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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2298
Cicero, On Laws, 1.27


nanAs for our two eloquent eyes (oculi nimis arguti), do they not speak forth every impulse and passion of our souls? And that which we call expression in which we infinitely excel all the inferior animals, how marvellously it delineates all our speculations and feelings! Of this the Greeks well knew the meaning, though they had no word for it. I will not enlarge on the wonderful faculties and qualities of the rest of the body, the modulation of the voice, and the power of oratory, which is perhaps the greatest instrument of our influence over human society. These matters do not belong to the occasion of our present discourse, and I think that Scipio has already sufficiently explained them in those books of mine which you have read. As the Deity, therefore, was pleased to create man as the chief and president of all terrestrial creatures, so it is evident, without further argument, that human nature has made the greatest advances by its intrinsic energy; that nature, which without any other instruction than her own, has developed the first rude principles of the understanding, and strengthened and perfected reason to all the appliances of science and art. ATTICUS: Good heavens, my Cicero! from what a tremendous distance are you deducing the principles of justice! However, I wont hurry too eagerly to what I expect you to say on the Civil Law. But I will listen patiently, even if you spend the whole day in this kind of discourse, for assuredly these are grander topics which you introduce as a preamble than those to which they prepare the way. MARCUS: You may well describe these topics as grand, which we are now briefly discussing. For of all the questions on which our philosophers argue, there is none which it is more important thoroughly to understand than this, that man is born for justice, and that law and equity are not a mere establishment of opinion, but an institution of nature. This truth will become still more apparent if we investigate the nature of human association and society. There is no one thing more like to another, more homogeneous and analogous, than man is to man. And if the corruption of customs, and the variation of opinions, had not induced an imbecility of minds, and turned them aside from the course of nature, no one would more nearly resemble himself than all men would resemble all men. Therefore whatever definition we give of man, it must include the whole human race. And this is a good argument, that no portion of mankind can be heterogeneous or dissimilar from the rest; because, if this were the case, one definition could not include all men. In fact, reason, which alone gives us so many advantages over beasts, by means of which we conjecture, argue, refute, discourse, and accomplish and conclude our designs, is assuredly common to all men; for the faculty of acquiring knowledge is similar in all human minds, though the knowledge itself may be endlessly diversified. By the same senses we all perceive the same objects, and that which strikes the sensibilities of the few, cannot be indifferent to those of the many. Those first rude elements of intelligence which, as I before observed, are the earliest developments of thought, are similarly exhibited by all men; and that faculty of speech which is the soulʼs interpreter, agrees in the ideas it conveys, though it may differ in the syllables that express them. And therefore there exists not a man in any nation, who, adopting his true nature for his true guide, may not improve in virtue. Nor is this resemblance which all men bear to each other remarkable in those things only which accord to right reason. For it is scarcely less conspicuous in those corrupt practices by which right reason is most cruelly violated. For all men alike are captivated by voluptuousness, which is in reality no better than disgraceful vice, though it may seem to bear some natural relations to goodness; for by its delicious delicacy and luxury it insinuates error into the mind, and leads us to cultivate it as something salutary, forgetful of its poisonous qualities. An error, scarcely less universal, induces us to shun death, as if it were annihilation; and to cling to life, because it keeps us in our present stage of existence, which is perhaps rather a misfortune than a desideratum. Thus, likewise, we erroneously consider pain as one of the greatest evils, not only on account of its present asperity, but also because it seems the precursor of mortality. Another common delusion obtains, which induces all mankind to associate renown with honesty, as if we are necessarily happy when we are renowned, and miserable when we happen to be inglorious. In short, our minds are all similarly susceptible of inquietudes, joys, desires and fears; and if opinions are not the same in all men, it does not follow, for example, that the people of Egypt who deify dogs and cats, do not labour under superstition in the same way as other nations, though they may differ from them in the forms of its manifestation. But in nothing is the uniformity of human nature more conspicuous than in its respect for virtue. What nation is there, in which kindness, benignity, gratitude, and mindfulness of benefits are not recommended? What nation in which arrogance, malice, cruelty, and unthankfulness, are not reprobated and detested! This uniformity of opinions, invincibly demonstrates that mankind was intended to compose one fraternal association. And to affect this, the faculty of reason must be improved till it instructs us in all the arts of well-living. If what I have said meets your approbation, I will proceed; or if any of my argument appears defective, I will endeavour to explain it. ATTICUS: We see nothing to object to, if I may reply for both of us. MARCUS: It follows, then, in the line of our argument, that nature made us just that we might participate our goods with each other, and supply each others’ wants. You observe in this discussion whenever I speak of nature, I mean nature in its genuine purity, and not in the corrupt state which is displayed by the depravity of evil custom, which is so great, that the natural and innate flame of virtue is often almost extinguished and stifled by the antagonist vices, which are accumulated around it. But if our true nature would assert her rights, and teach men the noble lesson of the poet, who says, "I am a man, therefore no human interest can be indifferent to me," -- then would justice be administered equally by all and to all. For nature hath not merely given us reason, but right reason, and consequently that law, which is nothing else than right reason enjoining what is good, and forbidding what is evil. Now if nature hath given us law, she hath also given us justice, -- for as she has bestowed reason on all, she has equally bestowed the sense of justice on all. And therefore did Socrates deservedly execrate the man who first drew a distinction between the law of nature and the law of morals, for he justly conceived that this error is the source of most human vices. It is to this essential union between the naturally honorable, and the politically expedient, that this sentence of Pythagoras refers: -- "Love is universal: let its benefits be universal likewise.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

