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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



2338
Cicero, Lucullus, 136
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

13 results
1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.75, 4.74-4.78 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.75. quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator dictator est BE —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis quam corporis NV quam corporibus ABE corporibus ( om. quam) R —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum uti tum Se. ut tum (ut in ras., sequente ras. 2 vel 3 litt. ) N virtutum ABE ututū R ubi tum V denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit; 4.74. Nam ex eisdem verborum praestrigiis praestrigiis BEN praestigiis et regna nata vobis sunt et imperia et divitiae, et tantae quidem, ut omnia, quae ubique sint, sapientis esse dicatis. solum praeterea formosum, solum liberum, solum civem, stultos omnia contraria, add. hoc loco Mdv., post contraria Morel. quos etiam insanos esse vultis. haec para/doca illi, nos admirabilia dicamus. quid autem habent admirationis, cum prope accesseris? conferam tecum, quam cuique verbo rem subicias; nulla erit controversia. Omnia peccata paria dicitis. non ego tecum iam ita iocabor, Jocabor N locabor RB locabar E letabor V ut isdem his de his de edd. is de ER ijs de V de B om. N rebus, cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt, aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius. Peccata paria. 4.75. —Quonam modo?—Quia nec honesto quicquam honestius nec turpi turpius.—Perge porro; nam de isto magna dissensio est. illa argumenta propria videamus, cur omnia sint paria peccata.—Ut, inquit, in fidibus pluribus, nisi nisi Se. si nulla earum non ita contenta add. Se. nervis sit, ut concentum servare possit, omnes aeque incontentae sint, sic peccata, quia discrepant, aeque discrepant; paria sunt igitur.—Hic ambiguo ludimur. aeque enim contingit omnibus fidibus, ut incontentae sint, illud non continuo, ut aeque incontentae. collatio igitur ista te nihil iuvat. nec enim, omnes avaritias si aeque avaritias esse dixerimus, sequetur, ut etiam aequas esse dicamus. Ecce aliud simile dissimile. 4.76. Ut enim, inquit, gubernator aeque peccat, si palearum navem evertit et si auri, item aeque peccat, qui parentem et qui servum iniuria verberat.—Hoc non videre, cuius generis onus navis vehat, id ad gubernatoris artem nil nil om. R pertinere! itaque aurum paleamne paleamne V paleam ne RN paleamve BE portet, ad bene aut ad male guberdum nihil interesse! at quid inter parentem et servulum intersit, intellegi et potest et debet. ergo in guberdo nihil, in officio plurimum interest, quo in genere peccetur. et si in ipsa gubernatione neglegentia est navis eversa, maius est peccatum in auro quam in palea. omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam esse eam, quae communis appellatur prudentia, quam omnes, qui cuique qui cuique cuicumque Mdv. artificio praesunt, debent habere. ita ne hoc quidem modo paria quidem modo paria Lamb. modo paria quidem peccata sunt. 4.77. Urgent tamen et nihil remittunt. Quoniam, inquiunt, omne peccatum inbecillitatis et inconstantiae est, haec autem vitia in omnibus stultis aeque magna sunt, necesse est paria esse peccata. Quasi vero aut concedatur in omnibus stultis aeque magna esse vitia, et eadem inbecillitate et inconstantia L. Tubulum fuisse, qua qua BE quam illum, cuius is condemnatus est rogatione, P. Scaevolam, et quasi nihil inter res quoque ipsas, in quibus peccatur, intersit, ut, quo hae maiores minoresve sint, eo, quae peccentur in his rebus, aut 4.78. maiora sint aut minora! Itaque—iam enim concludatur oratio—hoc uno vitio maxime mihi premi videntur tui Stoici, quod se posse putant duas contrarias sententias optinere. quid enim est tam repugs quam eundem dicere, quod honestum sit, solum id bonum esse, qui dicat appetitionem rerum ad vivendum accommodatarum accomodatarum N 2 V accomodarum RN 1 accommodare BE a natura profectam? ita cum add. P. Man. ea volunt retinere, quae superiori sententiae conveniunt, in Aristonem incidunt; cum id fugiunt, re eadem defendunt, quae Peripatetici, verba tenent mordicus. quae rursus dum sibi evelli ex ordine nolunt, horridiores evadunt, asperiores, duriores et oratione et moribus. 3.75.  "Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a better right to the name of 'Master of the People' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man's authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. 4.74.  "The same verbal legerdemain supplies you with your kingdoms and empires and riches, riches so vast that you declare that everything the world contains is the property of the Wise Man. He alone, you say, is handsome, he alone a free man and a citizen: while the foolish are the opposite of all these, and according to you insane into the bargain. The Stoics call these paradoxa, as we might say 'startling truths.' But what is there so startling about them viewed at close quarters? I will consult you as to the meaning you attach to each term; there shall be no dispute. You Stoics say that all transgressions are equal. I won't jest with you now, as I did on the same subjects when you were prosecuting and I defending Lucius Murena. On that occasion I was addressing a jury, not an audience of scholars, and I even had to play to the gallery a little; but now I must reason more closely. 4.75.  Transgressions are equal. — How so, pray? — Because nothing can be better than good or baser than base. — Explain further, for there is much disagreement on this point; let us have your special arguments to prove how all transgressions are equal. — Suppose, says my opponent, of a number of lyres not one is so strung as to be in tune; then all are equally out of tune; similarly with transgressions, since all are departures from rule, all are equally departures from rule; therefore all are equal. — Here we are put off with an equivocation. All the lyres equally are out of tune; but it does not follow that all are equally out of tune. So your comparison does not help you; for it does not follow that because we pronounce every case of avarice equally to be avarice, we must therefore pronounce them all to be equal. 4.76.  Here is another of these false analogies: A skipper, says my adversary, commits an equal transgression if he loses his ship with a cargo of straw and if he does so when laden with gold; similarly a man is an equal transgressor if he beats his parent or his slave without due cause. — Fancy not seeing that the nature of the cargo has nothing to do with the skill of the navigator! so that whether he carries gold or straw makes no differences as regards good or bad seamanship; whereas the distinction between a parent and a mere slave is one that cannot and ought not to be overlooked. Hence the nature of the other upon which the offence is committed, which in navigation makes no difference, in conduct makes all the difference. Indeed in the case of navigation too, if the loss of the ship is due to negligence, the offence is greater with a cargo of gold than with one of straw. For the virtue known generally as prudence is an attribute as we hold of all the arts, and every master craftsman in each branch of art ought to possess it. Hence this proof also of the equality of transgression breaks down. 4.77.  "However, they press the matter, and will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, is a proof of weakness and instability of character; but all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though it were admitted that all foolish people possess an equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though there were no difference also between the respective circumstances in which the transgressions are committed, so that the magnitude of the transgression varies in proportion to the importance of the circumstances! 4.78.  And therefore (since my discourse must now conclude) this is the one chief defect under which your friends the Stoics seem to me to labour, — they think they can maintain two contrary opinions at once. How can you have a greater inconsistency than for the same person to say both that Moral Worth is the sole good and that we have a natural instinct to seek the things conducive to life? Thus in their desire to retain ideas consot with the former doctrine they are landed in the position of Aristo; and when they try to escape from this they adopt what is in reality the position of the Peripatetics, though still clinging tooth and nail to their own terminology. Unwilling again to take the next step and weed out this terminology, they end by being rougher and more uncouth than ever, full of asperities of style and even of manners.
2. Cicero, Lucullus, 101-109, 11, 110-113, 119, 12, 123, 13, 132-133, 14, 144-146, 15-62, 64, 69-70, 73, 77-78, 82-85, 98-100 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum, 4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, Pro Murena, 61-66, 60 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

