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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Cicero, Academica, 1.17
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1. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, Academica, 1.15-1.16, 1.18-1.19, 1.21, 1.23-1.35, 1.38-1.42, 1.46, 2.7-2.9, 2.74 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: 'Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnibus *d omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et de vitiis omninoque de de 1 om. *d bonis rebus et malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum. 1.16. hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab is qui illum audierunt perscripti varie copioseque que om. px sunt, ita disputat ut nihil affirmet ipse refellat alios, nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, pr. se m ; praestarem p 1 (ceteris in ras. ) quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, putent *dn -ant *g ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se se rem *g arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una hominis omnis *d . cf. Plato apol. 23 A Lact. ira 1, 6 s. epit. 35, 5 sapientia, non arbitrari sese se gf scire quod nesciat. quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tantum tantum Dav. ad Lact. epit. 37 tam *g*d tamen vel tum s in virtute laudanda et in hominibus hom. omnibus *d o. h. s ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris maximeque Platonis intellegi potest. 1.18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus ut dixi nominibus una; nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat. abundantia quadam ingenii praestabat, ut mihi quidem mihi uid. quidem *t*d transposuit m c (q. in ras. p ) videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque fugiendarumque om. p partitio. Sed quid ago' inquit aut sumne sanus qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non sus Minervam sus sum n 1 g 1 f (Minerua g 1 ) sum sus p 1 ? ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus Tu vero inquit perge Varro; valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque ista delectant cum Latine dicuntur et isto modo. Quid me inquam putas, qui philosophiam iam professus prof. iam *g sim sim *dn sum *g populo nostro me me om. *d exhibiturum. 1.19. VA. Pergamus igitur inquit, inquit om. *gx 'quoniam placet. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio rat. phil. p 1 triplex, una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum uerum et *d quid falsum quid rectum in oratione pravumve prauumue accedit s quid consentiens consentiens sit Goer. quid repugnet repugnat s -ans s -ans esset Mue. iudicando. Ac primum primam *d illam partem bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum summum illud psmn bonum quo omnia referrentur, referrentur *d*g -ere- *g constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura omn. e nat. Om. *g et animo anima *g et corpore et vita. corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto alia in partibus, valetudinem vires pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem; 1.21. ergo haec animorum; vitae autem (id enim erat tertium) adiuncta esse dicebant quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Iam nam Goer. virtus in in 1 et 2 om. *d animi bonis et in corporis cernitur et et om. *d in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. hominem enim enim om. *d autem Mue. esse censebant quasi partem quandam esse post quandam smn civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana hum. communi IFGronovius observ. 3, 6 quadam societate. ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt; cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut ad tenendum, aut ad agendum *dn om. s tuendum s ut divitias ut opes ut gloriam ut gratiam. Ita tripertita ab his inducitur ratio bonorum 1.24. De cf. Lact. inst. 7,3,1 natura autem (id enim sequebatur) ita dicebant docebant *g ut eam dividerent in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, eaque ea qua Man. ex qua Turn. ex eaque Mue. ea nominativus efficeretur efficerentur *gr 1 aliquid. in eo quod efficeret vim esse censebant, in eo autem quod efficeretur tantum modo tantum modo om. *d materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur. sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant—dabitis habitis *g enim profecto ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum inauditis.' 