35 results
1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.3 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

1.3. וּלְכָל־חַיַּת הָאָרֶץ וּלְכָל־עוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּלְכֹל רוֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר־בּוֹ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה אֶת־כָּל־יֶרֶק עֵשֶׂב לְאָכְלָה וַיְהִי־כֵן׃ 1.3. וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יְהִי אוֹר וַיְהִי־אוֹר׃ 1.3. And God said: ‘Let there be light.’ And there was light."
2. Hebrew Bible, Psalms, 33.9, 148.5 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

33.9. כִּי הוּא אָמַר וַיֶּהִי הוּא־צִוָּה וַיַּעֲמֹד׃ 148.5. יְהַלְלוּ אֶת־שֵׁם יְהוָה כִּי הוּא צִוָּה וְנִבְרָאוּ׃ 33.9. For He spoke, and it was; He commanded, and it stood." 148.5. Let them praise the name of the LORD; For He commanded, and they were created."
3. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

700b. one class of song was that of prayers to the gods, which bore the name of hymns ; contrasted with this was another class, best called dirges ; paeans formed another; and yet another was the dithyramb, named, I fancy, after Dionysus. Nomes also were so called as being a distinct class of song; and these were further described as citharoedic nomes. So these and other kinds being classified and fixed, it was forbidden to set one kind of words to a different class of tune.
4. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

246a. that that which moves itself is nothing else than the soul,—then the soul would necessarily be ungenerated and immortal. Concerning the immortality of the soul this is enough; but about its form we must speak in the following manner. To tell what it really is would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure; let us therefore speak in that way. We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all good and
5. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

