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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Cicero, Academica, 2.9
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1. Cicero, Academica, 1.15, 1.17-1.18, 1.25-1.26, 1.33, 1.35, 1.41, 1.46, 2.7-2.8, 2.100, 2.105 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: 'Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnibus *d omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et de vitiis omninoque de de 1 om. *d bonis rebus et malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum. 1.17. Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta constituta *g est Academicorum et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. nam cum Speusippum sororis filium Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, duo duos p 2 p 1 p 2 rg 2 f c autem praestantissimo praestatnissimos mn studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Calchedonium et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele Peripatetici dicti sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, quia quia *g*p qui wn Platonis instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. sed utrique Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitanter dubitanter Bai. -tantem *g -tationem *d (tionem in ras. p ) de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem consuetudine mn ; adh. cons. in. ras. p disserendi reliquerunt. ita facta est, est disserendi *d (diss. in ras. p ) quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 1.18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus ut dixi nominibus una; nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat. abundantia quadam ingenii praestabat, ut mihi quidem mihi uid. quidem *t*d transposuit m c (q. in ras. p ) videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque fugiendarumque om. p partitio. Sed quid ago' inquit aut sumne sanus qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non sus Minervam sus sum n 1 g 1 f (Minerua g 1 ) sum sus p 1 ? ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus Tu vero inquit perge Varro; valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque ista delectant cum Latine dicuntur et isto modo. Quid me inquam putas, qui philosophiam iam professus prof. iam *g sim sim *dn sum *g populo nostro me me om. *d exhibiturum. 1.25. Nos vero inquit Atticus; quin etiam Graecis licebit utare cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient. VA. Bene sane facis; sed enitar ut ut in p 1 Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce eiusce *gx modi verbis ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus ut aliis multis consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. qualitates s cf. Mart. Cap. 5, 510 igitur appellavi quas poio/thtas Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum sed philosophorum, atque id in multis; dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica, suis utuntur. et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium; s. cf. fin. 3, 3 nat. deor. 1, 44 frg. inc. K 10 Hier. in Gal. 3, 26 aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. quod si Graeci faciunt qui in his rebus tot iam saecla versantur, quanto id nobis magis m. n. *d n. maius p p smn concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur. 1.26. 'Tu vero' inquam Varro bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, ut effecisti, ut fecisti s uti f- RKl. sed etiam verborum. VA. Audebimus ergo inquit 'novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. erit *gpx est w —earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes aliae ex his ortae. principes sunt unius modi et simplices; ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes. itaque aer (hoc inde ab hoc rursus deest s hoc om. *d quoque utimur enim enim iam Ha. pro Latino) et et 1 om. *d ignis et aqua et terra prima primae s sunt; ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum quae gignuntur e terra. ergo illa initia et ut e Graeco vertam elementa dicuntur; e quibus aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare singulares *gw eorumque quattuor quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles Arist. cf. AKail diss. phil. Vind. 11, 90 quoddam esse rebatur. 1.33. Haec forma forma om. *d erat illis prima, a Platone tradita; cuius quas acceperim dissupationes dissupationes Bai. disputat- *g*d si vultis exponam.' Nos vero volumus inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam. ATT. Et recte quidem quidem om. *d inquit respondes; praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. VA. “Aristoteles igitur igitur om. *d primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, quas ... erat amplexatus pars codicum Non. p. 470 ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, ferret Ern. vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae; spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 1.35. sed Zeno, cum Arcesilam Archesilaum p 1 w anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. eam quoque si videtur correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus.” Mihi vero inquam videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium. VA. 'Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat qui ut Theophrastus nervos neruis p virtutis inciderit, incideret s Lb. -rent n sed contra qui omnia quae que om. s