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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Cicero, Academica, 1.42
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14 results
1. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, Academica, 1.15-1.19, 1.21, 1.23-1.35, 1.38-1.41, 1.46, 2.18, 2.74, 2.77 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: 'Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnibus *d omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et de vitiis omninoque de de 1 om. *d bonis rebus et malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum. 1.16. hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab is qui illum audierunt perscripti varie copioseque que om. px sunt, ita disputat ut nihil affirmet ipse refellat alios, nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, pr. se m ; praestarem p 1 (ceteris in ras. ) quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, putent *dn -ant *g ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se se rem *g arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una hominis omnis *d . cf. Plato apol. 23 A Lact. ira 1, 6 s. epit. 35, 5 sapientia, non arbitrari sese se gf scire quod nesciat. quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tantum tantum Dav. ad Lact. epit. 37 tam *g*d tamen vel tum s in virtute laudanda et in hominibus hom. omnibus *d o. h. s ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris maximeque Platonis intellegi potest. 1.17. Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta constituta *g est Academicorum et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. nam cum Speusippum sororis filium Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, duo duos p 2 p 1 p 2 rg 2 f c autem praestantissimo praestatnissimos mn studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Calchedonium et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele Peripatetici dicti sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, quia quia *g*p qui wn Platonis instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. sed utrique Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitanter dubitanter Bai. -tantem *g -tationem *d (tionem in ras. p ) de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem consuetudine mn ; adh. cons. in. ras. p disserendi reliquerunt. ita facta est, est disserendi *d (diss. in ras. p ) quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 1.18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus ut dixi nominibus una; nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat. abundantia quadam ingenii praestabat, ut mihi quidem mihi uid. quidem *t*d transposuit m c (q. in ras. p ) videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque fugiendarumque om. p partitio. Sed quid ago' inquit aut sumne sanus qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non sus Minervam sus sum n 1 g 1 f (Minerua g 1 ) sum sus p 1 ? ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus Tu vero inquit perge Varro; valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque ista delectant cum Latine dicuntur et isto modo. Quid me inquam putas, qui philosophiam iam professus prof. iam *g sim sim *dn sum *g populo nostro me me om. *d exhibiturum. 1.19. VA. Pergamus igitur inquit, inquit om. *gx 'quoniam placet. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio rat. phil. p 1 triplex, una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum uerum et *d quid falsum quid rectum in oratione pravumve prauumue accedit s quid consentiens consentiens sit Goer. quid repugnet repugnat s -ans s -ans esset Mue. iudicando. Ac primum primam *d illam partem bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum summum illud psmn bonum quo omnia referrentur, referrentur *d*g -ere- *g constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura omn. e nat. Om. *g et animo anima *g et corpore et vita. corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto alia in partibus, valetudinem vires pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem; 1.21. ergo haec animorum; vitae autem (id enim erat tertium) adiuncta esse dicebant quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Iam nam Goer. virtus in in 1 et 2 om. *d animi bonis et in corporis cernitur et et om. *d in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. hominem enim enim om. *d autem Mue. esse censebant quasi partem quandam esse post quandam smn civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana hum. communi IFGronovius observ. 3, 6 quadam societate. ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt; cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut ad tenendum, aut ad agendum *dn om. s tuendum s ut divitias ut opes ut gloriam ut gratiam. Ita tripertita ab his inducitur ratio bonorum 1.24. De cf. Lact. inst. 7,3,1 natura autem (id enim sequebatur) ita dicebant docebant *g ut eam dividerent in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, eaque ea qua Man. ex qua Turn. ex eaque Mue. ea nominativus efficeretur efficerentur *gr 1 aliquid. in eo quod efficeret vim esse censebant, in eo autem quod efficeretur tantum modo tantum modo om. *d materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur. sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant—dabitis habitis *g enim profecto ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum inauditis.' 1.25. Nos vero inquit Atticus; quin etiam Graecis licebit utare cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient. VA. Bene sane facis; sed enitar ut ut in p 1 Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce eiusce *gx modi verbis ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus ut aliis multis consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. qualitates s cf. Mart. Cap. 5, 510 igitur appellavi quas poio/thtas Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum sed philosophorum, atque id in multis; dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica, suis utuntur. et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium; s. cf. fin. 3, 3 nat. deor. 1, 44 frg. inc. K 10 Hier. in Gal. 3, 26 aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. quod si Graeci faciunt qui in his rebus tot iam saecla versantur, quanto id nobis magis m. n. *d n. maius p p smn concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur. 1.26. 'Tu vero' inquam Varro bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, ut effecisti, ut fecisti s uti f- RKl. sed etiam verborum. VA. Audebimus ergo inquit 'novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. erit *gpx est w —earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes aliae ex his ortae. principes sunt unius modi et simplices; ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes. itaque aer (hoc inde ab hoc rursus deest s hoc om. *d quoque utimur enim enim iam Ha. pro Latino) et et 1 om. *d ignis et aqua et terra prima primae s sunt; ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum quae gignuntur e terra. ergo illa initia et ut e Graeco vertam elementa dicuntur; e quibus aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare singulares *gw eorumque quattuor quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles Arist. cf. AKail diss. phil. Vind. 11, 90 quoddam esse rebatur. 1.27. Sed subiectam putant putant x -at *d -abant *g omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque effecta efficat Turn. sint, quae tota omnia accipere possit possit x -sunt *g -sint *dn omnibusque modis mutari mutari s ? Dav. -re *g*d atque ex omni parte eoque eque *g eamque Chr. etiam interire, non in nihilum sed in suas partes, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat. quae autem moveantur omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 1.28. et cum ita moveatur illa vis quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro citroque introque p in utroque w versetur, et materiam ipsam totam totam ipsam *g penitus commutari putant et illa effici quae appellant qualia; e quibus in in del. Dav. omni natura cohaerente cohaerente *gp m x cohercente *d et continuata cum omnibus suis partibus unum unum om. *d effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla pars materiae mat. par *g sit nullumque corpus. Partis autem esse mundi omnia quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna (nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat); 1.29. quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse esse 2 om. *g mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum quae sunt sint Mue. ei subiectae quasi prudentiam providentiam Lb. quandam procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quae pertineant pertinent r 1 wm ad homines; quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter dum interdum p 1, idem et item p m inter *g*d seriem causarum Pl. * * * quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni, non no num p numquam quidem quidem om. *g eandem fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa et et s ? Lb. haec *g*d ac Ha. necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum. fortunam — — quod multa eff. inopinata nobis ... causarum Lact. inst. 3, 29, 3, cf. ibid. 18 (ign. rerum atque caus.) 1.30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus tamen non non om. *g ; tamen non in ras. p esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. mentem volebant rerum esse esse ereum ngf iudicem, solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset (hanc illi i)de/an appellabant, appellabant *gw -labantur m 1 -lant pg iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere). 