28a. and has no Becoming? And what is that which is Becoming always and never is Existent? Now the one of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, since it is ever uniformly existent; whereas the other is an object of opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes and perishes and is never really existent. Again, everything which becomes must of necessity become owing to some Cause; for without a cause it is impossible for anything to attain becoming. But when the artificer of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using a model of this kind, that object, executed in this way, must of necessity
6. Xenophon, Memoirs, 2.1.21-2.1.34 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2.1.21. Aye, and Prodicus the wise expresses himself to the like effect concerning Virtue in the essay On Heracles that he recites to throngs of listeners. This, so far as I remember, is how he puts it: When Heracles was passing from boyhood to youth’s estate, wherein the young, now becoming their own masters, show whether they will approach life by the path of virtue or the path of vice, he went out into a quiet place 2.1.22. and sat pondering which road to take. And there appeared two women of great stature making towards him. The one was fair to see and of high bearing; and her limbs were adorned with purity, her eyes with modesty; sober was her figure, and her robe was white. The other was plump and soft, with high feeding. Her face was made up to heighten its natural white and pink, her figure to exaggerate her height. Open-eyed was she; and dressed so as to disclose all her charms. Now she eyed herself; anon looked whether any noticed her; and often stole a glance at her own shadow. 2.1.23. When they drew nigh to Heracles, the first pursued the even tenor of her way: but the other, all eager to outdo her, ran to meet him, crying: Heracles, I see that you are in doubt which path to take towards life. Make me your friend; follow me, and I will lead you along the pleasantest and easiest road. You shall taste all the sweets of life; and hardship you shall never know. 2.1.24. First, of wars and worries you shall not think, but shall ever be considering what choice food or drink you can find, what sight or sound will delight you, what touch or perfume; what tender love can give you most joy, what bed the softest slumbers; and how to come by all these pleasures with least trouble. 2.1.25. And should there arise misgiving that lack of means may stint your enjoyments, never fear that I may lead you into winning them by toil and anguish of body and soul. Nay; you shall have the fruits of others’ toil, and refrain from nothing that can bring you gain. For to my companions I give authority to pluck advantage where they will. 2.1.26. Now when Heracles heard this, he asked, Lady, pray what is your name? My friends call me Happiness, she said, but among those that hate me I am nicknamed Vice. 2.1.27. Meantime the other had drawn near, and she said: I, too, am come to you, Heracles: I know your parents and I have taken note of your character during the time of your education. Therefore I hope that, if you take the road that leads to me, you will turn out a right good doer of high and noble deeds, and I shall be yet more highly honoured and more illustrious for the blessings I bestow. But I will not deceive you by a pleasant prelude: I will rather tell you truly the things that are, as the gods have ordained them. 2.1.28. For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing to man without toil and effort. If you want the favour of the gods, you must worship the gods: if you desire the love of friends, you must do good to your friends: if you covet honour from a city, you must aid that city: if you are fain to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you must strive to do good to Hellas : if you want land to yield you fruits in abundance, you must cultivate that land: if you are resolved to get wealth from flocks, you must care for those flocks: if you essay to grow great through war and want power to liberate your friends and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practise their right use: and if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat. 2.1.29. And Vice, as Prodicus tells, answered and said: Heracles, mark you how hard and long is that road to joy, of which this woman tells? but I will lead you by a short and easy road to happiness. And Virtue said: 2.1.30. What good thing is thine, poor wretch, or what pleasant thing dost thou know, if thou wilt do nought to win them? Thou dost not even tarry for the desire of pleasant things, but fillest thyself with all things before thou desirest them, eating before thou art hungry, drinking before thou art thirsty, getting thee cooks, to give zest to eating, buying thee costly wines and running to and fro in search of snow in summer, to give zest to drinking; to soothe thy slumbers it is not enough for thee to buy soft coverlets, but thou must have frames for thy beds. For not toil, but the tedium of having nothing to do, makes thee long for sleep. Thou dost rouse lust by many a trick, when there is no need, using men as women: thus thou trainest thy friends, waxing wanton by night, consuming in sleep the best hours of day. 2.1.31. Immortal art thou, yet the outcast of the gods, the scorn of good men. Praise, sweetest of all things to hear, thou hearest not: the sweetest of all sights thou beholdest not, for never yet hast thou beheld a good work wrought by thyself. Who will believe what thou dost say? who will grant what thou dost ask? Or what sane man will dare join thy throng? While thy votaries are young their bodies are weak, when they wax old, their souls are without sense; idle and sleek they thrive in youth, withered and weary they journey through old age, and their past deeds bring them shame, their present deeds distress. Pleasure they ran through in their youth: hardship they laid up for their old age. 2.1.32. But I company with gods and good men, and no fair deed of god or man is done without my aid. I am first in honour among the gods and among men that are akin to me: to craftsmen a beloved fellow-worker, to masters a faithful guardian of the house, to servants a kindly protector: good helpmate in the toils of peace, staunch ally in the deeds of war, best partner in friendship. 2.1.33. To my friends meat and drink bring sweet and simple enjoyment: for they wait till they crave them. And a sweeter sleep falls on them than on idle folk: they are not vexed at awaking from it, nor for its sake do they neglect to do their duties. The young rejoice to win the praise of the old; the elders are glad to be honoured by the young; with joy they recall their deeds past, and their present well-doing is joy to them, for through me they are dear to the gods, lovely to friends, precious to their native land. And when comes the appointed end, they lie not forgotten and dishonoured, but live on, sung and remembered for all time. O Heracles, thou son of goodly parents, if thou wilt labour earnestly on this wise, thou mayest have for thine own the most blessed happiness. 2.1.34. Such, in outline, is Prodicus’ story of the training of Heracles by Virtue; only he has clothed the thoughts in even finer phrases than I have done now. But anyhow, Aristippus, it were well that you should think on these things and try to show some regard for the life that lies before you.
7. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.49, 3.24 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.49. philosophus nobilis, a quo non solum Graecia et Italia, sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est, honestum quid sit, si id non sit non sit Mdv. non est in voluptate, negat se intellegere, nisi forte illud, quod multitudinis rumore rumore mi|nore R timore NV laudetur. ego autem hoc etiam turpe esse saepe iudico et, si quando turpe non sit, tum esse non turpe, cum id a multitudine laudetur, quod sit ipsum per se rectum atque laudabile, non ob eam causam tamen tamen non ob eam causam BE illud dici esse honestum, honestum esse BE quia laudetur a multis, sed quia tale sit, ut, vel si ignorarent id homines, vel si obmutuissent, sua tamen pulchritudine esset specieque laudabile. itaque idem natura victus, cui obsisti non potest, dicit alio loco id, quod a te etiam paulo ante paulo ante ante paulo E ante populo B dictum est, non posse iucunde vivi nisi etiam honeste. 3.24. ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut ut arte N arte ut V in ipsa insit, insit ut sit N 1 ut insit N 2 non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. et tamen est etiam aliqua aliqua Brem. alia (est alia etiam N) cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant katorqw/mata, omnes numeros virtutis continent. sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit. 2.49.  Do you realize how vast a difference of opinion this is? Here is a famous philosopher, whose influence has spread not only over Greece and Italy but throughout all barbarian lands as well, protesting that he cannot understand what Moral Worth is, if it does not consist in pleasure; unless indeed it be that which wins the approval and applause of the multitude. For my part I hold that what is popular is often positively base, and that, if ever it is not base, this is only when the multitude happens to applaud something that is right and praiseworthy in and for itself; which even so is not called 'moral' (honourable) because it is widely applauded, but because it is of such a nature that even if men were unaware of its existence, or never spoke of it, it would still be worthy of praise for its own beauty and loveliness. Hence Epicurus is compelled by the irresistible force of instinct to say in another passage what you also said just now, that it is impossible to live pleasantly without also living morally (honourably). 3.24.  For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a certain particular part or dance, so life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as 'conformable' and suitable. In fact we do not consider Wisdom to be like seamanship or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and of dancing just mentioned; its End, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it. At the same time there is also another point which marks a dissimilarity between Wisdom and these arts as well. In the latter a movement perfectly executed nevertheless does not involve all the various motions which together constitute the subject matter of the art; whereas in the sphere of conduct, what we may call, if you approve, 'right actions,' or 'rightly performed actions,' in Stoic phraseology katorthōmata, contain all the factors of virtue. For Wisdom alone is entirely self-contained, which is not the case with the other arts.
8. Cicero, On Laws, 1.18-1.26, 1.28-1.48, 1.59, 2.4, 2.15-2.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