quaecumque Reid ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis idque appellaret honestum quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 1.41. visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec? hoc Dav. ' ATT. nos vero inquit; inquam Ald. quonam quoniam ng 1 quam p 1 ; (quo)nam ... sed in ras. p enim alio alio om. *dn modo katalhmpto diceres? — VA. “sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum probatum *g esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur; ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat at, del. Man. ac gf cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re in re iure mw usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter inscientiam nominabat; ex qua existebat existebat Pl. -erat p -eret rw extiterat *g etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla imb. adsensio Pl. et cum falso incognitoque communis. 1.46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur—sed tamen illa quam exposuisti exposuisti Dur. exposui *g*d ; an a Cicerone neglegenter scriptum ? vetus, haec nova nominetur. quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, producta mn (per in ras. p ) qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex is qui illum audierant maximeque ex Epicureo Epicureo ms -ZZZo *g*d Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret unum tamen praeter ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate et to fuit īo facultate et do m 1, īo del. et do ctrina m 2 ; et to om. *dn et co pia dicendi Chr. ” quid autem stomachatur stomachetur Sig. Mnesarchus, quid Antipater digladiatur Non. p. 65 (digladiari) digladiatur F 1 -etur cett. cum Carneade tot voluminibus? *
2. Cicero, On Divination, 1.7, 2.8-2.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.7. Sed haec quidem laus Academiae praestantissumi philosophi iudicio et testimonio conprobata est. Etenim nobismet ipsis quaerentibus, quid sit de divinatione iudicandum, quod a Carneade multa acute et copiose contra Stoicos disputata sint, verentibusque, ne temere vel falsae rei vel non satis cognitae adsentiamur, faciendum videtur, ut diligenter etiam atque etiam argumenta cum argumentis comparemus, ut fecimus in iis tribus libris, quos de natura deorum scripsimus. Nam cum omnibus in rebus temeritas in adsentiendo errorque turpis est, tum in eo loco maxime, in quo iudicandum est, quantum auspiciis rebusque divinis religionique tribuamus; est enim periculum, ne aut neglectis iis impia fraude aut susceptis anili superstitione obligemur. 2.8. Nam cum de divinatione Quintus frater ea disseruisset, quae superiore libro scripta sunt, satisque ambulatum videretur, tum in bibliotheca, quae in Lycio est, adsedimus. Atque ego: Adcurate tu quidem, inquam, Quinte, et Stoice Stoicorum sententiam defendisti, quodque me maxime delectat, plurimis nostris exemplis usus es, et iis quidem claris et inlustribus. Dicendum est mihi igitur ad ea, quae sunt a te dicta, sed ita, nihil ut adfirmem, quaeram omnia, dubitans plerumque et mihi ipse diffidens. Si enim aliquid certi haberem, quod dicerem, ego ipse divinarem, qui esse divinationem nego. 2.9. Etenim me movet illud, quod in primis Carneades quaerere solebat, quarumnam rerum divinatio esset, earumne, quae sensibus perciperentur. At eas quidem cernimus, audimus, gustamus, olfacimus, tangimus. Num quid ergo in his rebus est, quod provisione aut permotione mentis magis quam natura ipsa sentiamus? aut num nescio qui ille divinus, si oculis captus sit, ut Tiresias fuit, possit, quae alba sint, quae nigra, dicere aut, si surdus sit, varietates vocum aut modos noscere? Ad nullam igitur earum rerum, quae sensu accipiuntur, divinatio adhibetur. Atqui ne in iis quidem rebus, quae arte tractantur, divinatione opus est. Etenim ad aegros non vates aut hariolos, sed medicos solemus adducere, nec vero, qui fidibus aut tibiis uti volunt, ab haruspicibus accipiunt earum tractationem, sed a musicis. 1.7. At any rate, this praiseworthy tendency of the Academy to doubt has been approved by the solemn judgement of a most eminent philosopher. [4] Accordingly, since I, too, am in doubt as to the proper judgement to be rendered in regard to divination because of the many pointed and exhaustive arguments urged by Carneades against the Stoic view, and since I am afraid of giving a too hasty assent to a proposition which may turn out either false or insufficiently established, I have determined carefully and persistently to compare argument with argument just as I did in my three books On the Nature of the Gods. For a hasty acceptance of an erroneous opinion is discreditable in any case, and especially so in an inquiry as to how much weight should be given to auspices, to sacred rites, and to religious observances; for we run the risk of committing a crime against the gods if we disregard them, or of becoming involved in old womens superstition if we approve them. [5] 1.7. As briefly as I could, I have discussed divination by means of dreams and frenzy, which, as I said, are devoid of art. Both depend on the same reasoning, which is that habitually employed by our friend Cratippus: The human soul is in some degree derived and drawn from a source exterior to itself. Hence we understand that outside the human soul there is a divine soul from which the human soul is sprung. Moreover, that portion of the human soul which