1.31. sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur nec percipere ullo modo res eas quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quod quod *g quae *d essent aut ita parvae ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae ut nihil umquam unum esset et add. Ha. aut Reid constans, ne idem ne idem Man. eidem *g*d quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. itaque hanc omnem partem artem Non. rerum opinabilem opinabilium Goer. appellabant; itaque ... appellabant Non. p. 148 (opinabile) appellabat Non. ? 1.32. scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus notionibus s ? Lb. mot- *g*d atque rationibus. qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant et has ad omnia de quibus disceptabatur adhibebant; verborum etiam explicatio explicari *g probabatur, probatur *g id est qua de causa quaeque essent esset m p px ita nominata, quam e)tumologi/an appellabant; post argumentis quibusdam quibusdam om. *d et quasi rerum notis ducibus et rer. not. quasi duc. Dav. utebantur ad probandum ad prob. rursus accedit s et ad concludendum id quod explanari volebant. in qua in quo Man. denique Mue. tradebatur omnis dialecticae dialectica w disciplina id est orationis ratione conclusae; conclusa rw huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. 1.33. Haec forma forma om. *d erat illis prima, a Platone tradita; cuius quas acceperim dissupationes dissupationes Bai. disputat- *g*d si vultis exponam.' Nos vero volumus inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam. ATT. Et recte quidem quidem om. *d inquit respondes; praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. VA. “Aristoteles igitur igitur om. *d primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, quas ... erat amplexatus pars codicum Non. p. 470 ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, ferret Ern. vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae; spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 1.34. Nam Strato eius auditor quamquam fuit acri ingenio tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est; qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et in in om. mgf moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo Polemon *g et Crates unaque Crantor Cranto p 2 wg 2 Cratero g 1 Crator *g*d in Academia congregati diligenter ea eis px quae a superioribus acceperant tuebantur. utebantur *d Iam Polemonem audiverant assidue Zeno et Arcesilas. Archesilaus x 1.35. sed Zeno, cum Arcesilam Archesilaum p 1 w anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. eam quoque si videtur correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus.” Mihi vero inquam videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium. VA. 'Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat qui ut Theophrastus nervos neruis p virtutis inciderit, incideret s Lb. -rent n sed contra qui omnia quae que om. s quaecumque Reid ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis idque appellaret honestum quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 1.39. cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem alia in alia Lb. rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur; nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum matrem esse arbitrabatur arb. matr. esse rw immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum ut in ut in ut s ? Asc. uti Bai. quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et et etiam Reid mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet; statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret et mentem atque sensus. discrepabat etiam ab isdem, quod nullo modo arbitrabatur arbitrabantur *g quicquam effici posse ab ea quae expers esset corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 1.40. Plurima autem autem aut m 1 ? n etiam gf in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. in qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos uinctos pf inuictos s esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille fantasi/an, cf. p. 36, 10 Cael. Aur. acut. 3, 13 ( Gell. 19, 1, 15 ) nos visum appellemus appellemus p 2 -amus *g*d licet, et teramus terramus n -anus s teneamus *d hoc quidem verbum, hoc quidem uerbum s h. u. q. *g*d erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone saepius— sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem ascensionem *g adiungit animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. 1.41. visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec? hoc Dav. ' ATT. nos vero inquit; inquam Ald. quonam quoniam ng 1 quam p 1 ; (quo)nam ... sed in ras. p enim alio alio om. *dn modo katalhmpto diceres? — VA. “sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum probatum *g esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur; ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat at, del. Man. ac gf cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re in re iure mw usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter inscientiam nominabat; ex qua existebat existebat Pl. -erat p -eret rw extiterat *g etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla imb. adsensio Pl. et cum falso incognitoque communis. 1.46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur—sed tamen illa quam exposuisti exposuisti Dur. exposui *g*d ; an a Cicerone neglegenter scriptum ? vetus, haec nova nominetur. quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, producta mn (per in ras. p ) qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex is qui illum audierant maximeque ex Epicureo Epicureo ms -ZZZo *g*d Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret unum tamen praeter ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate et to fuit īo facultate et do m 1, īo del. et do ctrina m 2 ; et to om. *dn et co pia dicendi Chr. ” quid autem stomachatur stomachetur Sig. Mnesarchus, quid Antipater digladiatur Non. p. 65 (digladiari) digladiatur F 1 -etur cett. cum Carneade tot voluminibus? *
3. Cicero, On Divination, 2.61 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.61. Quorum omnium causas si a Chrysippo quaeram, ipse ille divinationis auctor numquam illa dicet facta fortuito naturalemque rationem omnium reddet; nihil enim fieri sine causa potest; nec quicquam fit, quod fieri non potest; nec, si id factum est, quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri; nulla igitur portenta sunt. Nam si, quod raro fit, id portentum putandum est, sapientem esse portentum est; saepius enim mulam peperisse arbitror quam sapientem fuisse. Illa igitur ratio concluditur: nec id, quod non potuerit fieri, factum umquam esse, nec, quod potuerit, id portentum esse; 2.61. If I were to ask Chrysippus the causes of all the phenomena just mentioned, that distinguished writer on divination would never say that they happened by chance, but he would find an explanation for each of them in the laws of nature. For he would say: Nothing can happen without a cause; nothing actually happens that cannot happen; if that has happened which could have happened, then it should not be considered a portent; therefore there are no such things as portents. Now if a thing is to be considered a portent because it is seldom seen, then a wise man is a portent; for, as I think, it oftener happens that a mule brings forth a colt than that nature produces a sage. Chrysippus, in this connexion, gives the following syllogism: That which could not have happened never did happen; and that which could have happened is no portent; therefore, in any view, there is no such thing as a portent.
4. Cicero, Lucullus, 146, 98, 105 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 6.12, 8.1-11.1, 8.6, 10.23 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

