1. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 47 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
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2. Hebrew Bible, Ezekiel, 41-48, 40 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
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3. Cicero, On Laws, 1.23, 2.2-2.4, 2.17, 2.26-2.69 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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4. Cicero, On Duties, 1.124 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 1.124. Ac ne illud quidem alienum est, de magistratuum, de privatorum, de civium, de peregrinorum officiis dicere. Est igitur proprium munus magistratus intellegere se gerere personam civitatis debereque eius dignitatem et decus sustinere, servare leges, iura discribere, ea fidei suae commissa meminisse. Privatum autem oportet aequo et pari cum civibus iure vivere neque summissum et abiectum neque se efferentem, tum in re publica ea velle, quae tranquilla et honesta sint; talem enim solemus et sentire bonum civem et dicere. | 1.124. At this point it is not at all irrelevant to discuss the duties of magistrates, of private individuals, [of native citizens,] and of foreigners. It is, then, peculiarly the place of a magistrate to bear in mind that he represents the state and that it is his duty to uphold its honour and its dignity, to enforce the law, to dispense to all their constitutional rights, and to remember that all this has been committed to him as a sacred trust. The private individual ought first, in private relations, to live on fair and equal terms with his fellow-citizens, with a spirit neither servile and grovelling nor yet domineering; and second, in matters pertaining to the state, to labour for her peace and honour; for such a man we are accustomed to esteem and call a good citizen. |
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5. Cicero, De Oratore, 3.168 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 3.168. quo item in genere et virtutes et vitia pro ipsis, in quibus illa sunt, appellantur: "luxuries quam in domum inrupit," et "quo avaritia penetravit"; aut "fides valuit, iustitia confecit." Videtis profecto genus hoc totum, cum inflexo immutatoque verbo res eadem enuntiatur ornatius; cui sunt finitima illa minus ornata, sed tamen non ignoranda, cum intellegi volumus aliquid aut ex parte totum, ut pro aedificiis cum parietes aut tecta dicimus; aut ex toto partem, ut cum unam turmam equitatum populi Romani dicimus; aut ex uno pluris: at Romanus homo, tamenetsi res bene gesta est corde suo trepidat; aut cum ex pluribus intellegitur unum: nos sumus Romani, qui fuimus ante Rudini; aut quocumque modo, non ut dictum est, in eo genere intellegitur, sed ut sensum est. | |
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6. Cicero, Republic, 1.39.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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7. Cicero, Philippicae, 3.15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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8. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.108 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 5.108. postremo ad omnis casus facillima ratio est eorum, eorum add. R c qui ad quia ad V 1 voluptatem ea referunt quae secuntur in vita, ut, quocumque haec loco suppeditetur, ibi beate queant quaeant GKV vivere. itaque ad omnem rationem Teucri vox accommodari potest: Pa/tria est, ubicumque e/st bene. Trag. inc. 92 Socrates quidem cum rogaretur, cuiatem se esse diceret, mundanum inquit; Socrates ... 24 inquit Non. 93, 6 totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur. nonne ... 453, 1 arbitrabatur ( sine 17 malo ... 18 proferre) H quid? qui t. alb. V ( V 3 ) T. Albucius albutius GKV nonne animo aequissimo Athenis exul philosophabatur? cui tamen illud ipsum non accidisset, si in re p. quiescens Epicuri legibus paruisset. | |
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9. Septuagint, 2 Maccabees, 6 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
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10. Augustus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, 10.2, 25.2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
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11. Dionysius of Halycarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 1.35 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 1.35. 