Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2298
Cicero, On Laws, 1.18-1.48
NaN
NaN


nanQUINTUS: By thus ascending to first principles, the order of our discourse will be more methodical, so as to conduct us by agreeable gradations to the practical bearings of the subject. MARCUS: You wish, then, that we should seek for justice in its native source, which being discovered, we shall afterwards be able to speak with more authority and precision respecting our civil laws, that come home to the affairs of our citizens? QUINTUS: Such is the course I would advise. ATTICUS: I also subscribe to your brotherʼs opinion. MARCUS: Well then, I shall endeavour to describe a system of Laws adapted to that Commonwealth, which Scipio declares to be most desirable in those Six Books which I have written under that title. All our laws, therefore, are to be accomodated to that mixed kind of political government there recommended. We shall also treat of the general principles of morals and manners, which appear most appropriate to such a constitution of society, but without descending to particular details. QUINTUS: You therefore derive the principles of justice from the principles of nature, to investigate which is the main object of all our discussions. ATTICUS: Certainly, and when she is our guide, we are not very likely to err.


nanMARCUS: Grant me, then, my Atticus, (for I know my brotherʼs opinion already), -- grant me that the entire universe is overruled by the power of God, that by his nature, reason, energy, mind, divinity, or some other word of clearer signification, all things are governed and directed; for if you will not grant me this, I must proceed to prove it. ATTICUS: Respecting the existence of God, and the superintendence of divine providence, I grant you all you can desire. But owing to this singing of birds and babbling of waters, I fear my friends can scarcely hear me. MARCUS: You are quite right to be on your guard, my Atticus; for even the best men occasionally fall into a passion, and what would your fellow-students, the Epicureans, say, if they heard you denying the first article of that notable book, entitled the Chief Doctrines of Epicurus, in which he says that "God takes care of nothing, neither of himself nor of any other being?


nanATTICUS: Pray proceed, for I am waiting to know what advantage you mean to take of the concession I have made you. MARCUS: I will not detain you long. Since you grant me the existence of God, and the superintendence of Providence, I maintain that he has been especially beneficent to man. This human animal -- prescient, sagacious, complex, acute, full of memory, reason and counsel, which we call man, -- is generated by the supreme God in a more transcendent condition than most of his fellow-creatures. For he is the only creature among the earthly races of animated beings endued with superior reason and thought, in which the rest are deficient. And what is there, I do not say in man alone, but in all heaven and earth, more divine than reason, which, when it becomes ripe and perfect, is justly termed wisdom?


nanThere exists, therefore, since nothing is better than reason, and since this is the common property of God and man, a certain aboriginal rational intercourse between divine and human natures. This reason, which is common to both, therefore, can be none other than right reason; and since this right reason is what we call Law, God and men are said by Law to be consociated. Between whom, since there is a communion of law, there must be also a communication of Justice. Law and Justice being thus the common rule of immortals and mortals, it follows that they are both the fellow-citizens of one city and commonwealth. And if they are obedient to the same rule, the same authority and denomination, they may with still closer propriety be termed fellow-citizens, since one celestial regency, one divine mind, one omnipotent Deity then regulates all their thoughts and actions. This universe, therefore, forms one immeasurable Commonwealth and city, common alike to gods and mortals. And as in earthly states, certain particular laws, which we shall hereafter describe, govern the particular relationships of kindred tribes; so in the nature of things doth an universal law, far more magnificent and resplendent, regulate the affairs of that universal city where gods and men compose one vast association. When we thus reason on universal nature, we are accustomed to reason after this method. We believe that in the long course of ages and the uninterrupted succession of celestial revolutions, the seed of the human race was sown on our planet, and being scattered over the earth, was animated by the divine gift of souls. Thus men retained from their terrestrial origin, their perishable and mortal bodies, while their immortal spirits were ingenerated by Deity. From which consideration we are bold to say that we possess a certain consanguinity and kindred fellowship with the celestials. And so far as we know, among all the varieties of animals, man alone retains the idea of the Divinity. And among men there is no nation so savage and ferocious as to deny the necessity of worshipping God, however ignorant it may be respecting the nature of his attributes.
NaN


