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Cicero, De Finibus, 4.7


nanThis whole field Zeno and his successors were either unable or unwilling to discover; at all events they left it untouched. Cleanthes it is true wrote a treatise on rhetoric, and Chrysippus wrote one too, but what are they like? why, they furnish a complete manual for anyone whose ambition is to hold his tongue; you can judge then of their style, coining new words, discarding those approved by use. 'But,' you will say, 'think how vast are the themes that they essay! for example, that this entire universe is our own town.' You see the magnitude of a Stoic's task, to convince an inhabitant of Circeii that the whole vast world is his own borough! 'If so, he must rouse his audience to enthusiasm.' What? a Stoic rouse enthusiasm? He is much more likely to extinguish any enthusiasm the student may have had to begin with. Even those brief maxims that you propounded, that the Wise Man alone is king, dictator, millionaire, — neatly rounded off no doubt as you put them: of course, for you learnt them from professors of rhetoric; — but how bald those very maxims, on the lips of the Stoics, when they talk about the potency of virtue, — virtue which they rate so highly that it can of itself, they say, confer happiness! Their meagre little syllogisms are mere pin‑pricks; they may convince the intellect, but they cannot convert the heart, and the hearer goes away no better than he came. What they say is possibly true, and certainly important; but the way in which they say it is wrong; it is far too petty. <


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

9 results
1. Cicero, On Divination, 2.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.3. Quibus rebus editis tres libri perfecti sunt de natura deorum, in quibus omnis eius loci quaestio continetur. Quae ut plane esset cumulateque perfecta, de divinatione ingressi sumus his libris scribere; quibus, ut est in animo, de fato si adiunxerimus, erit abunde satis factum toti huic quaestioni. Atque his libris adnumerandi sunt sex de re publica, quos tum scripsimus, cum gubernacula rei publicae tenebamus. Magnus locus philosophiaeque proprius a Platone, Aristotele, Theophrasto totaque Peripateticorum familia tractatus uberrime. Nam quid ego de Consolatione dicam? quae mihi quidem ipsi sane aliquantum medetur, ceteris item multum illam profuturam puto. Interiectus est etiam nuper liber is, quem ad nostrum Atticum de senectute misimus; in primisque, quoniam philosophia vir bonus efficitur et fortis, Cato noster in horum librorum numero ponendus est. 2.3. After publishing the works mentioned I finished three volumes On the Nature of the Gods, which contain a discussion of every question under that head. With a view of simplifying and extending the latter treatise I started to write the present volume On Divination, to which I plan to add a work on Fate; when that is done every phase of this particular branch of philosophy will be sufficiently discussed. To this list of works must be added the six volumes which I wrote while holding the helm of state, entitled On the Republic — a weighty subject, appropriate for philosophic discussion, and one which has been most elaborately treated by Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the entire peripatetic school. What need is there to say anything of my treatise On Consolation? For it is the source of very great comfort to me and will, I think, be of much help to others. I have also recently thrown in that book On Old Age, which I sent my friend Atticus; and, since it is by philosophy that a man is made virtuous and strong, my Cato is especially worthy of a place among the foregoing books. 2.3. Nevertheless Democritus jests rather prettily for a natural philosopher — and there is no more arrogant class — when he says:No one regards the things before his feet,But views with care the regions of the sky.And yet Democritus gives his approval to divination by means of entrails only to the extent of believing that their condition and colour indicate whether hay and other crops will be abundant or the reverse, and he even thinks that the entrails give signs of future health or sickness. O happy mortal! He never failed to have his joke — that is absolutely certain. But was he so amused with petty trifles as to fail to see that his theory would be plausible only on the assumption that the entrails of all cattle changed to the same colour and condition at the same time? But if at the same instant the liver of one ox is smooth and full and that of another is rough and shrunken, what inference can be drawn from the condition and colour of the entrails?
2. Cicero, On Fate, 3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.14, 1.22, 3.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.3.  In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals.