9. Cicero, On Duties, 1.65, 1.118 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.65. Fortes igitur et magimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri; etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam. 1.118. Nam quodHerculem Prodicus dicit, ut est apud Xenophontem, cum primum pubesceret, quod tempus a natura ad deligendum, quam quisque viam vivendi sit ingressurus, datum est, exisse in solitudinem atque ibi sedentem diu secum multumque dubitasse, cum duas cerneret vias, unam Voluptatis, alteram Virtutis, utram ingredi melius esset, hoc Herculi Iovis satu edito potuit fortasse contingere, nobis non item, qui imitamur, quos cuique visum est, atque ad eorum studia institutaque impellimur; plerumque autem parentium praeceptis imbuti ad eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur; alii multitudinis iudicio feruntur, quaeque maiori parti pulcherrima videntur, ea maxime exoptant; non nulli tamen sive felicitate quadam sive bonitate naturae sine parentium disciplina rectam vitae secuti sunt viam. 1.65.  So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which Nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for glory as a reward for his achievements. 1.118.  For we cannot all have the experience of Hercules, as we find it in the words of Prodicus in Xenophon; "When Hercules was just coming into youth's estate (the time which Nature has appointed unto every man for choosing the path of life on which he would enter), he went out into a desert place. And as he saw two paths, the path of Pleasure and the path of Virtue, he sat down and debated long and earnestly which one it were better for him to take." This might, perhaps, happen to a Hercules, "scion of the seed of Jove"; but it cannot well happen to us; for we copy each the model he fancies, and we are constrained to adopt their pursuits and vocations. But usually, we are so imbued with the teachings of our parents, that we fall irresistibly into their manners and customs. Others drift with the current of popular opinion and make especial choice of those callings which the majority find most attractive. Some, however, as the result either of some happy fortune or of natural ability, enter upon the right path of life, without parental guidance.
10. Cicero, Republic, 1.1, 1.4-1.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.1. im petu liberavissent, nec C. Duelius, A. Atilius, L. Metellus terrore Karthaginis, non duo Scipiones oriens incendium belli Punici secundi sanguine suo restinxissent, nec id excitatum maioribus copiis aut Q. Maximus enervavisset aut M. Marcellus contudisset aut a portis huius urbis avolsum P. Africanus compulisset intra hostium moenia. M. vero Catoni, homini ignoto et novo, quo omnes, qui isdem rebus studemus, quasi exemplari ad industriam virtutemque ducimur, certe licuit Tusculi se in otio delectare salubri et propinquo loco. Sed homo demens, ut isti putant, cum cogeret eum necessitas nulla, in his undis et tempestatibus ad summam senectutem maluit iactari quam in illa tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime vivere. Omitto innumerabilis viros, quorum singuli saluti huic civitati fuerunt, et quia sunt haud procul ab aetatis huius memoria, commemorare eos desino, ne quis se aut suorum aliquem praetermissum queratur. Unum hoc definio, tantam esse necessitatem virtutis generi hominum a natura tantumque amorem ad communem salutem defendendam datum, ut ea vis omnia blandimenta voluptatis otiique vicerit. 1.1. Plin. Nat. praef. 7 nec docti/ssimis. †Manium Persium haec le/gere nolo, Iu/nium Congu/m volo. 1.4. His rationibus tam certis tamque inlustribus opponuntur ab iis, qui contra disputant, primum labores, qui sint re publica defendenda sustinendi, leve sane inpedimentum vigilanti et industrio, neque solum in tantis rebus, sed etiam in mediocribus vel studiis vel officiis vel vero etiam negotiis contemnendum. Adiunguntur pericula vitae, turpisque ab his formido mortis fortibus viris opponitur, quibus magis id miserum videri solet, natura se consumi et senectute, quam sibi dari tempus, ut possint eam vitam, quae tamen esset reddenda naturae, pro patria potissimum reddere. Illo vero se loco copiosos et disertos putant, cum calamitates clarissimorum virorum iniuriasque iis ab ingratis inpositas civibus colligunt. 1.4. Non. p. 276M Cognoscere mehercule, inquit, consuetudinem istam et studium sermonis. 