nanFrom whence we conclude that every man must recognize a Deity, who considers the origin of his nature and the progress of his life. Now the law of virtue is the same in God and man, and cannot possibly be diverse. This virtue is nothing else than a nature perfect in itself, and developed in all its excellence. There exists therefore a similitude between God and man; nor can any knowledge be more appropriate and sterling than what relates to this divine similitude. Nature, attentive to our wants, offers us her treasures with the most graceful profusion. And it is easy to perceive that the benefits which flow from her are true and veritable gifts, which Providence has provided on purpose for human enjoyment, and not the fortuitous productions of her exuberant fecundity. Her liberality appears, not only in the fruits and vegetables which gush from the bosom of the earth, but likewise in cattle and the beasts of the field. It is clear that some of these are intended for the advantage of mankind, a part for propagation, and a part for food. Innumerable arts have likewise been discovered by the teaching of nature; for her doth reason imitate, and skilfully discover all things necessary to the happiness of life. With respect to man this same bountiful nature hath not merely allotted him a subtle and active spirit, but moreover favoured him with physical senses, like so many guardians and messengers. Thus has she improved our understanding in relation to many obscure principles, and laid the foundation of practical knowledge; and in all respects moulded our corporeal faculties to the service of our intellectual genius. For while she has debased the forms of other animals, who live to eat rather than eat to live, she has bestowed on man an erect stature, and an open countenance, and thus prompted him to the contemplation of heaven, the ancient home of his kindred immortals. So exquisitely, too, hath she fashioned the features of the human face, as to make them symbolic of the most recondite thoughts and sentiments.
NaN


nanAs for our two eloquent eyes (oculi nimis arguti), do they not speak forth every impulse and passion of our souls? And that which we call expression in which we infinitely excel all the inferior animals, how marvellously it delineates all our speculations and feelings! Of this the Greeks well knew the meaning, though they had no word for it. I will not enlarge on the wonderful faculties and qualities of the rest of the body, the modulation of the voice, and the power of oratory, which is perhaps the greatest instrument of our influence over human society. These matters do not belong to the occasion of our present discourse, and I think that Scipio has already sufficiently explained them in those books of mine which you have read. As the Deity, therefore, was pleased to create man as the chief and president of all terrestrial creatures, so it is evident, without further argument, that human nature has made the greatest advances by its intrinsic energy; that nature, which without any other instruction than her own, has developed the first rude principles of the understanding, and strengthened and perfected reason to all the appliances of science and art. ATTICUS: Good heavens, my Cicero! from what a tremendous distance are you deducing the principles of justice! However, I wont hurry too eagerly to what I expect you to say on the Civil Law. But I will listen patiently, even if you spend the whole day in this kind of discourse, for assuredly these are grander topics which you introduce as a preamble than those to which they prepare the way. MARCUS: You may well describe these topics as grand, which we are now briefly discussing. For of all the questions on which our philosophers argue, there is none which it is more important thoroughly to understand than this, that man is born for justice, and that law and equity are not a mere establishment of opinion, but an institution of nature. This truth will become still more apparent if we investigate the nature of human association and society. There is no one thing more like to another, more homogeneous and analogous, than man is to man. And if the corruption of customs, and the variation of opinions, had not induced an imbecility of minds, and turned them aside from the course of nature, no one would more nearly resemble himself than all men would resemble all men. Therefore whatever definition we give of man, it must include the whole human race. And this is a good argument, that no portion of mankind can be heterogeneous or dissimilar from the rest; because, if this were the case, one definition could not include all men. In fact, reason, which alone gives us so many advantages over beasts, by means of which we conjecture, argue, refute, discourse, and accomplish and conclude our designs, is assuredly common to all men; for the faculty of acquiring knowledge is similar in all human minds, though the knowledge itself may be endlessly diversified. By the same senses we all perceive the same objects, and that which strikes the sensibilities of the few, cannot be indifferent to those of the many. Those first rude elements of intelligence which, as I before observed, are the earliest developments of thought, are similarly exhibited by all men; and that faculty of speech which is the soulʼs interpreter, agrees in the ideas it conveys, though it may differ in the syllables that express them. And therefore there exists not a man in any nation, who, adopting his true nature for his true guide, may not improve in virtue. Nor is this resemblance which all men bear to each other remarkable in those things only which accord to right reason. For it is scarcely less conspicuous in those corrupt practices by which right reason is most cruelly violated. For all men alike are captivated by voluptuousness, which is in reality no better than disgraceful vice, though it may seem to bear some natural relations to goodness; for by its delicious delicacy and luxury it insinuates error into the mind, and leads us to cultivate it as something salutary, forgetful of its poisonous qualities. An error, scarcely less universal, induces us to shun death, as if it were annihilation; and to cling to life, because it keeps us in our present stage of existence, which is perhaps rather a misfortune than a desideratum. Thus, likewise, we erroneously consider pain as one of the greatest evils, not only on account of its present asperity, but also because it seems the precursor of mortality. Another common delusion obtains, which induces all mankind to associate renown with honesty, as if we are necessarily happy when we are renowned, and miserable when we happen to be inglorious. In short, our minds are all similarly susceptible of inquietudes, joys, desires and fears; and if opinions are not the same in all men, it does not follow, for example, that the people of Egypt who deify dogs and cats, do not labour under superstition in the same way as other nations, though they may differ from them in the forms of its manifestation. But in nothing is the uniformity of human nature more conspicuous than in its respect for virtue. What nation is there, in which kindness, benignity, gratitude, and mindfulness of benefits are not recommended? What nation in which arrogance, malice, cruelty, and unthankfulness, are not reprobated and detested! This uniformity of opinions, invincibly demonstrates that mankind was intended to compose one fraternal association. And to affect this, the faculty of reason must be improved till it instructs us in all the arts of well-living. If what I have said meets your approbation, I will proceed; or if any of my argument appears defective, I will endeavour to explain it. ATTICUS: We see nothing to object to, if I may reply for both of us. MARCUS: It follows, then, in the line of our argument, that nature made us just that we might participate our goods with each other, and supply each others’ wants. You observe in this discussion whenever I speak of nature, I mean nature in its genuine purity, and not in the corrupt state which is displayed by the depravity of evil custom, which is so great, that the natural and innate flame of virtue is often almost extinguished and stifled by the antagonist vices, which are accumulated around it. But if our true nature would assert her rights, and teach men the noble lesson of the poet, who says, "I am a man, therefore no human interest can be indifferent to me," -- then would justice be administered equally by all and to all. For nature hath not merely given us reason, but right reason, and consequently that law, which is nothing else than right reason enjoining what is good, and forbidding what is evil. Now if nature hath given us law, she hath also given us justice, -- for as she has bestowed reason on all, she has equally bestowed the sense of justice on all. And therefore did Socrates deservedly execrate the man who first drew a distinction between the law of nature and the law of morals, for he justly conceived that this error is the source of most human vices. It is to this essential union between the naturally honorable, and the politically expedient, that this sentence of Pythagoras refers: -- "Love is universal: let its benefits be universal likewise.
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN


nanFrom whence it appears that when a wise man is attached to a good man by that friendship whose rights are so extensive, that phenomenon takes place which is altogether incredible to worldlings, and yet it is a necessary consequence, that he loves himself not more dearly than he loves his friend. For how can a difference of interests arise where all interests are similar? If there could be such a difference of interests, however minute, it would be no longer a true friendship, which vanishes immediately when, for the sake of our own benefit, we would sacrifice that of our friend. I have made these preliminary remarks, to prepare you the better for the main subject of our discourse, in order that you may more easily understand the principle, that nature herself is the foundation of justice. When I have explained this a little more at large, I shall come to the consideration of that civil law to which all my arguments refer. QUINTUS: Then you have not much to add, my brother, for the arguments you have already used have sufficiently proved to Atticus and myself that nature is the fountain of justice. ATTICUS: How could I maintain any other opinion, since you have proved to us, first, that the gods have been pleased to enrich and adorn us with their gifts, on purpose that we might administer them justly. Secondly, that all mankind bear a fraternal resemblance and relationship to each other. And lastly, that these natural brethren are bound together by the reciprocal obligations of friendship and affection, as well as social rights. Since we are agreed, therefore, that these principles are correct, how can we, with any consistency, separate from nature that law and justice, which are her moral developements?
NaN


nanMARCUS: You are quite right, my Atticus; the argument is pretty well established. A few considerations, however, I will add, in conformity with the method of the philosophers. I do not mean the older sages of philosophy, but those modern philosophers who keep a magazine of arguments in reserve, on every imaginable topic, and who, instead of discussing questions freely and unconstrainedly, will permit us to speak only in accordance with their logical arrangements and dialectical distinctions. These gentlemen will never allow that we have done justice to our subject, unless we demonstrate that nature is just, and justice is natural, in a distinct and scientific disputation. ATTICUS: You seem to have renounced your liberty in debate, my Cicero, and resemble a schoolman, who rather follows the authority of his predecessors, than developes his individual sentiments. MARCUS: I am not always in this humour, Atticus. But I wish to avail myself of authorities on the present occasion, because, as you see, the main object of this whole discussion is to strengthen the foundations of our Commonwealth, to establish its forces, and to benefit its population in all their relations. I am therefore particularly anxious to avoid any inconsiderate statements or unsound arguments. Not that I expect to demonstrate my doctrine to all men, for that is impossible; but I would make my pleadings as perfect as may be, for those who maintain that justice and honour are worthy to be cultivated even for their own sake, that nothing can he properly called a good, which is not morally estimable, and that there can exist no great good whatever, which is not desirable mainly on its own account, without reference to points of interest or emolument.
NaN


nanAll the philosophers who flourished in the old Academy with Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, or those that followed Aristotle, and Theophrastus, agreeing with them in doctrine, though they might differ in their method of explaining it -- whether, like Zeno, they preserved the same principles, while they changed the terms of exposition, -- or whether they supported that difficult and arduous sect of Ariston, now generally scattered and confuted, which supposed, that saving virtue and vice, all things were equal and indifferent -- all these have favoured the moral theory I now unfold.