60. Catonem descensurum ad accusandum non fuisse, nisi prius de causa iudicasset, iniquam legem, iudices, et miseram condicionem instituet periculis hominum, si existimabit iudicium accusatoris in reum pro aliquo praeiudicio valere oportere. ego tuum consilium, Cato, propter singulare animi mei de tua virtute iudicium vituperare non possum non possum y2 : non audeo Lag. 24: om. cett. nolo Boot ; non nulla forsitan forsitan in re y2 conformare et leviter emendare possim. ' non multa peccas,' inquit ille fortissimo viro senior magister, 'sed sed sed si y, ed. R peccas; te regere possum.' at ego non te non te del. Halm ; verissime dixerim peccare te nihil neque ulla in re te esse te esse esse w, Halm huius modi ut corrigendus potius quam leviter inflectendus esse videare. finxit enim te ipsa natura ad honestatem, gravitatem, temperantiam, magnitudinem animi, iustitiam, ad omnis denique virtutes magnum hominem et excelsum. accessit istuc accessit istuc Ernesti : accessitis tot S : accessit his (iis px ) tot cett. : accessit his dotibus coni. Ernesti doctrina non moderata nec mitis sed, ut mihi videtur, paulo asperior et durior quam aut veritas aut natura patitur patiatur fy .
5. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 197 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

