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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Calcidius (Chalcidius), Platonis Timaeus Commentaria, 220
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17 results
1. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 1.7.33 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

2. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

184c. SOC. The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your answer, in so far as it is incorrect. Just consider; which answer is more correct, that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears that by which or that through which we hear? THEAET. I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each case.
3. Cicero, On Invention, 2.21 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.21. et hoc eum magno opere consi- derare oportebit, non quid in veritate modo, verum etiam vehementius, quid in opinione eius, quem arguet, fuerit. nihil enim refert non fuisse aut non esse aliquid commodi aut incommodi, si ostendi potest ei visum esse, qui arguatur. nam opinio dupliciter fallit ho- mines, cum aut res alio modo est, ac putatur, aut non is eventus est, quem arbitrati sunt. res alio modo est tum, cum aut id, quod bonum est, malum putant, aut contra, quod malum est, bonum, aut, quod nec malum est nec bonum, malum aut bonum, aut, quod malum aut bonum est, nec malum nec bonum.
4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.22, 2.30-2.32, 2.57 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.22. 'Nothing devoid of sensation can have a part of itself that is sentient; but the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world is not devoid of sensation.' He also proceeds to press the argument more closely: 'Nothing,' he says, 'that is iimate and irrational can give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.' Furthermore he proved his argument by means of one of his favourite comparisons, as follows: 'If flutes playing musical tunes grew on an olive-tree, surely you would not question that the olive-tree possessed some knowledge of the art of flute-playing; or if plane-trees bore well-tuned lutes, doubtless you would likewise infer that the plane-trees possessed the art of music; why then should we not judge the world to be animate and endowed with wisdom, when it produces animate and wise offspring? 2.30. Now we observe that the parts of the world (and nothing exists in all the world which is not a part of the whole world) possess sensation and reason. Therefore it follows that that part which contains the ruling principle of the world must necessarily possess sensation and reason, and these in a more intense and higher form. Hence it follows that the world possesses wisdom, and that the element which holds all things in its embrace is pre‑eminently and perfectly rational, and therefore that the world is god, and all the forces of the world are held together by the divine nature. "Moreover that glowing heat of the world is far purer and more brilliant and far more mobile, and therefore more stimulating to the senses, than this warmth of ours by which the things that we know are preserved and vitalized. 2.31. As therefore man and the animals are possessed by this warmth and owe to this their motion and sensation, it is absurd to say that the world is devoid of sensation, considering that it is possessed by an intense heat that is stainless, free and purpose, and also penetrating and mobile in the extreme; especially as this intense world-heat does not derive its motion from the operation of some other force from outside, but is self-moved and spontaneous in its activity: for how can there be anything more powerful than the world, to impart motion and activity in the warmth by which the world is held together? 2.32. For let us hear Plato, that divine philosopher, for so almost he is to be deemed. He holds that motion is of two sorts, one spontaneous, the other derived from without; and that that which moves of itself spontaneously is more divine than that which has motion imparted to it by some force not its own. The former kind of motion he deems to reside only in the soul, which he considers to be the only source and origin of motion. Hence, since all motion springs from the world-heat, and since that heat moves spontaneously and not by any impulse from something else, it follows that that heat is soul; which proves that the world is an animate being. "Another proof that the world possesses intelligence is supplied by the fact that the world is unquestionably better than any of its elements; for even as there is no part of our body that is not of less value than we are ourselves, so the whole universe must needs be of higher worth than any portion of the universe; and if this be so, it follows that the world must be endowed with wisdom, for, if it were not, man, although a part of the world, being possessed of reason would necessarily be of higher worth than the world as a whole. 2.57. I therefore believe that I shall not be wrong if in discussing this subject I take my first principle from the prince of seekers after truth, Zeno himself. Now Zeno gives this definition of nature: 'nature (he says) is a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to the work of generation.' For he holds that the special function of an art or craft is to create and generate, and that what in the processes of our arts is done by the hand is done with far more skilful craftsmanship by nature, that is, as I said, by that 'craftsmanlike' fire which is the teacher of the other arts. And on this theory, while each department of nature is 'craftsmanlike,' in the sense of having a method or path marked out for it to follow
5. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 4.12 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

6. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 82.10, 83.9, 117.13, 121.12-121.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

7. Aelius Aristides, Sacred Tales, 1.7.33 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 2.5.69-2.5.70, 3.1.10-3.1.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9. Galen, On The Usefulness of Respiration, 4.502 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