nanFor the rest, who indulged their appetites and pampered their passions, pursuing some objects and avoiding others, for no other reason than their amount of gratification or annoyance, though they sometimes speak truth, as we candidly allow, -- let them talk in their own gardens, and let them retire from all the political debates respecting the interests of the state, of which they know nothing, nor, indeed, care to know. As to that new academy of which Arcesilas and Carneades are the leaders, and who attack all sects and parties, we implore them not to interrupt us in our present discussion; for if they invade us on these subjects in which our minds are thoroughly familiar and resolved, they will seek their own ruin. But I, who wish rather to please, dare not excite their resentment; for in questions of this nature, we would fain proceed without any mixture of sophistry or anger; and any defects in our arguments, may surely be expiated without such fumigations as the invectives of criticism. ATTICUS: As you use the word 'expiation,' permit me to enquire what views you entertain respecting the justice of punishment, where laws have been broken and violated. Do you think such offences against laws can be expiated without enforcing the penalty, either directly or indirectly? MARCUS: I think not. I conceive there is no other expiation for the crimes and impieties of men. The guilty therefore must pay the penalty, and bear the punishment. The retributions they undergo are not so much those inflicted by courts of justice, which were not always in being, do not exist at present in many places, and even where established, are frequently biased and partial; but the retributions I principally intend are those of conscience. The Furies pursue and torment them, not with their burning torches, as the poets feign, but by remorse and the tortures arising from guilt. Was it the fear of punishment, and not the nature of the thing itself that ought to restrain mankind from wickedness, what, I would ask, could give villains the least uneasiness, abstracting from all fears of this kind? And yet none of them was ever so audaciously impudent, but he endeavoured to justify what he had done by some law of nature, denied the fact, or else pretended a just sorrow for it. Now if the wicked have the confidence to appeal to these laws, with what profound respect ought good men to treat them? There is the greater need, therefore, of insisting on the natural and unavoidable penalties of conscience. For if either direct punishment, or the fear of it, was what deterred from a vicious course of life, and not the turpitude of the thing itself, then none could he guilty of injustice, in a moral sense, and the greatest offenders ought rather to be called imprudent than wicked.
NaN


nanOn the other hand, if we are determined to the practice of goodness, not by its own intrinsic excellence, but for the sake of some private advantage, we are cunning, rather than good men. What will not that man do in the dark who fears nothing but a witness and a judge? Should he meet a solitary individual in a desert place, with a large sum of money about him, and altogether unable to defend himself from being robbed, how would he behave? In such a case the man whom we have represented to be honest from principle, and the nature of the thing itself, would converse with the stranger, assist him, and show him the way. But as to the man who does nothing for the sake of another, and measures every thing by the advantage it brings to himself, it is obvious, I suppose, how such a one would act; and should he deny that he would kill the man or rob him of his treasure, his reason for this cannot be that he apprehends there is any moral turpitude in such actions, but only because he is afraid of a discovery, and the bad consequences that would thence ensue. A sentiment this, at which not only learned men, but even clowns must blush.


nanIt is therefore an absurd extravagance in some philosophers to assert that all things are necessarily just, which are established by the civil laws and the institutions of the people. Are then the laws of tyrants just, simply because they are laws? If the thirty tyrants of Athens imposed certain laws on the Athenians, and if these Athenians were delighted with these tyrannical laws, are we therefore bound to consider these laws as just? For my own part, I do not think such laws deserve any greater estimation than that past during our own interregnum, which ordained, that the dictator should be empowered to put to death with impunity, whatever citizens he pleased, without hearing them in their own defence. There can be but one essential justice, which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked. But if justice consists in submission to written laws and national customs, and if, as the Epicureans persist in affirming, every thing must be measured by utility alone, he who wishes to find an occasion of breaking such laws and customs, will be sure to discover it. So that real justice remains powerless if not supported by nature, and this pretended justice is overturned by that very utility which they call its foundation. But this is not all. If nature does not ratify law, all the virtues lose their sway. What becomes of generosity, patriotism, or friendship? Where should we find the desire of benefitting our neighbours, or the gratitude that acknowledges kindness? For all these virtues proceed from our natural inclination to love and cherish our associates. This is the true basis of justice, and without this, not only the mutual charities of men, but the religious services of the gods, would become obsolete; for these are preserved, as I imagine, rather by the natural sympathy which subsists between divine and human beings, than by mere fear and timidity. If the will of the people, the decrees of the senate, the adjudications of magistrates, were sufficient to establish justice, the only question would be how to gain suffrages, and to win over the votes of the majority, in order that corruption and spoliation, and the falsification of wills, should become lawful. But if the opinions and suffrages of foolish men had sufficient weight to outbalance the nature of things, might they not determine among them, that what is essentially bad and pernicious should henceforth pass for good and beneficial? Or why should not a law able to enforce injustice, take the place of equity? Would not this same law be able to change evil into good, and good into evil? As far as we are concerned, we have no other rule capable of distinguishing between a good or a bad law, than our natural conscience and reason. These, however, enable us to separate justice from injustice, and to discriminate between the honest and the scandalous. For common sense has impressed in our minds the first principles of things, and has given us a general acquaintance with them, by which we connect with Virtue every honourable and excellent quality, and with Vice all that is abominable and disgraceful. Now we must entirely take leave of our senses, ere we can suppose that law and justice have no foundation in nature, and rely merely on the transient opinions of men. We should not venture to praise the virtue of a tree or a horse, in which expression there is an abuse of terms, were we not convinced that this virtue was in their nature, rather than in our opinion. For a stronger reason, it is mainly with respect to the moral nature of things, that we ought to speak of honour and shame among men. If opinion could determine respecting the character of universal virtue, it might also decide respecting particular or partial virtues. But who will dare to determine that a man is prudent and cautious in his moral disposition, from any external appearances. For virtue evidently lies in perfect rationality, and this resides in the inmost depths of our nature. The same remark applies to all honour and honesty, for we judge of true and false, creditable and discreditable, rather by their essential qualities, than their external relations. Thus we judge according to their intrinsic nature, that rationality of life, which is virtue, must be ever constant and perpetual, and that inconstancy must necessarily be vicious. We form an estimate of the opinions of youths, but not by their opinions. Those virtues and vices which reside in their moral natures, must not be measured by opinions. And so of all moral qualities, we must discriminate between honourable and dishonourable by reference to the essential nature of the things themselves. The good we commend, must needs contain in itself something commendable. For as I before stated, goodness is not a mode of opinion: it is what it is, by the force of its very essence. If it were otherwise, opinion alone might constitute virtue and happiness, which is the most absurd of suppositions. And since we judge of good and evil by their nature, and since good and evil are the true constituents of honour and shame, we should judge in the same manner all honourable and all shameful qualities, testing them by the law of nature, without prejudice or passion.
NaN
NaN
NaN
NaN


