and wove their plumage together to make himself garments. 5.33. But do I speak of the human race or of animals generally, when the nature of trees and plants is almost the same? For whether it be, as very learned men have thought, that this capacity has been engendered in them by some higher and diviner power, or whether it is the result of chance, we see that the vegetable species secure by means of their bark and roots that support and protection which animals derive from the distribution of the sensory organs and from the well-knit framework of the limbs. On this matter I agree, it is true, with those who hold that all these things are regulated by nature, because if nature were to neglect them her own existence would be impossible; yet I allow those who think otherwise on this point to hold whatever view they please: whenever I mention 'the nature of man,' let them, if they like, understand me to mean 'man,' as it makes no difference. For the individual can no more lose the instinct to seek the things that are good for him than he can divest himself of his own personality. The wisest authorities have therefore been right in finding the basis of the Chief Good in nature, and in holding that this instinctive desire for things suited to our nature is innate in all men, because it is founded on that natural attraction which makes them love themselves. 5.34. "Having made it sufficiently clear that self-love is an instinct of nature, we must next examine what is the nature of man; for it is human nature that is the object of our investigation. Now it is manifest that man consists of body and mind, although the mind plays the more important part and the body the less. Next we further observe both that man's body is of a structure surpassing that of other animals, and that his mind is so constituted as not only to be equipped with senses but also to possess the domit factor of intellect, which commands the obedience of the whole of man's nature, being endowed with the marvellous faculties of reason, of cognition, of knowledge and of all the virtues. In fact the faculties of the body are not comparable in importance with the parts of the mind. Moreover they are easier to understand. We will therefore begin with them. 5.35. "It is manifest how well the parts of our body, and its entire shape, form and attitude are adapted to our nature; and that special conformation of the brow, eyes, ears and other parts which is appropriate to man can be recognized without hesitation by the understanding. But of course it is necessary that these organs should be healthy and vigorous and possessed of their natural motions and uses; no part must be lacking and none must be diseased or enfeebled â this is a requirement of nature. Again, there is also a certain form of bodily activity which keeps the motions and postures in harmony with nature; and any error in these, due to distortion or abnormality of movement or posture, â for example, if a man were to walk on his hands, or backwards instead of forwards, â would make a man appear alienated from himself, as if he had stripped off his proper humanity and hated his own nature. Hence certain attitudes in sitting, and slouching, languishing movements, such as are affected by the wanton and the effeminate, are contrary to nature, and though really arising from a defect of mind, suggest to the eye a bodily perversion of man's nature. 5.36. And so, on the contrary, a controlled and well-regulated bearing, condition and movement of the body has the appearance of being in harmony with nature. "Turning now to the mind, this must not only exist, but also be of a certain character; it must have all its parts intact and lack none of the virtues. The senses also possess their several virtues or excellences, consisting in the unimpeded performance of their several functions of swiftly and readily perceiving sensible objects. The mind, on the other hand, and that domit part of the mind which is called the intellect, possess many excellences or virtues, but these are of two main classes; one class consists of those excellences which are implanted by their own nature, and which are called nonâvolitional; and the other of those which, depending on our volition, are usually styled 'virtues' in the more special sense; and the latter are the preâeminent glory and distinction of the mind. To the former class belong receptiveness and memory; and practically all the excellences of this class are included under one name of 'talent,' and their possessors are spoken of as 'talented.' The other class consists of the lofty virtues properly so called, which we speak of as dependent on volition, for instance, Prudence, Temperance, Courage, Justice, and the others of the same kind. 5.37. "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.38. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâvolitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. 5.39. "Plants also have a development and progress to maturity that is not unlike that of animals; hence we speak of a vine living and dying, or of a tree as young or old, in the prime of life or decrepit; consequently it is appropriate to suppose that with them as with animals certain things are suited and certain other things foreign to their nature; and that their growth and nurture is tended by a foster-mother, the science and art of husbandry, which trims and prunes, straightens, raises and props, enabling them to advance to the goal that nature prescribes, till the vines themselves, could they speak, would acknowledge this to be their proper mode of treatment and of tendance. In reality, of course, the power that tends the vine, to take that particular instance, is something outside of it; for the vine does not possess force enough in itself to be able to attain its highest possible development without the aid of cultivation. 5.40. But suppose the vine to receive the gift of sensation, bestowing on it some degree of appetition and power of movement; then what do you think it will do? Will it not endeavour to provide for itself the benefits which it previously obtained by the aid of the vine-dresser? But do you mark how it will further be concerned to protect its sensory faculties also and all their appetitive instincts, and any additional organs it may have developed? Thus with the properties that it always possessed it will combine those subsequently added to it, and it will not have the same end as the husbandman who tended it had, but will desire to live in accordance with that nature which it has subsequently acquired. And so its End or Good will be similar to, but not the same as, what it was before; it will no longer seek the Good of a plant, but that of an animal. Suppose again that it have bestowed upon it not merely sensation but also a human mind. Will it not result that while its former properties remain objects of its care, these added properties will be far more dear to it, and that the best parts of the mind will be the dearest of all? Will it not find its End or Chief Good in this crowning development of its nature, inasmuch as intellect and reason are far and away the highest of all faculties? Thus there has emerged the final term of the series of objects of desire; thus starting from the primary attraction of nature, by gradual stages of ascent we have arrived at the summit, the consummation of perfect bodily integrity combined with the full development of the mental faculty of reason. 5.41. "The plan of our nature being then that which I have explained, if, as I said at the outset, every man as soon as he is born could know himself and could appreciate the powers of his nature as a whole and of its several parts, he would at once perceive the true essence of the thing that is the subject of our inquiry, namely the highest and last of the objects of our desires, and he would be incapable of error in anything. But as it is, our nature at all events at the outset is curiously hidden from us, and we cannot fully realize or understand it; yet as we grow older we gradually or I should say tardily come, as it were, to know ourselves. Accordingly, the earliest feeling of attraction which nature has created in us towards ourselves is vague and obscure, and the earliest instinct of appetition only strives to secure our safety and freedom from injury. When, however, we begin to look about us and to perceive what we are and how we differ from the rest of living creatures, we then commence to pursue the objects for which we are intended by nature. 5.42. Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie helpless, as if absolutely iimate; when they have acquired a little more strength, they exercise their mind and senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take an inquisitive interest in what goes on in their homes; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in their contests with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. 5.43. It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for these are primary elements of our nature, and they sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of action, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence there is a reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher's torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity when the intellect is weak the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition. 