4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.14-1.15, 1.22, 3.3, 4.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.14. nam cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi causa uterque venisset, pauca primo inter nos inter nos primo BE de litteris, quarum summum erat in utroque studium, deinde Torquatus: Quoniam nacti te, nacti te VN 2 hac tite A 1 BER, N 1 (ut videtur); hac die A 2 inquit, sumus aliquando otiosum, certe audiam, quid sit, quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt, qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes, eum quem ego arbitror unum vidisse verum maximisque erroribus animos hominum liberavisse et omnia tradidisse, quae pertinerent pertinent R ad bene beateque vivendum. sed existimo te, sicut nostrum Triarium, minus ab eo delectari, quod ista Platonis, Aristoteli, aristoteli A 1 aristotili E aristotilis Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. nam illud illuc NV ad illud A 2 quidem adduci vix possum, ut ea, quae senserit ille, tibi non vera videantur. 1.15. Vide, quantum, inquam, fallare, fallare A. Man. fallere Torquate. oratio me istius philosophi non offendit; nam et complectitur verbis, quod vult, et dicit plane, quod intellegam; et tamen ego a philosopho, si afferat eloquentiam, non asperner, si non habeat, non admodum flagitem. re mihi non aeque satisfacit, satis facit R satisfecit et quidem locis pluribus. plurimis BE sed quot homines, tot sententiae; falli igitur possumus. Quam ob rem tandem, inquit, non satisfacit? te enim iudicem aequum puto, modo quae dicat ille bene noris. 1.22. Iam in altera altera in BE philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disserendi, quae logikh/ logice ABERN loyce V dicitur, iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus nudus mundus BE est. tollit definitiones, nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet, non quo modo efficiatur concludaturque ratio tradit, non qua via captiosa solvantur ambigua distinguantur ostendit; iudicia rerum in sensibus ponit, quibus si semel aliquid falsi pro vero probatum sit, sublatum esse omne iudicium veri et falsi putat. 3.3. ipse etiam dicit dicit cf. p. 13, 24—29 Epicurus ne ne nec RNV argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. nec enim in Torquati sermone quicquam sermone quicquam VN 2 sermone nec quicquam (quitquam ABE) implicatum inpl. R aut tortuosum fuit, nostraque, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis tum magis nobis, quibus etiam verba parienda sunt inponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur cogitans in omni arte, cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit, multam novitatem nominum esse, cum constituantur earum rerum vocabula, quae in quaque arte versentur. 4.7. Totum genus hoc Zeno et qui ab eo sunt aut non potuerunt tueri aut noluerunt, certe reliquerunt. add. Cobet Mnemosyn. nov. ser. III p. 99 quamquam scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes, Chrysippus etiam, sed sic, ut, si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides, quo modo loquantur. nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata. At quanta cotur! mundum hunc omnem oppidum esse nostrum! incendi incendi ABERN 1 incendit N 2 V igitur igitur ergo BE eos, qui audiunt, vides. quantam rem agas, quantam rem agas = quid efficere quis possit, quod (ut illi Stoicorum conatus) tantum sit, ut Circeiis qui habitet cet. agat (t ab alt. m. in ras. ) N ut Circeiis qui habitet totum hunc mundum suum municipium esse existimet? Quid? ille incendat? restinguet citius, si ardentem acceperit. Ista ipsa, ista ipsa p. 118, 29 sqq. quae tu breviter: regem, dictatorem, divitem solum esse sapientem, a te quidem apte ac rotunde; quippe; habes enim a rhetoribus; illorum vero ista ipsa quam exilia de virtutis vi! quam tantam volunt esse, ut beatum per se efficere possit. pungunt quasi pungunt enim quasi BE aculeis interrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutantur animo et idem abeunt, qui venerant. res enim fortasse verae, certe graves, non ita tractantur, ut debent, sed aliquanto minutius. 3.3.  In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. 4.7.  This whole field Zeno and his successors were either unable or unwilling to discover; at all events they left it untouched. Cleanthes it is true wrote a treatise on rhetoric, and Chrysippus wrote one too, but what are they like? why, they furnish a complete manual for anyone whose ambition is to hold his tongue; you can judge then of their style, coining new words, discarding those approved by use. 'But,' you will say, 'think how vast are the themes that they essay! for example, that this entire universe is our own town.' You see the magnitude of a Stoic's task, to convince an inhabitant of Circeii that the whole vast world is his own borough! 'If so, he must rouse his audience to enthusiasm.' What? a Stoic rouse enthusiasm? He is much more likely to extinguish any enthusiasm the student may have had to begin with. Even those brief maxims that you propounded, that the Wise Man alone is king, dictator, millionaire, — neatly rounded off no doubt as you put them: of course, for you learnt them from professors of rhetoric; — but how bald those very maxims, on the lips of the Stoics, when they talk about the potency of virtue, — virtue which they rate so highly that it can of itself, they say, confer happiness! Their meagre little syllogisms are mere pin‑pricks; they may convince the intellect, but they cannot convert the heart, and the hearer goes away no better than he came. What they say is possibly true, and certainly important; but the way in which they say it is wrong; it is far too petty.