1.5. Hinc enim illa et apud Graecos exempla, Miltiadem, victorem domitoremque Persarum, nondum sanatis volneribus iis, quae corpore adverso in clarissima victoria accepisset, vitam ex hostium telis servatam in civium vinclis profudisse, et Themistoclem patria, quam liberavisset, pulsum atque proterritum non in Graeciae portus per se servatos, sed in barbariae sinus confugisse, quam adflixerat; nec vero levitatis Atheniensium crudelitatisque in amplissimos civis exempla deficiunt; quae nata et frequentata apud illos etiam in gravissumam civitatem nostram dicuntur redundasse; 1.5. Lactant. Div. Inst. 3.16.5 Profecto omnis istorum disputatio, quamquam uberrimos fontes virtutis et scientiae continet, tamen collata cum eorum actis perfectisque rebus vereor ne non tantum videatur attulisse negotii hominibus, quantam oblectationem. 1.6. nam vel exilium Camilli vel offensio commemoratur Ahalae vel invidia Nasicae vel expulsio Laenatis vel Opimii damnatio vel fuga Metelli vel acerbissima C. Marii clades principum que caedes vel eorum multorum pestes, quae paulo post secutae sunt. Nec vero iam meo nomine abstinent et, credo, quia nostro consilio ac periculo sese in illa vita atque otio conservatos putant, gravius etiam de nobis queruntur et amantius. Sed haud facile dixerim, cur, cum ipsi discendi aut visendi causa maria tramittant 1.6. Arusianus Messius GL 7.457K A qua isti avocabant. 1.7. salvam esse consulatu abiens in contione populo Romano idem iurante iuravissem, facile iniuriarum omnium compensarem curam et molestiam. Quamquam nostri casus plus honoris habuerunt quam laboris neque tantum molestiae, quantum gloriae, maioremque laetitiam ex desiderio bonorum percepimus quam ex laetitia improborum dolorem. Sed si aliter, ut dixi, accidisset, qui possem queri? cum mihi nihil inproviso nec gravius, quam exspectavissem, pro tantis meis factis evenisset. Is enim fueram, cui cum liceret aut maiores ex otio fructus capere quam ceteris propter variam suavitatem studiorum, in quibus a pueritia vixeram, aut si quid accideret acerbius universis, non praecipuam, sed parem cum ceteris fortunae condicionem subire, non dubitaverim me gravissimis tempestatibus ac paene fulminibus ipsis obvium ferre conservandorum civium causa meisque propriis periculis parere commune reliquis otium.
11. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.109-1.110, 3.2-3.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.109. quantum famaeque V (ae in r. V c ) autem consuetudini famaeque dandum sit, id curent vivi, sed ita, ut intellegant nihil id id ss. G 1 ad mortuos pertinere. Sed profecto mors tum aequissimo animo oppetitur, cum suis se laudibus vita occidens consolari potest. nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis virtutis -utis in r. V c perfectae perfecto perfecto exp. V 2 functus est munere. multa mihi ipsi ad mortem tempestiva fuerunt. quam quam Dav. quae (idem error p. 274, 16 saep.) utinam potuissem obire! nihil enim iam adquirebatur, cumulata erant officia vitae, cum fortuna fortunae K 2 B bella restabant. quare si ipsa ratio minus perficiat, perficiet V 2 ut mortem neglegere possimus, at vita acta perficiat, ut satis superque vixisse videamur. videamus V 1 quamquam enim en im V (si et ... 2 ) sensus abierit, tamen suis suis Lb. (cf.p.253,9) summis et propriis bonis laudis et gloriae, quamvis non sentiant, mortui non carent. etsi enim nihil habet habe t G( eras. n) in se gloria cur expetatur, expectatur X (c exp. in V) vir tutē V ( ss. 2? ) tamen virtutem tamquam umbra sequitur. sequatur V 2? 1.110. verum suppl. Po. (obl. Bitschofsky, Berl. ph. Woch. 1913,173) ante verum quod pro adi. habent add. et Bentl. igitur Sey multitudinis iudicium de bonis bonum si quando est, magis laudandum est quam illi ob eam rem beati. non possum autem dicere, quoquo quo V 1 ( add. c ) modo hoc accipietur, Lycurgum Solonem legum et publicae publicę V (-ce K publi G 1 ) disciplinae carere gloria, Themistoclem Epaminondam et epam. V 2 bellicae virtutis. ante enim Salamina salamina Man. salaminam cf. We. salamini GK 1 (i add. 2 ) V ipsam Neptunus obruet quam Salaminii tropaei trop hi G 1 K ( add. 2 ) trop ei m. V ( ss. 2 ) memoriam, priusque e V 2 om. X e Boeotia bootia X (boetia K 2 V 2 B) Leuctra leuctrae V 2 leuctrha K 1 R 1 tollentur quam quam K quae GRV 1 ( supra ae add. V rec ) pugnae Leuctricae gloria. multo autem tardius fama deseret desseret GV 1 Curium Fabricium Calatinum, duo Scipiones duo duos V rec Africanos, Maximum Marcellum Paulum, Catonem Laelium, innumerabilis alios; quorum similitudinem aliquam