5.44. "We must therefore penetrate into the nature of things, and come to understand thoroughly its requirements; otherwise we cannot know ourselves. That maxim was too lofty for it to be thought to have emanated from a human being, and it was therefore ascribed to a god. Accordingly the Pythian Apollo bids us 'learn to know ourselves'; but the sole road to self-knowledge is to know our powers of body and of mind, and to follow the path of life that gives us their full employment."Now inasmuch as our original instinct of desire was for the possession of the parts aforesaid in their fullest natural perfection, it must be allowed that, when we have attained the object of our desire, our nature takes its stand in this as its final End, and this constitutes our Chief Good; and that this End as a whole must be desired intrinsically and in and for itself, follows of necessity from the fact that the several parts of it also have already been proved to be desirable for themselves. 5.45. "If however anyone thinks that our enumeration of bodily advantages is incomplete owing to the omission of pleasure, let us postpone this question to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not one of the objects we have called the primary things in accordance with nature makes no difference for our present inquiry. If, as I hold, pleasure adds nothing to the sumâtotal of nature's goods, it has rightly been omitted. If on the contrary pleasure does possess the property that some assign to it, this fact does not impair the general outline we have just given of the Chief Good; since if to the primary objects of nature as we have explained them, pleasure be added, this only adds one more to the list of bodily advantages, and does not alter the interpretation of the Chief Good which has been propounded. 5.46. "So far as our argument has proceeded hitherto, it has been based entirely upon the primary attractions of nature. But from this point on let us adopt a different line of reasoning, namely to show that, in addition to the argument from self-love, the fact that each part of our nature, both mental and bodily, possesses its own peculiar faculty goes to prove that the activity of our several parts is preâeminently spontaneous. To start with the body, do you notice how men try to hide a deformed or infirm or maimed limb? They actually take great pains and trouble to conceal, if they possibly can, their bodily defect, or at all events to let it be seen as little as possible; they even undergo painful courses of treatment in order to restore the natural appearance of their limbs, even though the actual use of them will not only not be improved but will even be diminished. In fact, since every man instinctively thinks that he himself in his entirety is a thing to be desired, and this not for the sake of anything else but for his own sake, it follows that when a thing is desired as a whole for its own sake, the parts also of that thing are desired for their own sakes. 5.47. Again, is there nothing in the movements and postures of the body which Nature herself judges to be of importance? A man's mode of walking and sitting, his particular cast of features and expression â is there nothing in these things that we consider worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not often think people deserving of dislike, who by some movement or posture appear to have violated a law or principle of nature? And since people try to get rid of these defects of bearing, why should not even beauty have a good claim to be considered as desirable for its own sake? For we think imperfection or mutilation of the body things to be avoided for their own sake, why should we not with equal or perhaps still greater reason pursue distinction of form for its own sake? And if we avoid ugliness in bodily movement and posture, why should we not pursue beauty? Health also, and strength and freedom from pain we shall desire not merely for their utility but also for their own sakes. For since our nature aims at the full development of all its parts, she desires for its own sake that state of body which is most in accordance with himself; because she is thrown into utter disorder if the body is diseased or in pain or weak. 5.48. "Let us consider the parts of the mind, which are of nobler aspect. The loftier these are, the more unmistakable indications of nature do they afford. So great is our innate love of learning and of knowledge, that no one can doubt that man's nature is strongly attracted to these things even without the lure of any profit. Do we notice how children cannot be deterred even by punishment from studying and inquiry into the world around them? Drive them away, and back they come. They delight in knowing things; they are eager to impart their knowledge to others; pageants, games and shows of that sort hold them spell-bound, and they will even endure hunger and thirst so as to be able to see them. Again, take persons who delight in the liberal arts and studies; do we not see them careless of health or business, patiently enduring any inconvenience when under the spell of learning and of science, and repaid for endless toil and trouble by the pleasure they derive from acquiring knowledge? 5.49. For my part I believe Homer had something of this sort in view in his imaginary account of the songs of the Sirens. Apparently it was not the sweetness of their voices or the novelty and diversity of their songs, but their professions of knowledge that used to attract the passing voyageurs; it was the passion for learning that kept men rooted to the Sirens' rocky shores. This is their invitation to Ulysses (for I have translated this among other passages of Homer): Ulysses, pride of Argos, turn thy bark And listen to our music. Never yet Did voyager sail these waters blue, but stayed His course, enchanted by our voices sweet, And having filled his soul with harmony, Went on his homeward way a wiser man. We know the direful strife and clash of war That Greece by Heaven's mandate bore to Troy, And whatsoe'er on the wide earth befalls. Homer was aware that his story would not sound plausible if the magic that held his hero immeshed was merely an idle song! It is knowledge that the Sirens offer, and it was no marvel if a lover of wisdom held this dearer than his home. A passion for miscellaneous omniscience no doubt stamps a man as a mere dilettante; but it must be deemed the mark of a superior mind to be led on by the contemplation of high matters to a passionate love of knowledge. 5.50. "What an ardour for study, think you, possessed Archimedes, who was so absorbed in a diagram he was drawing in the dust that he was unaware even of the capture of his native city! What genius do we see expended by Aristoxenus on the theory of music! Imagine the zeal of a lifetime that Aristophanes devoted to literature! Why should I speak of Pythagoras, or of Plato, or Democritus? For they, we are told, in their passion for learning travelled through the remotest parts of the earth! Those who are blind to these facts have never been enamoured of some high and worthy study. And those who in this connexion allege that the studies I have mentioned are pursued for the sake of mental pleasure fail to see that they are proved to be desirable for their own sake by the very fact that the mind feels delight in them when no bait of advantage is held out, and finds enjoyment in the mere possession of knowledge even though it is likely to be a positive disadvantage to its possessor. 5.51. But what is the point of inquiring further into matters so obvious? Let us ask ourselves the question, how it is we are interested in the motions of the stars and in contemplating the heavenly bodies and studying all the obscure and secret realms of nature; why we derive pleasure from history, which we are so fond of following up, to the remotest detail, turning back to parts we have omitted, and pushing on to the end when we have once begun. Not that I am unaware that history is useful as well as entertaining. But what of our reading fiction, from which no utility can be extracted? 5.52. What of our eagerness to learn the names of people who have done something notable, their parentage, birthplace, and many quite unimportant details beside? What of the delight that is taken in history by men of the humblest station, who have no expectation of participating in public life, even mere artisans? Also we may notice that the persons most eager to hear and read of public affairs are those who are debarred by the infirmities of age from any prospect of taking part in them. Hence we are forced to infer that the objects of study and knowledge contain in themselves the allurements that entice us to study and to learning. 5.53. The old philosophers picture what the life of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and think that being released from all anxiety and needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, they will do nothing but spend their whole time upon study and research in the science of nature. We on the other hand see in such studies not only the amusement of a life of happiness, but also the alleviation of misfortune; hence the numbers of men who when they had fallen into the power of enemies or tyrants, or when they were in prison or in exile, have solaced their sorrow with the pursuit of learning. 