1.25. Nos vero inquit Atticus; quin etiam Graecis licebit utare cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient. VA. Bene sane facis; sed enitar ut ut in p 1 Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce eiusce *gx modi verbis ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus ut aliis multis consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. qualitates s cf. Mart. Cap. 5, 510 igitur appellavi quas poio/thtas Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum sed philosophorum, atque id in multis; dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica, suis utuntur. et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium; s. cf. fin. 3, 3 nat. deor. 1, 44 frg. inc. K 10 Hier. in Gal. 3, 26 aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. quod si Graeci faciunt qui in his rebus tot iam saecla versantur, quanto id nobis magis m. n. *d n. maius p p smn concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur. 1.26. 'Tu vero' inquam Varro bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, ut effecisti, ut fecisti s uti f- RKl. sed etiam verborum. VA. Audebimus ergo inquit 'novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. erit *gpx est w —earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes aliae ex his ortae. principes sunt unius modi et simplices; ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes. itaque aer (hoc inde ab hoc rursus deest s hoc om. *d quoque utimur enim enim iam Ha. pro Latino) et et 1 om. *d ignis et aqua et terra prima primae s sunt; ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum quae gignuntur e terra. ergo illa initia et ut e Graeco vertam elementa dicuntur; e quibus aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare singulares *gw eorumque quattuor quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles Arist. cf. AKail diss. phil. Vind. 11, 90 quoddam esse rebatur. 1.27. Sed subiectam putant putant x -at *d -abant *g omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque effecta efficat Turn. sint, quae tota omnia accipere possit possit x -sunt *g -sint *dn omnibusque modis mutari mutari s ? Dav. -re *g*d atque ex omni parte eoque eque *g eamque Chr. etiam interire, non in nihilum sed in suas partes, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat. quae autem moveantur omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 1.28. et cum ita moveatur illa vis quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro citroque introque p in utroque w versetur, et materiam ipsam totam totam ipsam *g penitus commutari putant et illa effici quae appellant qualia; e quibus in in del. Dav. omni natura cohaerente cohaerente *gp m x cohercente *d et continuata cum omnibus suis partibus unum unum om. *d effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla pars materiae mat. par *g sit nullumque corpus. Partis autem esse mundi omnia quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna (nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat); 1.29. quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse esse 2 om. *g mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum quae sunt sint Mue. ei subiectae quasi prudentiam providentiam Lb. quandam procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quae pertineant pertinent r 1 wm ad homines; quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter dum interdum p 1, idem et item p m inter *g*d seriem causarum Pl. * * * quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni, non no num p numquam quidem quidem om. *g eandem fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa et et s ? Lb. haec *g*d ac Ha. necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum. fortunam — — quod multa eff. inopinata nobis ... causarum Lact. inst. 3, 29, 3, cf. ibid. 18 (ign. rerum atque caus.) 1.30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus tamen non non om. *g ; tamen non in ras. p esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. mentem volebant rerum esse esse ereum ngf iudicem, solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset (hanc illi i)de/an appellabant, appellabant *gw -labantur m 1 -lant pg iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere). 1.31. sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur nec percipere ullo modo res eas quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quod quod *g quae *d essent aut ita parvae ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae ut nihil umquam unum esset et add. Ha. aut Reid constans, ne idem ne idem Man. eidem *g*d quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. itaque hanc omnem partem artem Non. rerum opinabilem opinabilium Goer. appellabant; itaque ... appellabant Non. p. 148 (opinabile) appellabat Non. ? 1.32. scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus notionibus s ? Lb. mot- *g*d atque rationibus. qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant et has ad omnia de quibus disceptabatur adhibebant; verborum etiam explicatio explicari *g probabatur, probatur *g id est qua de causa quaeque essent esset m p px ita nominata, quam e)tumologi/an appellabant; post argumentis quibusdam quibusdam om. *d et quasi rerum notis ducibus et rer. not. quasi duc. Dav. utebantur ad probandum ad prob. rursus accedit s et ad concludendum id quod explanari volebant. in qua in quo Man. denique Mue. tradebatur omnis dialecticae dialectica w disciplina id est orationis ratione conclusae; conclusa rw huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. 