10. Hierocles Stoicus, , 4.38-4.53 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 9.76, 9.102 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

12. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.91, 2.70 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

13. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.161-7.163, 7.228-7.231, 7.372, 8.400 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

14. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.109-2.110, 7.50-7.51, 7.57, 7.63, 7.110, 7.138, 7.142-7.143, 7.147, 7.163 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.109. Eubulides kept up a controversy with Aristotle and said much to discredit him.Among other members the school of Eubulides included Alexinus of Elis, a man very fond of controversy, for which reason he was called Elenxinus. In particular he kept up a controversy with Zeno. Hermippus says of him that he left Elis and removed to Olympia, where he studied philosophy. His pupils inquired why he took up his abode here, and were told that it was his intention to found a school which should be called the Olympian school. But as their provisions ran short and they found the place unhealthy, they left it, and for the rest of his days Alexinus lived in solitude with a single servant. And some time afterwards, as he was swimming in the Alpheus, the point of a reed ran into him, and of this injury he died. 2.110. I have composed the following lines upon him:It was not then a vain tale that once an unfortunate man, while diving, pierced his foot somehow with a nail; since that great man Alexinus, before he could cross the Alpheus, was pricked by a reed and met his death.He has written not only a reply to Zeno but other works, including one against Ephorus the historian.To the school of Eubulides also belonged Euphantus of Olynthus, who wrote a history of his own times. He was besides a poet and wrote several tragedies, with which he made a great reputation at the festivals. He taught King Antigonus and dedicated to him a work On Kingship which was very popular. He died of old age. 7.50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take impression in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object. 7.51. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man. 7.57. Seven of the letters are vowels, a, e, ē i, o, u, ō, and six are mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. There is a difference between voice and speech; because, while voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement, because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example βλίτυρι, may be unintelligible – which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse. 7.63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries. 7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure. 7.138. Again, they give the name of cosmos to the orderly arrangement of the heavenly bodies in itself as such; and (3) in the third place to that whole of which these two are parts. Again, the cosmos is defined as the individual being qualifying the whole of substance, or, in the words of Posidonius in his elementary treatise on Celestial Phenomena, a system made up of heaven and earth and the natures in them, or, again, as a system constituted by gods and men and all things created for their sake. By heaven is meant the extreme circumference or ring in which the deity has his seat.The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence: so says Chrysippus in the fifth book of his treatise On Providence and Posidonius in his work On the Gods, book iii. – inasmuch as reason pervades every part of it, just as does the soul in us. Only there is a difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less. 7.142. The world, they hold, comes into being when its substance has first been converted from fire through air into moisture and then the coarser part of the moisture has condensed as earth, while that whose particles are fine has been turned into air, and this process of rarefaction goes on increasing till it generates fire. Thereupon out of these elements animals and plants and all other natural kinds are formed by their mixture. The generation and the destruction of the world are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, by Posidonius in the first book of his work On the Cosmos, by Cleanthes, and by Antipater in his tenth book On the Cosmos. Panaetius, however, maintained that the world is indestructible.The doctrine that the world is a living being, rational, animate and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius. 7.143. It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world, ergo the world is a living being. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it. Boethus, however, denies that the world is a living thing. The unity of the world is maintained by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius in the first book of his Physical Discourse. By the totality of things, the All, is meant, according to Apollodorus, (1) the world, and in another sense (2) the system composed of the world and the void outside it. The world then is finite, the void infinite. 7.147. The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil, taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes. 7.163. When some Academic alleged that he had no certainty of anything, Ariston said, Do you not even see your neighbour sitting by you? and when the other answered No, he rejoined,Who can have blinded you? who robbed you of luminous eyesight?The books attributed to him are as follows:Exhortations, two books.of Zeno's Doctrines.Dialogues.Lectures, six books.Dissertations on Philosophy, seven books.Dissertations on Love.Commonplaces on Vainglory.Notebooks, twenty-five volumes.Memorabilia, three books.Anecdotes, eleven books.Against the Rhetoricians.An Answer to the Counter-pleas of Alexinus.Against the Dialecticians, three books.Letters to Cleanthes, four books.Panaetius and Sosicrates consider the Letters to be alone genuine; all the other works named they attribute to Ariston the Peripatetic.
15. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 15.20.2 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