5.54. Demetrius of Phalerum, a ruler of this city, when unjustly banished from his country, repaired to the court of King Ptolemy at Alexandria. Being eminent in the very system of philosophy which we are recommending to you, and a pupil of Theophrastus, he employed the leisure afforded by his disaster in composing a number of excellent treatises, not for any practical use of his own, for he was debarred from affairs; but he found a sort of food for his higher nature in thus cultivating his mind. I myself frequently heard the blind exâpraetor and scholar Gnaeus Aufidius declare that he felt the actual loss of light more than the inconvenience of blindness. Take lastly the gift of sleep: did it not bring us repose for our bodies and an antidote for labour, we should think it a violation of nature, for it robs us of sensation and entirely suspends our activity; so that if our nature did not require repose or could obtain it in some other manner, we should be quite content, inasmuch as even as it is we frequently deny ourselves slumber, almost to the point of doing violence to nature, in the interests of business or of study. 5.55. "Even more striking, and in fact absolutely obvious and convincing natural indications are not wanting, more particularly no doubt in man, but also in every living creature, of the presence of a positive craving for constant activity. Perpetual repose is unendurable on any terms. This is a fact that may be readily detected in children of the tenderest age, if I may risk being thought to lay undue stress on a field of observation sanctioned by the older thinkers, all of whom, and my own school more than others, go to the nursery, because they believe that Nature reveals her plan to them most clearly in childhood. Even infants, we notice, are incapable of keeping still. Children of a somewhat more advanced age delight in games involving considerable exertion, from which not even fear of punishment can restrain them. And this passion for activity grows as they grow older. The prospect of the most delightful dreams would not reconcile us to feeling asleep for ever: Endymion's fate we should consider no better than death. 5.56. Observe the least energetic among men: even in a notorious idler both mind and body are constantly in motion; set him free from unavoidable occupations, and he calls for a dice-board, goes off to some sport, or looks for somebody to chat with, seeking at the club or at some trivial social gathering a substitute for higher and more intellectual amusements. Even the wild animals that we keep caged up for our amusement find their captivity irksome, although they are better fed than if they were at large; they miss their natural birthright of free and untrammelled movement. 5.57. Hence the abler and more accomplished a man is, the less he would care to be alive at all if debarred from taking part in affairs, although allowed to batten on the most exquisite pleasures. Men of ability either choose a life of private activity, or, if of loftier ambition, aspire to a public career of political or military office, or else they devote themselves entirely to study and learning; and the devotees of learning are so far from making pleasure their aim, that they actually endure care, anxiety and loss of sleep, in the exercise of the noblest part of man's nature, the divine element within us (for so we must consider the keen edge of the intellect and the reason), they ask for no pleasure and avoid no toil; they are ceaselessly occupied in marvelling at the discoveries of the ancients or in pursuing new researches of their own; insatiable in their appetite for study, they forget all else besides, and harbour not one base or mean thought. So potent is the spell of these pursuits, that even those who profess to follow other Ends of Goods, defined by utility or pleasure, may yet be seen to spend their whole lives in investigating and unfolding the processes of nature. 5.58. "It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities vary in kind, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Courage and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consot therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature's own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. 'Happy the man,' Plato well says, 'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.' Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later. 5.59. In generating and developing the human body, Nature's procedure was to make some parts perfect at birth, and to fashion other parts as it grew up, without making much use of external and artificial aids. The mind on the other hand she endowed with its remaining faculties in the same perfection as the body, equipping it with senses already adapted to their function of perception and requiring little or no assistance of any kind to complete their development; but the highest and noblest part of man's nature she neglected. It is true she bestowed an intellect capable of receiving every virtue, and implanted in it at birth and without instruction embryonic notions of the loftiest ideas, laying the foundation of its education, and introducing among its endowments the elementary constituents, so to speak, of virtue. But of virtue itself she merely gave the germ and no more. 5.60. Therefore it rests with us (and when I say with us, I mean with our science), in addition to the elementary principles bestowed upon us, to seek out their logical developments, until our full purpose is realized. For this is much more valuable and more intrinsically desirable than either the senses or the endowments of the body above alluded to; since those are surpassed in an almost inconceivable degree by the matchless perfection of the intellect. Therefore all honour, all admiration, all enthusiasm is directed toward virtue and towards the actions in harmony with virtue, and all such properties and processes of the mind are entitled by the single name of Moral Worth. "The connotation of all these conceptions and the signification of the terms that denote them, and their several values and natures we shall study later; 5.61. for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. 5.62. But this belongs to childhood; the picture is filled in at the age when the character is fully formed. Who is so unlike a human being as to feel no repulsion at baseness and no approval for goodness? Who is there that does not hate a youth spent in debauchery and wantonness? Who on the contrary would not esteem modesty and orderliness in the young, even though he has no personal concern in them? Who does not hate the traitor Pullus Numitorius of Fregellae, although he did a service to our country? Who does not praise and extol Codrus, the preserver of this city, or honour the daughters of Erechtheus? or loathe the very name of Tubulus? or love the memory of Aristides? Do we forget the strong emotion that we feel when we hear or read of some deed of piety, of friendship or of magimity? 5.63. But I need not speak of ourselves, whose birth, breeding and education point us towards glory and towards honour; think of the uneducated multitude, â what a tempest of applause rings through the theatre at the words: I am Orestes, and at the rejoinder: No, no, 'tis I, I say, I am Orestes. And then when each offers a solution to the king in his confusion and perplexity: Then prithee slay us both; we'll die together: as often as this scene is acted, does it ever fail to arouse the greatest enthusiasm? This proves that all men without exception approve and applaud the disposition that not only seeks no advantage for itself, but is loyal and true even to its own disadvantage. 5.64. These high examples crowd the pages not only of romance but also of history, and especially the history of our own country. It was we who chose our most virtuous citizen to receive the sacred emblems from Ida; we who sent guardians to royal princes; our generals sacrificed their lives to save their country; our consuls warned the king who was their bitterest enemy, when close to the walls of Rome, to be on his guard against poison; in our commonwealth was found the lady who expiated her outraged honour by a self-sought death, and the father who killed his daughter to save her from shame. Who is there who cannot see that all these deeds and countless others besides were done by men who were inspired by the splendour of moral greatness to forget all thought of interest, and are praised by us from no other consideration but that of Moral Worth?"The considerations thus briefly set out (for I have not aimed at such a full account as I might have given, since the matter admitted of no uncertainty), these considerations then lead to the undoubted conclusion that all the virtues, and the Moral Worth which springs from them and inheres in them, are intrinsically desirable. 5.65. But in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests and that actual affection which exists between man and man, which, coming into existence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a whole is bound together by the ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of neighbourhood, then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I speak, is termed Justice; connected with it are dutiful affection, kindness, liberality, good-will, courtesy and the other graces of the same kind. And while these belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors shared by the remaining virtues. 5.66. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this general union and combination of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent, and in agreement with nature. 5.67. "At the same time this complex of interfused virtues can yet be theoretically resolved into its separate parts by philosophers. For although the virtues are so closely united that each participates in every other and none can be separated from any other, yet on the other hand each has its own special function. Thus Courage is displayed in toils and dangers, Temperance in forgoing pleasures, Prudence in the choice of goods and evils, Justice in giving each his due. As then each virtue contains an element not merely self-regarding, which embraces other men and makes them its end, there results a state of feeling in which friends, brothers, kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all human beings (since our belief is that all mankind are united in one society) are things desirable for their own sakes. Yet none of these relations is such as to form part of the end and Ultimate Good. 5.68. Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good. 5.69. "How then, you will object, can it be true that all things are means to the Chief Good, if friendships and relationships and the other external goods are not part of the Chief Good? The answer is that it is in this way: we maintain these external goods by those acts of duty which spring from the particular class of virtue connected with each. For example, dutiful conduct towards friends and parents benefits the doer from the very fact that such performance of duty is a right action, and right actions take their rise from virtues. And whereas the Wise, under nature's guidance, make right action their aim, on the other hand men not perfect and yet endowed with noble characters often respond to the stimulus of honour, which has some show and semblance of Moral Worth. But if they could fully discern Moral Worth itself in its absolute perfection and completeness, the one thing of all others most splendid and most glorious, how enraptured would they be, if they take such a delight in the mere shadow and reputation of it! 5.71. Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. 5.73. Aristotle and Theophrastus often and admirably praised knowledge for its own sake; Erillus, captivated by this single tenet, maintained that knowledge was the Chief Good and that nothing else was desirable as an end in itself. The ancients enlarged on the duty of rising proudly superior to human fortunes; Aristo singled out this one point, and declared that nothing but vice or virtue was either to be avoided or desired. Our school included freedom from pain among the things in accordance with nature; Hieronymus made it out to be the Supreme Good. On the other hand Callipho and later Diodorus, the one having fallen in love with pleasure, and the other with freedom from pain, could neither of them dispense with Moral Worth, which by our school was extolled above all else. 5.74. Even the votaries of pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all. There remain the Stoics. The Stoics have conveyed from us not some one or other item, but our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our opinions as their own, have changed the names, which are the marks of things. Our system therefore is left as the sole philosophy worthy of the student of the liberal arts, of the learned and the eminent, of statesmen and princes. 5.75. After these words he paused, and then added: "How now? Do you think I have made good use of my privilege of having you hear me say over my lesson?" "Why, Piso," I replied, "you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not think we should have to rely much upon the aid of the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to be convinced by you because I remember that your great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat different account of your system, agreeing with those who attached great importance to good and bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils." "That is true," said he; "but our friend Antiochus is a far better and far more uncompromising exponent of the system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't want to know how far I succeeded in convincing you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here; I want to kidnap your pupil from you. 5.76. To this Lucius replied: "Oh, I am quite convinced by what you have said, and I think my cousin is so too." "How now?" said Piso to me, "Has the young man your consent? or would you rather he should study a system which, when he has mastered it, will lead to his knowing nothing?" "Oh, I leave him his liberty," said I; "but don't you remember that it is quite open to me to approve the doctrines you have stated? Since who can refrain from approving statements that appear to him probable?" "But," said he, "can anyone approve that of which he has not full perception, comprehension and knowledge?" "There is no great need to quarrel about that, Piso," I rejoined. "The only thing that makes me deny the possibility of perception is the Stoics' definition of that faculty; they maintain that nothing can be perceived except a true presentation having such a character as no false presentation can possess. Here then I have a quarrel with the Stoics, but certainly none with the Peripatetics. However let us drop this question, for it involves a very long and somewhat contentious debate. |
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3. Cicero, On Duties, 1.6-1.8, 1.11-1.15, 1.20-1.22, 1.25, 1.28, 1.30, 1.34-1.37, 1.39, 1.42-1.45, 1.47-1.54, 1.56-1.58, 1.63, 1.65, 1.67-1.70, 3.20-3.21, 5.2, 5.24-5.26, 5.41-5.43, 5.65 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 1.6. Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat, tamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi consentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum, Academicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset. Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. 1.7. Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio futura est, ante definire, quid sit officium; quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror. Omnis enim, quae a ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio, debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur, quid sit id, de quo disputetur Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum, alterum, quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnis partis usus vitae conformari possit. Superioris generis huius modi sunt exempla: omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem. Quorum autem officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur; de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum. Atque etiam alia divisio est officii. 1.8. Nam et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum. Perfectum officium rectum, opinor, vocemus, quoniam Graeci kato/rqwma, hoc autem commune officium kaqh=kon vocant. Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. 1.11. Principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum, ut se, vitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea, quae nocitura videantur, omniaque, quae sint ad vivendum necessaria, anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut latibula, ut alia generis eiusdem. Commune item animantium omnium est coniunctionis adpetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sint; sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest, quod haec tantum, quantum sensu movetur, ad id solum, quod adest quodque praesens est, se accommodat paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut futurum; homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt earumque praegressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adiungit atque annectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias. 1.12. Eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem ingeneratque in primis praecipuum quendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt, impellitque, ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit ob easque causas studeat parare ea, quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum, nec sibi soli, sed coniugi, liberis ceterisque, quos caros habeat tuerique debeat; quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam facit. 1.13. In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum avemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus. Ex quo intellegitur, quod verum, simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis aptissimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi exsistit humanarumque rerum contemptio. 1.14. Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque. quod unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit, quod deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit; quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandam putat cavetque, ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat, tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet. Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quaerimus, honestum, quod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile. 1.15. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti vides, quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae. Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore aut in omnium, quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte, quae prima discripta est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium. 1.20. De tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur; cuius partes duae, iustitia, in qua virtutis est splendor maximus, ex qua viri boni nomitur, et huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet. Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria, deinde ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis. 1.21. Sunt autem privata nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt, aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut lege, pactione, condicione, sorte; ex quo fit, ut ager Arpinas Arpinatium dicatur, Tusculanus Tusculanorum; similisque est privatarum possessionum discriptio. Ex quo, quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae natura fuerant communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat; e quo si quis sibi appetet, violabit ius humanae societatis. 