1. But in the course of time the land came to be called Italy, after a ruler named Italus. This man, according to Antiochus of Syracuse, was both a wise and good prince, and persuading some of his neighbours by arguments and subduing the rest by force, he made himself master of all the land which lies between the Napetine and Scylacian bays, which was the first land, he says, to be called Italy, after Italus. And when he had possessed himself of this district and had many subjects, he immediately coveted the neighbouring peoples and brought many cities under his rule. He says further that Italus was an Oenotrian by birth.,2. But Hellanicus of Lesbos says that when Hercules was driving Geryon's cattle to Argos and was come to Italy, a calf escaped from the herd and in its flight wandered the whole length of the coast and then, swimming across the intervening strait of the sea, came into Sicily. Hercules, following the calf, inquired of the inhabitants wherever he came if anyone had seen it anywhere, and when the people of the island, who understood but little Greek and used their own speech when indicating the animal, called it vitulus (the name by which it is still known), he, in memory of the calf, called all the country it had wandered over Vitulia.,3. And it is no wonder that the name has been changed in the course of time to its present form, since many Greek names, too, have met with a similar fate. But whether, as Antiochus says, the country took this name from a ruler, which perhaps is more probable, or, as Hellanicus believes, from the bull, yet this at least is evident from both their accounts, that in Hercules' time, or a little earlier, it received this name. Before that it had been called Hesperia and Ausonia by the Greeks and Saturnia by the natives, as I have already stated. |
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12. Horace, Sermones, 2.1.34 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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13. Strabo, Geography, 5.1.1, 5.1.11 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 5.1.11. Both in Cispadana and around the Po there are some fine cities. Placentia and Cremona, situated about the middle of the country, are close to each other. Between these and Ariminum, are Parma, Mutina, and Bononia, which is near to Ravenna; amongst these are smaller cities on the route to Rome, as Acara, Regium Lepidum, Campi Macri, where a public festival is held every year, Claterna, Forum Cornelium; while Faventia and Caesena, situated near to the river Savio and the Rubicon, are adjacent to Ariminum. Ariminum, like Ravenna, is an ancient colony of the Ombri. but both of them have received also Roman colonies. Ariminum has a port and a river of the same name as itself. From Placentia to Ariminum there are 1300 stadia. About 36 miles above Placentia, towards the boundaries of the kingdom of Cottius, is the city of Ticinum, by which flows a river bearing the same name, which falls into the Po, while a little out of the route are Clastidium, Derthon, and Aquae Statiellae. But the direct route to Ocelum, along the Po and the Doria river is full of precipices, intersected by numerous other rivers, one of which is the Druentia, and is about 160 miles long. Here commence the Alpine mountains and Keltica. Near to the mountains above Luna is the city of Lucca. Some [of the people of this part of Italy] dwell in villages, nevertheless it is well populated, and furnishes the greater part of the military force, and of equites, of whom the senate is partly composed. Derthon is a considerable city, situated about half way on the road from Genoa to Placentia, which are distant 400 stadia from each other. Aquae Statiellae is on the same route. That from Placentia to Ariminum we have already described, but the sail to Ravenna down the Po requires two days and nights. A great part of Cispadana likewise was covered by marshes, through which Hannibal passed with difficulty on his march into Tyrrhenia. But Scaurus drained the plains by navigable canals from the Po to the country of the Parmesans. For the Trebia meeting the Po near Placentia, and having previously received many other rivers, is over-swollen near this place. I allude to the Scaurus who also made the Aemilian road through Pisa and Luna as far as Sabbatorum, and thence through Derthon. There is another Aemilian road, which continues the Flaminian. For Marcus Lepidus and Caius Flaminius being colleagues in the consulship, and having vanquished the Ligurians, the one made the Via Flaminia from Rome across Tyrrhenia and Ombrica as far as the territory of Ariminum, the other, the road as far as Bononia, and thence to Aquileia by the roots of the Alps, and encircling the marshes. The boundaries which separate from the rest of Italy this country, which we designate Citerior Keltica, were marked by the Apennine mountains above Tyrrhenia and the river Esino, and afterwards by the Rubicon. Both these rivers fall into the Adriatic. |
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14. Josephus Flavius, Against Apion, 2.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
| 2.6. However, it is not a very easy thing to go over this man’s discourse, nor to know plainly what he means; yet does he seem, amidst a great confusion and disorder in his falsehoods, to produce, in the first place, such things as resemble what we have examined already, and relate to the departure of our forefathers out of Egypt; 2.6. nay, when last of all Caesar had taken Alexandria, she came to that pitch of cruelty, that she declared she had some hope of preserving her affairs still, in case she could kill the Jews, though it were with her own hand; to such a degree of barbarity and perfidiousness had she arrived; and doth any one think that we cannot boast ourselves of any thing, if, as Apion says, this queen did not at a time of famine distribute wheat among us? |