qui arripuerit, non eam fama populari, sed vera bonorum laude metiens, fidenti animo, anima G si ita res feret, res feret V 2 s Lact. refert X gradietur ad mortem; in qua aut summum bonum aut nullum malum esse cognovimus. fidenti...24 cognovimus Lact. inst. 7, 10, 9 secundis vero suis rebus volet etiam mori; non enim tam tam add. G 1 cumulus bonorum iucundus esse potest quam molesta decessio. hanc sententiam significare videtur Laconis illa vox, qui, cum Rhodius Diagoras, Olympionices olimp. X (10 solus V) nobilis, uno die duo suos filios victores Olympiae vidisset, accessit ad senem et gratulatus: 3.2. Quodsi talis nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri et perspicere eademque optima duce cursum vitae conficere possemus, haut haut V 2 aut GK 1 RV 1 haud K 2 B s erat sane quod quisquam rationem ac doctrinam rationem ac doctrinam s ratione ac doctrina X rationedẽ V 2 hac pro ac G 1 et Gr.?) requireret. requiret G 1 nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravati depravati V 1? e corr. B s depravatis X sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina semita G innata virtutum, quae si adolescere adholescere G 1 adol. sed o in r. V 1 liceret, licet in liceret corr. R c licetret G 1 ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. nunc autem, simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate et in summa opinionum perversitate versamur, ut paene cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur. cum vero parentibus redditi, dein reddit idem G reddit idemr R ( et r = require al.m. ) redditidē V 1 (redditi dein V 2 sec. Str. ) redditi idem HK ( demŭ ss. 2 ) redditi demum Gr.(?)B magistris traditi sumus, tum tum ... 9 cedat Non. 416, 32 ita variis imbuimur inb. KR erroribus, ut vanitati veritas et opinioni opinio G 1 confirmatae confirmatae s Non. confirmata X natura naturae K ipsa cedat. 3.3. accedunt etiam poëtae, qui cum magnam speciem doctrinae sapientiaeque prae se tulerunt, audiuntur leguntur ediscuntur et inhaerescunt penitus in mentibus. cum vero eodem quasi maxumus quidam quidem K 1 R 1 H magister populus accessit accessit V c ( cf. rep. 4,9 ) om. X (accedit ante eodem add. multi s ) atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, tum plane inficimur opinionum pravitate a naturaque desciscimus, dessciscimus KR 1 ut nobis optime naturae vim vidisse naturae vim vidisse Mdv. ad fin. 3,62 naturam invidisse videantur, qui nihil melius homini, nihil magis expetendum, nihil praestantius honoribus, imperiis, populari gloria iudicaverunt. ad ad at K quam fertur optumus quisque veramque illam honestatem expetens, expe tens V quam unam natura maxime anquirit, unam s una anquirit Mos. inquirit in summa iitate versatur consectaturque nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis, virtutis del. Bentl. gloriae ( ex gloria V 2 ) del. Bai. sed adumbratam imaginem gloriae. est enim gloria solida quaedam res et expressa, non adumbrata; ea est consentiens laus bonorum, incorrupta et ante incorrupta add. V c vox bene iudicantium de excellenti excellenti ex -te V 1 excellente rell. ( ft. recte cf. de orat. 2, 85 fr. ap. Char. GL. I p. 138, 13 ) virtute, ea virtuti resonat tamquam imago; gloriae post imago add. X exp. V 1 quae quia recte factorum plerumque comes est, non est non est ea H est in r. V c bonis viris repudianda. repudienda in -anda corr. K 1 V 1 3.4. illa autem, quae se eius imitatricem esse volt, uult R e corr. H temeraria atque inconsiderata et plerumque peccatorum vitiorumque laudatrix, fama popularis, simulatione honestatis formam forme G 1 eius pulchritudinemque corrumpit. qua caecitate homines, cum quaedam etiam praeclara cuperent eaque que om. H nescirent nec ubi nec qualia essent, funditus alii everterunt everterent X corr. K 2 R c V 1? suas civitates, alii ipsi occiderunt. atque hi quidem optuma petentes non tam voluntate quam cursus errore falluntur. quid? qui quid qui K c R 2 V 1? e corr. quid- que GR 1 V 1 quiqui K 1 pecuniae cupiditate, qui voluptatum libidine feruntur, quid...12 feruntur om. H quorumque ita perturbantur animi, ut non multum absint ab insania, quod insipientibus contingit contigit G 1 omnibus, quod 14 omnibus del. Ba. is is H his rell. nullane ne om. G 1 est adhibenda curatio? utrum quod minus noceant animi aegrotationes quam corporis, an quod corpora curari possint, animorum medicina nulla sit?
12. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 120 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

