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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2291
Cicero, On Fate, 29-30
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

23 results
1. Demosthenes, Orations, 3.33, 18.324, 19.255, 25.95 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, On Divination, 1.82-1.84, 1.125-1.128, 2.22-2.25 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.82. Quam quidem esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur: Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus, quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines aut, quid eventurum sit, ignorant aut existumant nihil interesse hominum scire, quid sit futurum, aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus, quae sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt; at neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici) neque ignorant ea, quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt, neque nostra nihil interest scire ea, quae eventura sunt, (erimus enim cautiores, si sciemus) neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius) neque non possunt futura praenoscere; 1.83. non igitur sunt di nec significant futura; sunt autem di; significant ergo; et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam (frustra enim significarent), nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio; est igitur divinatio. 1.84. Hac ratione et Chrysippus et Diogenes et Antipater utitur. Quid est igitur, cur dubitandum sit, quin sint ea, quae disputavi, verissima, si ratio mecum facit, si eventa, si populi, si nationes, si Graeci, si barbari, si maiores etiam nostri, si denique hoc semper ita putatum est, si summi philosophi, si poe+- tae, si sapientissimi viri, qui res publicas constituerunt, qui urbes condiderunt? An, dum bestiae loquantur, exspectamus, hominum consentiente auctoritate contenti non sumus? 1.125. Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum. Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis dividi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci ei(marme/nhn, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. 1.126. Ex quo intellegitur, ut fatum sit non id, quod superstitiose, sed id, quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea, quae praeterierunt, facta sint et, quae instant, fiant et, quae sequuntur, futura sint. Ita fit, ut et observatione notari possit, quae res quamque causam plerumque consequatur, etiamsi non semper (nam id quidem adfirmare difficile est), easdemque causas veri simile est rerum futurarum cerni ab iis, qui aut per furorem eas aut in quiete videant. 1.127. Praeterea cum fato omnia fiant, id quod alio loco ostendetur, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui conligationem causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. Qui enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat, quae futura sint. Quod cum nemo facere nisi deus possit, relinquendum est homini, ut signis quibusdam consequentia declarantibus futura praesentiat. Non enim illa, quae futura sunt, subito exsistunt, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis. Quod et ii vident, quibus naturalis divinatio data est, et ii, quibus cursus rerum observando notatus est. Qui etsi causas ipsas non cernunt, signa tamen causarum et notas cernunt; ad quas adhibita memoria et diligentia et monumentis superiorum efficitur ea divinatio, quae artificiosa dicitur, extorum, fulgorum, ostentorum signorumque caelestium. 1.128. Non est igitur, ut mirandum sit ea praesentiri a divitibus, quae nusquam sint; sunt enim omnia, sed tempore absunt. Atque ut in seminibus vis inest earum rerum, quae ex iis progignuntur, sic in causis conditae sunt res futurae, quas esse futuras aut concitata mens aut soluta somno cernit aut ratio aut coniectura praesentit. Atque ut ii, qui solis et lunae reliquorumque siderum ortus, obitus motusque cognorunt, quo quidque tempore eorum futurum sit, multo ante praedicunt, sic, qui cursum rerum eventorumque consequentiam diuturnitate pertractata notaverunt, aut semper aut, si id difficile est, plerumque, quodsi ne id quidem conceditur, non numquam certe, quid futurum sit, intellegunt. Atque haec quidem et quaedam eiusdem modi argumenta, cur sit divinatio, ducuntur a fato. 2.22. Atque ego ne utilem quidem arbitror esse nobis futurarum rerum scientiam. Quae enim vita fuisset Priamo, si ab adulescentia scisset, quos eventus senectutis esset habiturus? Abeamus a fabulis, propiora videamus. Clarissimorum hominum nostrae civitatis gravissimos exitus in Consolatione collegimus. Quid igitur? ut omittamus superiores, Marcone Crasso putas utile fuisse tum, cum maxumis opibus fortunisque florebat, scire sibi interfecto Publio filio exercituque deleto trans Euphratem cum ignominia et dedecore esse pereundum? An Cn. Pompeium censes tribus suis consulatibus, tribus triumphis, maximarum rerum gloria laetaturum fuisse, si sciret se in solitudine Aegyptiorum trucidatum iri amisso exercitu, post mortem vero ea consecutura, quae sine lacrimis non possumus dicere? 