is endowed with sensation, motion, and carnal desire is inseparable from bodily influence; while that portion which thinks and reasons is most vigorous when it is most distant from the body. 2.8. After my brother Quintus had delivered his views on divination, as set out in the preceding volume, and we had walked as much as we wished, we took our seats in the library in my Lyceum, and I remarked:Really, my dear Quintus, you have defended the Stoic doctrine with accuracy and like a Stoic. But the thing that delights me most is the fact that you illustrated your argument with many incidents taken from Roman sources — incidents, too, of a distinguished and noble type. I must now reply to what you said, but I must do so with great diffidence and with many misgivings, and in such a way as to affirm nothing and question everything. For if I should assume anything that I said to be certain I should myself be playing the diviner while saying that no such thing as divination exists! 2.8. Then dismiss Romuluss augural staff, which you say the hottest of fires was powerless to burn, and attach slight importance to the whetstone of Attus Navius. Myths would have no place in philosophy. It would have been more in keeping with your rôle as a philosopher to consider, first, the nature of divination generally, second, its origin, and third, its consistency. What, then, is the nature of an art which makes prophets out of birds that wander aimlessly about — now here, now there — and makes the action or inaction of men depend upon the song or flight of birds? and why was the power granted to some birds to give a favourable omen when on the left side and to others when on the right? Again, however, when, and by whom, shall we say that the system was invented? The Etruscans, it is true, find the author of their system in the boy who was ploughed up out of the ground; but whom have we? Attus Navius? But Romulus and Remus, both of whom, by tradition, were augurs, lived many years earlier. Are we to say that it was invented by the Pisidians, Cilicians, or Phrygians? It is your judgement, then, that those devoid of human learning are the authors of a divine science! [39] 2.9. I am impressed with the force of the questions with which Carneades used to begin his discussions: What are the things within the scope of divination? Are they things that are perceived by the senses? But those are things that we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch. Is there, then, in such objects some quality that we can better perceive with the aid of prophecy and inspiration than we can with the aid of the senses alone? And is there any diviner, anywhere, who, if blind, like Tiresias, could tell the difference between white and black? Or, who, if deaf, could distinguish between different voices and different tones? Now you must admit that divination is not applicable in any case where knowledge is gained through the senses.Nor is there any need of divination even in matters within the domain of science and of art. For, when people are sick, we, as a general rule, do not summon a prophet or a seer, but we call in a physician. Again, persons who want to learn to play on the harp or on the flute take lessons, not from a soothsayer, but from a musician. 2.9. What inconceivable madness! For it is not enough to call an opinion foolishness when it is utterly devoid of reason. However, Diogenes the Stoic makes some concessions to the Chaldeans. He says that they have the power of prophecy to the extent of being able to tell the disposition of any child and the calling for which he is best fitted. All their other claims of prophetic powers he absolutely denies. He says, for example, that twins are alike in appearance, but that they generally unlike in career and in fortune. Procles and Eurysthenes, kings of the Lacedaemonians, were twin brothers.
3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.2-2.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.2. sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros sophistas, ut e Platone intellegi potest, lusos videmus a Socrate. is enim percontando percontando A 2 percun- tando NV percunctando A 1 BE per cunctando R atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, ea haec R quae ii ii hi BER hii A hij NV respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas archesilas A acesilaos N achesilas V eum revocavit instituitque ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non de se quaererent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent; quod cum dixissent, ille contra. sed eum eum om. RNV qui audiebant, quoad poterant, defendebant sententiam suam. apud ceteros autem philosophos, qui quaesivit aliquid, tacet; quod quidem iam fit etiam etiam om. BER in Academia. ubi enim is, qui audire vult, ita dixit: 'Voluptas mihi videtur esse summum bonum', perpetua oratione contra disputatur, ut facile intellegi possit eos, qui aliquid sibi videri sibi aliquid (aliquit E) videri BE aliquid videri sibi V dicant, non ipsos in ea sententia esse, sed audire velle contraria. Nos commodius agimus. 