1.22. Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gigtur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem. 1.25. Expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, tum ad perfruendas voluptates. In quibus autem maior est animus, in iis pecuniae cupiditas spectat ad opes et ad gratificandi facultatem, ut nuper M. Crassus negabat ullam satis magnam pecuniam esse ei, qui in re publica princeps vellet esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non posset. Delectant etiam magnifici apparatus vitaeque cultus cum elegantia et copia; quibus rebus effectum est, ut infinita pecuniae cupiditas esset. Nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria est. 1.28. Praetermittendae autem defensionis deserendique officii plures solent esse causae; nam aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt aut etiam neglegentia, pigritia, inertia aut suis studiis quibusdam occupationibusve sic impediuntur, ut eos, quos tutari debeant, desertos esse patiantur. Itaque videndum est, ne non satis sit id, quod apud Platonem est in philosophos dictum, quod in veri investigatione versentur quodque ea, quae plerique vehementer expetant, de quibus inter se digladiari soleant, contemt et pro nihilo putent, propterea iustos esse. Nam alterum iustitiae genus assequuntur, ut inferenda ne cui noceant iniuria, in alterum incidunt; discendi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent, deserunt. Itaque eos ne ad rem publicam quidem accessuros putat nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri; namhoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit, si est voluntarium. 1.30. est enim difficilis cura rerum alienarum. Quamquam Terentianus ille Chremes humani nihil a se alienum putat ; sed tamen, quia magis ea percipimus atque sentimus, quae nobis ipsis aut prospera aut adversa eveniunt, quam illa, quae ceteris, quae quasi longo intervallo interiecto videmus, aliter de illis ac de nobis iudicamus. Quocirca bene praecipiunt, qui vetant quicquam agere, quod dubites aequum sit an iniquum. Aequitas enim lucet ipsa per se, dubitatio cogitationem significat iniuriae. 1.34. Atque in re publica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli. Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore. 1.35. Quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, parta autem victoria conservandi ii, qui non crudeles in bello, non immanes fuerunt, ut maiores nostri Tusculanos, Aequos, Volscos, Sabinos, Hernicos in civitatem etiam acceperunt, at Carthaginem et Numantiam funditus sustulerunt; nollem Corinthum, sed credo aliquid secutos, opportunitatem loci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad bellum faciendum locus ipse adhortari. Mea quidem sententia paci, quae nihil habitura sit insidiarum, semper est consulendum. In quo si mihi esset optemperatum, si non optimam, at aliquam rem publicam, quae nunc nulla est, haberemus. Et cum iis, quos vi deviceris, consulendum est, tum ii, qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi. In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta est, ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum. 1.36. Ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure perscripta est. Ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum. Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam, in cuius exercitu Catonis filius tiro militabat. Cum autem Popilio videretur unam dimittere legionem, Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cum amore pugdi in exercitu remansisset, Cato ad Popilium scripsit, ut, si eum patitur in exercitu remanere, secundo eum obliget militiae sacramento, quia priore amisso iure cum hostibus pugnare non poterat.Adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo. 1.37. M. quidem Catonis senis est epistula ad M. filium, in qua scribit se audisse eum missum factum esse a consule, cum in Macedonia bello Persico miles esset. Monet igitur, ut caveat, ne proelium ineat; negat enim ius esse, qui miles non sit, cum hoste pugnare. Equidem etiam illud animadverto, quod, qui proprio nomine perduellis esset, is hostis vocaretur, lenitate verbi rei tristitiam mitigatam. Hostis enim apud maiores nostros is dicebatur, quem nunc peregrinum dicimus. Indicant duodecim tabulae: aut status dies cum hoste, itemque: adversus hostem aeterna auctoritas. Quid ad hanc mansuetudinem addi potest, eum, quicum bellum geras, tam molli nomine appellare? Quamquam id nomen durius effect iam vetustas; a peregrino enim recessit et proprie in eo, qui arma contra ferret, remansit. 1.39. Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserunt, est in eo ipso fides conservanda, ut primo Punico bello Regulus captus a Poenis cum de captivis commutandis Romam missus esset iurassetque se rediturum, primum, ut venit, captivos reddendos in senatu non censuit, deinde, cum retineretur a propinquis et ab amicis, ad supplicium redire maluit quam fidem hosti datam fallere. 1.42. Deinceps, ut erat propositum, de beneficentia ae de liberalitate dicatur, qua quidem nihil est naturae hominis accommodatius, sed habet multas cautiones. Videndum est enim, primum ne obsit benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri et ceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit quam facultates, tum ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur; id enim est iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam haec referenda sunt omnia. Nam et qui gratificantur cuipiam, quod obsit illi, cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici neque liberales, sed perniciosi assentatores iudicandi sunt, et qui aliis nocent, ut in alios liberales sint, in eadem sunt iniustitia, ut si in suam rem aliena convertant. 1.43. Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur, iique arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacumque ratione. Id autem tantum abest ab officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate utamur, quae prosit amicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri; nihil est enim liberale, quod non idem iustum. 1.44. Alter locus erat cautionis, ne benignitas maior esset quam facultates, quod, qui benigniores volunt esse, quam res patitur, primum in eo peccant, quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos; quas enim copias his et suppeditari aequius est et relinqui, eas transferunt ad alienos. Inest autem in tali liberalitate cupiditas plerumque rapiendi et auferendi per iniuriam, ut ad largiendum suppetant copiae. Videre etiam licet plerosque non tam natura liberales quam quadam gloria ductos, ut benefici videantur, facere multa, quae proficisci ab ostentatione magis quam a voluntate videantur. Talis autem sinulatio vanitati est coniunctior quam aut liberalitati aut honestati. 1.45. Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia dilectus esset dignitatis; in quo et mores eius erunt spectandi, in quem beneficium conferetur, et animus erga nos et communitas ac societas vitae et ad nostras utilitates officia ante collata; quae ut concurrant omnia, optabile est; si minus, plures causae maioresque ponderis plus habebunt. 1.47. De benivolentia autem, quam quisque habeat erga nos, primum illud est in officio, ut ei plurimum tribuamus, a quo plurimum diligamur, sed benivolentiam non adulescentulorum more ardore quodam amoris, sed stabilitate potius et constantia iudicemus. Sin erunt merita, ut non ineunda, sed referenda sit gratia, maior quaedam cura adhibenda est; nullum enim officium referenda gratia magis necessarium est. 1.48. Quodsi ea, quae utenda acceperis, maiore mensura, si modo possis, iubet reddere Hesiodus, quidnam beneficio provocati facere debemus? an imitari agros fertiles, qui multo plus efferunt quam acceperunt? Etenim si in eos, quos speramus nobis profuturos, non dubitamus officia conferre, quales in eos esse debemus, qui iam profuerunt? Nam cum duo genera liberalitatis sint, unum dandi beneficii, alterum reddendi, demus necne, in nostra potestate est, non reddere viro bono non licet, modo id facere possit sine iniuria. 1.49. Acceptorum autem beneficiorum sunt dilectus habendi, nec dubium, quin maximo cuique plurimum debeatur. In quo tamen in primis, quo quisque animo, studio, benivolentia fecerit, ponderandum est. Multi enim faciunt multa temeritate quadam sine iudicio vel morbo in omnes vel repentino quodam quasi vento impetu animi incitati; quae beneficia aeque magna non sunt habenda atque ea, quae iudicio, considerate constanterque delata sunt. Sed in collocando beneficio et in referenda gratia, si cetera paria sunt, hoc maxime officii est, ut quisque maxime opis indigeat, ita ei potissimum opitulari; quod contra fit a plerisque; a quo enim plurimum sperant, etiamsi ille iis non eget, tamen ei potissimum inserviunt. 1.50. Optime autem societas hominum coniunctioque servabitur, si, ut quisque erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum conferetur. Sed, quae naturae principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae, repetendum videtur altius; est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate. Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate; neque ulla re longius absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes. 1.51. Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium autem communia hominum videntur ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri in permultas potest: Homó, qui erranti cómiter monstrát viam, Quasi lúmen de suo lúmine accendát, facit. Nihiló minus ipsi lúcet, cum illi accénderit. Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; 1.52. ex quo sunt illa communia: non prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit, consilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt, danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem: Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales. 1.53. Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa infinita discedatur, propior est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maxime homines coniunguntur; interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia, forum, fana, porticus, viae, leges, iura: iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines praeterea et familiaritates multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae. Artior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum; ab illa enim immensa societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur. 1.54. Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia omnia; id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos tamquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur conubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui; quae propagatio et suboles origo est rerum publicarum. Sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines et caritate; 1.56. Et quamquam omnis virtus nos ad se allicit facitque, ut eos diligamus, in quibus ipsa inesse videatur, tamen iustitia et liberalitas id maxime efficit. Nihil autem est amabilius nec copulatius quam morum similitudo bonorum; in quibus enim eadem studia sunt, eaedem voluntates, in iis fit ut aeque quisque altero delectetur ac se ipso, efficiturque id, quod Pythagoras vult in amicitia, ut unus fiat ex pluribus. Magna etiam illa communitas est, quae conficitur ex beneficiis ultro et citro datis acceptis, quae et mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt, firma devinciuntur societate. 1.57. Sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea, quae cum re publica est uni cuique nostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiars, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt. 1.58. Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus,proximi liberi totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps bene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est. Quam ob rem necessaria praesidia vitae debentur iis maxime, quos ante dixi, vita autem victusque communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes, consolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime, estque ea iucundissima amicitia, quam similitudo morum coniugavit. 1.63. Praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: Non, inquit, solum scientia, quae est remota ab iustitia, calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda, verum etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate, non utilitate communi impellitur, audaciae potius nomen habeat quam fortitudinis. Itaque viros fortes et magimnos eosdem bonos et simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus; quae sunt ex media laude iustitiae. 1.65. Fortes igitur et magimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri; etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam. 1.67. Harum rerum duarum splendor omnis, amplitudo, addo etiam utilitatem, in posteriore est, causa autem et ratio efficiens magnos viros in priore; in eo est enim illud, quod excellentes animos et humana contemnentes facit. Id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, si et solum id, quod honestum sit, bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis. Nam et ea. quae eximia plerisque et praeclara videntur, parva ducere eaque ratione stabili firmaque contemnere fortis animi magnique ducendum est, et ea, quae videntur acerba, quae multa et varia in hominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu naturae discedas, nihil a dignitate sapientis, robusti animi est magnaeque constantiae. 1.68. Non est autem consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi cupiditate nec, qui invictum se a labore praestiterit, vinci a voluptate. Quam ob rem et haec vitanda et pecuniae figienda cupiditas; nihil enim est tam angusti animi tamque parvi quam amare divitias, nihil honestius magnificentiusque quam pecuniam contemnere, si non habeas, si habeas, ad beneficentiam liberalitatemque conferre. Cavenda etiam est gloriae cupiditas, ut supra dixi; eripit enim libertatem, pro qua magimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nee vero imperia expetenda ac potius aut non accipienda interdum aut deponenda non numquam. 1.69. Vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia, ut tranquillitas animi et securitas adsit, quae affert cum constantiam, tum etiam dignitatem. Multi autem et sunt et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes a negotiis publicis se removerint ad otiumque perfugerint; in his et nobilissimi philosophi longeque principes et quidam homines severi et graves nec populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt, vixeruntque non nulli in agris delectati re sua familiari. 1.70. His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus, ut ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur, cuius proprium est sic vivere, ut velis. Quare cum hoc commune sit potentiae cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otiosis, alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant, alteri, si contenti sint et suo et parvo. In quo neutrorum omnino contemnenda sententia est, sed et facilior et tutior et minus aliis gravis aut molesta vita est otiosorum, fructuosior autem hominum generi et ad claritatem amplitudinemque aptior eorum, qui se ad rem publicam et ad magnas res gerendas accommodaverunt. 3.20. Erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius haec ab eis disseruntur, quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis, quibus et honestum aliquid non utile et utile non honestum. Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam. 3.21. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. | 1.20. of the three remaining divisions, the most extensive in its application is the principle by which society and what we may call its "common bonds" are maintained. of this again there are two divisions â justice, in which is the crowning glory of the virtues and on the basis of which men are called "good men"; and, close akin to justice, charity, which may also be called kindness or generosity. The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another, unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests, private property for their own. 1.21. There is, however, no such thing as private ownership established by nature, but property becomes private either through long occupancy (as in the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied territory) or through conquest (is in the case of those who took it in war) or by due process of law, bargain, or purchase, or by allotment. On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar is the assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common property became the property of individuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot; and if anyone appropriates to himself anything beyond that, he will be violating the laws of human society. 1.22. But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man. 1.25. Again, men seek riches partly to supply the needs of life, partly to secure the enjoyment of pleasure. With those who cherish higher ambitions, the desire for wealth is entertained with a view to power and influence and the means of bestowing favours; Marcus Crassus, for example, not long since declared that no amount of wealth was enough for the man who aspired to be the foremost citizen of the state, unless with the income from it he could maintain an army. Fine establishments and the comforts of life in elegance and abundance also afford pleasure, and the desire to secure it gives rise to the insatiable thirst for wealth. Still, I do not mean to find fault with the accumulation of property, provided it hurts nobody, but unjust acquisition of it is always to be avoided. 1.28. The motives for failure to prevent injury and so for slighting duty are likely to be various: people either are reluctant to incur enmity or trouble or expense; or through indifference, indolence, or incompetence, or through some preoccupation or self-interest they are so absorbed that they suffer those to be neglected whom it is their duty to protect. And so there is reason to fear that what Plato declares of the philosophers may be inadequate, when he says that they are just because they are busied with the pursuit of truth and because they despise and count as naught that which most men eagerly seek and for which they are prone to do battle against each other to the death. For they secure one sort of justice, to be sure, in that they do no positive wrong to anyone, but they fall into the opposite injustice; for hampered by their pursuit of learning they leave to their fate those whom they ought to defend. And so, Plato thinks, they will not even assume their civic duties except under compulsion. But in fact it were better that they should assume them of their own accord; for an action intrinsically right is just only on condition that it is voluntary. 1.30. and yet in Terence's play, we know, Chremes "thinks that nothing that concerns man is foreign to him." Nevertheless, when things turn out for our own good or ill, we realize it more fully and feel it more deeply than when the same things happen to others and we see them only, as it were, in the far distance; and for this reason we judge their case differently from our own. It is, therefore, an excellent rule that they give who bid us not to do a thing, when there is a doubt whether it be right or wrong; for righteousness shines with a brilliance of its own, but doubt is a sign that we are thinking of a possible wrong. 