2.23. Quid vero Caesarem putamus, si divinasset fore ut in eo senatu, quem maiore ex parte ipse cooptasset, in curia Pompeia ante ipsius Pompeii simulacrum tot centurionibus suis inspectantibus a nobilissumis civibus, partim etiam a se omnibus rebus ornatis, trucidatus ita iaceret, ut ad eius corpus non modo amicorum, sed ne servorum quidem quisquam accederet, quo cruciatu animi vitam acturum fuisse? Certe igitur ignoratio futurorum malorum utilior est quam scientia. 2.24. Nam illud quidem dici, praesertim a Stoicis, nullo modo potest: Non isset ad arma Pompeius, non transisset Crassus Euphratem, non suscepisset bellum civile Caesar. Non igitur fatalis exitus habuerunt; vultis autem evenire omnia fato; nihil ergo illis profuisset divinare; atque etiam omnem fructum vitae superioris perdidissent; quid enim posset iis esse laetum exitus suos cogitantibus? Ita, quoquo sese verterint Stoici, iaceat necesse est omnis eorum sollertia. Si enim id, quod eventurum est, vel hoc vel illo modo potest evenire, fortuna valet plurimum; quae autem fortuita sunt, certa esse non possunt. Sin autem certum est, quid quaque de re quoque tempore futurum sit, quid est, quod me adiuvent haruspices? qui cum res tristissimas portendi dixerunt, addunt ad extremum omnia levius casura rebus divinis procuratis; 2.25. si enim nihil fit extra fatum, nihil levari re divina potest. Hoc sentit Homerus, cum querentem Iovem inducit, quod Sarpedonem filium a morte contra fatum eripere non posset. Hoc idem significat Graecus ille in eam sententiam versus: Quod fóre paratum est, íd summum exsuperát Iovem. Totum omnino fatum etiam Atellanio versu iure mihi esse inrisum videtur; sed in rebus tam severis non est iocandi locus. Concludatur igitur ratio: Si enim provideri nihil potest futurum esse eorum, quae casu fiunt, quia esse certa non possunt, divinatio nulla est; sin autem idcirco possunt provideri, quia certa sunt et fatalia, rursus divinatio nulla est; eam enim tu fortuitarum rerum esse dicebas. 1.82. The Stoics, for example, establish the existence of divination by the following process of reasoning:If there are gods and they do not make clear to man in advance what the future will be, then they do not love man; or, they themselves do not know what the future will be; or, they think that it is of no advantage to man to know what it will be; or, they think it inconsistent with their dignity to give man forewarnings of the future; or, finally, they, though gods, cannot give intelligible signs of coming events. But it is not true that the gods do not love us, for they are the friends and benefactors of the human race; nor is it true that they do not know their own decrees and their own plans; nor is it true that it is of no advantage to us to know what is going to happen, since we should be more prudent if we knew; nor is it true that the gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to give forecasts, since there is no more excellent quality than kindness; nor is it true that they have not the power to know the future; 1.83. therefore it is not true that there are gods and yet that they do not give us signs of the future; but there are gods, therefore they give us such signs; and if they give us such signs, it is not true that they give us no means to understand those signs — otherwise their signs would be useless; and if they give us the means, it is not true that there is no divination; therefore there is divination. [39] 1.84. Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater employ the same reasoning. Then what ground is there to doubt the absolute truth of my position? For I have on my side reason, facts, peoples, and races, both Greek and barbarian, our own ancestors, the unvarying belief of all ages, the greatest philosophers, the poets, the wisest men, the builders of cities, and the founders of republics. Are we not satisfied with the uimous judgement of men, and do we wait for beasts to give their testimony too? 1.125. Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening. 