1.33. Haec forma forma om. *d erat illis prima, a Platone tradita; cuius quas acceperim dissupationes dissupationes Bai. disputat- *g*d si vultis exponam.' Nos vero volumus inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam. ATT. Et recte quidem quidem om. *d inquit respondes; praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. VA. “Aristoteles igitur igitur om. *d primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, quas ... erat amplexatus pars codicum Non. p. 470 ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, ferret Ern. vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae; spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 1.34. Nam Strato eius auditor quamquam fuit acri ingenio tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est; qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et in in om. mgf moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo Polemon *g et Crates unaque Crantor Cranto p 2 wg 2 Cratero g 1 Crator *g*d in Academia congregati diligenter ea eis px quae a superioribus acceperant tuebantur. utebantur *d Iam Polemonem audiverant assidue Zeno et Arcesilas. Archesilaus x 1.35. sed Zeno, cum Arcesilam Archesilaum p 1 w anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. eam quoque si videtur correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus.” Mihi vero inquam videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium. VA. 'Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat qui ut Theophrastus nervos neruis p virtutis inciderit, incideret s Lb. -rent n sed contra qui omnia quae que om. s quaecumque Reid ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis idque appellaret honestum quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 1.39. cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem alia in alia Lb. rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur; nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum matrem esse arbitrabatur arb. matr. esse rw immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum ut in ut in ut s ? Asc. uti Bai. quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et et etiam Reid mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet; statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret et mentem atque sensus. discrepabat etiam ab isdem, quod nullo modo arbitrabatur arbitrabantur *g quicquam effici posse ab ea quae expers esset corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 1.40. Plurima autem autem aut m 1 ? n etiam gf in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. in qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos uinctos pf inuictos s esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille fantasi/an, cf. p. 36, 10 Cael. Aur. acut. 3, 13 ( Gell. 19, 1, 15 ) nos visum appellemus appellemus p 2 -amus *g*d licet, et teramus terramus n -anus s teneamus *d hoc quidem verbum, hoc quidem uerbum s h. u. q. *g*d erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone saepius— sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem ascensionem *g adiungit animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. 1.41. visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec? hoc Dav. ' ATT. nos vero inquit; inquam Ald. quonam quoniam ng 1 quam p 1 ; (quo)nam ... sed in ras. p enim alio alio om. *dn modo katalhmpto diceres? — VA. “sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum probatum *g esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur; ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat at, del. Man. ac gf cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re in re iure mw usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter inscientiam nominabat; ex qua existebat existebat Pl. -erat p -eret rw extiterat *g etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla imb. adsensio Pl. et cum falso incognitoque communis. 1.42. sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam quam dixi collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis paruis *g numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod ut supra dixi comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod quod om. *g, in ras. p omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam eam nat. Man. n. eam Fab. posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur; e quibus non principia solum sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. aperituntur Man. -rirentur Dav. reperirentur Gr. errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam ignorationem s et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmae et constantis assensionis a virtute sapientiaque removebat. Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a superioribus.” 1.46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur—sed tamen illa quam exposuisti exposuisti Dur. exposui *g*d ; an a Cicerone neglegenter scriptum ? vetus, haec nova nominetur. quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, producta mn (per in ras. p ) qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex is qui illum audierant maximeque ex Epicureo Epicureo ms -ZZZo *g*d Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret unum tamen praeter ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate et to fuit īo facultate et do m 1, īo del. et do ctrina m 2 ; et to om. *dn et co pia dicendi Chr. ” quid autem stomachatur stomachetur Sig. Mnesarchus, quid Antipater digladiatur Non. p. 65 (digladiari) digladiatur F 1 -etur cett. cum Carneade tot voluminibus? *
3. Cicero, On Divination, 1.7, 2.8-2.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.7. Sed haec quidem laus Academiae praestantissumi philosophi iudicio et testimonio conprobata est. Etenim nobismet ipsis quaerentibus, quid sit de divinatione iudicandum, quod a Carneade multa acute et copiose contra Stoicos disputata sint, verentibusque, ne temere vel falsae rei vel non satis cognitae adsentiamur, faciendum videtur, ut diligenter etiam atque etiam argumenta cum argumentis comparemus, ut fecimus in iis tribus libris, quos de natura deorum scripsimus. Nam cum omnibus in rebus temeritas in adsentiendo errorque turpis est, tum in eo loco maxime, in quo iudicandum est, quantum auspiciis rebusque divinis religionique tribuamus; est enim periculum, ne aut neglectis iis impia fraude aut susceptis anili superstitione obligemur. 2.8. Nam cum de divinatione Quintus frater ea disseruisset, quae superiore libro scripta sunt, satisque ambulatum videretur, tum in bibliotheca, quae in Lycio est, adsedimus. Atque ego: Adcurate tu quidem, inquam, Quinte, et Stoice Stoicorum sententiam defendisti, quodque me maxime delectat, plurimis nostris exemplis usus es, et iis quidem claris et inlustribus. Dicendum est mihi igitur ad ea, quae sunt a te dicta, sed ita, nihil ut adfirmem, quaeram omnia, dubitans plerumque et mihi ipse diffidens. Si enim aliquid certi haberem, quod dicerem, ego ipse divinarem, qui esse divinationem nego. 2.9. Etenim me movet illud, quod in primis Carneades quaerere solebat, quarumnam rerum divinatio esset, earumne, quae sensibus perciperentur. At eas quidem cernimus, audimus, gustamus, olfacimus, tangimus. Num quid ergo in his rebus est, quod provisione aut permotione mentis magis quam natura ipsa sentiamus? aut num nescio qui ille divinus, si oculis captus sit, ut Tiresias fuit, possit, quae alba sint, quae nigra, dicere aut, si surdus sit, varietates vocum aut modos noscere? Ad nullam igitur earum rerum, quae sensu accipiuntur, divinatio adhibetur. Atqui ne in iis quidem rebus, quae arte tractantur, divinatione opus est. Etenim ad aegros non vates aut hariolos, sed medicos solemus adducere, nec vero, qui fidibus aut tibiis uti volunt, ab haruspicibus accipiunt earum tractationem, sed a musicis. 1.7. At any rate, this praiseworthy tendency of the Academy to doubt has been approved by the solemn judgement of a most eminent philosopher. [4] Accordingly, since I, too, am in doubt as to the proper judgement to be rendered in regard to divination because of the many pointed and exhaustive arguments urged by Carneades against the Stoic view, and since I am afraid of giving a too hasty assent to a proposition which may turn out either false or insufficiently established, I have determined carefully and persistently to compare argument with argument just as I did in my three books On the Nature of the Gods. For a hasty acceptance of an erroneous opinion is discreditable in any case, and especially so in an inquiry as to how much weight should be given to auspices, to sacred rites, and to religious observances; for we run the risk of committing a crime against the gods if we disregard them, or of becoming involved in old womens superstition if we approve them. [5] 1.7. As briefly as I could, I have discussed divination by means of dreams and frenzy, which, as I said, are devoid of art. Both depend on the same reasoning, which is that habitually employed by our friend Cratippus: The human soul is in some degree derived and drawn from a source exterior to itself. Hence we understand that outside the human soul there is a divine soul from which the human soul is sprung. Moreover, that portion of the human soul which is endowed with sensation, motion, and carnal desire is inseparable from bodily influence; while that portion which thinks and reasons is most vigorous when it is most distant from the body. 2.8. After my brother Quintus had delivered his views on divination, as set out in the preceding volume, and we had walked as much as we wished, we took our seats in the library in my Lyceum, and I remarked:Really, my dear Quintus, you have defended the Stoic doctrine with accuracy and like a Stoic. But the thing that delights me most is the fact that you illustrated your argument with many incidents taken from Roman sources — incidents, too, of a distinguished and noble type. I must now reply to what you said, but I must do so with great diffidence and with many misgivings, and in such a way as to affirm nothing and question everything. For if I should assume anything that I said to be certain I should myself be playing the diviner while saying that no such thing as divination exists! 