nanBut our steady attention to this moral law of nature is often too much disturbed by the dissention of men and the variation of opinions. We might perhaps obey this law of nature more exactly, if we attended more accurately to the evidence of our senses, which being absolutely natural, are less likely to be deceived by artificial objects. Those objects, indeed, which sometimes present to us one appearance, sometimes another, we term fictions of the senses; but it is far otherwise. For neither parent, nor nurse, nor master, nor poet, nor drama, deceive our senses; nor do popular prejudices seduce them. But our delusions are connected with corruption of our mental opinions. And this corruption is either superinduced by those causes of error I have enumerated, which, taking possession of the young and uneducated, betray them into a thousand perversities, or by that voluptuousness which is the mimic of goodness, implicated and interfused through all our senses -- the prolific mother of all human disasters. For she so corrupts us by her bewitching blandishments that we no longer perceive that things may be essentially excellent, though they have none of this deliciousness and pruriency. (Quae natura bona sunt quia, dulcedine hac et scabie carent.)


nanFrom what I have said on this subject, it may then easily be concluded, that Justice and Equity are desirable for their own sake. For all virtuous men love Justice and Equity, for what they are in themselves; and we cannot believe that such virtuous men should delude themselves by loving something which does not deserve their affection. Justice and Right are therefore desirable and amiable in themselves; and if this is true of Right, it must be true of all the moral virtues with which it is connected. What then shall we say of liberality? Is it to be exercised gratuituously, or does it covet some reward and recompense? If a man does good without expecting any recompense for his kindness, then it is gratuitous: if he does expect compensation, it is a mere matter of traffic. Doubtless, he who truly deserves the reputation of a generous and good-natured man, performs his philanthropical duties without consulting his secular interests. In the same way the virtue of justice demands neither emolument nor salary, and therefore we desire it for its own sake, because it is its own reward. And for this reason we should entertain the same estimate of all moral virtues.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