1.126. Consequently, we know that Fate is that which is called, not ignorantly, but scientifically, the eternal cause of things, the wherefore of things past, of things present, and of things to come. Hence it is that it may be known by observation what effect will in most instances follow any cause, even if it is not known in all; for it would be too much to say that it is known in every case. And it is probable that these causes of coming events are perceived by those who see them during frenzy or in sleep. [56] 1.127. Moreover, since, as will be shown elsewhere, all things happen by Fate, if there were a man whose soul could discern the links that join each cause with every other cause, then surely he would never be mistaken in any prediction he might make. For he who knows the causes of future events necessarily knows what every future event will be. But since such knowledge is possible only to a god, it is left to man to presage the future by means of certain signs which indicate what will follow them. Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable: it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order. This connexion between cause and effect is obvious to two classes of diviners: those who are endowed with natural divination and those who know the course of events by the observation of signs. They may not discern the causes themselves, yet they do discern the signs and tokens of those causes. The careful study and recollection of those signs, aided by the records of former times, has evolved that sort of divination, known as artificial, which is divination by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and celestial phenomena. 1.128. Therefore it is not strange that diviners have a presentiment of things that exist nowhere in the material world: for all things are, though, from the standpoint of time, they are not present. As in seeds there inheres the germ of those things which the seeds produce, so in causes are stored the future events whose coming is foreseen by reason or conjecture, or is discerned by the soul when inspired by frenzy, or when it is set free by sleep. Persons familiar with the rising, setting, and revolutions of the sun, moon, and other celestial bodies, can tell long in advance where any one of these bodies will be at a given time. And the same thing may be said of men who, for a long period of time, have studied and noted the course of facts and the connexion of events, for they always know what the future will be; or, if that is putting it too strongly, they know in a majority of cases; or, if that will not be conceded either, then, surely, they sometimes know what the future will be. These and a few other arguments of the same kind for the existence of divination are derived from Fate. [57] 2.22. And further, for my part, I think that a knowledge of the future would be a disadvantage. Consider, for example, what Priams life would have been if he had known from youth what dire events his old age held in store for him! But let us leave the era of myths and come to events nearer home. In my work On Consolation I have collected instances of very grievous deaths that befell some of the most illustrious men of our commonwealth. Passing by men of earlier day, let us take Marcus Crassus. What advantage, pray, do you think it would have been to him, when he was at the very summit of power and wealth, to know that he was destined to perish beyond the Euphrates in shame and dishonour, after his son had been killed and his own army had been destroyed? Or do you think that Gnaeus Pompey would have found joy in his three consulships, in his three triumphs, and in the fame of his transcendent deeds, if he had known that he would be slain in an Egyptian desert, after he had lost his army, and that following his death those grave events would occur of which I cannot speak without tears? 2.23. Or what do we think of Caesar? Had he foreseen that in the Senate, chosen in most part by himself, in Pompeys hall, aye, before Pompeys very statue, and in the presence of many of his own centurions, he would be put to death by most noble citizens, some of whom owed all that they had to him, and that he would fall to so low an estate that no friend — no, not even a slave — would approach his dead body, in what agony of soul would he have spent his life!of a surety, then, ignorance of future ills is more profitable than the knowledge of them. 2.24. For, assuming that men knew the future it cannot in any wise be said — certainly not by the Stoics — that Pompey would not have taken up arms, that Crassus would not have crossed the Euphrates, or that Caesar would not have embarked upon the civil war. If