5. Cicero, On Invention, 1.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.1. Saepe et multum hoc mecum cogitavi, bonine an mali plus attulerit hominibus et civitatibus copia di- cendi ac summum eloquentiae studium. nam cum et nostrae rei publicae detrimenta considero et maxi- marum civitatum veteres animo calamitates colligo, non minimam video per disertissimos homines in- vectam partem incommodorum; cum autem res ab nostra memoria propter vetustatem remotas ex litte- rarum monumentis repetere instituo, multas urbes constitutas, plurima bella restincta, firmissimas socie- tates, sanctissimas amicitias intellego cum animi ra- tione tum facilius eloquentia comparatas. ac me quidem diu cogitantem ratio ipsa in hanc potissimum sententiam ducit, ut existimem sapientiam sine elo- quentia parum prodesse civitatibus, eloquentiam vero sine sapientia nimium obesse plerumque, prodesse numquam. quare si quis omissis rectissimis atque honestissimis studiis rationis et officii consumit omnem operam in exercitatione dicendi, is inutilis sibi, per- niciosus patriae civis alitur; qui vero ita sese armat eloquentia, ut non oppugnare commoda patriae, sed pro his propugnare possit, is mihi vir et suis et pu- blicis rationibus utilissimus atque amicissimus civis fore videtur.
6. Cicero, On Duties, 1.2-1.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. 1.3. Quam ob rem magnopere te hortor, mi Cicero, ut non solum orationes meas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam illis fere se aequarunt, studiose legas; vis enim maior in illis dicendi, sed hoc quoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum orationis genus. Et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere elaboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium, utrumque certe secuti sumus.
7. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.53-1.54, 3.72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.53. Quis enim nescit maximam vim exsistere oratoris in hominum mentibus vel ad iram aut ad odium aut ad dolorem incitandis vel ab hisce eisdem permotionibus ad lenitatem misericordiamque revocandis? Quae nisi qui naturas hominum vimque omnem humanitatis causasque eas, quibus mentes aut incitantur aut reflectuntur, penitus perspexerit, dicendo quod volet perficere non poterit. Atque totus hic locus philosophorum proprius videtur, neque orator me auctore umquam repugnabit; 1.54. sed, cum illis cognitionem rerum concesserit, quod in ea solum illi voluerint elaborare, tractationem orationis, quae sine illa scientia est nulla, sibi adsumet; hoc enim est proprium oratoris, quod saepe iam dixi, oratio gravis et ornata et hominum sensibus ac mentibus accommodata. 3.72. Namque, ut ante dixi, veteres illi usque ad Socratem omnem omnium rerum, quae ad mores hominum, quae ad vitam, quae ad virtutem, quae ad rem publicam pertinebant, cognitionem et scientiam cum dicendi ratione iungebant; postea dissociati, ut exposui, a Socrate diserti a doctis et deinceps a Socraticis item omnibus philosophi eloquentiam despexerunt, oratores sapientiam, neque quicquam ex alterius parte tetigerunt, nisi quod illi ab his aut ab illis hi mutuarentur; ex quo promisce haurirent, si manere in pristina communione voluissent.
8. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum, 2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

9. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 2.8, 2.52-2.53, 4.9, 4.49-4.50 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.8. nam, ut Platonem reliquosque Socraticos et deinceps eos, qui ab his profecti sunt, legunt omnes, etiam qui illa aut non adprobant appr. KV c R c (ad|adp. R 1 ) aut non studiosissime consectantur, Philosophia 283, 23 consectantur H consecrantur R 1 V 1 ( corr. R c V c ) Epicurum autem et Metrodorum non fere praeter suos quisquam in manus sumit, sic hos Latinos i soli legunt, qui illa recte dici putant. nobis autem videtur, quicquid litteris mandetur, id commendari omnium eruditorum lectioni lectione K si G 1 decere; nobis... 28 decere H nec, si id id post si del. Ba.; cf. comm. ipsi minus consequi possumus, idcirco minus id ita faciendum esse sentimus. 2.52. 'cave turpe quicquam, languidum, non virile.' obversentur obversentur s obversetur GRK 2 observetur K 1 V (s in r. m.vet ) species honestae honeste X( alt. e transf. V vet ) animo: animo ( aio ) s ūo V 1 ( exp. 2autc ) uero GKR viro Tr. Zeno proponatur Eleates, qui perpessus est omnia potius quam conscios conscius X (consscius G 1 ) corr. V rec s delendae tyrannidis indicaret; de Anaxarcho de anaxarcho V 2 Democritio denax. X cogitetur, qui cum Cypri cypri V (p e corr. 1 ) cyrri GKR(r 1 ) in manus Timocreontis Timocreontis Nicocreontis s regis incidisset, nullum genus supplicii supplici V 1 deprecatus est neque recusavit. Callanus Callanus W cf. Th. l. l. Indus, indoctus ac barbarus, in radicibus Caucasi natus, sua voluntate vivus nobis V 2 combustus est; nos, si pes condoluit, si dens sed fac totum fac totum factotum facto tum factottum K 1 dolere dolere om. V dolore K 1 G 1 ( corr. K 2 G 2 ) corpus si tactum dolore corpus s We. ( addito est) sed... corpus del. Bai. , ferre non possumus. opinio est enim quaedam effeminata ac levis—nec in dolore magis quam eadem in voluptate—, qua qua V cum liquescimus liquiscimus R 1 fluimusque flu musque V ( m V c ) mollitia, apis aculeum sine clamore ferre non possumus. 