17 results
1. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

700b. one class of song was that of prayers to the gods, which bore the name of hymns ; contrasted with this was another class, best called dirges ; paeans formed another; and yet another was the dithyramb, named, I fancy, after Dionysus. Nomes also were so called as being a distinct class of song; and these were further described as citharoedic nomes. So these and other kinds being classified and fixed, it was forbidden to set one kind of words to a different class of tune.
2. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.49, 3.24 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.49. philosophus nobilis, a quo non solum Graecia et Italia, sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est, honestum quid sit, si id non sit non sit Mdv. non est in voluptate, negat se intellegere, nisi forte illud, quod multitudinis rumore rumore mi|nore R timore NV laudetur. ego autem hoc etiam turpe esse saepe iudico et, si quando turpe non sit, tum esse non turpe, cum id a multitudine laudetur, quod sit ipsum per se rectum atque laudabile, non ob eam causam tamen tamen non ob eam causam BE illud dici esse honestum, honestum esse BE quia laudetur a multis, sed quia tale sit, ut, vel si ignorarent id homines, vel si obmutuissent, sua tamen pulchritudine esset specieque laudabile. itaque idem natura victus, cui obsisti non potest, dicit alio loco id, quod a te etiam paulo ante paulo ante ante paulo E ante populo B dictum est, non posse iucunde vivi nisi etiam honeste. 3.24. ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut ut arte N arte ut V in ipsa insit, insit ut sit N 1 ut insit N 2 non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. et tamen est etiam aliqua aliqua Brem. alia (est alia etiam N) cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant katorqw/mata, omnes numeros virtutis continent. sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit. 2.49.  Do you realize how vast a difference of opinion this is? Here is a famous philosopher, whose influence has spread not only over Greece and Italy but throughout all barbarian lands as well, protesting that he cannot understand what Moral Worth is, if it does not consist in pleasure; unless indeed it be that which wins the approval and applause of the multitude. For my part I hold that what is popular is often positively base, and that, if ever it is not base, this is only when the multitude happens to applaud something that is right and praiseworthy in and for itself; which even so is not called 'moral' (honourable) because it is widely applauded, but because it is of such a nature that even if men were unaware of its existence, or never spoke of it, it would still be worthy of praise for its own beauty and loveliness. Hence Epicurus is compelled by the irresistible force of instinct to say in another passage what you also said just now, that it is impossible to live pleasantly without also living morally (honourably). 3.24.  For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a certain particular part or dance, so life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as 'conformable' and suitable. In fact we do not consider Wisdom to be like seamanship or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and of dancing just mentioned; its End, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it. At the same time there is also another point which marks a dissimilarity between Wisdom and these arts as well. In the latter a movement perfectly executed nevertheless does not involve all the various motions which together constitute the subject matter of the art; whereas in the sphere of conduct, what we may call, if you approve, 'right actions,' or 'rightly performed actions,' in Stoic phraseology katorthōmata, contain all the factors of virtue. For Wisdom alone is entirely self-contained, which is not the case with the other arts.
3. Cicero, On Laws, 1.17, 1.19-1.48, 2.10-2.11, 2.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, On Duties, 1.65, 3.69 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.65. Fortes igitur et magimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri; etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam. 3.69. Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis. 1.65.  So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which Nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for glory as a reward for his achievements. 3.69.  Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship — although I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and again — which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford.
5. Cicero, Republic, 3.33 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.33. Lactant. Div. Inst. 6.8.6 Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpres eius alius, nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit.
6. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.109-1.110, 3.2-3.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.109. quantum famaeque V (ae in r. V c ) autem consuetudini famaeque dandum sit, id curent vivi, sed ita, ut intellegant nihil id id ss. G 1 ad mortuos pertinere. Sed profecto mors tum aequissimo animo oppetitur, cum suis se laudibus vita occidens consolari potest. nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis virtutis -utis in r. V c perfectae perfecto perfecto exp. V 2 functus est munere. multa mihi ipsi ad mortem tempestiva fuerunt. quam quam Dav. quae (idem error p. 274, 16 saep.) utinam potuissem obire! nihil enim iam adquirebatur, cumulata erant officia vitae, cum fortuna fortunae K 2 B bella restabant. quare si ipsa ratio minus perficiat, perficiet V 2 ut mortem neglegere possimus, at vita acta perficiat, ut satis superque vixisse videamur. videamus V 1 quamquam enim en im V (si et ... 