so, then, the deaths that befell these men were not determined by Fate. But you will have it that everything happens by Fate; consequently, knowledge of the future would have done these men no good. In reality it would have entirely deprived the earlier portion of their lives of enjoyment; for how could they have been happy in reflecting what their ends would be? And so, however the Stoics turn and twist, all their shrewdness must come to naught. For, if a thing that is going to happen, may happen in one way or another, indifferently, chance is predomit; but things that happen by chance cannot be certain. But if it is certain what is going to befall me in reference to any matter and on every occasion, how do the soothsayers help me by saying that the greatest misfortunes await me? [10] 2.25. To the last point the Stoics make the rejoinder that every evil which is going to befall us is made lighter by means of religious rites. But if nothing happens except in accordance with Fate, no evil can be made lighter by means of religious rites. Homer shows his appreciation of this fact when he represents Jupiter as complaining because he could not snatch his son Sarpedon from death when Fate forbade. The same thought is expressed in the following verses translated from a Greek poet:That which has been decreed by Fate to beAlmighty Jove himself cannot prevent.The whole idea of Fate in every detail is justly, as I think, the subject of derision even in Atellan farces, but in a discussion as serious as ours joking is out of place. So then let us sum up our argument: If it is impossible to foresee things that happen by chance because they are uncertain, there is no such thing as divination; if, on the contrary, they can be foreseen because they are preordained by Fate, still there is no such thing as divination, which, by your definition, deals with things that happen by chance.
3. Cicero, On Fate, 11-16, 20-23, 25-28, 3, 30-34, 36, 39-45, 47-48, 5-10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, On Laws, 2.19-2.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.62 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.62. Neque enim si Philonem illum architectum, qui Atheniensibus armamentarium fecit, constat perdiserte populo rationem operis sui reddidisse, existimandum est architecti potius artificio disertum quam oratoris fuisse; nec, si huic M. Antonio pro Hermodoro fuisset de navalium opere dicendum, non, cum ab illo causam didicisset, ipse ornate de alieno artificio copioseque dixisset; neque vero Asclepiades, is quo nos medico amicoque usi sumus tum eloquentia vincebat ceteros medicos, in eo ipso, quod ornate dicebat, medicinae facultate utebatur, non eloquentiae.
6. Cicero, Republic, 1.62-1.63, 5.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.62. Et Scipio: Tum magis adsentiare, Laeli, si, ut omittam similitudines, uni gubernatori, uni medico, si digni modo sint iis artibus, rectius esse alteri navem committere, aegrum alteri quam multis, ad maiora pervenero. L. Quaenam ista sunt? S. Quid? tu non vides unius inportunitate et superbia Tarquinii nomen huic populo in odium venisse regium? L. Video vero, inquit. S. Ergo etiam illud vides, de quo progrediente oratione plura me dicturum puto, Tarquinio exacto mira quadam exultasse populum insolentia libertatis; tum exacti in exilium innocentes, tum bona direpta multorum, tum annui consules, tum demissi populo fasces, tum provocationes omnium rerum, tum secessiones plebei, tum prorsus ita acta pleraque, ut in populo essent omnia. L. Est, inquit, ut dicis. 1.63. Est vero, inquit Scipio, in pace et otio; licet enim lascivire, dum nihil metuas, ut in navi ac saepe etiam in morbo levi. Sed ut ille, qui navigat, cum subito mare coepit horrescere, et ille aeger ingravescente morbo unius opem inplorat, sic noster populus in pace et domi imperat et ipsis magistratibus minatur, recusat, appellat, provocat, in bello sic paret ut regi; valet enim salus plus quam libido. Gravioribus vero bellis etiam sine collega omne imperium nostri penes singulos esse voluerunt, quorum ipsum nomen vim suae potestatis indicat. Nam dictator quidem ab eo appellatur, quia dicitur, sed in nostris libris vides eum, Laeli, magistrum populi appellari. L. Video, inquit. Et Scipio: Sapienter igitur illi vete res
7. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 53.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 26.18, 26.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Plutarch, On Fate, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