10.23. All things are lawful for me," but not all things areprofitable. "All things are lawful for me," but not all things buildup.
6. New Testament, Romans, 3.29-3.30 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

3.29. Or is God the God of Jews only? Isn't he the God of Gentiles also? Yes, of Gentiles also 3.30. since indeed there is one God who will justify the circumcised by faith, and the uncircumcised through faith.
7. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 42.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

8. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 28.199.16-28.199.18 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9. Lucian, Philosophies For Sale, 20 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.150-7.153, 7.228-7.229 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.46-7.47, 7.50-7.51 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 7.47. By wariness they mean a strong presumption against what at the moment seems probable, so as not to be taken in by it. Irrefutability is strength in argument so as not to be brought over by it to the opposite side. Earnestness (or absence of frivolity) is a habit of referring presentations to right reason. Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension or as a habit or state which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. Without the study of dialectic, they say, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so as never to fall; for it enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate what is merely plausible and what is ambiguously expressed, and without it he cannot methodically put questions and give answers. 7.50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take impression in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object. 7.51. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man.
12. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 6.8.13, 6.8.16 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

13. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 3.2.3 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

14. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.66, 2.111 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academics Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166
academy, new Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25, 26
academy, old Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
antiochus of ascalon Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25, 26
art, skill, expertise, technique techne, ars, doctrina Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166
assent Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 36
augustine Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25
biography, of zeno Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244
carneades Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166
charmadas Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25
cicero Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244; Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 8; Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244
cicero (academic allegiance) Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25, 26
clitomachus Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166
cognitive procedures, theory Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166
convention, conventionalism Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166
crantor Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
dialogue-form Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
diogenes laertius Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244
doxography Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244
epicureans, authority of epicurus Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244
epistemology, pauls Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138
epistemology, stoic Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138
epistemology, suneidēsis Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138
epistemology Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166; Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25
grasp Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 36
historical sages Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 8
impression phantasia, representation, cataleptic kataleptike Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166
jewish practices/torah observance Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138
laws Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166
moral progress Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 8
peripatetics Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
philo, of larissa Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25, 26
phoenix Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 8
plato, gorgias Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25
plato, phaedrus Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25, 26
posidonius Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
sagehood Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 8
sedley, david Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244
skepticism Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25
speusippus Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
stoic Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 8
stoics, origins of school Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244
stoics Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 8
stoics and stoicism Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 166
style of writing. see stoicism, wisdom., wisdom' Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 36
theophrastus Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
virtue Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 8
xenocrates Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
zeno (of citium) Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
zeno of citium, biography Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244
zeno of citium, founder of stoicism Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244
zeno of citium, writings Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 244