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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2298
Cicero, On Laws, 2.13
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

14 results
1. Homer, Odyssey, 19.178-19.179 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)

2. Pindar, Fragments, 169 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

3. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

757b. For there are two kinds of equality which, though identical in name, are often almost opposites in their practical results. The one of these any State or lawgiver is competent to apply in the assignment of honors,—namely, the equality determined by measure, weight and number,—by simply employing the lot to give even results in the distributions; but the truest and best form of equality is not an easy thing for everyone to discern. It is the judgment of Zeus, and men it never assists save in small measure, but in so far as it does assist either States or individuals
4. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

6. Cicero, On Laws, 1.17-1.19, 1.34, 1.37, 1.42, 2.11, 3.2-3.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.34 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.34. Upon the animals she bestowed sensation and motion, and an appetite or impulse to approach things wholesome and retire from things harmful. For man she amplified her gift by the addition of reason, whereby the appetites might be controlled, and alternately indulged and held in check. But the fourth and highest grade is that of beings born by nature good and wise, and endowed from the outset with the innate attributes of right reason and consistency; this must be held to be above the level of man: it is the attribute of god, that is, of the world, which must needs possess that perfect and absolute reason of which I spoke.
8. Cicero, On Duties, 1.98-1.100, 3.69 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.98. Quocirca poëtae in magna varietate personarum, etiam vitiosis quid conveniat et quid deceat, videbunt, nobis autem cum a natura constantiae, moderationis, temperantiae, verecundiae partes datae sint, cumque eadem natura doceat non neglegere, quem ad modum nos adversus homines geramus, efficitur, ut et illud, quod ad omnem honestatem pertinet, decorum quam late fusum sit, appareat et hoc, quod spectatur in uno quoque genere virtutis. Ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum. 1.99. Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum. Nam neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti. Est autem, quod differat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam et verecundiam. Iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere; in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori. His igitur expositis, quale sit id, quod decere dicimus, intellectum puto. 1.100. officium autem, quod ab eo ducitur, hanc primum habet viam, quae deducit ad convenientiam conservationemque naturae; quam si sequemur ducem, numquam aberrabimus sequemurque et id, quod acutum et perspicax natura est, et id, quod ad hominum consociationem accommodatum, et id, quod vehemens atque forte. Sed maxima vis decori in hac inest parte, de qua disputamus; neque enim solum corporis, qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accommodati sunt. 3.69. Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis. 1.98.  The poets will observe, therefore, amid a great variety of characters, what is suitable and proper for all — even for the bad. But to us Nature has assigned the rôles of steadfastness, temperance, self-control, and considerateness of others; Nature also teaches us not to be careless in our behaviour towards our fellow-men. Hence we may clearly see how wide is the application not only of that propriety which is essential to moral rectitude in general, but also of the special propriety which is displayed in each particular subdivision of virtue. For, as physical beauty with harmonious symmetry of the limbs engages the attention and delights the eye, for the very reason that all the parts combine in harmony and grace, so this propriety, which shines out in our conduct, engages the approbation of our fellow-men by the order, consistency, and self-control it imposes upon every word and deed. 1.99.  We should, therefore, in our dealings with people show what I may almost call reverence toward all men — not only toward the men who are the best, but toward others as well. For indifference to public opinion implies not merely self-sufficiency, but even total lack of principle. There is, too, a difference between justice and considerateness in one's relations to one's fellow-men. It is the function of justice not to do wrong to one's fellow-men; of considerateness, not to wound their feelings; and in this the essence of propriety is best seen. With the foregoing exposition, I think it is clear what the nature is of what we term propriety. 1.100.  Further, as to the duty which has its source in propriety, the first road on which it conducts us leads to harmony with Nature and the faithful observance of her laws. If we follow Nature as our guide, we shall never go astray, but we shall be pursuing that which is in its nature clear-sighted and penetrating (Wisdom), that which is adapted to promote and strengthen society (Justice), and that which is strong and courageous (Fortitude). But the very essence of propriety is found in the division of virtue which is now under discussion (Temperance). For it is only when they agree with Nature's laws that we should give our approval to the movements not only of the body, but still more of the spirit. 3.69.  Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship — although I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and again — which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford.
9. Cicero, Republic, 1.39.1, 3.33 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.33. Lactant. Div. Inst. 6.8.6 Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpres eius alius, nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit.
10. Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 12.20-12.21 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