16. Origen, On First Principles, 3.1.3 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.1.3. But since a rational animal not only has within itself these natural movements, but has moreover, to a greater extent than other animals, the power of reason, by which it can judge and determine regarding natural movements, and disapprove and reject some, while approving and adopting others, so by the judgment of this reason may the movements of men be governed and directed towards a commendable life. And from this it follows that, since the nature of this reason which is in man has within itself the power of distinguishing between good and evil, and while distinguishing possesses the faculty of selecting what it has approved, it may justly be deemed worthy of praise in choosing what is good, and deserving of censure in following that which is base or wicked. This indeed must by no means escape our notice, that in some dumb animals there is found a more regular movement than in others, as in hunting-dogs or war-horses, so that they may appear to some to be moved by a kind of rational sense. But we must believe this to be the result not so much of reason as of some natural instinct, largely bestowed for purposes of that kind. Now, as we had begun to remark, seeing that such is the nature of a rational animal, some things may happen to us human beings from without; and these, coming in contact with our sense of sight, or hearing, or any other of our senses, may incite and arouse us to good movements, or the contrary; and seeing they come to us from an external source, it is not within our own power to prevent their coming. But to determine and approve what use we ought to make of those things which thus happen, is the duty of no other than of that reason within us, i.e., of our own judgment; by the decision of which reason we use the incitement, which comes to us from without for that purpose, which reason approves, our natural movements being determined by its authority either to good actions or the reverse. 3.1.3. The rational animal, however, has, in addition to its phantasial nature, also reason, which judges the phantasies, and disapproves of some and accepts others, in order that the animal may be led according to them. Therefore, since there are in the nature of reason aids towards the contemplation of virtue and vice, by following which, after beholding good and evil, we select the one and avoid the other, we are deserving of praise when we give ourselves to the practice of virtue, and censurable when we do the reverse. We must not, however, be ignorant that the greater part of the nature assigned to all things is a varying quantity among animals, both in a greater and a less degree; so that the instinct in hunting-dogs and in war-horses approaches somehow, so to speak, to the faculty of reason. Now, to fall under some one of those external causes which stir up within us this phantasy or that, is confessedly not one of those things that are dependent upon ourselves; but to determine that we shall use the occurrence in this way or differently, is the prerogative of nothing else than of the reason within us, which, as occasion offers, arouses us towards efforts inciting to what is virtuous and becoming, or turns us aside to what is the reverse.
17. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.111, 1.120, 1.135, 1.137-1.138, 1.229, 2.774, 2.1027



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
alexinus, his parallel argument against zeno Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
analogy Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115
animal Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115
animals, impressions of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
animals, in wise person Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
aristo Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
aristotle, on impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
beliefs, terms for Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
brain, in ancient physiology Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
chrysippus, on directive faculty Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 22, 226
chrysippus, treatises of, on the psyche Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
chrysippus Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115, 140
cleanthes, on impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
consciousness Frey and Levison, The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2014) 41
cosmic soul/world soul, proofs of cosmic soul Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 140
diogenes laertius Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
diogenes of seleucia (also, of babylon) Frey and Levison, The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2014) 41
directive faculty Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 22
father/offspring argument Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 140
fire, fiery, stoic fire (πῦρ τεχνικόν) Frey and Levison, The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2014) 41
god, stoic Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115
heart, as location of psyche Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 22
heart Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115
heraclitus Frey and Levison, The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2014) 41
hierocles, editions of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
homer Frey and Levison, The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2014) 41
hēgemonikon/central organ of soul, etc. Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115, 140
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
inspiration, stoic Frey and Levison, The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2014) 41
intellect, intelligence Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115
knowledge, vs. opinion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
lekton Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
matter, stoic Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115
medical writers, greek, influence on stoics Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
medical writers, greek, limited knowledge of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 22
mind, relation to body Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
mind Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 22
nature Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 140
parallel argument, formulated by alexinus against zeno Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
part of a whole (soul as, etc.) Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 140
parts of soul, stoic Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115
perception Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 22
plato, on mind and spirit Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
pneuma (spiritus) Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115
posidonius Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115
powers (of the soul) Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 140
praxagoras of cos Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
propositions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
psyche, self-perception Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
psyche Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 22
related fabulously about, of the stoics' Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
related fabulously about, of zeno Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
respiration Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 22
sayable (lekton) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
scholarship, qumran Frey and Levison, The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2014) 41
seeds (seminal reasons) Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 140
self-perception Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
sensation motion Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 115
sextus empiricus Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
spirit, characterizations as, fire Frey and Levison, The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2014) 41
stoicism/stoic; Frey and Levison, The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2014) 41
wax seals Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
wisdom (sophia), parallelled by alexinus Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
wisdom (sophia), sagehood of Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
wise person, epistemic condition Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 226
zeno of citium Inwood and Warren, Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy (2020) 140