574e. But the "indolent argument," that of the "reaper," and that termed "contrary to fate" turn out on this view to be sophisms indeed. The order of points in the Stoic argument According to the opposing argument the chief and first point would appear to be that nothing occurs without cause, and that instead everything occurs in conformity with antecedent causes; the second, that this universe, at one with itself in spirit and in affections, is governed by nature; and in the third place comes what would rather seem to be evidence added to these points in contention: the good repute in which the art of divination is held by all mankind, in the belief that its existence and that of God are in fact involved in one another;
10. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 107.11-107.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

11. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 3.3.3, 5.3.3 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

12. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 2.14.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

13. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.23 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.23. Again he would say that if we want to master the sciences there is nothing so fatal as conceit, and again there is nothing we stand so much in need of as time. To the question Who is a friend? his answer was, A second self (alter ego). We are told that he was once chastising a slave for stealing, and when the latter pleaded that it was his fate to steal, Yes, and to be beaten too, said Zeno. Beauty he called the flower of chastity, while according to others it was chastity which he called the flower of beauty. Once when he saw the slave of one of his acquaintance marked with weals, I see, said he, the imprints of your anger. To one who had been drenched with unguent, Who is this, quoth he, who smells of woman? When Dionysius the Renegade asked, Why am I the only pupil you do not correct? the reply was, Because I mistrust you. To a stripling who was talking nonsense his words were, The reason why we have two ears and only one mouth is that we may listen the more and talk the less.
14. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 6.8.30, 6.8.35 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

15. Origen, Commentary On Romans, 4.12 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

16. Origen, Commentary On Romans, 4.12 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

17. Origen, Commentary On Romans, 4.12 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

18. Origen, Against Celsus, 2.20 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.20. Let us see how he continues after this: These events, he says, he predicted as being a God, and the prediction must by all means come to pass. God, therefore, who above all others ought to do good to men, and especially to those of his own household, led on his own disciples and prophets, with whom he was in the habit of eating and drinking, to such a degree of wickedness, that they became impious and unholy men. Now, of a truth, he who shared a man's table would not be guilty of conspiring against him; but after banqueting with God, he became a conspirator. And, what is still more absurd, God himself plotted against the members of his own table, by converting them into traitors and villains! Now, since you wish me to answer even those charges of Celsus which seem to me frivolous, the following is our reply to such statements. Celsus imagines that an event, predicted through foreknowledge, comes to pass because it was predicted; but we do not grant this, maintaining that he who foretold it was not the cause of its happening, because he foretold it would happen; but the future event itself, which would have taken place though not predicted, afforded the occasion to him, who was endowed with foreknowledge, of foretelling its occurrence. Now, certainly this result is present to the foreknowledge of him who predicts an event, when it is possible that it may or may not happen, viz., that one or other of these things will take place. For we do not assert that he who foreknows an event, by secretly taking away the possibility of its happening or not, makes any such declaration as this: This shall infallibly happen, and it is impossible that it can be otherwise. And this remark applies to all the foreknowledge of events dependent upon ourselves, whether contained in the sacred Scriptures or in the histories of the Greeks. Now, what is called by logicians an idle argument, which is a sophism, will be no sophism as far as