2.53. at vero C. C. G. X Marius, rusticanus vir, sed plane vir, cum secaretur, ut supra supra p.298,5 dixi, principio vetuit se alligari, C. Marius, rust. vir, cum secaretur, principio ... alligari Char. GL. I 215,17 nec quisquam nequisquam KV 1 ante Marium solutus dicitur esse sectus. esse sectus et postea alii V ( signa app. 2 ) cur ergo postea alii? valuit auctoritas. videsne igitur opinionis esse, non naturae malum? et tamen fuisse acrem morsum doloris idem Marius ostendit; crus enim alterum non praebuit. ita et tulit dolorem ut vir et ut homo maiorem ferre sine causa necessaria noluit. Totum igitur in eo est, ut tibi imperes. ostendi autem, quod esset imperandi genus; atque haec cogitatio, quid patientia, quid fortitudine, quid magnitudine animi dignissimum sit, non solum animum comprimit, sed ipsum etiam dolorem nescio quo pacto mitiorem facit. 4.9. Sic prorsus intellego. Utrum igitur mavis? statimne nos vela vela add. G 2 facere an quasi e portu egredientis aegridientis V 1 paululum remigare? Quidnam est istuc? non enim intellego. Quia Chrysippus et Stoici cum de animi perturbationibus St. fr. 3, 483 disputant, magnam partem in his his is? partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt, illa eorum perexigua oratio est, qua medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos esse patiantur, Peripatetici autem ad placandos animos multa adferunt, spinas partiendi et definiendi praetermittunt. quaerebam igitur, utrum panderem vela orationis vela orationis V c (vela or in r. ) s velorationis GKR (o R 2 ) statim an eam ante paululum dialecticorum remis propellerem. propellerem propalarem K 2 Isto modo vero; erit enim hoc totum, quod quaero, ex utroque perfectius. Est id quidem rectius; 4.49. cuius, ut arma sumpsit, ingressio laetitiam attulit attollit K sociis, terrorem autem autem add. G 2 hostibus, ut ipsum Hectorem, haect. KV (6 G) quem ad modum est apud Homerum, toto pectore trementem provocasse ad pugnam paeniteret. atque atque V hi conlocuti inter se, prius quam manum consererent, leniter et quiete nihil ne in ipsa quidem pugna iracunde rabioseve fecerunt. ego ne Torquatum quidem illum, qui hoc cognomen cognomen e corr. V rec B s cognovit nomen X invenit, iratum existimo Gallo torquem detraxisse, nec Marcellum apud Clastidium ideo fortem fuisse, quia fuerit iratus. 4.50. de Africano quidem, quia notior est nobis propter recentem memoriam, vel iurare possum non illum iracundia tum inflammatum fuisse, cum in acie M. Alliennium aciem alliennium KRG ( ex ali- 1 ) acie malliennium V Paelignum pelignum KV e corr. scuto protexerit gladiumque hosti in pectus infixerit. de L. Bruto fortasse dubitarim, an propter infinitum odium tyranni ecfrenatius effren. K 1 (hecfren. c ) e fren. V 1 in Arruntem arrunte X invaserit; video enim utrumque comminus comminus eqs. Ennii verba latere susp. Mue. adhuc G 1 ictu cecidisse contrario. quid igitur huc adhibetis iram? an fortitudo, nisi insanire coepit, impetus suos non habet? quid? Herculem, quem in caelum ista ipsa, quam vos iracundiam esse vultis, sustulit fortitudo, iratumne ratumne X corr. V 3 s censes conflixisse cum Erymanthio erymathio X (erim. V) corr. R 2 apro aut aut ut R 1 ( corr. c? ) K leone Nemeaeo? nemaeo X an etiam Theseus Marathonii tauri marathonii auri GV 1 ( corr. c ) marathonii auri R 1 marathoniit auri K cornua conprehendit comp. KR iratus? vide ne fortitudo minime sit rabiosa sitque iracundia tota levitatis.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aristotle,cicero on Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
cicero,on epicureans Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
cicero,on philosophy Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
cicero,on plato and aristotle Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
cicero,on stoicism Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
cicero Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
determinism,dialectic Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
dialectic,ciceros views Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 22
emotions Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 22
epicureanism Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
exempla (narrative examples) Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 22
exousia Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 132
mackendrick,p. Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
marius,gaius Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 22
oratory,contrasted with philosophy Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 22
plato,cicero on Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
politics Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
rhetoric' Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 286
rhetoric,ciceros views Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 22
rhetoric,use of examples Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 22
soul,immortality of Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 22
stoicism,rhetorical style Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 22