1.34. Then, too, in the case of a state in its external relations, the rights of war must be strictly observed. For since there are two ways of settling a dispute: first, by discussion; second; by physical force; and since the former is characteristic of man, the latter of the brute, we must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of discussion. 1.35. The only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed; and when the victory is won, we should spare those who have not been blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare. For instance, our forefathers actually admitted to full rights of citizenship the Tusculans, Aequians, Volscians, Sabines, and Hernicians, but they razed Carthage and Numantia to the ground. I wish they had not destroyed Corinth; but I believe they had some special reason for what they did â its convenient situation, probably â and feared that its very location might some day furnish a temptation to renew the war. In my opinion, at least, we should always strive to secure a peace that shall not admit of guile. And if my advice had been heeded on this point, we should still have at least some sort of constitutional government, if not the best in the world, whereas, as it is, we have none at all. Not only must we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by force of arms but we must also ensure protection to those who lay down their arms and throw themselves upon the mercy of our generals, even though the battering-ram has hammered at their walls. And among our countrymen justice has been observed so conscientiously in this direction, that those who have given promise of protection to states or nations subdued in war become, after the custom of our forefathers, the patrons of those states. 1.36. As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn up in the fetial code of the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion; and from this it may be gathered that no war is just, unless it is entered upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or warning has been given and a formal declaration made. Popilius was general in command of a province. In his army Cato's son was serving on his first campaign. When Popilius decided to disband one of his legions, he discharged also young Cato, who was serving in that same legion. But when the young man out of love for the service stayed on in the field, his father wrote to Popilius to say that if he let him stay in the army, he should swear him into service with a new oath of allegiance, for in view of the voidance of his former oath he could not legally fight the foe. So extremely scrupulous was the observance of the laws in regard to the conduct of war. 1.37. There is extant, too, a letter of the elder Marcus Cato to his son Marcus, in which he writes that he has heard that the youth has been discharged by the consul, when he was serving in Macedonia in the war with Perseus. He warns him, therefore, to be careful not to go into battle; for, he says, the man who is not legally a soldier has no right to be fighting the foe. This also I observe â that he who would properly have been called "a fighting enemy" (perduellis) was called "a guest" (hostis), thus relieving the ugliness of the fact by a softened expression; for "enemy" (hostis) meant to our ancestors what we now call "stranger" (peregrinus). This is proved by the usage in the Twelve Tables: "Or a day fixed for trial with a stranger" (hostis). And again: "Right of ownership is inalienable for ever in dealings with a stranger" (hostis). What can exceed such charity, when he with whom one is at war is called by so gentle a name? And yet long lapse of time has given that word a harsher meaning: for it has lost its signification of "stranger" and has taken on the technical connotation of "an enemy under arms. 1.39. Again, if under stress of circumstance individuals have made any promise to the enemy, they are bound to keep their word even then. For instance, in the First Punic War, when Regulus was taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, he was sent to Rome on parole to negotiate an exchange of prisoners; he came and, in the first place, it was he that made the motion in the Senate that the prisoners should not be restored; and in the second place, when his relatives and friends would have kept him back, he chose to return to a death by torture rather than prove false to his promise, though given to an enemy. 1.42. Next in order, as outlined above, let us speak of kindness and generosity. Nothing appeals more to the best in human nature than this, but it calls for the exercise of caution in many particulars; we must, in the first place, see to it that our act of kindness shall not prove an injury either to the object of our beneficence or to others; in the second place, that it shall not be beyond our means; and finally, that it shall be proportioned to the worthiness of the recipient; for this is the corner-stone of justice; and by the standard of justice all acts of kindness must be measured. For those who confer a harmful favour upon someone whom they seemingly wish to help are to be accounted not generous benefactors but dangerous sycophants; and likewise those who injure one man, in order to be generous to another, are guilty of the same injustice as if they diverted to their own accounts the property of their neighbours. 1.43. Now, there are many â and especially those who are ambitious for eminence and glory â who rob one to enrich another; and they expect to be thought generous towards their friends, if they put them in the way of getting rich, no matter by what means. Such conduct, however, is so remote from moral duty that nothing can be more completely opposed to duty. We must, therefore, take care to indulge only in such liberality as will help our friends and hurt no one. The conveyance of property by Lucius Sulla and Gaius Caesar from its rightful owners to the hands of strangers should, for that reason, not be regarded as generosity; for nothing is generous if it is not at the same time just. 1.44. The second point for the exercise of caution was that our beneficence should not exceed our means; for those who wish to be more open-handed than their circumstances permit are guilty of two faults: first they do wrong to their next of kin; for they transfer to strangers property which would more justly be placed at their service or bequeathed to them. And second, such generosity too often engenders a passion for plundering and misappropriating property, in order to supply the means for making large gifts. We may also observe that a great many people do many things that seem to be inspired more by a spirit of ostentation than by heart-felt kindness; for such people are not really generous but are rather influenced by a sort of ambition to make a show of being open-handed. Such a pose is nearer akin to hypocrisy than to generosity or moral goodness. 1.45. The third rule laid down was that in acts of kindness we should weigh with discrimination the worthiness of the object of our benevolence; we should take into consideration his moral character, his attitude toward us, the intimacy of his relation to us, and our common social ties, as well as the services he has hitherto rendered in our interest. It is to be desired that all these considerations should be combined in the same person; if they are not, then the more numerous and the more important considerations must have the greater weight. 1.47. But as to the affection which anyone may have for us, it is the first demand of duty that we do most for him who loves us most; but we should measure affection, not like youngsters, by the ardour of its passion, but rather by its strength and constancy. But if there shall be obligations already incurred, so that kindness is not to begin with us, but to be requited, still greater diligence, it seems, is called for; for no duty is more imperative that that of proving one's gratitude. 1.48. But if, as Hesiod bids, one is to repay with interest, if possible, what one has borrowed in time of need, what, pray, ought we to do when challenged by an unsought kindness? Shall we not imitate the fruitful fields, which return more than they receive? For if we do not hesitate to confer favours upon those who we hope will be of help to us, how ought we to deal with those who have already helped us? For generosity is of two kinds: doing a kindness and requiting one. Whether we do the kindness or not is optional; but to fail to requite one is not allowable to a good man, provided he can make the requital without violating the rights of others. 