2 ) sensus abierit, tamen suis suis Lb. (cf.p.253,9) summis et propriis bonis laudis et gloriae, quamvis non sentiant, mortui non carent. etsi enim nihil habet habe t G( eras. n) in se gloria cur expetatur, expectatur X (c exp. in V) vir tutē V ( ss. 2? ) tamen virtutem tamquam umbra sequitur. sequatur V 2? 1.110. verum suppl. Po. (obl. Bitschofsky, Berl. ph. Woch. 1913,173) ante verum quod pro adi. habent add. et Bentl. igitur Sey multitudinis iudicium de bonis bonum si quando est, magis laudandum est quam illi ob eam rem beati. non possum autem dicere, quoquo quo V 1 ( add. c ) modo hoc accipietur, Lycurgum Solonem legum et publicae publicę V (-ce K publi G 1 ) disciplinae carere gloria, Themistoclem Epaminondam et epam. V 2 bellicae virtutis. ante enim Salamina salamina Man. salaminam cf. We. salamini GK 1 (i add. 2 ) V ipsam Neptunus obruet quam Salaminii tropaei trop hi G 1 K ( add. 2 ) trop ei m. V ( ss. 2 ) memoriam, priusque e V 2 om. X e Boeotia bootia X (boetia K 2 V 2 B) Leuctra leuctrae V 2 leuctrha K 1 R 1 tollentur quam quam K quae GRV 1 ( supra ae add. V rec ) pugnae Leuctricae gloria. multo autem tardius fama deseret desseret GV 1 Curium Fabricium Calatinum, duo Scipiones duo duos V rec Africanos, Maximum Marcellum Paulum, Catonem Laelium, innumerabilis alios; quorum similitudinem aliquam qui arripuerit, non eam fama populari, sed vera bonorum laude metiens, fidenti animo, anima G si ita res feret, res feret V 2 s Lact. refert X gradietur ad mortem; in qua aut summum bonum aut nullum malum esse cognovimus. fidenti...24 cognovimus Lact. inst. 7, 10, 9 secundis vero suis rebus volet etiam mori; non enim tam tam add. G 1 cumulus bonorum iucundus esse potest quam molesta decessio. hanc sententiam significare videtur Laconis illa vox, qui, cum Rhodius Diagoras, Olympionices olimp. X (10 solus V) nobilis, uno die duo suos filios victores Olympiae vidisset, accessit ad senem et gratulatus: 3.2. Quodsi talis nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri et perspicere eademque optima duce cursum vitae conficere possemus, haut haut V 2 aut GK 1 RV 1 haud K 2 B s erat sane quod quisquam rationem ac doctrinam rationem ac doctrinam s ratione ac doctrina X rationedẽ V 2 hac pro ac G 1 et Gr.?) requireret. requiret G 1 nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravati depravati V 1? e corr. B s depravatis X sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina semita G innata virtutum, quae si adolescere adholescere G 1 adol. sed o in r. V 1 liceret, licet in liceret corr. R c licetret G 1 ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. nunc autem, simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate et in summa opinionum perversitate versamur, ut paene cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur. cum vero parentibus redditi, dein reddit idem G reddit idemr R ( et r = require al.m. ) redditidē V 1 (redditi dein V 2 sec. Str. ) redditi idem HK ( demŭ ss. 2 ) redditi demum Gr.(?)B magistris traditi sumus, tum tum ... 9 cedat Non. 416, 32 ita variis imbuimur inb. KR erroribus, ut vanitati veritas et opinioni opinio G 1 confirmatae confirmatae s Non. confirmata X natura naturae K ipsa cedat. 3.3. accedunt etiam poëtae, qui cum magnam speciem doctrinae sapientiaeque prae se tulerunt, audiuntur leguntur ediscuntur et inhaerescunt penitus in mentibus. cum vero eodem quasi maxumus quidam quidem K 1 R 1 H magister populus accessit accessit V c ( cf. rep. 4,9 ) om. X (accedit ante eodem add. multi s ) atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, tum plane inficimur opinionum pravitate a naturaque desciscimus, dessciscimus KR 1 ut nobis optime naturae vim vidisse naturae vim vidisse Mdv. ad fin. 3,62 naturam invidisse videantur, qui nihil melius homini, nihil magis expetendum, nihil praestantius honoribus, imperiis, populari gloria iudicaverunt. ad ad at K quam fertur optumus quisque veramque illam honestatem expetens, expe tens V quam unam natura maxime anquirit, unam s una anquirit Mos. inquirit in summa iitate versatur consectaturque nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis, virtutis del. Bentl. gloriae ( ex gloria V 2 ) del. Bai. sed adumbratam imaginem gloriae. est enim gloria solida quaedam res et expressa, non adumbrata; ea est consentiens laus bonorum, incorrupta et ante incorrupta add. V c vox bene iudicantium de excellenti excellenti ex -te V 1 excellente rell. ( ft. recte cf. de orat. 2, 85 fr. ap. Char. GL. I p. 138, 13 ) virtute, ea virtuti resonat tamquam imago; gloriae post imago add. X exp. V 1 quae quia recte factorum plerumque comes est, non est non est ea H est in r. V c bonis viris repudianda. repudienda in -anda corr. K 1 V 1 3.4. illa autem, quae se eius imitatricem esse volt, uult R e corr. H temeraria atque inconsiderata et plerumque peccatorum vitiorumque laudatrix, fama popularis, simulatione honestatis formam forme G 1 eius pulchritudinemque corrumpit. qua caecitate homines, cum quaedam etiam praeclara cuperent eaque que om. H nescirent nec ubi nec qualia essent, funditus alii everterunt everterent X corr. K 2 R c V 1? suas civitates, alii ipsi occiderunt. atque hi quidem optuma petentes non tam voluntate quam cursus errore falluntur. quid? qui quid qui K c R 2 V 1? e corr. quid- que GR 1 V 1 quiqui K 1 pecuniae cupiditate, qui voluptatum libidine feruntur, quid...12 feruntur om. H quorumque ita perturbantur animi, ut non multum absint ab insania, quod insipientibus contingit contigit G 1 omnibus, quod 14 omnibus del. Ba. is is H his rell. nullane ne om. G 1 est adhibenda curatio? utrum quod minus noceant animi aegrotationes quam corporis, an quod corpora curari possint, animorum medicina nulla sit?
7. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Joseph, 29 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