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15. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, 1.5.11 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
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16. Augustine, The City of God, 2.21, 19.21 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
| 2.21. But if our adversaries do not care how foully and disgracefully the Roman republic be stained by corrupt practices, so long only as it holds together and continues in being, and if they therefore pooh-pooh the testimony of Sallust to its utterly wicked and profligate condition, what will they make of Cicero's statement, that even in his time it had become entirely extinct, and that there remained extant no Roman republic at all? He introduces Scipio (the Scipio who had destroyed Carthage) discussing the republic, at a time when already there were presentiments of its speedy ruin by that corruption which Sallust describes. In fact, at the time when the discussion took place, one of the Gracchi, who, according to Sallust, was the first great instigator of seditions, had already been put to death. His death, indeed, is mentioned in the same book. Now Scipio, at the end of the second book, says: As among the different sounds which proceed from lyres, flutes, and the human voice, there must be maintained a certain harmony which a cultivated ear cannot endure to hear disturbed or jarring, but which may be elicited in full and absolute concord by the modulation even of voices very unlike one another; so, where reason is allowed to modulate the diverse elements of the state, there is obtained a perfect concord from the upper, lower, and middle classes as from various sounds; and what musicians call harmony in singing, is concord in matters of state, which is the strictest bond and best security of any republic, and which by no ingenuity can be retained where justice has become extinct. Then, when he had expatiated somewhat more fully, and had more copiously illustrated the benefits of its presence and the ruinous effects of its absence upon a state, Pilus, one of the company present at the discussion, struck in and demanded that the question should be more thoroughly sifted, and that the subject of justice should be freely discussed for the sake of ascertaining what truth there was in the maxim which was then becoming daily more current, that the republic cannot be governed without injustice. Scipio expressed his willingness to have this maxim discussed and sifted, and gave it as his opinion that it was baseless, and that no progress could be made in discussing the republic unless it was established, not only that this maxim, that the republic cannot be governed without injustice, was false, but also that the truth is, that it cannot be governed without the most absolute justice. And the discussion of this question, being deferred till the next day, is carried on in the third book with great animation. For Pilus himself undertook to defend the position that the republic cannot be governed without injustice, at the same time being at special pains to clear himself of any real participation in that opinion. He advocated with great keenness the cause of injustice against justice, and endeavored by plausible reasons and examples to demonstrate that the former is beneficial, the latter useless, to the republic. Then, at the request of the company, L lius attempted to defend justice, and strained every nerve to prove that nothing is so hurtful to a state as injustice; and that without justice a republic can neither be governed, nor even continue to exist. When this question has been handled to the satisfaction of the company, Scipio reverts to the original thread of discourse, and repeats with commendation his own brief definition of a republic, that it is the good of the people. The people he defines as being not every assemblage or mob, but an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of law, and by a community of interests. Then he shows the use of definition in debate; and from these definitions of his own he gathers that a republic, or good of the people, then exists only when it is well and justly governed, whether by a monarch, or an aristocracy, or by the whole people. But when the monarch is unjust, or, as the Greeks say, a tyrant; or the aristocrats are unjust, and form a faction; or the people themselves are unjust, and become, as Scipio for want of a better name calls them, themselves the tyrant, then the republic is not only blemished (as had been proved the day before), but by legitimate deduction from those definitions, it altogether ceases to be. For it could not be the people's good when a tyrant factiously lorded it over the state; neither would the people be any longer a people if it were unjust, since it would no longer answer the definition of a people - an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of law, and by a community of interests. When, therefore, the Roman republic was such as Sallust described it, it was not utterly wicked and profligate, as he says, but had