2.8. Then dismiss Romuluss augural staff, which you say the hottest of fires was powerless to burn, and attach slight importance to the whetstone of Attus Navius. Myths would have no place in philosophy. It would have been more in keeping with your rôle as a philosopher to consider, first, the nature of divination generally, second, its origin, and third, its consistency. What, then, is the nature of an art which makes prophets out of birds that wander aimlessly about — now here, now there — and makes the action or inaction of men depend upon the song or flight of birds? and why was the power granted to some birds to give a favourable omen when on the left side and to others when on the right? Again, however, when, and by whom, shall we say that the system was invented? The Etruscans, it is true, find the author of their system in the boy who was ploughed up out of the ground; but whom have we? Attus Navius? But Romulus and Remus, both of whom, by tradition, were augurs, lived many years earlier. Are we to say that it was invented by the Pisidians, Cilicians, or Phrygians? It is your judgement, then, that those devoid of human learning are the authors of a divine science! [39] 2.9. I am impressed with the force of the questions with which Carneades used to begin his discussions: What are the things within the scope of divination? Are they things that are perceived by the senses? But those are things that we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch. Is there, then, in such objects some quality that we can better perceive with the aid of prophecy and inspiration than we can with the aid of the senses alone? And is there any diviner, anywhere, who, if blind, like Tiresias, could tell the difference between white and black? Or, who, if deaf, could distinguish between different voices and different tones? Now you must admit that divination is not applicable in any case where knowledge is gained through the senses.Nor is there any need of divination even in matters within the domain of science and of art. For, when people are sick, we, as a general rule, do not summon a prophet or a seer, but we call in a physician. Again, persons who want to learn to play on the harp or on the flute take lessons, not from a soothsayer, but from a musician. 2.9. What inconceivable madness! For it is not enough to call an opinion foolishness when it is utterly devoid of reason. However, Diogenes the Stoic makes some concessions to the Chaldeans. He says that they have the power of prophecy to the extent of being able to tell the disposition of any child and the calling for which he is best fitted. All their other claims of prophetic powers he absolutely denies. He says, for example, that twins are alike in appearance, but that they generally unlike in career and in fortune. Procles and Eurysthenes, kings of the Lacedaemonians, were twin brothers.
4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.2-2.3, 5.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.2. sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros sophistas, ut e Platone intellegi potest, lusos videmus a Socrate. is enim percontando percontando A 2 percun- tando NV percunctando A 1 BE per cunctando R atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, ea haec R quae ii ii hi BER hii A hij NV respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas archesilas A acesilaos N achesilas V eum revocavit instituitque ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non de se quaererent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent; quod cum dixissent, ille contra. sed eum eum om. RNV qui audiebant, quoad poterant, defendebant sententiam suam. apud ceteros autem philosophos, qui quaesivit aliquid, tacet; quod quidem iam fit etiam etiam om. BER in Academia. ubi enim is, qui audire vult, ita dixit: 'Voluptas mihi videtur esse summum bonum', perpetua oratione contra disputatur, ut facile intellegi possit eos, qui aliquid sibi videri sibi aliquid (aliquit E) videri BE aliquid videri sibi V dicant, non ipsos in ea sententia esse, sed audire velle contraria. Nos commodius agimus. 