12.20. 1.  Now Zaleucus was by birth a Locrian of Italy, a man of noble family, admired for his education, and a pupil of the philosopher Pythagoras. Having been accorded high favour in his native city, he was chosen lawmaker and committed to writing a thorough novel system of law, making his beginning, first of all, with the gods of the heavens.,2.  For at the outset in the introduction to his legislation as a whole he declared it to be necessary that the inhabitants of the city should first of all assume as an article of their creed that gods exist, and that, as their minds survey the heavens and its orderly scheme and arrangement, they should judge that these creations are not the result of Chance or the work of men's hands; that they should revere the gods as the cause of all that is noble and good in the life of mankind; and that they should keep the soul pure from every kind of evil, in the belief that the gods take no pleasure in either the sacrifices or costly gifts of the wicked but in the just and honourable practices of good men.,3.  And after inviting the citizens in this introduction to reverence and justice, he appended the further command that they should consider no one of their fellow citizens as an enemy with whom there can be no reconciliation, but that the quarrel be entered into with the thought that they will again come to agreement and friendship; and that the one who acts otherwise should be considered by his fellow citizens to be savage and untamed of soul. Also the magistrates were urged by him not to be wilful or arrogant, and not to render judgement out of enmity or friendship. And among his several ordices a number were added of his own devising, which showed exceptionally great wisdom. 12.21. 1.  To cite examples, whereas everywhere else wayward wives were required to pay fines, Zaleucus stopped their licentious behaviour by a cunningly devised punishment. That is, he made the following laws: a free-born woman may not be accompanied by more than one female slave, unless she is drunk; she may not leave the city during the night, unless she is planning to commit adultery; she may not wear gold jewelry or a garment with a purple border, unless she is a courtesan; and a husband may not wear a gold-studded ring or a cloak of Milesian fashion unless he is bent upon prostitution or adultery.,2.  Consequently, by the elimination, with its shameful implications, of the penalties he easily turned men aside from harmful luxury and wanton living; for no man wished to incur the sneers of his fellow citizens by acknowledging the disgraceful licentiousness.,3.  He wrote many other excellent laws, such as those on contracts and other relations of life which are the cause of strife. But it would be a long task for us to recount them and foreign to the plan of our history, and so we shall resume our account at the point where we digressed from the course of our narrative.
11. Gaius, Instiutiones, 1.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

12. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.128 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.128. For if magimity by itself alone can raise us far above everything, and if magimity is but a part of virtue, then too virtue as a whole will be sufficient in itself for well-being – despising all things that seem troublesome. Panaetius, however, and Posidonius deny that virtue is self-sufficing: on the contrary, health is necessary, and some means of living and strength.Another tenet of theirs is the perpetual exercise of virtue, as held by Cleanthes and his followers. For virtue can never be lost, and the good man is always exercising his mind, which is perfect. Again, they say that justice, as well as law and right reason, exists by nature and not by convention: so Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful.
13. Macrobius, Commentary On The Dream of Scipio, 1.8.13 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

14. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.38



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aretē/-a (virtue, excellence), in on law and justice Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 464
aristotle, and archytas Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 465
aristotle, on distributive justice Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 465
aristotle, on law and nature Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 465
augurs, augurate Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 33
charondas Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
cicero, and law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18, 21, 25
codes, justinian Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 138
codes, theodosian Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 138
diogenes laertius Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 21
dorians Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
imperium Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 33
ius antiquum, civile Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 138
ius antiquum, quiritium Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 138
justice (dikē), in on law and justice Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 465
law, civil Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 138
law (nomos), in on law and justice Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 464, 465
law (nomos) common belief of a city, as a musical genre Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
law of nature, and common law Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18
law of nature, and stoicism Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18
law of nature, and wise man Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 25
law of nature, connection to reason and god Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18, 21
law of nature, transcended written law Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 21, 25
minos Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
morality Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 25
mosaic law, for ordinary people Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18, 21, 25
music basis of education, prelude and song Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
natural law Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 33
nature, and virtue Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18
nomos—phusis opposition Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 464, 465
on law and justice (attrib. archytas), on compliance of law with nature and proportion Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 464, 465
on law and justice (attrib. archytas) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 464, 465
ontology, ontological Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
plato Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 33
pomponius Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 138
potestas Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 33
preamble, definition of, novelty of platos preambles Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
pythagoras and pythagoreans Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
quirinus Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 138
ratio Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 33
stoics/stoicism, and law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18, 21, 25
stoics/stoicism, and the sage Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 25
the twelve tables Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 138
tradition, roman religious' Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 138
vergilius Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 138
virtue, and nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18
virtue (aretê), wisdom (phronêsis, nous, sophia), privilege of the elderly Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
wise man, and law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 25
wise man, and stoics Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 25
written law, vis a vis law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 25
zaleucus Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
zeno Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 18
zeus, cave of Laks, Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws (2022) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 185
zeus, judgment of Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 465
ἀπάθεια\u200e Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 464