altogether ceased to exist, if we are to admit the reasoning of that debate maintained on the subject of the republic by its best representatives. Tully himself, too, speaking not in the person of Scipio or any one else, but uttering his own sentiments, uses the following language in the beginning of the fifth book, after quoting a line from the poet Ennius, in which he said, Rome's severe morality and her citizens are her safeguard. This verse, says Cicero, seems to me to have all the sententious truthfulness of an oracle. For neither would the citizens have availed without the morality of the community, nor would the morality of the commons without outstanding men have availed either to establish or so long to maintain in vigor so grand a republic with so wide and just an empire. Accordingly, before our day, the hereditary usages formed our foremost men, and they on their part retained the usages and institutions of their fathers. But our age, receiving the republic as a chef-d'oeuvre of another age which has already begun to grow old, has not merely neglected to restore the colors of the original, but has not even been at the pains to preserve so much as the general outline and most outstanding features. For what survives of that primitive morality which the poet called Rome's safeguard? It is so obsolete and forgotten, that, far from practising it, one does not even know it. And of the citizens what shall I say? Morality has perished through poverty of great men; a poverty for which we must not only assign a reason, but for the guilt of which we must answer as criminals charged with a capital crime. For it is through our vices, and not by any mishap, that we retain only the name of a republic, and have long since lost the reality. This is the confession of Cicero, long indeed after the death of Africanus, whom he introduced as an interlocutor in his work De Republica, but still before the coming of Christ. Yet, if the disasters he bewails had been lamented after the Christian religion had been diffused, and had begun to prevail, is there a man of our adversaries who would not have thought that they were to be imputed to the Christians? Why, then, did their gods not take steps then to prevent the decay and extinction of that republic, over the loss of which Cicero, long before Christ had come in the flesh, sings so mournful a dirge? Its admirers have need to inquire whether, even in the days of primitive men and morals, true justice flourished in it; or was it not perhaps even then, to use the casual expression of Cicero, rather a colored painting than the living reality? But, if God will, we shall consider this elsewhere. For I mean in its own place to show that - according to the definitions in which Cicero himself, using Scipio as his mouthpiece, briefly propounded what a republic is, and what a people is, and according to many testimonies, both of his own lips and of those who took part in that same debate - Rome never was a republic, because true justice had never a place in it. But accepting the more feasible definitions of a republic, I grant there was a republic of a certain kind, and certainly much better administered by the more ancient Romans than by their modern representatives. But the fact is, true justice has no existence save in that republic whose founder and ruler is Christ, if at least any choose to call this a republic; and indeed we cannot deny that it is the people's good. But if perchance this name, which has become familiar in other connections, be considered alien to our common parlance, we may at all events say that in this city is true justice; the city of which Holy Scripture says, Glorious things are said of you, O city of God. 19.21. This, then, is the place where I should fulfill the promise gave in the second book of this work, and explain, as briefly and clearly as possible, that if we are to accept the definitions laid down by Scipio in Cicero's De Republica, there never was a Roman republic; for he briefly defines a republic as the good of the people. And if this definition be true, there never was a Roman republic, for the people's good was never attained among the Romans. For the people, according to his definition, is an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right and by a community of interests. And what he means by a common acknowledgment of right he explains at large, showing that a republic cannot be administered without justice. Where, therefore, there is no true justice there can be no right. For that which is done by right is justly done, and what is unjustly done cannot be done by right. For the unjust inventions of men are neither to be considered nor spoken of as rights; for even they themselves say that right is that which flows from the fountain of justice, and deny the definition which is commonly given by those who misconceive the matter, that right is that which is useful to the stronger party. Thus, where there is not true justice there can be no assemblage of men associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and therefore there can be no people, as defined by Scipio or Cicero; and if no people, then no good