2.3. non enim solum Torquatus dixit quid sentiret, sed etiam cur. ego autem arbitror, quamquam admodum delectatus sum eius oratione perpetua, tamen commodius, cum in rebus singulis insistas et intellegas quid quisque concedat, quid abnuat, ex rebus concessis concludi quod velis et ad exitum perveniri. cum enim fertur quasi torrens oratio, quamvis multa cuiusque modi rapiat, nihil tamen teneas, nihil apprehendas, reprehendas BE nusquam orationem rapidam cœrceas. Omnis autem in quaerendo, quae via quadam et ratione habetur, oratio praescribere primum debet ut quibusdam in formulis ea res agetur, ut, inter quos disseritur, conveniat quid sit id, de quo disseratur. 5.9. Sic est igitur locutus: Quantus ornatus in Peripateticorum disciplina sit satis est a me, ut brevissime potuit, paulo ante dictum. sed est forma eius disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, triplex: una pars est naturae, naturae edd. natura ( etiam B) disserendi altera, vivendi tertia. Natura sic ab iis investigata est, ut nulla pars caelo, mari, terra, ut poe+tice loquar, praetermissa sit; quin etiam, cum de rerum initiis omnique mundo locuti essent, ut multa non modo probabili argumentatione, sed etiam necessaria mathematicorum ratione concluderent, maximam materiam ex rebus per se investigatis ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attulerunt. 2.2.  But we read how Socrates made fun of the aforesaid Gorgias, and the rest of the Sophists also, as we can learn from Plato. His own way was to question his interlocutors and by a process of cross-examination to elicit their opinions, so that he might express his own views by way of rejoinder to their answers. This practice was abandoned by his successors, but was afterwards revived by Arcesilas, who made it a rule that those who wished to hear him should not ask him questions but should state their own opinions; and when they had done so he argued against them. But whereas the pupils of Arcesilas did their best to defend their own position, with the rest of the philosophers the student who has put a question is then silent; and indeed this is nowadays the custom even in the Academy. The would‑be learner says, for example, 'The Chief Good in my opinion is pleasure,' and the contrary is then maintained in a formal discourse; so that it is not hard to realize that those who say they are of a certain opinion do not actually hold the view they profess, but want to hear what can be argued against it. 2.3.  We are adopting a more profitable mode of procedure, for Torquatus has not only told us his own opinion but also his reasons for holding it. Still, for my part, though I enjoyed his long discourse very much, I believe all the same that it is better to stop at point after point, and make out what each person is willing to admit and what he denies, and then to draw such inferences as one desires from these admissions and so arrive at one's conclusion. When the exposition goes rushing on like a mountain stream in spate, it carries along with it a vast amount of miscellaneous material, but there is nothing one can take hold of or rescue from the flood; there is no point at which one can stem the torrent of oratory. "However, in philosophical investigation a methodical and systematic discourse must always begin by formulating a preamble like that which occurs in certain forms of process at law, 'The issue shall be as follows'; so that the parties to the debate may be agreed as to what the subject is about which they are debating.   5.9.  Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the elements of being and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation.
5. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.6 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.6. I observe however that a great deal of talk has been current about the large number of books that I have produced within a short space of time, and that such comment has not been all of one kind; some people have been curious as to the cause of this sudden outburst of philosophical interest on my part, while others have been eager to learn what positive opinions I hold on the various questions. Many also, as I have noticed, are surprised at my choosing to espouse a philosophy that in their view robs the world of daylight and floods it with a darkness as of night; and they wonder at my coming forward so unexpectedly as the champion of a derelict system and one that has long been given up. As a matter of fact however I am no new convert to the study of philosophy. From my earliest youth I have devoted no small amount of time and energy to it, and I pursued it most keenly at the very periods when I least appeared to be doing so, witness the philosophical maxims of which my speeches are full, and my intimacy with the learned men who have always graced my household, as well as those eminent professors, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius, who were my instructors.