197. What, then, ought he who hears this answer, and who is by nature inclined to receive instruction, to do, but to draw him out at once from thence? Accordingly, we are told, "He ran up and took him out from thence, because he who was abiding among the vessels of the soul, that is, the body and the outward senses, was not worthy to hear the doctrines and laws of the kingdom (and by the kingdom, we mean wisdom, since we call the wise man a king); but when he has risen up and changed his place, then the mist around him is dissipated, and he will be able to see clearly. Very appropriately, therefore, does the companion of knowledge think it right to leave the region of the outward sense, by name Charran;
6. Philo of Alexandria, On The Change of Names, 152 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

152. And these are not my words only, but those of the most holy scriptures, in which certain persons are introduced as saying to Abraham, "Thou art a king from God among Us;" not out of consideration for his resources (for what resources could a man have who was an emigrant and who had no city to inhabit, but who was wandering over a great extent of impassable country?), but because they saw that he had a royal disposition in his mind, so that they confessed, in the words of Moses, that he was the only wise king.
7. Philo of Alexandria, On Sobriety, 56 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

8. Philo of Alexandria, On Dreams, 2.244 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

2.244. for those who behold the excellence of Abraham say unto him, "Thou art a king, sent from God among Us:" proposing as a maxim, for those who study philosophy, that the wise man alone is a ruler and a king, and that virtue is the only irresponsible authority and sovereignty. XXXVII.
9. Lucian, Philosophies For Sale, 20 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.122 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified.
11. Augustine, Contra Academicos, 3.41 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

12. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.101.14-2.101.20 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

13. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.591, 3.617, 3.658, 3.663, 3.674, 3.682



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
alexandria Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 57
antiochus of ascalon Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25, 57; Volk and Williams, Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry and Politics (2006) 159
arcesilaus Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
argument Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 57
athens Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 57
augustinus a. Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25, 57
carneades of cyrene Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25, 57
change (metabolē) to wisdom, between opposite states Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59, 60
change (metabolē) to wisdom, in ethics Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59, 60
change (metabolē) to wisdom Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59, 60
chrysippus, on the fact that zeno used terms in their proper significations Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 60
cicero Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59; Volk and Williams, Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry and Politics (2006) 159
criterium / criterion Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
dogmatism Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25, 57
epistemology Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 57
evil Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
excellence (aretē), as tenor Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
excutere se, exile, figurative potential of Volk and Williams, Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry and Politics (2006) 159
helvia Volk and Williams, Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry and Politics (2006) 159
kataleptic representation / comprehensive representation / καταληπτικὴ φαντασία Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
lucullus l. licinius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25, 57
negotium Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
new academy Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25, 57
otium Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
paradox Volk and Williams, Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry and Politics (2006) 159
perception / comprehensio / κατάληψις Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
philo of larissa Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25, 57
plato Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
platonism Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
plutarch Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59, 60
probable / probability / probabilitas / πιθανόν Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
proclus Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
roman books Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 57
sage, as beautiful Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
sage, as king Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
sage, as rich Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59, 60
sage, as virtuous' Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 60
sage, as virtuous Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
scepticism Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25, 57
socrates Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
sosus Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 57
stobaeus Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 60
stoicism/stoics, paradoxa Volk and Williams, Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry and Politics (2006) 159
tradition Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 57
varro m. terentius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25
verisimilaritude / veri simile / εἰκός Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 25