Celsus can help, but according to sound reasoning it is a sophism. And that this may be seen, I shall take from the Scriptures the predictions regarding Judas, or the foreknowledge of our Saviour regarding him as the traitor; and from the Greek histories the oracle that was given to Laius, conceding for the present its truth, since it does not affect the argument. Now, in Ps. cviii., Judas is spoken of by the mouth of the Saviour, in words beginning thus: Hold not Your peace, O God of my praise; for the mouth of the wicked and the mouth of the deceitful are opened against me. Now, if you carefully observe the contents of the psalm, you will find that, as it was foreknown that he would betray the Saviour, so also was he considered to be himself the cause of the betrayal, and deserving, on account of his wickedness, of the imprecations contained in the prophecy. For let him suffer these things, because, says the psalmist, he remembered not to show mercy, but persecuted the poor and needy man. Wherefore it was possible for him to show mercy, and not to persecute him whom he did persecute. But although he might have done these things, he did not do them, but carried out the act of treason, so as to merit the curses pronounced against him in the prophecy. And in answer to the Greeks we shall quote the following oracular response to Laius, as recorded by the tragic poet, either in the exact words of the oracle or in equivalent terms. Future events are thus made known to him by the oracle: Do not try to beget children against the will of the gods. For if you beget a son, your son shall murder you; and all your household shall wade in blood. Now from this it is clear that it was within the power of Laius not to try to beget children, for the oracle would not have commanded an impossibility; and it was also in his power to do the opposite, so that neither of these courses was compulsory. And the consequence of his not guarding against the begetting of children was, that he suffered from so doing the calamities described in the tragedies relating to Œdipus and Jocasta and their sons. Now that which is called the idle argument, being a quibble, is such as might be applied, say in the case of a sick man, with the view of sophistically preventing him from employing a physician to promote his recovery; and it is something like this: If it is decreed that you should recover from your disease, you will recover whether you call in a physician or not; but if it is decreed that you should not recover, you will not recover whether you call in a physician or no. But it is certainly decreed either that you should recover, or that you should not recover; and therefore it is in vain that you call in a physician. Now with this argument the following may be wittily compared: If it is decreed that you should beget children, you will beget them, whether you have intercourse with a woman or not. But if it is decreed that you should not beget children, you will not do so, whether you have intercourse with a woman or no. Now, certainly, it is decreed either that you should beget children or not; therefore it is in vain that you have intercourse with a woman. For, as in the latter instance, intercourse with a woman is not employed in vain, seeing it is an utter impossibility for him who does not use it to beget children; so, in the former, if recovery from disease is to be accomplished by means of the healing art, of necessity the physician is summoned, and it is therefore false to say that in vain do you call in a physician. We have brought forward all these illustrations on account of the assertion of this learned Celsus, that being a God He predicted these things, and the predictions must by all means come to pass. Now, if by by all means he means necessarily, we cannot admit this. For it was quite possible, also, that they might not come to pass. But if he uses by all means in the sense of simple futurity, which nothing hinders from being true (although it was possible that they might not happen), he does not at all touch my argument; nor did it follow, from Jesus having predicted the acts of the traitor or the perjurer, that it was the same thing with His being the cause of such impious and unholy proceedings. For He who was among us, and knew what was in man, seeing his evil disposition, and foreseeing what he would attempt from his spirit of covetousness, and from his want of stable ideas of duty towards his Master, along with many other declarations, gave utterance to this also: He that dips his hand with Me in the dish, the same shall betray Me.