1.49. Furthermore, we must make some discrimination between favours received; for, as a matter of course the greater the favour, the greater is the obligation. But in deciding this we must above all give due weight to the spirit, the devotion, the affection that prompted the favour. For many people often do favours impulsively for everybody without discrimination, prompted by a morbid sort of benevolence or by a sudden impulse of the heart, shifting the wind. Such acts of generosity are not to be so highly esteemed as those which are performed with judgment, deliberation, and mature consideration. But in bestowing a kindness, as well as in making a requital, the first rule of duty requires us â other things being equal â to lend assistance preferably to people in proportion to their individual need. Most people adopt the contrary course: they put themselves most eagerly at the service of the one from whom they hope to receive the greatest favours even though he has no need of their help. 1.50. The interests of society, however, and its common bonds will be best conserved, if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion to the closeness of his relationship. But it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles of fellowship and society that Nature has established among men. The first principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting between all the members of the human race; and that bond of connection is reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity. In no other particular are we farther removed from the nature of beasts; for we admit that they may have courage (horses and lions, for example); but we do not admit that they have justice, equity, and goodness; for they are not endowed with reason or speech. 1.51. This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common." Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and, though restricted by him to one instance, the principle may be applied very generally: "Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his: No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit." In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to give. 1.52. On this principle we have the following maxims:"Deny no one the water that flows by;" "Let anyone who will take fire from our fire;" "Honest counsel give to one who is in doubt;" for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the giver no loss. We should, therefore, adopt these principles and always be contributing something to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are limited and the number of the needy is infinite, this spirit of universal liberality must be regulated according to that test of Ennius â "No less shines his" â in order that we may continue to have the means for being generous to our friends. 1.53. Then, too, there are a great many degrees of closeness or remoteness in human society. To proceed beyond the universal bond of our common humanity, there is the closer one of belonging to the same people, tribe, and tongue, by which men are very closely bound together; it is a still closer relation to be citizens of the same city-state; for fellow-citizens have much in common â forum, temples colonnades, streets, statutes, laws, courts, rights of suffrage, to say nothing of social and friendly circles and diverse business relations with many. But a still closer social union exists between kindred. Starting with that infinite bond of union of the human race in general, the conception is now confined to a small and narrow circle. 1.54. For since the reproductive instinct is by Nature's gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common. And this is the foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it were, of the state. Then follow the bonds between brothers and sisters, and next those of first and then of second cousins; and when they can no longer be sheltered under one roof, they go out into other homes, as into colonies. Then follow between these in turn, marriages and connections by marriage, and from these again a new stock of relations; and from this propagation and after-growth states have their beginnings. The bonds of common blood hold men fast through good-will and affection; 1.56. And while every virtue attracts us and makes us love those who seem to possess it, still justice and generosity do so most of all. Nothing, moreover, is more conducive to love and intimacy than compatibility of character in good men; for when two people have the same ideals and the same tastes, it is a natural consequence that each loves the other as himself; and the result is, as Pythagoras requires of ideal friendship, that several are united in one. Another strong bond of fellowship is effected by mutual interchange of kind services; and as long as these kindnesses are mutual and acceptable, those between whom they are interchanged are united by the ties of an enduring intimacy. 1.57. But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, there is no social relation among them all more close, none more close, none more dear than that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; one native land embraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his death he could render her a service? So much the more execrable are those monsters who have torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of outrage and who are and have been engaged in compassing her utter destruction. 1.58. Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be made to find out where most of our moral obligation is due, country would come first, and parents; for their services have laid us under the heaviest obligation; next come children and the whole family, who look to us alone for support and can have no other protection; finally, our kinsmen, with whom we live on good terms and with whom, for the most part, our lot is one. All needful material assistance is, therefore, due first of all to those whom I have named; but intimate relationship of life and living, counsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even reproof flourish best in friendships. And that friendship is sweetest which is cemented by congeniality of character. 1.63. This, then, is a fine saying of Plato's: "Not only must all knowledge that is divorced from justice be called cunning rather than wisdom," he says, "but even the courage that is prompt to face danger, if it is inspired not by public spirit, but by its own selfish purposes, should have the name of effrontery rather than of courage." And so we demand that men who are courageous and high-souled shall at the same time be good and straightforward, lovers of truth, and foes to deception; for these qualities are the centre and soul of justice. 1.65. So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which Nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for glory as a reward for his achievements. 1.67. All the glory and greatness and, I may add, all the usefulness of these two characteristics of courage are centred in the latter; the rational cause that makes men great, in the former. For it is the former that contains the element that makes souls pre-eminent and indifferent to worldly fortune. And this quality is distinguished by two criteria: (1) if one account moral rectitude as the only good; and (2) if one be free from all passion. For we must agree that it takes a brave and heroic soul to hold as slight what most people think grand and glorious, and to disregard it from fixed and settled principles. And it requires strength of character and great singleness of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes to pass in many and various forms in human life, and to bear it so unflinchingly as not to be shaken in the least from one's natural state of the dignity of a philosopher. 1.68. Moreover, it would be inconsistent for the man who is not overcome by fear to be overcome by desire, or for the man who has shown himself invincible to toil to be conquered by pleasure. We must, therefore, not only avoid the latter, but also beware of ambition for wealth; for there is nothing so characteristic of narrowness and littleness of soul as the love of riches; and there is nothing more honourable and noble than to be indifferent to money, if one does not possess it, and to devote it to beneficence and liberality, if one does possess it. As I said before, we must also beware of ambition for glory; for it robs us of liberty, and in defence of liberty a high-souled man should stake everything. And one ought not to seek military authority; nay, rather it ought sometimes to be declined, sometimes to be resigned. 1.69. Again, we must keep ourselves free from every disturbing emotion, not only from desire and fear, but also from excessive pain and pleasure, and from anger, so that we may enjoy that calm of soul and freedom from care which bring both moral stability and dignity of character. But there have been many and still are many who, while pursuing that calm of soul of which I speak, have withdrawn from civic duty and taken refuge in retirement. Among such have been found the most famous and by far the foremost philosophers and certain other earnest, thoughtful men who could not endure the conduct of either the people or their leaders; some of them, too, lived in the country and found their pleasure in the management of their private estates. 1.70. Such men have had the same aims as kings â to suffer no want, to be subject to no authority, to enjoy their liberty, that is, in its essence, to live just as they please. So, while this desire is common to men of political ambitions and men of retirement, of whom I have just spoken, the one class think they can attain their end if they secure large means; the other, if they are content with the little they have. And, in this matter, neither way of thinking is altogether to be condemned; but the life of retirement is easier and safer and at the same time less burdensome or troublesome to others, while the career of those who apply themselves to statecraft and to conducting great enterprises is more profitable to mankind and contributes more to their own greatness and renown. 3.20. That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I am following in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to my rule. 3.21. Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. |
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