6. Cicero, On Duties, 1.2, 2.7-2.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. 2.7. Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et eruditis quaerentibus, satisne constanter facere videamur, qui, cum percipi nihil posse dicamus, tamen et aliis de rebus disserere soleamus et hoc ipso tempore praecepta officii persequamur. Quibus vellem satis cognita esset nostra sententia. Non enim sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore nec habeat umquam, quid sequatur. Quae enim esset ista mens vel quae vita potius non modo disputandi, sed etiam vivendi ratione sublata? Nos autem, ut ceteri alia certa, alia incerta esse dicunt, sic ab his dissentientes alia probabilia, contra alia dicimus. 2.8. Quid est igitur, quod me impediat ea, quae probabilia mihi videantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare atque affirmandi arrogantiam vitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapientia dissidet plurimum? Contra autem omnia disputatur a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere non posset, nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio. Sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror, diligenter. Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima nobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris iis simillimo, qui ista praeclara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra finitima vestris ignota esse nolui. Sed iam ad instituta pergamus. 2.7.  But people raise other objections against me â€” and that, too, philosophers and scholars — asking whether I think I am quite consistent in my conduct — for although our school maintains that nothing can be known for certain, yet, they urge, I make a habit of presenting my opinions on all sorts of subjects and at this very moment am trying to formulate rules of duty. But I wish that they had a proper understanding of our position. For we Academicians are not men whose minds wander in uncertainty and never know what principles to adopt. For what sort of mental habit, or rather what sort of life would that be which should dispense with all rules for reasoning or even for living? Not so with us; but, as other schools maintain that some things are certain, others uncertain, we, differing with them, say that some things are probable, others improbable. 2.8.  What, then, is to hinder me from accepting what seems to me to be probable, while rejecting what seems to be improbable, and from shunning the presumption of dogmatism, while keeping clear of that recklessness of assertion which is as far as possible removed from true wisdom? And as to the fact that our school argues against everything, that is only because we could not get a clear view of what is "probable," unless a comparative estimate were made of all the arguments on both sides. But this subject has been, I think, quite fully set forth in my "Academics." And although, my dear Cicero, you are a student of that most ancient and celebrated school of philosophy, with Cratippus as your master — and he deserves to be classed with the founders of that illustrious sect — still I wish our school, which is closely related to yours, not to be unknown to you. Let us now proceed to the task in hand.
7. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.240 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.240. ut vidit hominem, "suspenso" inquit "animo et occupato Crassum tibi respondisse video," deinde ipsum Crassum manu prehendit et "heus tu," inquit "quid tibi in mentem venit ita respondere?" Tum ille fidenter homo peritissimus confirmare ita se rem habere, ut respondisset, nec dubium esse posse; Galba autem adludens varie et copiose multas similitudines adferre multaque pro aequitate contra ius dicere; atque illum, cum disserendo par esse non posset— quamquam fuit Crassus in numero disertorum, sed par Galbae nullo modo—ad auctores confugisse et id, quod ipse diceret, et in P. Muci fratris sui libris et in Sex. Aeli commentariis scriptum protulisse ac tamen concessisse Galbae disputationem sibi probabilem et prope veram videri.
8. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5.11. cuius multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo Platonis memoria et litteris consecrata plura genera effecit effecit s efficit X dissentientium philosophorum, e quibus nos id potissimum consecuti consecuti con del. V 2 sumus, quo Socratem usum arbitrabamur, arbitramur V 2 s ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus et in omni disputatione, quid esset simillimum veri, quaereremus. quaeremus G 1 K quem morem moyerem G 2 cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias saepe et nuper in Tusculano, ut ad eam eam ( del. c ) R consuetudinem disputaremus. et quadridui quidem sermonem superioribus ad ad a R missimus G 1 K te perscriptum libris misimus, quinto autem die cum eodem in loco consedissemus, sic est propositum, de quo disputaremus:


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academic philosophy, attitude towards auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 2, 268
academics, the academy Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
academics Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
academy, new Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25, 26
academy, old Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
academy Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 88
antiochus Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 268; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 268
antiochus of ascalon Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 88; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288; Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168; Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25, 26
aristotle, aristotelian Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
auctor Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 2
auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 2, 268
augustine Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25
authority Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 88
charmadas Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25
cicero, on philosophy Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
cicero, on plato and aristotle Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
cicero Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 2, 268; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288; Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 2, 268
cicero (academic allegiance) Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25, 26
clarity perspicuitas Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
crantor Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
dialogue-form Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
epistemology Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25
ethics Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
etymology, etymological Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
linguistic naturalism Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
logic Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
old academy Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 268
peripatetics Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168; Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 2, 268
peripatos Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 268
philo, of larissa Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25, 26
philo of larisa Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
philosophy, philosophical Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
plato, cicero on Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
plato, gorgias Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25
plato, phaedrus Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25, 26
plato Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 88; Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
posidonius Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
rhetoric Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 88
scepticism, academic' Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 288
skepticism Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 25
speusippus Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
stoics and stoicism Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
system Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 88
theophrastus Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 268
varro Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 168
xenocrates Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26
zeno (of citium) Tarrant et al, Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity (2018) 26