2.3. non enim solum Torquatus dixit quid sentiret, sed etiam cur. ego autem arbitror, quamquam admodum delectatus sum eius oratione perpetua, tamen commodius, cum in rebus singulis insistas et intellegas quid quisque concedat, quid abnuat, ex rebus concessis concludi quod velis et ad exitum perveniri. cum enim fertur quasi torrens oratio, quamvis multa cuiusque modi rapiat, nihil tamen teneas, nihil apprehendas, reprehendas BE nusquam orationem rapidam cœrceas. Omnis autem in quaerendo, quae via quadam et ratione habetur, oratio praescribere primum debet ut quibusdam in formulis ea res agetur, ut, inter quos disseritur, conveniat quid sit id, de quo disseratur. 2.2.  But we read how Socrates made fun of the aforesaid Gorgias, and the rest of the Sophists also, as we can learn from Plato. His own way was to question his interlocutors and by a process of cross-examination to elicit their opinions, so that he might express his own views by way of rejoinder to their answers. This practice was abandoned by his successors, but was afterwards revived by Arcesilas, who made it a rule that those who wished to hear him should not ask him questions but should state their own opinions; and when they had done so he argued against them. But whereas the pupils of Arcesilas did their best to defend their own position, with the rest of the philosophers the student who has put a question is then silent; and indeed this is nowadays the custom even in the Academy. The would‑be learner says, for example, 'The Chief Good in my opinion is pleasure,' and the contrary is then maintained in a formal discourse; so that it is not hard to realize that those who say they are of a certain opinion do not actually hold the view they profess, but want to hear what can be argued against it. 2.3.  We are adopting a more profitable mode of procedure, for Torquatus has not only told us his own opinion but also his reasons for holding it. Still, for my part, though I enjoyed his long discourse very much, I believe all the same that it is better to stop at point after point, and make out what each person is willing to admit and what he denies, and then to draw such inferences as one desires from these admissions and so arrive at one's conclusion. When the exposition goes rushing on like a mountain stream in spate, it carries along with it a vast amount of miscellaneous material, but there is nothing one can take hold of or rescue from the flood; there is no point at which one can stem the torrent of oratory. "However, in philosophical investigation a methodical and systematic discourse must always begin by formulating a preamble like that which occurs in certain forms of process at law, 'The issue shall be as follows'; so that the parties to the debate may be agreed as to what the subject is about which they are debating.  
4. Cicero, On Invention, 2.4, 2.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.4. Quod quoniam nobis quoque voluntatis accidit, ut artem dicendi perscriberemus, non unum aliquod pro- posuimus exemplum, cuius omnes partes, quocumque essent in genere, exprimendae nobis necessarie vi- derentur; sed omnibus unum in locum coactis scripto- ribus, quod quisque commodissime praecipere vide- batur, excerpsimus et ex variis ingeniis excellentis- sima quaeque libavimus. ex iis enim, qui nomine et memoria digni sunt, nec nihil optime nec omnia prae- clarissime quisquam dicere nobis videbatur. quapropter stultitia visa est aut a bene inventis alicuius recedere, si quo in vitio eius offenderemur, aut ad vitia eius quoque accedere, cuius aliquo bene praecepto duceremur. 2.8. cuius ipsius quam constet esse artem non in- venimus. discipulorum autem atque eorum, qui pro- tinus ab hac sunt disciplina profecti, multa de arte praecepta reperimus. ex his duabus diversis sicuti fa- miliis, quarum altera cum versaretur in philosophia, nonnullam rhetoricae quoque artis sibi curam assume- bat, altera vero omnis in dicendi erat studio et prae- ceptione occupata, unum quoddam est conflatum ge- nus a posterioribus, qui ab utrisque ea, quae com- mode dici videbantur, in suas artes contulerunt; quos ipsos simul atque illos superiores nos nobis omnes, quoad facultas tulit, proposuimus et ex nostro quoque nonnihil in commune contulimus.
5. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.6, 1.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.6. I observe however that a great deal of talk has been current about the large number of books that I have produced within a short space of time, and that such comment has not been all of one kind; some people have been curious as to the cause of this sudden outburst of philosophical interest on my part, while others have been eager to learn what positive opinions I hold on the various questions. Many also, as I have noticed, are surprised at my choosing to espouse a philosophy that in their view robs the world of daylight and floods it with a darkness as of night; and they wonder at my coming forward so unexpectedly as the champion of a derelict system and one that has long been given up. As a matter of fact however I am no new convert to the study of philosophy. From my earliest youth I have devoted no small amount of time and energy to it, and I pursued it most keenly at the very periods when I least appeared to be doing so, witness the philosophical maxims of which my speeches are full, and my intimacy with the learned men who have always graced my household, as well as those eminent professors, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius, who were my instructors. 1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason.