120. Before now, indeed, cities, and countries, and peoples, and nations of the earth, have enjoyed the greatest happiness and prosperity in consequence of the virtue and prudence of the individual; especially so when, in addition to a good disposition and wisdom, God has also given him irresistible power, as he may have given to a musician or to any artist the proper instruments for music, or for carrying out any other art, or as wood is supplied as a material for fire;
13. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 18, 17 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

17. But that world which consists of ideas, it were impious in any degree to attempt to describe or even to imagine: but how it was created, we shall know if we take for our guide a certain image of the things which exist among us. When any city is founded through the exceeding ambition of some king or leader who lays claim to absolute authority, and is at the same time a man of brilliant imagination, eager to display his good fortune, then it happens at times that some man coming up who, from his education, is skilful in architecture, and he, seeing the advantageous character and beauty of the situation, first of all sketches out in his own mind nearly all the parts of the city which is about to be completed--the temples, the gymnasia, the prytanea, and markets, the harbour, the docks, the streets, the arrangement of the walls, the situations of the dwelling houses, and of the public and other buildings.
14. Clement of Rome, 2 Clement, 1.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

1.8. ἐκάλεσεν γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ὄντας καὶ ἠθέλησεν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἶναι ἡμᾶς.
15. Ignatius, To The Smyrnaeans, 1.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

16. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 15.38 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

15.38. But God gives it a body even as it pleased him, and to eachseed a body of its own.
17. New Testament, Romans, 8.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

8.6. For the mind of the flesh is death, but the mind of the Spirit is life and peace;
18. New Testament, Luke, 22.42 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

22.42. saying, "Father, if you are willing, remove this cup from me. Nevertheless, not my will, but yours, be done.
19. New Testament, Mark, 14.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

14.36. He said, "Abba, Father, all things are possible to you. Please remove this cup from me. However, not what I desire, but what you desire.
20. New Testament, Matthew, 26.39 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

26.39. He went forward a little, fell on his face, and prayed, saying, "My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass away from me; nevertheless, not what I desire, but what you desire.
21. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 2.27 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

22. Plutarch, On Fate, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

573b. yet some things conform to providence (some to one, some to another), some to fate. And whereas fate most certainly conforms to providence, providence most certainly does not conform to fate (here it is to be understood that we are speaking of the primary and highest providence): for what is said to "conform to" a thing is posterior to that, whatever it may be, to which it is said to conform (for example, "what conforms to law" is posterior to law and "what conforms to nature" to nature); thus "what conforms to fate" is younger than fate, while the highest providence is eldest of all, save the one whose will or intellection or both it is, and it is that, as has been previously stated, of the Father and Artisan of all things.
23. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 11.3.66 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

11.3.66.  For we can indicate our will not merely by a gesture of the hands, but also with a nod from the head: signs take the place of language in the dumb, and the movements of the dance are frequently full of meaning, and appeal to the emotions without any aid from words. The temper of the mind can be inferred from the glance and gait, and even speechless animals show anger, joy, or the desire to please by means of the eye and other physical indications.
24. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 120.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

25. Silius Italicus, Punica, 4.454-4.471, 13.391-13.392, 15.18-15.31 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

26. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 10.4 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

27. Clement of Alexandria, Excerpts From Theodotus, 7.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

28. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.12.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