19. Origen, On First Principles, 2.9.5, 3.1.5 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.9.5. Now, when we say that this world was established in the variety in which we have above explained that it was created by God, and when we say that this God is good, and righteous, and most just, there are numerous individuals, especially those who, coming from the school of Marcion, and Valentinus, and Basilides, have heard that there are souls of different natures, who object to us, that it cannot consist with the justice of God in creating the world to assign to some of His creatures an abode in the heavens, and not only to give such a better habitation, but also to grant them a higher and more honourable position; to favour others with the grant of principalities; to bestow powers upon some, dominions on others; to confer upon some the most honourable seats in the celestial tribunals; to enable some to shine with more resplendent glory, and to glitter with a starry splendour; to give to some the glory of the sun, to others the glory of the moon, to others the glory of the stars; to cause one star to differ from another star in glory. And, to speak once for all, and briefly, if the Creator God wants neither the will to undertake nor the power to complete a good and perfect work, what reason can there be that, in the creation of rational natures, i.e., of beings of whose existence He Himself is the cause, He should make some of higher rank, and others of second, or third, or of many lower and inferior degrees? In the next place, they object to us, with regard to terrestrial beings, that a happier lot by birth is the case with some rather than with others; as one man, e.g., is begotten of Abraham, and born of the promise; another, too, of Isaac and Rebekah, and who, while still in the womb, supplants his brother, and is said to be loved by God before he is born. Nay, this very circumstance — especially that one man is born among the Hebrews, with whom he finds instruction in the divine law; another among the Greeks, themselves also wise, and men of no small learning; and then another among the Ethiopians, who are accustomed to feed on human flesh; or among the Scythians, with whom parricide is an act sanctioned by law; or among the people of Taurus, where strangers are offered in sacrifice — is a ground of strong objection. Their argument accordingly is this: If there be this great diversity of circumstances, and this diverse and varying condition by birth, in which the faculty of free-will has no scope (for no one chooses for himself either where, or with whom, or in what condition he is born); if, then, this is not caused by the difference in the nature of souls, i.e., that a soul of an evil nature is destined for a wicked nation, and a good soul for a righteous nation, what other conclusion remains than that these things must be supposed to be regulated by accident and chance? And if that be admitted, then it will be no longer believed that the world was made by God, or administered by His providence; and as a consequence, a judgment of God upon the deeds of each individual will appear a thing not to be looked for. In which matter, indeed, what is clearly the truth of things is the privilege of Him alone to know who searches all things, even the deep things of God. 3.1.5. Seeing, then, that these positions are thus established by a sort of natural evidence, is it not superfluous to throw back the causes of our actions on those things which happen to us from without, and thus transfer the blame from ourselves, on whom it wholly lies? For this is to say that we are like pieces of wood, or stones, which have no motion in themselves, but receive the causes of their motion from without. Now such an assertion is neither true nor becoming, and is invented only that the freedom of the will may be denied; unless, indeed, we are to suppose that the freedom of the will consists in this, that nothing which happens to us from without can incite us to good or evil. And if any one were to refer the causes of our faults to the natural disorder of the body, such a theory is proved to be contrary to the reason of all teaching. For, as we see in very many individuals, that after living unchastely and intemperately, and after being the captives of luxury and lust, if they should happen to be aroused by the word of teaching and instruction to enter upon a better course of life, there takes place so great a change, that from being luxurious and wicked men, they are converted into those who are sober, and most chaste and gentle; so, again, we see in the case of those who are quiet and honest, that after associating with restless and shameless individuals, their good morals are corrupted by evil conversation, and they become like those whose wickedness is complete. And this is the case sometimes with men of mature age, so that such have lived more chastely in youth than when more advanced years have enabled them to indulge in a freer mode of life. The result of our reasoning, therefore, is to show that those things which happen to us from without are not in our own power; but that to make a good or bad use of those things which do so happen, by help of that reason which is within us, and which distinguishes and determines how these things ought to be used, is within our power. 3.1.5. Such being the case, to say that we are moved from without, and to put away the blame from ourselves, by declaring that we are like to pieces of wood and stones, which are dragged about by those causes that act upon them from without, is neither true nor in conformity with reason, but is the statement of him who wishes to destroy the conception of free-will. For if we were to ask such an one what was free-will, he would say that it consisted in this, that when purposing to do some thing, no external cause came inciting to the reverse. But to blame, on the other hand, the mere constitution of the body, is absurd; for the disciplinary reason, taking hold of those who are most intemperate and savage (if they will follow her exhortation), effects a transformation, so that the alteration and change for the better is most extensive — the most licentious men frequently becoming better than those who formerly did not seem to be such by nature; and the most savage men passing into such a state of mildness, that those persons who never at any time were so savage as they were, appear savage in comparison, so great a degree of gentleness having been produced within them. And we see other men, most steady and respectable, driven from their state of respectability and steadiness by intercourse with evil customs, so as to fall into habits of licentiousness, often beginning their wickedness in middle age, and plunging into disorder after the period of youth has passed, which, so far as its nature is concerned, is unstable. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that external events do not depend on us, but that it is our own business to use them in this way or the opposite, having received reason as a judge and an investigator of the manner in which we ought to meet those events that come from without.