of the people, but only of some promiscuous multitude unworthy of the name of people. Consequently, if the republic is the good of the people, and there is no people if it be not associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and if there is no right where there is no justice, then most certainly it follows that there is no republic where there is no justice. Further, justice is that virtue which gives every one his due. Where, then, is the justice of man, when he deserts the true God and yields himself to impure demons? Is this to give every one his due? Or is he who keeps back a piece of ground from the purchaser, and gives it to a man who has no right to it, unjust, while he who keeps back himself from the God who made him, and serves wicked spirits, is just? This same book, De Republica, advocates the cause of justice against injustice with great force and keenness. The pleading for injustice against justice was first heard, and it was asserted that without injustice a republic could neither increase nor even subsist, for it was laid down as an absolutely unassailable position that it is unjust for some men to rule and some to serve; and yet the imperial city to which the republic belongs cannot rule her provinces without having recourse to this injustice. It was replied in behalf of justice, that this ruling of the provinces is just, because servitude may be advantageous to the provincials, and is so when rightly administered - that is to say, when lawless men are prevented from doing harm. And further, as they became worse and worse so long as they were free, they will improve by subjection. To confirm this reasoning, there is added an eminent example drawn from nature: for why, it is asked, does God rule man, the soul the body, the reason the passions and other vicious parts of the soul? This example leaves no doubt that, to some, servitude is useful; and, indeed, to serve God is useful to all. And it is when the soul serves God that it exercises a right control over the body; and in the soul itself the reason must be subject to God if it is to govern as it ought the passions and other vices. Hence, when a man does not serve God, what justice can we ascribe to him, since in this case his soul cannot exercise a just control over the body, nor his reason over his vices? And if there is no justice in such an individual, certainly there can be none in a community composed of such persons. Here, therefore, there is not that common acknowledgment of right which makes an assemblage of men a people whose affairs we call a republic. And why need I speak of the advantageousness, the common participation in which, according to the definition, makes a people? For although, if you choose to regard the matter attentively, you will see that there is nothing advantageous to those who live godlessly, as every one lives who does not serve God but demons, whose wickedness you may measure by their desire to receive the worship of men though they are most impure spirits, yet what I have said of the common acknowledgment of right is enough to demonstrate that, according to the above definition, there can be no people, and therefore no republic, where there is no justice. For if they assert that in their republic the Romans did not serve unclean spirits, but good and holy gods, must we therefore again reply to this evasion, though already we have said enough, and more than enough, to expose it? He must be an uncommonly stupid, or a shamelessly contentious person, who has read through the foregoing books to this point, and can yet question whether the Romans served wicked and impure demons. But, not to speak of their character, it is written in the law of the true God, He that sacrifices unto any god save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed. Exodus 22:20 He, therefore, who uttered so menacing a commandment decreed that no worship should be given either to good or bad gods. |
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17. Macrobius, Commentary On The Dream of Scipio, 1.8.13 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
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18. Anon., 4 Ezra, 8.52, 10.51-10.56
| 8.52. because it is for you that paradise is opened, the tree of life is planted, the age to come is prepared, plenty is provided, a city is built, rest is appointed, goodness is established and wisdom perfected beforehand. 10.51. Therefore I told you to remain in the field where no house had been built 10.52. for I knew that the Most High would reveal these things to you. 10.53. Therefore I told you to go into the field where there was no foundation of any building 10.54. for no work of man's building could endure in a place where the city of the Most High was to be revealed. 10.55. Therefore do not be afraid, and do not let your heart be terrified; but go in and see the splendor and vastness of the building, as far as it is possible for your eyes to see it 10.56. and afterward you will hear as much as your ears can hear. |
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19. Papyri, P.Ups.8, 1.8
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