29. Theophilus, To Autolycus, 2.22 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.22. You will say, then, to me: You said that God ought not to be contained in a place, and how do you now say that He walked in Paradise? Hear what I say. The God and Father, indeed, of all cannot be contained, and is not found in a place, for there is no place of His rest; but His Word, through whom He made all things, being His power and His wisdom, assuming the person of the Father and Lord of all, went to the garden in the person of God, and conversed with Adam. For the divine writing itself teaches us that Adam said that he had heard the voice. But what else is this voice but the Word of God, who is also His Son? Not as the poets and writers of myths talk of the sons of gods begotten from intercourse [with women], but as truth expounds, the Word, that always exists, residing within the heart of God. For before anything came into being He had Him as a counsellor, being His own mind and thought. But when God wished to make all that He determined on, He begot this Word, uttered, the first-born of all creation, not Himself being emptied of the Word [Reason], but having begotten Reason, and always conversing with His Reason. And hence the holy writings teach us, and all the spirit-bearing [inspired] men, one of whom, John, says, In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, John 1:1 showing that at first God was alone, and the Word in Him. Then he says, The Word was God; all things came into existence through Him; and apart from Him not one thing came into existence. The Word, then, being God, and being naturally produced from God, whenever the Father of the universe wills, He sends Him to any place; and He, coming, is both heard and seen, being sent by Him, and is found in a place.
30. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.147, 7.175 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.147. The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil, taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes. 7.175. Antiquities.of the Gods.of Giants.of Marriage.On Homer.of Duty, three books.of Good Counsel.of Gratitude.An Exhortation.of the Virtues.of Natural Ability.of Gorgippus.of Envy.of Love.of Freedom.The Art of Love.of Honour.of Fame.The Statesman.of Deliberation.of Laws.of Litigation.of Education.of Logic, three books.of the End.of Beauty.of Conduct.of Knowledge.of Kingship.of Friendship.On the Banquet.On the Thesis that Virtue is the same in Man and in Woman.On the Wise Man turning Sophist.of Usages.Lectures, two books.of Pleasure.On Properties.On Insoluble Problems.of Dialectic.of Moods or Tropes.of Predicates.This, then, is the list of his works.
31. Nag Hammadi, A Valentinian Exposition, 22.34-22.36, 24.26-24.28 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

32. Nag Hammadi, The Gospel of Truth, 16.35, 37.15-37.17 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

33. Nag Hammadi, The Tripartite Tractate, 118.33-118.34, 120.7, 121.20, 130.26 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

34. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None

35. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 2.1021



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
action, appropriate actions (kathekonta) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
action, right actions (katorthomata) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
aeons Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
agents, definition of Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 15
all, the Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
animals Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 15
appropriation Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 127
assent homologia Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
atticus Iricinschi et al., Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels (2013) 114
augustine of hippo Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 159
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
body Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119
brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
choice will Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119, 130
church Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
cicero, on etymology of lex/nomos Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
cicero, on honor and glory Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
cicero Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248; Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 15
cognitive theory Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119, 130
community Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 66
concepts, formation of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
corruption, sources on Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
cosmogony Iricinschi et al., Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels (2013) 114
cosmology, cosmogony Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119, 130
cult images of the gods Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 77
de re publica Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 159
decreta Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 127
determinism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119, 130
distributive justice Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
emotions, as contumacious Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
father, the Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119, 130
free will Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119, 130
gods/goddesses, intuitions about Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 15
good, the Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119
hannibal Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
hercules Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
honor Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
honour Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 159
human nature, innate orientations Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
human nature, intellectual and moral development Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
indifferents Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 127
intuition Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 15
jesus christ, savior, and son Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119
jews hebrew Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
law (nomos), in on law and justice Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
matter (material substance/existence) Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
natural law Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 127
on law and justice (attrib. archytas), on compliance of law with nature and proportion Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
on law and justice (attrib. archytas), on rulers Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
on law and justice (attrib. archytas) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
paris, judgment of Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
paul, apostle Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119
paul Iricinschi et al., Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels (2013) 114
philo of alexandria Iricinschi et al., Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels (2013) 114
philosophers Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119
platonism Iricinschi et al., Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels (2013) 114
pleroma Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
pneumatic humans/powers Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
proairesis\u2003 Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
prodicus Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
psychic humans/powers Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
punic wars, second Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
raphael Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
rationality, and human nature Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
rulers, in on law and justice Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
rules Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 127
savior jesus, christ, and son Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 130
scipio africanus, imitatio of alexander the great by Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
scipio africanus, meeting with virtus and voluptas Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
scipio the elder, father of africanus Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
self-determination free will Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119
silius italicus, and cicero Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
silius italicus, and ennius Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
silius italicus, and homer Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
silius italicus, and lucretius Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
silius italicus, and the tradition on kingship Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
silius italicus, nekyia in Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
spirit pneuma Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119
stoicism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 119
temple buildings' Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 77
underworld Augoustakis, Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past (2014) 316
valentinians Iricinschi et al., Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels (2013) 114
virtue, starting points toward (aphormai) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
zeus, as νόμιος\u200e and νεμήιος\u200e Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483