29. for this world is a sort of large state, and has one constitution, and one law, and the word of nature enjoins what one ought to do, and forbids what one ought not to do: but the cities themselves in their several situations are unlimited in number, and enjoy different constitutions, and laws which are not all the same; for there are different customs and established regulations found out and established in different nations;
8. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Plutarch, How A Man May Become Aware of His Progress In Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

75c. until the opposite condition had been unmistakably engendered, his body having completely recovered its strength. On the contrary, just as in these cases persons make no progress unless their progress is marked by such an abatement of what is oppressing them, that, when the scale turns and they swing upward in the opposite direction, they can note the change, so too, in the study of philosophy, neither progress nor any sense of progress is to be assumed, if the soul does not put aside any of its gross stupidity and purge itself thereof, and if, up to the moment of its attaining the absolute and perfect good, it is wedded to evil which is also absolute. Why if this is so, the wise man in a moment or a second of time
10. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 120.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

11. Gaius, Instiutiones, 1.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

12. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.28, 7.86-7.88, 7.147, 7.175 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.28. And in very truth in this species of virtue and in dignity he surpassed all mankind, ay, and in happiness; for he was ninety-eight when he died and had enjoyed good health without an ailment to the last. Persaeus, however, in his ethical lectures makes him die at the age of seventy-two, having come to Athens at the age of twenty-two. But Apollonius says that he presided over the school for fifty-eight years. The manner of his death was as follows. As he was leaving the school he tripped and fell, breaking a toe. Striking the ground with his fist, he quoted the line from the Niobe:I come, I come, why dost thou call for me?and died on the spot through holding his breath. 7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. 7.147. The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil, taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes. 7.175. Antiquities.of the Gods.of Giants.of Marriage.On Homer.of Duty, three books.of Good Counsel.of Gratitude.An Exhortation.of the Virtues.of Natural Ability.of Gorgippus.of Envy.of Love.of Freedom.The Art of Love.of Honour.of Fame.The Statesman.of Deliberation.of Laws.of Litigation.of Education.of Logic, three books.of the End.of Beauty.of Conduct.of Knowledge.of Kingship.of Friendship.On the Banquet.On the Thesis that Virtue is the same in Man and in Woman.On the Wise Man turning Sophist.of Usages.Lectures, two books.of Pleasure.On Properties.On Insoluble Problems.of Dialectic.of Moods or Tropes.of Predicates.This, then, is the list of his works.
13. Papyri, P.Hercul.:, 1428

14. Papyrip.Hercul., P.Hercul., 1428

15. Papyrip.Hercul., P.Hercul., 1428

16. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None

17. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 2.1021, 2.1076



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
action, appropriate actions (kathekonta) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
action, right actions (katorthomata) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
cicero, and law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 21
cicero, on etymology of lex/nomos Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
cicero, on honor and glory Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
cicero, on stoic divine law theory Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
cicero Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
codes, justinian Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
codes, theodosian Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
concepts, formation of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
corporealism Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 4
corruption, sources on Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
decreta Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 199
diogenes laertius Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 21
discourses of divine law, in greco-roman sources Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
distributive justice Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
divine law, as defined by cicero Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
divine law, in greco-roman thought Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
divine perspective Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 199
emotions, as contumacious Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
epictetus Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 202
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
fairmindedness, all-embracing Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 4
fairmindedness, fate, two pictures of Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 4
fairmindedness, personal Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 4
god, gods, and suicide Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 202
godlikeness, stoic Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 202
human nature, innate orientations Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
human nature, intellectual and moral development Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
immutability, of divine law Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
ius antiquum, civile Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
ius antiquum, gentium Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
ius antiquum, naturale Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
ius antiquum, publicum Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
jupiter Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 90
law, constitutional Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
law, natural Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
law, private Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
law (nomos), in on law and justice Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
law of nature, connection to reason and god Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 21
law of nature, transcended written law Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 21
lawyers Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
lucretius carus, t Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 90
magistrates Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
marcus (character of de legibus) Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 90
mosaic law, for ordinary people Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 21
natural law, in cicero' Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
natural law Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 90
on law and justice (attrib. archytas), on compliance of law with nature and proportion Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
on law and justice (attrib. archytas), on rulers Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
on law and justice (attrib. archytas) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
pantheism Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 4
polytheism Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 4
prudentia Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 90
ratio Rosa and Santangelo, Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies (2020) 90
rationality, and human nature Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
responsibility, human Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 4
rulers, in on law and justice Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483
sacra Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
socrates, and stoicism Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 202
stoics, and divine law theory Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 57
stoics/stoicism, and law of nature Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (2003) 21
suicide, in stoicism Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 202
ulpianus, domitius Ando and Ruepke, Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome (2006) 133
virtue, starting points toward (aphormai) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 248
zeno of citium Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 202
zeus, as νόμιος\u200e and νεμήιος\u200e Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 483