6. Cicero, On Duties, 1.2, 2.7-2.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. 2.7. Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et eruditis quaerentibus, satisne constanter facere videamur, qui, cum percipi nihil posse dicamus, tamen et aliis de rebus disserere soleamus et hoc ipso tempore praecepta officii persequamur. Quibus vellem satis cognita esset nostra sententia. Non enim sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore nec habeat umquam, quid sequatur. Quae enim esset ista mens vel quae vita potius non modo disputandi, sed etiam vivendi ratione sublata? Nos autem, ut ceteri alia certa, alia incerta esse dicunt, sic ab his dissentientes alia probabilia, contra alia dicimus. 2.8. Quid est igitur, quod me impediat ea, quae probabilia mihi videantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare atque affirmandi arrogantiam vitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapientia dissidet plurimum? Contra autem omnia disputatur a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere non posset, nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio. Sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror, diligenter. Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima nobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris iis simillimo, qui ista praeclara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra finitima vestris ignota esse nolui. Sed iam ad instituta pergamus. 2.7.  But people raise other objections against me â€” and that, too, philosophers and scholars — asking whether I think I am quite consistent in my conduct — for although our school maintains that nothing can be known for certain, yet, they urge, I make a habit of presenting my opinions on all sorts of subjects and at this very moment am trying to formulate rules of duty. But I wish that they had a proper understanding of our position. For we Academicians are not men whose minds wander in uncertainty and never know what principles to adopt. For what sort of mental habit, or rather what sort of life would that be which should dispense with all rules for reasoning or even for living? Not so with us; but, as other schools maintain that some things are certain, others uncertain, we, differing with them, say that some things are probable, others improbable. 2.8.  What, then, is to hinder me from accepting what seems to me to be probable, while rejecting what seems to be improbable, and from shunning the presumption of dogmatism, while keeping clear of that recklessness of assertion which is as far as possible removed from true wisdom? And as to the fact that our school argues against everything, that is only because we could not get a clear view of what is "probable," unless a comparative estimate were made of all the arguments on both sides. But this subject has been, I think, quite fully set forth in my "Academics." And although, my dear Cicero, you are a student of that most ancient and celebrated school of philosophy, with Cratippus as your master — and he deserves to be classed with the founders of that illustrious sect — still I wish our school, which is closely related to yours, not to be unknown to you. Let us now proceed to the task in hand.
7. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5.11. cuius multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo Platonis memoria et litteris consecrata plura genera effecit effecit s efficit X dissentientium philosophorum, e quibus nos id potissimum consecuti consecuti con del. V 2 sumus, quo Socratem usum arbitrabamur, arbitramur V 2 s ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus et in omni disputatione, quid esset simillimum veri, quaereremus. quaeremus G 1 K quem morem moyerem G 2 cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias saepe et nuper in Tusculano, ut ad eam eam ( del. c ) R consuetudinem disputaremus. et quadridui quidem sermonem superioribus ad ad a R missimus G 1 K te perscriptum libris misimus, quinto autem die cum eodem in loco consedissemus, sic est propositum, de quo disputaremus:


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academica (dialogue of cicero) Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 72
academics, the academy Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
academy, new Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 67
academy Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 106
antiochus of ascalon Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
arcesilaus Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 67
aristotle Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 106
assent Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 106
authority Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 106
authority (platos) Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 67
cicero, on judgment and knowledge Ayres and Ward, The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual (2021) 82
cicero, on philosophy Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
cicero, on plato and aristotle Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
cicero Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 224; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
cicero (academic allegiance) Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 67
dialogue-form Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 67
hume, david Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 224
incidental knowledge, concept of Ayres and Ward, The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual (2021) 82
intellectual independence, loyalty to teachers/schools and Ayres and Ward, The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual (2021) 82
intellectual independence Ayres and Ward, The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual (2021) 82
isocrates Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 106
philo of larisa Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
philo of larissa Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 224
plato, cicero on Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
scepticism, academic' Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
sceptics Ayres and Ward, The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual (2021) 82
skepticism, academic Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 224
skepticism Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 106
skeptics, academic Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 67
specific christian intellectuals, intellectual independence in Ayres and Ward, The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual (2021) 82
stoicism Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 224
suspension of assent Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 106
voluntarism, epistemological Bett, How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2019) 224