20. Plotinus, Enneads, 3.1.1.24 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

21. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 35 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

22. Cleanthes, Hymn To Zeus, 16-21, 15

23. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.298, 1.527



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academic scepticism Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7
agency Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140
antipater of tarsus Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 241
appearance (phantasia, impression) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
arcesilaus Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7
asclepiades of bithynia Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 34
assent (sunkatathesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
atomism/atomists, plotinus and Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 252
atomism/atomists Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 252
auctoritas Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 34
bad (evil) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
bardaisan of edessa Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 175
basilides Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
bobzien, susanne Williams, The Cosmic Viewpoint: A Study of Seneca's 'Natural Questions' (2012) 320, 323
carneades Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140, 148; Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7
causation, and confatalia Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
causation, on fate Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
choice (hairesis) / choosing (haireisthai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
chrysippus Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
church fathers, irenaeus Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
cleanthes Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
clement of alexandria Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
cosmos (visible world, universe) / cosmology Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
demons, gnostics on Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 175
destiny / fate Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
determinism, and fatalism Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
determinism, hard Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
determinism Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140; Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258; Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
determinism and free will Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
disease (nosos, nosēma) / illness Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
divination Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140, 148
divine Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
doctors, attitudes towards Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 34
elites (roman) Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 148
epictetus Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
epicureanism Santangelo, Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond (2013) 17
epicurus/epicureans/epicureanism Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7
eschatology Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
fatalism' Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 241
fate Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140, 145; Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
following (akolouthos, hepesthai), following / follower of god Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
free/freedom (ἐλεύθερος/ἐλευθερία, liber/libertas), stoics on Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7
freedom, and determinism Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
freedom (eleutheria) / free (eleutheros) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
freedom (human) Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140, 145
gnosticism Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
gnostics/gnosticism Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 175
goal (telos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
god (theos) ix Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
gods / goddesses, zeus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
harmony / symphony / orchestration Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
honor Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 148
impression (phantasia) Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
indeterminism/antideterminism Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7
isidorus Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
lazy argument, the Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 241
lazy argument Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140
logic Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 145
marcion Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
marcus (character of div.) Santangelo, Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond (2013) 17
medical imagery, and auctoritas Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 34
medical imagery, in greek literature Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 34
medical imagery, in roman oratory Walters, Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome (2020) 34
medicine / therapy Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
mind (animus) Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 145
nag hammadi Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
nature (phusis) / natural, cosmos / universe Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
necessity Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
necessity ἀνάγκη, plotinus on Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 252
oedipus Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 241
paradoxes Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7
plato Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
plotinus, on atomism Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 252
plotinus, on causality Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 252
plotinus Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 252
pompey (gnaeus pompeius magnus) Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 241
prediction Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140, 145
preface Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 148
principle of bivalence Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 145
process Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
providence Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
punishment and reward Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 145, 148
quintus (character of div.) Santangelo, Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond (2013) 17
reason (divine) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
res publica Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140, 148
responsibility, and natures Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
responsibility, moral Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
rome Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 148
sage (wise person) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
seneca Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
slavery (δουλεία), stoics on Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7
stoicism Santangelo, Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond (2013) 17
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
stoics, and determinism Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
stoics, and fate Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
stoics, and freedom Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
stoics/stoicism, on freedom (ἐλευθερία) Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 7
stoics Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258; Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
superstition Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 148
swerve (atomic) Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 145
truth Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 145
tullius cicero, m., de diuinatione Santangelo, Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond (2013) 17
tullius cicero, q. Santangelo, Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond (2013) 17
up to us (to ephhēmin) Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (1998) 258
valentinian, anthropology Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
valentinus Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
virtue / moral virtue (aretē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
voluntary (ἑκών, ἑκούσιος, voluntarius), gnostics on Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 175
will (voluntas) Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 140
will (βούλησις, voluntas) Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 175